Rationalism and relativism: an essay on john rawls and michael oakeshott

⁹ Note the similarity be Rawls' definition of “reasonable” here, and Oakeshott's definition of “rationality” or “rational conduct”:.

The fact that Rawls' principles are, in their final analyses, relative to the liberal-democratic tradition should come as no surprise. In A Theory of Justice Rawls tells us that the central ideas and aims of his theory of justice are designed for constitutional democracies (Rawls, 1999a, p. XI), and in Political Liberalism he goes on to say that the content of his conception “is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls, 1993, p. 13). What is more, in A Theory of Justice Rawls acknowledges that there are “many variations of the initial situation” and that the conditions and principles he espouses are contingent (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 109, 506). As a final point, Rawls' Political Liberalism goes so far as to downplay the role of the original position and the uniquely determinate principle of justice that it entails; and instead appears to embrace a “family” of liberal theories of justice that are relative to and fully endorse the liberal ideas of the person and of society (Rawls, 1993, p. XLVIII).

With that in mind, we are now in a position to return to the Rawlsian's second objection to Oake- shott: namely, that the Oakeshottian critique misrepresented the overall ground upon which Rawls' theory rests. Here the Rawlsian will no doubt invoke Rawls' claim that the constraints and conditions in the original position - and therefore the principles adopted therein - are constraints or conditions that we as citizens of a liberal society traditionally accept. At this point we can imagine the Rawlsian's counter as running something like this: if the principles of justice are based on a fair procedure, and if a fair procedure is something that we as citizens of a liberal democracy traditionally accept, then the principles of justice are something we citizens traditionally accept. Although perhaps trivial, what this short little argument teaches us is that both the grounds for accepting and the strength of Rawls' principles of justice lay, not in some hypothetical or otherworldly agreement that Oakeshott could criticize, but rather in the fact that they cohere with concrete values deeply rooted in Western tradition itself.

6. Oakeshott's Rejoinder:

In response to the Rawlsian's objection that Rawls himself cannot engage in the “practice” or “`activity” of the Rationalist if the “practice” or “activity” of the Rationalist is itself impossible, Oake- shott would no doubt make a distinction between “Rational conduct”, Oakeshott says, “is acting in such a way that the coherence of the idiom of activity to which the conduct belongs is preserved and possible enhanced” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 122).

the theory of rational conduct and that the Rationalist espouses and the actual conduct of the Rationalist herself. In fact, Oakeshott tells us that what he has been criticizing all along is not the actual practice or activity of the Rationalist, but the theory or form of “practice” and “activity” that the Rationalist recommends (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 108). Of course, there then seems to be little reason to doubt that, when speaking of the “practice” and “activity” of the Rationalist, Oakeshott was well aware of its impossibility. And the point of Oakeshott's exercise appears to have been to elucidate an erroneous theory and illustrate the dangers - disillusion, dizziness, failure, falsity, the inability to act, self-destruction, social decay and social destruction, etc - of attempting to adhere to it in everyday life. In Oakeshott's words, “the practical danger of an erroneous theory is not that it may persuade people to act in an undesirable manner, but that it may confuse activity by putting it on a false scent” (Oakeshott, 1991, pp. 108-109).

Concerning the Rawlsian's second objection to Oakeshott's critique: in no way could Oakeshott agree more. Although Oakeshott's aim in Rationalism and Politics was to clarify and criticize the erroneous theory of action that the Rationalist and Rawls' A Theory of Justice invoke, Oakeshott would most certainly agree that the foundation and strength of Rawls' principles of justice rest, not in the fact that they were allegedly established in a hypothetical original position, but in the fact that they are principles that emerge from and cohere with (and bring coherence to) ideas deeply rooted in the Western tradition itself. In short, Rawls' political project turns out to be nothing more than a complex, and at times highly abstract, (Oakeshottian) pursuit of intimations.

7. The Place of Political Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind:

Having shown that the strength of Rawls' theory and his two principles of justice rest on Oakeshot- tian terms, I would like to conclude this essay by alluding to an important difference between the two thinkers: namely, the place each assigns to political philosophy in what Oakeshott calls “the conversation of mankind”.

Oakeshott imagines that all “the diverse idioms of utterance which make up current human intercourse have some meeting-place and compose a manifold of some sort. And, as [he] understands it, the image of this meeting place is not an inquiry or an argument, but a conversation” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 489). In this conversation, Oakeshott tells us that each idiom has a voice, that all idioms are welcome, and that no particular idiom is authoritative (Oake- shott, 1991, p. 490). Yet given the inclusiveness of such a conversation, the place Oakeshott assigns philosophy is surprising. “Philosophy”, Oakeshott says, “must be counted as a parasitic activity; it springs from the conversation, but it makes no contribution to it” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 491). In less poetic terms, Oakeshott continues with this theme by suggesting that, “political philosophy cannot be expected to increase our ability to distinguish between good and bad political projects; it has no power to guide or to direct us in the enterprise of pursuing the intimations of our tradition” (Oake- shott, 1991, p. 65). At best, political theory removes “some of the crookedness from our thinking and leads to a more economical use of concepts”, and this, Oakeshott says, “is an activity neither to be overrated nor despised” (Oakeshott, 1991, p. 16).

In contrast, Rawls paints a brighter picture of the role political philosophy plays in the human world. As was noted earlier, in A Theory of Justice Rawls' recommends that the two principles of justice serve as a standard for appraising social institutions and the aspirations they generate (Rawls, 1999a, p. 456). Political Liberalism tells us that we ought to look to political philosophy for answers when our shared political understanding breaks down (Rawls, 1993, p. 44). And finally, Rawls suggests that “no political conception of justice can have weight with us unless it helped to put in order our considered convictions of justice at all levels of generality, from the most general to the most particular” (Rawls, 1993, p. 45).

Through these passages we see that Oakeshott and Rawls certainly disagree on the place of political philosophy in the whole of human experience. Yet given that each claims political philosophy to emerge from and operate within particular political traditions, the question becomes: “What are we to make of these apparent differences?” Although I envision Oakeshott charging Rawls with one last attempt to provide political activity with a speculative master, I think it best that we view Rawls' work as another voice in the conversation and another contribution to a long and rich tradition of political thought.

rationalism belief reason perfection political affairs conversation rawls oakeshott

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Вендланд А. Дж.

РАЦІОНАЛІЗМ ТА РЕЛЯТИВІЗМ: ЕСЕЙ ПРО ДЖОНА РОУЛЗА ТА МАЙКЛА ОУКШОТТА

У цій статті змодельовано уявну розмову між двома мислителями ХХ століття: Джоном Роулзом і Майклом Оукшоттом. Розмова є «уявною», оскільки, окрім кількох невеличких зауважень, що можна знайти у їхній спадщині, жоден з них напряму не звертався до іншого. Стаття починається з аналізу Оукшоттового образу «раціоналіста» та відповідної традиції в історії політичної думки. Зокрема, у статті показано, що раціоналізм у політиці передбачає переконання, що розум є непохибним провідником у політичній діяльності і що раціоналіст прагне визначеності та досконалості в політичних справах. Далі у статті висвітлено раціоналістичні тенденції в «Теорії справедливості» Роулза, а також проаналізовано Оукшоттову критику раціоналізму, яку застосовано й до Роулза. Якщо стисло, Оукшотт розрізняє технічне та практичне знання і стверджує, що принципи, з яких складаються технічні керівництва на кшталт «Теоріїсправедливості», є спрощенням і не замінюють розуміння, яке ми отримуємо через власний практичний досвід та участь у певній політичній традиції. Пояснюючи Оукшоттову критику раціоналізму та позиції Роулза, автор статті демонструє наявність елементів релятивізму у ставленні першого до політичних практик і традицій, а через це - формулює заперечення проти Оукшотта, які міг би висунути прихильник Роулза. В цьому контексті проаналізовано схильність Роулза до ліберальної традиції та релятивності, що імпліцитно присутня у його поясненні «рефлексивноїрівноваги» та «розумності», а також зауважено схожість Роулза з Оукшоттом. Зрештою, у цій статті стверджується, що сила Роулзової позиції полягає не в тому, що сформульовані ним принципи справедливості встановлюються раціональними агентами у вихідній позиції, а в тому, що вони є принципами, які породжені й співзвучні з ідеями, що глибоко вкорінені у самій західній традиції.

Ключові слова: раціоналізм, релятивізм, теорія, практика, свобода, рівність, традиція, Джон Роулз, Майкл Оукшотт.

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