Why they fail? Explanation of abortive military coups d’état in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2012

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

Размещено на http://www.allbest.ru/

Thesis

Why they fail? Explanation of abortive military coups d'йtat in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2012

Soboleva Anastasiia Victorovna

Introduction

A quick glance at the phenomenon of military takeover produces a lot to review. Generally speaking, coup d'йtat as a type of unconstitutional change of government has an impressive worldwide picture: it has affected 94 countries, having yielded 457 coup attempts overall in 1950-2010. Although the global frequency of the phenomenon is found to be declining, by no means has it ceased to haunt some places. Namely, Africa represents such a site. Military coups d'йtat, which the paper focuses on specifically, have exhibited quite unprecedented scores since its independence. According to K. Harkness, there have been more than 215 attempts in 43 countries, with almost half of them successful. And as stated earlier, the thing is that today's military coup is prerogatively an African disease. Since the mid-1980s, the phenomenon has somewhat relieved other parts of the world - Latin America, the Caribbean, the MENA and Asia - while lingering on in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).^, Currently, the latter experiences highest degrees of the army's role in politics at the global scale, whether through direct military rule or through influence of armed forces on civilian regimes. The situation in the continent is so conspicuous that it draws spirited attention of the EU as well as of the African Union.^,

From the data presented it gets clear that abortive attempts comprise over a half of cases. An interesting fact indeed: though background conditions may show variance, the cases share an outcome upon which personnel fails to assume power. The first «solution» coming to mind is to find common aspects that would engender a specific aftermath. This is exactly what existing research has done: more often statistically, literature uncovers relevant factors which usher in either a triumphant or abortive attempt. However, such accounts seem inadequate to explicate the question of why coups fail. Thus, we want to look beyond the present explanations and elucidate the logic of actors involved in regime-military relations - the military itself and the government. The presumption is that the interweaving behaviours of each actor give rise to the situation when a coup becomes highly exposed to fiasco. The research question therefore is: under which scenarios do military coups in SSA states collapse from 1960 to 2012?

(While referring to «military» - we will also consider coups perpetrated by related security services. The assumption is that the rationale of these forces is generally akin to the army's one.)

So far, investigation of military intervention and African coups in particular have been captivating for a plentitude of scholars. Thus, the economic explanation serves as a handy tool for probing into regime-challenging actions. Being members of the winning coalition, coup-plotters desire to maximize accrued private goods as well as the probability of long-run retention in elite. Thus incumbents become notably vulnerable in the times of revenue failures, when potential plotters cannot be co-opted effectively. The periods of economic busts, not to say about weak economies altogether, therefore do account for the increase in coup risk. The situation gets worse if the economy is export-dependent: then external market fluctuations afflict substantially the feasibility of status-quo. Along these lines, internal instability looms large whenever it is a poor country economically based on the export of primary goods - a common picture of an archetypal sub-Saharan state. Foreign development aid largely characterizing African economies has also an adverse effect, being a means with which rulers pay up to their militaries. The latter raise coup risk once they detect available resources, such that the governments appease «extortion» by re-directing aid money to military expenditures.

The intuitive logic, induced from the evident concentration of coups in Africa, is that the military could be especially prone to assume power in poor and stagnant countries. It is exactly the case according to the research by P. Collier and A. Hoeffler. They argue that prime factors exposing regimes to downfall are akin to those inciting civil war, i.e. low per capita income and slow economic growth. It can be glossed in different terms - from elites' rapacity for scarce resources, arduous to obtain but through administering the state, to the government's inability to ward off.

While economic issues indubitably matter, they sometimes act more as a trigger than an underlying cause. So it is asserted that coup risk should be understood structurally: it may gradually accumulate, depending on three background features - regime legitimacy, the strength of civil society and the past history of coups. These features, closely associated with the political system, tend to be necessary for some event to usher in a takeover. In this way, for example, entrenched economic backwardness impairing both the people and the regime is distinct from sporadic economic/political crises, insufficient to prompt seizures alone. Couched in these terms, the risk of a coup should be remarkable in the SSA states. The robustness of civil society is typically slight, given the region's low incomes, underdevelopment of human resources and ensuing poverty.^, While political legitimacy (even the one gained only with time) matters for troops' loyalty, coup traps - i.e. the propensity of attempts to bunch up temporarily - strongly impact on future intervention cases in the world and Africa specifically. Beside that, political instability (strikes, regime crises, etc.) and varied in kind violence (purges, repressions, civil wars) can account for military subversion too.

Regime type is deemed a critical determinant of coup instances, although interpretations given by authors may differ. On the one hand, democracies are considered liable to fewer coups because of greater civilian control and popular legitimacy. Notably, while willingness to interfere may indeed subside, the chances of success actually increase as the government becomes less oppressive. On the other hand, army interference is proven to beset exactly [collegial] military regimes, given their propensity for prompting countercoups. There is also some literature claiming that the most susceptible type is neither full-fledged democracy nor dictatorship, but anocracy. Being situated between the two extremes, they tend to possess the hazards of both, and not the strengths. In view of all this, African states can provide a fruitful field for research owing to their long history of military rule as well as current anocratic trends.

Ethnicity-based argument is also very pertinent to African countries, which are usually diverse in ethnic composition. As argued, dominance of one ethnicity can contribute to the risk of a military ouster: it creates the situation when the leader and her winning coalition are most likely of the same descent, so that coalition members' fidelity wanes as the size of the ethnic group increases. Plotters thus aspire to secure own position through choosing a reliable successor or sometimes trying to take office by themselves. From a different perspective, the ruler is at risk if an ethnically skewed army has its institutional interests endangered, unguaranteed or discriminated - i.e., most probably, troops do not share the incumbent's origin. Then capturing power to advance own privileges and protect against another ethnic group's ascendancy seems to be an optimal solution. Moreover, the analysis on African data shows that conspiracies can be made not only by ethnic militaries at large, but by any individual members of a distinct [from the ruler] dissent.^,

Overall, mal-governance, instability, violence as well as human agency are apt to spark off subversion by the military, which is clearly discernible in African countries. Those roots are manifold, and, crucially, they are firmly embedded in the socio-economic and political context of SSA states.

Yet, there is an important aspect missed from proper scrutiny. This is exactly failed coups. Though figures vary throughout works, the fact remains that unsuccessful bids comprise over a half of all instances. It seems to be a high score if bearing in mind that the background against which the stories unfold is diverse across and within countries. Here we want to look beyond the present explanation of failed attempts, which does not elucidate the logic of actors involved in regime-military relations - the military and political elites. The question «why» is not just about revealing factors that contribute to some result. Rather, it is about scenarios of regime-military relationship and their impact on coup outcome. The interweaving behaviours of each actor thus give rise to the situation when a conspiracy gets highly exposed to fiasco.

To elaborate on the issue, it is reasonable to get deeper insight into the relations between the government and the military. In particular, the principal mechanism addressed here is coup-proofing, which rulers utilize to stop their armies from interfering in politics. Having become quite popular recently, this theory can offer much for understanding coup dynamics. Our expectation here is that the structure and actions of troops determine coup-proofing strategies chosen by the government, which in return condition civil-military relations and personnel's response. (In this study, however, we do not cover the situation when attempts become absent. That is, we focus specifically on staged conspiracies and probability of their success/failure.) The goal therefore is to comprehend the process of coup failure in sub-Saharan Africa by grasping the logic of coup-proofing: what rationale conditions the government's choice and how this choice effects takeover proceeding.

The answer to the research question is relevant not only for academia, but for affected states themselves. Indeed, social significance of the study gets evident when we perceive ramifications of military coups d'йtat, especially for underdeveloped countries as in sub-Saharan Africa. Once the coup has succeeded, it ushers in a spell of authoritarian military rule, which can be either «military regime», collegial governance by a group of officers, or «military strongman» rule approaching genuine personalist dictatorship. Besides that, hardly have men in uniform proved to be good at curing economic illnesses. Whether such regimes preserve economic status quo or disrupt it utterly, they are usually corrupt and aim at personal-collective enrichment. All coup activity by itself - be it plots, abortive attempts or victorious undertakings - negatively affects the economy: together they markedly hamper economic growth, whereas victorious coups also inhibit the transformation of growth into human development. The consequences are found to be detrimental if the overthrown government was democratic.

Though another issue, the prospects of democratization, has seen no consensus among scholars so far - the overall portrait of military rule is rather bleak. It seems that coups and military rule are unpromising for societies aiming at development, be it social, political or economic. For SSA states, the assertion looks even more serious as the region lags behind the rest of the developing world. (Still, one reservation is needed here: in the 20th century's Africa, the political, economic or military situation sometimes became so desperate that army intervention was deemed a kind of the nation's redemption. See Chapter 1.2.)

The paper will proceed according to the following tasks: 1) review literature on the theory of civil-military relations, specifying the latter for the African context as well as accounting for reasons driving soldiers to intervene in politics there; 2) compose a theoretical framework reflecting the endogenous relationship between the military's behaviour and coup-proofing chosen by the government, inferring hypotheses about its influence on coup outcome; 3) perform operationalization and indicate a testing model; 4) check hypotheses on sub-Saharan Africa data over the years 1960-2012. The method utilized is logistic regression analysis, suitable to work with spatial panel data where a variable tested is binary.

1. Literature Review

Who will guard the guardians? This Latin phrase opens the essay by P. Feaver with the speaking name «Civil-military relations». Indeed, the issue reflected in the question has been daunting since the times when first regular armies appeared. The answer intensely highlighted by scholars suggests that civilian government must reign supreme. At this point, the whole concept of civilian control arises, with the ensuing broad deliberation on how to achieve it. To begin with, what is the civil-military relationship about?

The work that is till now deemed as founding in the sphere is S. Huntington's «The soldier and the state». For Huntington, the most desired state of affairs can be described with a word «balance»: the balance between military vis-а-vis non-military groups is necessary in order to maximize security at the lowest cost of other social values. Once any of the parts begins to distort equilibrium - the consequences for nations are squandered resources and uncalculated risks. To view the symptoms of malfunction, we should look at the distribution of the two imperatives shaping the military institution, which are functional and societal ones. The disbalance between them is equally undesirable at both sides, since it implies either weak defence of society or disregard for principles held by civilians. Through revealing this trade-off in an optimal power distribution, the author actually ushers us to the seminal praetorian dilemma, picked up by the next generations of scientists. The dilemma refers to the question of where is an optimum on the effectiveness-obedience continuum.

Huntington regards obedience as the main virtue of the soldier, and nothing secures troops' subordination better than civilian control. The latter represents a core argument of the book. The author distinguishes between objective and subjective control, claiming that only the first can render military men disengaged from politics. Exercising objective control means that civilian government occupies the top of the hierarchy, while its powers vis-а-vis officer corps are maximized. At the same time, however, it does not encroach upon the management of violence, which is the prime responsibility of the military institution. Being concentrated on their own sphere, troops acquire high professionalism and herewith hone institutional ideals of political neutrality. Given that, the effect of objective civilian control is directly opposite to what subjective control yields - politicized, ineffective armed forces. Because then subordination and security needs are assumed to be in essential conflict, subjectively controlled soldiers either threaten intervention under rising (external/internal) danger or show profound loyalty with concurrent lack of expertise, being subjugated to politicians' interests.

In addition, the scholar discusses the relationship of the officer corps to civil authority, namely possible distribution of power between them as well as various in its origin influence which can be exerted by army personnel. On the whole, the civil-military relations in a particular country are said to match any of the five patterns, depending upon compatibility of a leading ideology in society and troops' internal ethics.^,

Yet, the seminal theory proposed by Huntington is not free of deficiencies. From one perspective, the criticism can be related to its wording. It seems that a suggested rigid dichotomy in civilian control (objective-subjective), though allowing for model parsimoniousness, may still neglect other feasible types. It would also be fair to say that objective control, advocated by the author, constitutes an ideal type applicable specifically to developed countries. Indeed, Huntington used mainly the US military as an example, which makes the theory rather Westernized and not fully operational in other settings.^, One more thing is that the scholar (whether intentionally or not) discards the notion of the officer corps acting consistently with self-interest: in particular, it leaves out the internal dynamics of the bureaucratic entity able to produce policy drift.

From another perspective, the book's main argument on the effect of military professionalism has aroused critique with time. The question is whether strict delineation of the two domains can indeed render troops subject to civilians. The answer given by Huntington is positive due to his very specific definition of professionalism, which deems the army as self-centered, confined to own technical tasks and committed to military ideals. As S. Finer contends, professionalization does not provide an ultimate solution since even such armies did intervene in politics throughout the history. What matters therefore is the adoption of the norm of civil supremacy. Until this principle gets entrenched, enhanced professionalism and effectiveness may actually work the other way round, encouraging interference rather than preventing it. (For instance, E. Bellin in her study of the MENA region departs from Huntington's professionalization, instead introducing the term «institutionalization». The idea is to avoid imparting the sense of depoliticization laid in the former, since even professionalized and merit-based Arab militaries may still lack political sterility.)

Given that «The soldier and the state» is the earliest step to understand civil-military relations, it appears to be not very exhaustive and systemic. Further research has suggested a more comprehensive framework commonly applied today. The new focus specifies the two crucial characteristics in securing control over the corps - its capacity and willingness to oust the government. They represent seminal determinants of whether intervention will take place and whether it will succeed. Drawing on the importance of coordination for mounting a coup, C. Welch supposes that technical specialization may decrease troops' ability to organize, without hindering the capacity to defend against external threat. Still, resulting organizational complexity cannot totally prevent a coup if there is a desire on the part of armed forces to increase political power. The motivation of the corps has thus appeared as a vital element to be examined. Likewise, Finer rejects the notion that civilian supremacy is explicitly endorsed on the other side: rather, the exercise of control depends upon the response of soldiers, i.e. their disposition. Evoking H. Lasswell's «garrison state» with its emphasis on power of security elites, the scholar highlights significance of general motivation since the ethic of obedience is not «natural» for the army and is not incorporated in professionalism (contrary to what Huntington claims).

Another key distinction concerns varied ways of achieving civilian control. Welch distinguishes between two Strategies - one directed at the military institution and the other concentrating on civil authority. The latter strengthens the position of the government by playing on its popular legitimacy, as the army starts to perceive seizure and exercise of power unsustainable in the long run. However, this Strategy fits only those societies where civilian institutions reap enough public support; in developing countries, as Welch says, Strategy 1 is more pertinent. The unsound economies, persistent social cleavages, fragile political institutions as well as ambitious militaries left by decolonization make it more effective to abstain from legitimacy claims, addressing instead the armed forces themselves. (Ideally, however, both Strategies must be deployed simultaneously.) Finer suggests the similar thesis, adding also the critical dimension of political culture: in settings with advanced political culture and resulting strong attachment to institutions, the need for legitimacy obstructs misbehaviour of corps. The higher the level of a political system's maturity, the more unattainable legitimacy is for military rulers, coupled by their technical incapacity to administer.

Moreover, the authors recognize the difference between disengagement and neutrality of personnel in relation to politics, which is again linked to the amount of public approval the controllers can accrue. When there is a chronic legitimacy crisis, the government becomes highly reliant on the army's support and by this provokes the danger of being overthrown. Unlike political systems with strong civilian institutions, where militaries are neutral and the absence of interference is conditioned by the nature of society - those countries feature rather influential corps not intervening primarily because of current disinterest to do this, i.e. change in own mentality. Hence, it is the state of the military's «disengagement from active politics» that causes a coup not to occur. The Third World in particular is regarded as a common site for such disengaged armies.

Owing to the expansion in the object's scope, the need for greater attention to the different degree of army interference has become evident. (Huntington's book does not heed that much due to its primary focus on advanced societies.) Thus, the one part of the continuum is characterized by «military involvement» that comprises influence on politicians, present even under highest levels of civilian control, and military participation, which is more intensive than influence and can grow into «blackmailing». The second part sees civilian control superseded by that of troops; now it is not the scope which increases first but the means of intrusion. The milder type of «military intervention» refers to the displacement of civilian government when the army governs by building inclusive partnerships. The terminal stage is unilateral military control, meaning that civilian regime becomes completely supplemented.

Although the world has been observing a decline in the total number of coups, it does not mean that the civil-military problematique has become extinct. Even if the ways of intervention are not so manifest on average, there is still neither perfect convergence of preferences, upon which any tensions cease to exist, nor their absolute divergence when military coup or dissolution of the army takes place.^, The praetorian dilemma therefore endlessly daunts the mind of authorities: how can the corps remain obedient to the political leadership, staying nonetheless effective? Indeed, «the two central desiderata-to have protection by the military and to have protection from the military-are in tension because efforts to assure one side complicate efforts to assure the other». Relentlessly guarding itself either from external threat or from internal overthrow, the society eventually gets vulnerable to strengthened troops or to outside aggressors. This logic dates back to Huntington who suggested that the contradiction exists unless objective civilian control is adopted. Since that time, the notion of civilian supremacy has been staying the main purpose of various control techniques, which, ideally, must not impinge on military effectiveness. What are those control mechanisms?

The first way corresponds to Welch's Strategy 2 dealing with empowerment of the controllers themselves. It implies measures of buttressing legitimacy and enhancing military expertise in the government. However, as was said, such reforms can be workable in a narrow list of countries where authorities are rather promising in terms of popularity and effectiveness. The second way comprises means aimed primarily at the military institution, which target two aspects of a feasible plot - personnel's capacity and willingness to perpetrate it. Strictly speaking, both represent coup-proofing strategies which affect behaviour of the armed forces in a particular manner. Hindering ability refers to a miscellany of structural techniques obstructing conspirators' coordination. Structural coup-proofing is actually widely deployed regardless of the regime type, being advocated by some scholars as most productive. Yet, exactly these efforts can be implicated in worsening the army's battlefield performance, which necessitates another approach that would mitigate the praetorian dilemma.

The alternative option regards motivation of troops as a foremost characteristic to be addressed. This tradition is more long-established for it has had proponents in the face of Huntington as well as his critics, Janowitz (1960), Finer (1962) and Welch (1976) in particular. Speaking generally, it is all about rendering corps unwilling to subvert the government, either through instilling «professionalism», or «the cult of obedience», or «the norm of civilian control». (In this sense, the word «rendering» bears significance because the armed forces alone are not yet committed to civilian rule - instead, they require the state's actions to keep them out of politics.) There are two techniques to obtain it: come up with the selection criteria that staff the army only with members predisposed to obey, and create the incentives which make military personnel prefer to obey, notwithstanding their nature. While the former denotes exploitation of some inherent societal attributes, such as ethnicity or religion - the latter, though sometimes less reliable, seems to be more elaborated and broadly applicable (e.g., financial coup-proofing and monitoring). In Feaver's words, the optimal combination of controls abating the civil-military problematique «minimizes the incentives and opportunity for the agent to flout the principal's wishes, at the least cost to the principal and while preserving the efficiencies of specialization that come with delegation».

(However, the important note should be made: though the classical interpretation of civil-military relations is the relationship between men in uniform and non-military authorities - in this work we build on another tradition and regard «civil» as any political leadership (even in uniform) which performs broad executive functions. We therefore use terms «regime-military» and «civil-military» interchangeably.)

1.2 Civil-military relations in Africa

Despite the present decline in scholarly attention towards direct army involvement (as opposed to other manifestations of civil-military relations), this work focuses specifically on coups d'йtat and causes behind their failures. Here, the African continent can provide an exemplary outlook on such anti-government activities, which are shown to be predominantly a concern of developing countries.

Although full-fledged military institutions in Africa have colonial origins, in fact, early state-like entities were not short of security functions. Those native armed forces were tailored to the needs of an indigenous population, just as alike bodies in any society. With the advent of the Europeans, administration of subject territories required not only civil service establishment, but also formation of the colonial armies. The latter basically ensured metropoles' defence and international image, together with its vital stakes in the continent. From the earliest stages of colonization, the economic dimension played a crucial role for the onset of local militarized structures. The slave trade necessitated armed guards - typically composed of natives - who would catch men and women for their subsequent enslavement. This purely economic rationale was further amplified by the growing considerations of internal security closer to the end of the 19^th century. In the background of nascent political and labour ferment, European powers felt the need to enhance own authority as well as to protect new-settlers through creation of specialized frontier troops, such as the Royal West African Frontier Force or the King's African Rifles.^, Being aimed at dealing with internal unrest (except for the times of the two world wars), African colonial armies «were little more than a reasonably well-organized and military-based gendarmerie».

The composition of military forces was hence quite clearly divided between the top brass and lower ranks. As a rule, the command comprised European personnel whereas the rank and file consisted of local recruits. The latter originated primarily from rural areas where potential soldiers were less likely to espouse nationalist or radical stance. The present minority of native-born officers usually belonged to the most socially mobile and educated ethnic groups and tribes which colonial authorities regarded as the «martial races». Besides, the enlistment in the service was often eschewed owing to the widespread inimical image colonial forces had acquired among the people, coupled by the risk of retaliation from local insurgent movements.

Undoubtedly, the deployment of Africans overseas during the two world wars brought about a new generation of military men - those having obtained remarkable knowledge, skills and overall life experience. As it happened elsewhere, the veteran organisations began to exert influence on domestic politics: they often encouraged the struggle for independence, promoting nationalist ideas and thus causing serious disquiet to colonial governors. Interweaving with other historical developments, this internal factor contributed to the rapid advancement of decolonization in the 1950s. Granting independence implied conversion of imperial forces into nationally-based armies, which rested fully on the shoulders of Europeans given that almost no former colony had fostered indigenous (meaning nationalist-oriented) defence structures. Thus, «the military transfer of power» presupposed disengagement of imperial powers and institution-building at newly born states.

Building national military institutions started prior to independence and carried on after that. One of its principle elements was Africanisation of the officer corps, which, however, went rather slowly until the fully autonomous nationalist leadership got a vested interest in the reformation. Such pace was conditioned by the entrenched selection practices that favoured experienced and reliable soldiers from the ranks, therefore leaving little chance for native-born candidates who usually did not fit metropolitan training standards. This fact not just retarded the troops re-composition, it hindered the very progress in postcolonial armies' operation. Not less important aspect, which doubtlessly had certain repercussions, was localisation of imperial forces, i.e. the ascription of resident units to local territorial jurisdictions. Being purposed to establish separate defence systems, the process primarily considered the existing administrative and financial relationships, but not personnel's race or ethnicity. Finally, institution-building involved the issue of further military development that implied adaptation of inherited structures to the national needs and, critically, the goal of reaching defence self-sufficiency. Still, either objective required mobilisation of diverse resources typically unavailable at home, which by itself hampered the advance of colonial disengagement.

Although the policies undertaken more or less smoothed the process of transition, it stayed nonetheless the same that African countries were left with forces hardly reflecting anything «national». Inherited armies necessitated the amplified indigenous enlargement as well as the creation of institutions that would shift military affairs from manual control to the bureaucratic procedure. With that, the dependence on former metropoles endured to a different degree as the matters of finance, training, cadres, logistics and (of course) weaponry still demanded participation of Europeans. For example, it was not until 1961 in Ghana (independent since 1957) and 1964 in Tanzania (independent since 1961) that the last British officers were dismissed by the African governments.

Having become sovereigns of new states, the local civil authorities perceived it essential to groom the military for own purposes, which increasingly translated into its politicization. The latter gained particular importance if noting the fact that security issues confronted by armed forces in Africa have been predominantly of internal nature. Such colonial legacy, when the army has generally not exceeded the functions laid upon its foundation, has surely affected evolution of civil-military relations. By opting for subjective control and depriving troops of autonomy to make them serve political interests, post-independence leaders sowed seeds of own demise which began to sprout in the near future.

Yet before Africa saw the relentless second face of its military, there was the time when states laid open to the whims of newly-elected politicians. Though they were commonly the same people struggling against colonialism, their strengthening regimes seemed to strip the population of the freedom granted with independence. In truth, it was quite widespread among the native intellectuals to compare the plight of ordinary Africans with that of Blacks under Apartheid; and the former was claimed to be much more worse. Racist discrimination in South Africa paled against the tyranny which «had lost its way and was running wild», permeating the life of «liberated» people. As scholar D. Austin notes, «in the 1960's and `70's violence divided Nigeria and the Sudan, Mali, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Burundi by civil war not between settler and colonized peoples, but between African governments and rebel citizens, and between one Nigerian community and another. Violence also divided governments from people, and the black jailer was no less cruel than the white prison warder.» Indeed, post-independence officials treated Black compatriots not better then Whites had done at the times of slavery. In a personal diary, Kenyan Ngugi wa Thiong'o recollects the days of his political detention under the Kenyatta regime (1963-1978), decrying government actions as ones «turning Kenyans into slaves». Other African regimes could not be exempt from such accusation.

As it occurs with immature political systems, postcolonial Africa witnessed the rise of omnipotent rulers who managed to take advantage of the «cold start». The Fathers of the Nation often became manifest dictators, whose way to do business was not softer than that of the imperial counterparts. To curb political opposition and deter prospective one, authorities deployed treasonable felony acts, political detentions, and other repressive measures. Public hanging and firing squads execution of convicted dissenters was also not an uncommon thing. The technique of internal exile was applied to rebellion agitators as well as powerful locals, most conspicuous in Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Angola. With time elections lost their democratic essence, being largely unfair and hence unable to bring about transfer of power. However, even when genuine electoral procedure was allowed to take place, change of government could hardly provide consolation for citizens. New coming politicians from the opposition frequently ushered in even more authoritarian governance, which turned overall African politics into a vicious circle of dictatorship.

Political oppression was not a single source of distress as it would go hand in hand with socioeconomic hardships. The deepening chasm between a small elite cohort and the rest of society, as well as intensifying ethnicity-related questions, indicated the regime's unwillingness to tackle them or its incapacity to do that, or both. Gambia and Liberia exemplified this pattern aptly: either was overrun with socioeconomic troubles, either featured opulence of the establishment and privileged groups amidst apparent poverty, and either ended up with military conspiracies - the successful 1980 coup in Liberia and the failed 1994 attempt in Gambia.

Thus, the first generation of black leadership in Africa can by no means called democratic, or at least benevolent, towards the public. It undertook various measures to perpetuate own incumbency, from rigging elections to deterring opponents via repression. Occupying government seats for decades, the rulers sometimes succeeded in retaining power until death, as it happened with Kenya's Kenyatta, Liberia's Tubman, Guinea's Toure, and, to some degree, Malawi's Banda. Yet in other cases, such as Ghana and Zambia, they often had to flee the country because of being politically defeated or ousted in a takeover. Indeed, such political behaviour should sooner or later induce a response from the oppressed side. This response can be made through either legal or illegal means, depending on the prospect of successful leader removal. In post-independence Africa, ballot box voting typically proved ineffective since it was directly controlled by the regime. Another alternative, deemed a single option left, came to be outright subversion that in most instances appeared as military coup d'йtat.

So, why was the army a central actor to assume that role? In fact, this is not unique to Africa. Postcolonial armed forces became the special symbol of sovereignty, being thought indispensable for subsequent national integration. Besides traditional functions of defence, the military was associated with major state priorities such as infrastructure-building, education and overall development. Furthermore, the institution's remarkable status was enhanced by the popular attribution to it of rationalist nature far greater than other institutions possessed. Given such a position in society, African armed forces can actually challenge Finer's argument that the army reneges on toppling civilians because of own inability to administer. In Africa of the 20th century, one of the main justifications for the military to intervene was exactly its desire to save the nation from ineffective or/and tyrannical authorities. Indeed, subversion of dictatorship which could not be displaced otherwise, with further permission of free elections, is reckoned to be the most evident contribution to democracy that African armies could make. As Economist points out, «the instinct to support democrats and condemn military coups is correct, yet it is worth remembering that not all elected leaders are democrats and not all generals are villains. It is regrettable that the army should be the instrument of change <…>, but the departure of the government <…> may well bring an improvement to the country's fortunes».

Though, what usually followed a takeover is another thing. The expectations and real outcomes rarely coincided, which truly might reflect one well-known axiom: when any elite seizes power, its corporate wellbeing is the prime to be ensured. Aside from that, the presumption about the corps' commitment to rationality and other classical institutional values should be applied with particular caution to the Third World setting. In result, military coups displacing African black rulers turned into «a method of change that changes little», attaining chiefly a reshuffle of resources among the elites.^,

1.3 African coups: why do soldiers intervene?

Distribution of coups on the African continent is rather patchy. There are places like Ghana or Uganda numbering 11 and 13 attempts respectively, while in other parts the score of interventions equals zero, as in Botswana and Malawi. Logically, such a variance signifies that some armed forces have had clear-cut reasons and an opportunity for ouster compared to different militaries possessing no such grounds or being deliberately constrained in their disobedience. It thus seems important to examine the army itself, its rationale and behaviour in different circumstances, rather than merely the effect of structural factors on coup occurrence. (Notably, we consider all the cases - those where armed forces topple civilians and those where they unseat military governments. The assumption is that both types of authority can exert a similar influence on troops' actions.)

As mentioned above, coup d'йtat was deemed an act of last resort able to relieve the deteriorating political and socio-economic situation of newly-independent countries. For the first time then the military came to the scene, making a precedent which would be difficult to eradicate afterwards. It appeared as a noble objective on the part of conspirators: to liberate the nation from the unpopular dictator culpable of current systemic illnesses. In truth, coup attempts arose not necessarily due to institutional or personal factors - they might fairly result from «both perceived and real» dissatisfaction with the existing regime. Such scenario could be observed in Ghana in 1966, when the officer corps, named the National Liberation Council, overthrew the CPP government of first indigenous ruler K. Nkrumah. The perpetrators veritably believed that by ousting the leader they were rescuing Ghana from authoritarianism. The 1980 coup in Liberia toppled the regime of two succeeding Presidents, W. Tubman (1944-1971) and W. Tolbert (1971-1980), and with this the long-standing rule of the True Whig Party. Both takeovers remarkably appealed to citizens given their ever-increasing distress under those leaderships. Another example is the foiled Ghanaian coup of 1967 which was mounted by one Lieutenant Arthur holding that the junta in power had cheated on Ghanaians, that it turned out to be not better than the autocracy it had removed, while its members permeated the state with corruption.

Yet, frustration with ongoing nation's hardship was usually not the only reason. As a matter of fact, above-listed tendencies perturbing African societies did not spare regime elites too. Dictatorships often hurt officers via purges, whereas corruption and mismanagement of resources - human, material, or natural - had a (real or potential) negative effect on the military's interests. Hence, the substantial part of motivation should be viewed particularly through the prism of institutional considerations.

It is broadly accepted in academia that for a professional soldier, the survival and efficacy of own institution are the things of outmost importance. Such properties as cohesiveness and discipline, autonomy from civilian interference, sufficient budget and adequate supply, as well as preeminence over other parallel security forces, represent common desiderata for the men in uniform. It therefore is not surprising that corporate grievances constituted a principal rationale to act against officials in Africa too. The same 1966 Ghanaian coup actually reflected much discontent about the adverse impact of Nkrumah's policies on the army itself. The latter was fed up with various devisive schemes, favouritism to politically loyal and dismissing of competent personnel, threats regarding deployment in high-risk foreign operations, exacerbated by cuts in services and amenities compared to the paramilitary. In a year, Lieutenant Arthur also cited his professional grievances as a reason to displace the military government. He was especially disappointed about unfair advancement of allies as well as stacked promotion exams, which deprived younger officers of any chance to move up.

Even more sensitive issue is seen in formation of ethnically skewed elite groups. Indeed, enlistment in African security forces has proven to be so biased toward leaders' ethnicity that it gets hard to consider the institution as abating ethnic rivalry. This scenario lies along K. Harkness' thesis on the danger of exclusion from power-holding due to a potentially aroused coup situation.^, (Though, it does not mean that political inclusion eliminates such risk.) In Ghana again, one of the prominent factors for the overthrow of the new democratic government in 1972 was manifest purges against the Ewe and Ga ethnic groups. Both had ascended to power during the preceding military rule, which put them at odds with the Akans dominating the introduced cabinet. Similarly, the 1966 Nigerian coup was led by representatives of the southern Igbo people being then, equally at the military and civilian level, largely disgruntled with the policies of the northerners-controlled government. In Cameroon in 1984, members of the elite Republican Guard who were co-ethnics with former incumbent A. Ahidjo staged a coup after newly elected President P. Biya had ordered to transfer those soldiers to other (less prestigious) units. The rebellion was suppressed by loyal troops following four days of confrontation, with the consequent purge of dissenters and disbanding of the Guard.

Though corporate grievances doubtlessly matter, they commonly emerge not in the vacuum but rather involving the personal factor of a conspirator. Be it career aspirations, desire for enrichment, fears of or grudge against opponents, these reasons are supposed to have a non-negligible impact on coup occurrence. The ouster of CAR President D. Dacko in 1965 - while happening at the background of harsh corruption, economic downturn and political instability - was also driven by personal ambitions of the main organizer, Colonel Bokassa. His rivalry with the Chief of Police had been substantially conditioned by Dacko's bid to balance them out, which eventually turned against the latter. The mentioned 1967 Ghanaian coup provides an excellent example when a perpetrator strives for personal glory withal: as Lt. Arthur confessed, «Not in the history of military coups have I heard that a lieutenant had staged one.»

The destiny of failed attempts is not to be envied, since punishment incurred sometimes amounts to death. Still, what is the next strategy once an endeavour has succeeded? From the onset, much depends on the dynamics within a military government right after power seizure, when rule is typically unstructured, lacking strict hierarchy and routine processes. In this (quite chaotic) context, it gets clear whether new leadership will continue in the form of a junta, where collegial decision-making predominates - or there will be a transition to strongman rule that arises from conflict and bargaining within a junta; here the dictator must commit himself to share spoils and influence with other members in exchange for their commitment not to oust him. A junta is a very precarious regime type: it is not resistant to external shocks, such as economic crises, which can produce split within the corps, kindle public discontent and thus engender counter-coups. The best option it therefore may choose is to step down before unexpected problems damage the army's cohesiveness and reputation. Indeed, new leaders in uniform should give way to elected authorities as soon as possible, otherwise coup trap looms large.

Instead, rising strongmen - who are veritably potential personalist dictators - become able to entrench own power and avoid early democratic negotiations. The first path then is to adhere to the military style of governance, while trying to broaden support among the corps. Yet, this strategy is frequently abandoned because the ruler's trust in subordinate officers wanes proportionally to authority acquired. The alternative lies in diluting dependence on the winning coalition through garnering civilian-based support, e.g., the establishment of a popular party. Such technique allows to manipulate rivalling factions of the alliance, so that they get marginalized from decision-making of the incipient dictator. Afterwards, the latter may completely shift to the civilian mode and legitimize himself via running in elections. If the strongman persists in relying solely on inferior military men, it will most likely bring repercussions for the prospects of long-term survival. As demonstrated, in the absence of sufficient public approval the leader is rendered vulnerable to ouster by uprisings and insurgencies. In other words, legitimization of some sort appears to be necessary for prolonged stay in office.

African examples also corroborate this pattern of civilianization, which can proceed at different stages and to different degrees. Flight Lt. J. Rawlings, who came into Ghanaian politics with the 1979 counter-coup, assumed leadership of the country for the following 20 years. (Though Rawlings ceded power to elected authorities right after the takeover, he nonetheless finally replaced them in the second coup of 1981.) Remaining in khaki till 1992, the ruler then initiated competitive elections upon which he proved own popularity by winning presidency and being re-elected in 4 years. The similar scenario took place in Benin, where «coup-mania» and ensuing instability of all kind had made citizens welcome the resolute coup by Major M. Kerekou in 1972. He retained power throughout consequent 19 years, heading besides the revolutionary party PRPB, and was thereafter elected in the 1996 presidential election (following a 5-year break). Neighbouring Togo witnessed a rise of a strongman in the wake of the 1967 coup, when its leader Lt. Col. G. Eyadema proclaimed himself a president and governed the state harshly until 2005. Being faced with mass protests in 1991, Eyadema consented to national elections that allegedly confirmed his and his party's, the RPT, support. (Though, in truth, elections results were more specious than reflecting reality.) Other cases include coup-born rulers in Mali in 1968, Niger in 1974, Liberia in 1980, as well as Nigeria in 1985, Guinea in 1984, Mauritania in 1984, and Burkina Faso in 1987 - who ultimately managed to secure own position instead of, e.g., the Zaire Republic's President Mobutu Sese Seko, Uganda's Idi Amin, or Mali's Modibo Keita.