Why they fail? Explanation of abortive military coups d’état in sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–2012

-1.353***

-1.342***

-1.495***

-1.441***

-1.521***

-1.465***

-1.587***

-1.498***

(0.476)

(0.478)

(0.540)

(0.542)

(0.540)

(0.542)

(0.536)

(0.533)

GDP pc change

-3.379

-3.558

-3.050

-3.052

-2.990

-2.994

-4.088*

-4.027*

(2.186)

(2.199)

(2.298)

(2.304)

(2.270)

(2.276)

(2.391)

(2.383)

Cold War

1.210**

1.206**

1.277**

1.286**

1.217**

1.222**

1.536**

1.597**

(0.555)

(0.555)

(0.593)

(0.593)

(0.598)

(0.597)

(0.624)

(0.624)

From middle

0.933**

0.896**

1.096**

1.108**

1.161**

1.173**

0.816*

0.787*

(0.444)

(0.444)

(0.468)

(0.465)

(0.472)

(0.469)

(0.466)

(0.461)

From top

2.355***

2.337***

2.470***

2.489***

2.540***

2.562***

2.504***

2.458***

(0.550)

(0.550)

(0.615)

(0.616)

(0.615)

(0.617)

(0.582)

(0.578)

Expenditure per soldier: cumulative ethnic threat

0.431

0.436*

(0.263)

(0.263)

Ruling party: cumulative a: low a

2.147**

2.264**

2.174**

2.303**

(1.037)

(1.047)

(1.039)

(1.045)

Change in expenditure: a

0.202*

0.203*

(0.119)

(0.118)

Ruling party: b: low ethnic threat

3.799*

(2.189)

Ruling party: b_t-1: low ethnic threat

4.739*

(2.850)

Constant

3.820

3.930

5.349

5.355

5.435

5.427

2.127

2.338

(3.197)

(3.219)

(3.467)

(3.469)

(3.430)

(3.433)

(3.480)

(3.440)

Observations

172

172

172

172

172

172

172

172

Log Likelihood

-90.089

-89.400

-86.238

-85.435

-85.704

-84.894

-89.977

-91.146

Akaike Inf. Crit.

222.177

220.800

222.475

220.871

221.408

219.787

239.955

242.292

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Only significant variables are presented. For the full table - see Appendix

Since no more combinations possess significance, we now additionally test all the models of this section (i.e. 8 models) without because the variable could produce unnecessary upshots. The output is presented in Table 3. Besides the ethnic stacking variable noted previously, which withal saves all attributes, there are some new interactions contributing to what has been discussed. Thus, the number of effective organizations is sustained at the 0.1 level in the term encompassing and both prerequisites and . This finding goes along the prior interpretation of counterbalancing conditioned by the amount of preceding success. Critically, here the predictor is accompanied by two other moderators from Hypothesis 2, which renders that combination important for demonstration of the theory. (In other models of the second section Effective Number is insignificant, albeit it saves the negative coefficient.)

Further, the coup-proofing technique most frequently relevant is military spending as a GDP percentage mentioned in the first part of analysis. Though previously we have made a caveat on its validity within full Strategy 2, as can be seen now it gains 10% significance in 5 out of 8 models, being one of two such terms where both and are present. Speaking generally, with not alarming [and , in some cases] upon an overthrow, an introduced leadership is likely to want the potent army to settle down via providing [long-run] economic incentives. Yet, a positive coefficient points out that the more economic privileges are conferred on the institution, the more its interests override these of a government owing to buttressed capacity. Here the predictor performs similarly also in combination with , which has been conceived as a key element of Hypothesis 2. The logic therefore applies to overall success observed both upon the moment of ascent as well as after a last staged conspiracy. This finding, however, opposes the existing account by Collier and Hoeffler (2007) who uncover that this coup-proofing tool actually reduces the risk of removal. The discrepancy might be explained by specificities of our theory and models involving many interactions. Besides, when tested individually (see Table 1 in Appendix), the variable is ascribed a negative [insignificant] coefficient. Therefore, an inference on the impact of an expenditure share in GDP as prescribed by the output should be made with caution.

Table 3. Regression Results

	Dependent variable:
	Successful coup
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ethnic stacking	-2.469*	-2.556*	-0.866	-0.678	-0.843	-0.639	-2.299	-2.435
	(1.372)	(1.388)	(1.488)	(1.471)	(1.497)	(1.477)	(1.606)	(1.592)
Military regime	-1.397***	-1.377***	-1.559***	-1.416***	-1.584***	-1.431***	-1.626***	-1.518***
	(0.472)	(0.475)	(0.520)	(0.519)	(0.520)	(0.518)	(0.532)	(0.526)
GDP pc change	-3.280	-3.441	-2.747	-2.932	-2.679	-2.858	-4.547*	-4.359*
	(2.139)	(2.154)	(2.243)	(2.211)	(2.210)	(2.185)	(2.389)	(2.366)
Cold War	1.245**	1.233**	1.240**	1.226**	1.204**	1.186**	1.521**	1.578**
	(0.552)	(0.553)	(0.586)	(0.575)	(0.588)	(0.575)	(0.612)	(0.614)
From middle	0.963**	0.929**	1.014**	0.976**	1.070**	1.033**	0.847*	0.832*
	(0.441)	(0.441)	(0.457)	(0.453)	(0.460)	(0.456)	(0.449)	(0.449)
From top	2.372***	2.349***	2.403***	2.384***	2.463***	2.439***	2.417***	2.407***
	(0.551)	(0.551)	(0.596)	(0.591)	(0.595)	(0.590)	(0.577)	(0.571)
Effective Number: bt-1: low a: low ethnic threat		-2.099*
		(1.275)
Expenditure as GDP%: bt-1: low a: low ethnic threat		4.807*
		(2.575)
Ethnic stacking: ethnic threat			-6.342*	-6.734**
			(3.342)	(3.322)
Ethnic stacking: cumulative ethnic threat					-4.876*	-5.234*
					(2.877)	(2.841)
Expenditure as GDP%: b: low a			1.369*		1.328*
			(0.713)		(0.694)
Expenditure as GDP%: bt-1: low a				1.668*		1.593*
				(0.974)		(0.933)
Ruling party: b: low ethnic threat							2.457*
							(1.457)
								(2.439)
Constant	3.765	3.907	4.442	4.514	4.502	4.596	1.660	2.089
	(3.148)	(3.152)	(3.274)	(3.231)	(3.238)	(3.196)	(3.438)	(3.383)
Observations	172	172	172	172	172	172	172	172
Log Likelihood	-90.408	-89.670	-89.326	-90.231	-88.835	-89.796	-91.148	-91.597
Akaike Inf. Crit.	216.817	215.340	222.652	224.463	221.670	223.591	234.296	235.193
	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Only significant variables are presented. For the full table - see Appendix

One more interaction, which obtains support in 4 models, refers to Hypothesis 1's ethnic stacking mechanism. Its counterpart featuring moderator has been scrutinized in the first section, so that now it stands significant at the level from 0.1 to 0.05 with the two ethnicity variables. A coefficient is negative, meaning that the influence of stacked troops conditioned by the ethnic factor stated in Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. (As can be remembered, the relationship has not been proved before.) Substantial characterising either a point of a takeover by current leaders or the entire span of their rule preceding an endeavour indeed hinders its accomplishment. Stacked corps emerges as a powerful counteragent to those trying to intervene. With that, moderator renders a slightly larger modulo coefficient than (-6.34 and -6.73 vs. -4.88 and -5.23). It could signify that the technique's effect is more pronounced at the beginning of tenure when the imminent menace is acute and the productiveness is thus higher, in comparison to the situation when authorities have amassed an amount of that danger as a result of foiled ejections. (I.e. the very fact that countercoups are continuously staged and hence the army has not been subdued, which evinces, may decrease the hampering force of stacked troops.)

This reasoning entirely corresponds to the thesis proposed by Roessler (2011, 2016) that «emotionally shaken and paranoid about the possibility of subsequent threats to their survival, rulers desperately seek to reinforce their grip on power and purge their regimes of all disloyalists.» Facing an information problem, they tend to base upon a «shortcut» seen in ethnic identity and hence «purge [the rival's coethnics] from the regime in order to nullify the risk of a future internal challenge». The pattern described is well illustrated by Cфte d'Ivoire's 1999 coup that owns the highest score for in our dataset. The deposition turned Gen. R. Guйп in a new head of the state, which then engendered a full-scale campaign against Northerners in the armed forces (with Guйп himself being from the Southwest). The government survived three attempted removals in the short aftermath: they were suppressed by allegiant units safeguarding the regime against intra-elite and civilian dissent. Another examples are the Congolese ouster in 1968 confronting three response conspiracies; the 1990 overthrow in Chad led by Idriss Dйby which then withstood six countercoups; or the 2003 toppling in Guinea-Bissau that also endured through three tried ejections. In all the cases new leaderships originated from low-status ethnicities, while countercoups were rather quick to come. Most probably, coup-proofing pursued by the authorities itself bred retaliation - which, however, was put down by the regime agents.

(Besides, the ruling party predictor becomes corroborated only if combined with and - in any other interaction it does not attain significance).

Speaking of controls, the strongest negative effect present throughout all the models is owned by the military regime indicator. In other words, conspiracies against officials in uniform are less likely to triumph, which actually disputes existing literature. According to Powell (2012a) and Bцhmelt and Pilster (2015), such attempts have more chances to succeed while De Bruin (2018) proves it to be irrelevant. Yet, this variation may be partly explained by the difference in data sources and their coding specificities: our data come mainly from McGowan (2003) also representing the base of the coup instances data; Powell (2012a) together with Bцhmelt and Pilster (2015) draw on Banks (2001), and De Bruin (2018) rely upon Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Besides, in contrast to other papers our work treats endeavors bunched in one year as distinct observations, which should logically yield more abortive takeovers against the military government just installed. Ultimately, it is by no means incorrect that countercoups in response to a recent overthrow become often doomed to failure.

Additional factor strongly influencing a coup outcome is proved to be the rank of perpetrators. If the latter are from the upper echelons, a bid for power is most likely to come off; middle-ranking plotters sometimes have also higher chances of success, though the degree is incomparable to that of the command. The result is totally consistent with De Bruin's (2018) findings, therefore rendering support to Singh's (2014) theory of coups as coordination game. Furthermore, the period of the Cold War amplifies the probability of displacement too. On the one hand, it can be the implication of economic and military assistance to allying African countries, which in turn aggravated local conflicts and perpetuated instability. On the other hand, the ensuing era of democratization should as well account for the relationship because of the greater attention to popular legitimacy. The similar contributive impact belongs to civil conflict (though only in the first part of analysis), so that the widely accepted repercussion of turmoil is evidenced one more time by our study.

Finally, a better economic situation appears to augur bad for a launched attempt: real GDP per capita and change in real GDP per capita negatively affect a coup outcome according to the output. Explanations can be multiple: possibly, wealthier countries and especially those witnessing a rise in wealth have greater government capacities to resist, more actors ready to oppose a takeover because they are satisfied with the regime, or perpetrators just not trying hard since their grudge against authorities is not so remarkable compared to poorer states. Whatever reason, the idea totally concurs with the previous research which argues that poverty and slow economic growth undermine political status-quo, making elites vulnerable to ouster.

Based on the analysis performed, we therefore formulate several conclusions. First, ethnic stacking works out with either condition prescribed by Hypothesis 1, substantially reducing the likelihood of displacement. Once we add resources, however, the relationship direction becomes reverse: sometimes allegiant corps fail to impede plotters' coordination, strengthened particularly due to [unwitting] accumulation of those resources in rivals' hands. The tests additionally provide support to the productiveness of financial rewards under growing - which, yet, are not helpful in case of . In general, all this allows us to say that Hypothesis 1 is substantiated. Second, counterbalancing approached with the number of effective organizations indeed lowers the probability of a future overthrow, and, notably, this is such when both prerequisites of Hypothesis 2 - minor and - are included in the model. Still, in interaction with , which has been deemed a key moderator of the second part, the impact of Effective Number is not confirmed (though the sign of coefficients is negative). The presence of a ruling party indicates an opposite trend to the one anticipated - that is, coup success gets more feasible. Although in other terms and when set as a control the variable's coefficients are negative, they do not achieve significance which would at least somehow let us prove the effect initially hypothesised. Expenditure as a GDP percentage also appears to refute the supposition about its coup-proofing capacity. Besides, this fact implies that we possibly need better operationalization of the long-term financial benefits. Both ruling party and spending as GDP% are significant in combination with , which is important from the viewpoint of Hypothesis 2. Nonetheless, while the contributing impact of the political institution can be indeed admitted in the circumstances laid out by interaction terms - the output for economic coup-proofing should be treated with caution, furthermore considering the remark on correctness of approximation.

Overall, the results appear rather affirmative for Hypothesis 1 - whereas only one coup-proofing element from Hypothesis 2 influences coup success as has been expected. Regarding two other components, findings are to be either strictly specified along their interaction terms (for a ruling party), or even reviewed with a more fitting proxy (for a long-term financial coup-proofing).



Conclusion

The phenomenon of military coup d'йtat, which became so conspicuous in the 20th century, seems to not loosen its reins in some regions of the world. Africa - the primary focus of this paper - continues to behold the army occasionally intervene in politics. About half of all cases, however, is characterized by the failure to seize power. No doubt, it is not the first time when the question «why» is asked: indeed, literature comprises a substantial amount of research revealing factors which lead to either triumphant or abortive bids. Still, this approach does not take into account rationale of actors involved in regime-military (or civil-military) relations. The current study relies upon the latter perspective, viewing a [negative] coup outcome majorly a result of how behaviours of the government and armed forces have interweaved. Deeming the theory of coup-proofing an apt tool for our purpose, we have anticipated that it is an endogenous dynamics where the structure and actions of troops determine techniques deployed by authorities, which in return condition the probability of conspiracy success/failure.

In particular, we have presupposed that there are two general scenarios of civil-military relations, each featuring a respective coup-proofing strategy. In the first, a newly-minted leadership possesses non-dominant ethnicity or observes the trend of political instability (or even both), meaning that it perceives the threat of an impending ouster. To handle the issue right away, the government is most likely to surround itself with people predisposed to fidelity, and criteria for that commonly amounts to ethnic identity. Thus, ethnic stacking of the army represents a fast solution to the problem of political survival: loyal troops turn into a personal guardian resisting emergent subversion. Still, these latter not always can promise full security as there are also potent disgruntled groups able to overcome the counter-agent. Resources needed for such good coordination may well be accrued through a prior expansion in state financing, which dissenters divert into enhancement of own capacities. Hypothesis 1 therefore asserts that while conspiracies in these settings are effectively foiled by stacked troops, an overthrow is nonetheless to be expected if resources fall into the «wrong hands».

In the second scenario, a new leadership has neither of two conditions set above and thus is not menaced by the imminent threat of takeover. Being more or less relaxed as to present-day safety, authorities that care about long-term survival will most likely address the military's far-reaching disposition and ability to intervene. The latter is tackled with deployment of counterbalancing techniques directly aimed to hamper perpetrators' coordination. Further, officials may want to reduce the very inclination of soldiers to step in politics via providing state patronage through a party as well as granting long-term economic benefits. Loyal personnel obtained as a result will present assistance in resisting countercoups if any arise. Hypothesis 2 hence claims that dawning ejections get systemically thwarted through structural and long-oriented financial coup-proofing, intended to constrain the powerful army. Given that, ultimate displacement can be staged by tenacious troops still capable of organizing despite the leadership's policies.

The empirical analysis has shown that whereas Hypothesis 1 manages to draw sufficient support, Hypothesis 2 becomes at best partly substantiated. Ethnic stacking, conditioned by either unwelcomed ethnicity or concurrent political turmoil, is indeed an effective tool for hindering subversion. The same impact is also attributed to financial incentives, though only if the reason for dispensing them lies not in present ethnic rivalry. Yet, when combining the two techniques, an outcome turns out to be strikingly different: the probability of success increases, which can be due to antecedent accumulation of resources by potential schemers. The unwitting consequences of buying-off begin to cost the leadership too much.

Structural coup-proofing also proves to possess the impact suggested, and, importantly, the result stays such when both prerequisites of Hypothesis 2 are present. Still, Strategy 2's key condition - the percentage of success upon a last ouster - does not receive statistical evidence: it seems that the score of success closer to an attempt is more constructive in explaining the use of counterbalancing. Two other coup-proofing components, however, rebut our initial expectations. An existing ruling party appears to enlarge the feasibility of an overthrow under the circumstances specified in the output. Though quite not obvious, foundation of own party may fail to bring its fruits because the military previously proficient in staging coups or even continuously trying to intervene is hardly to evolve into a subordinate body. Apart from witnessing the spurious relationship, we can suppose a dominant party to be an auxiliary venue for officers to organize. In respect of long-term financial endowments, operationalized through military expenditure as GDP%, the tests evince a positive influence on an outcome, too. Though, such result is rather dubious in the light of other literature and hence should be relied upon with caution. Additionally, we consider selecting another proxy which would reflect this type of coup-proofing more pertinently.

Of course, the research presented here is not devoid of drawbacks. Speaking of technical problems, in an attempt to evade multicollinearity we have been forced to introduce correlating variables separately, which discards the possibility to juxtapose their effect in one model. Furthermore, regression models encompass many interactions given quite a modest number of observations, so that some predictors might become stripped of significance. There can also be potential repercussions of poor operationalization, e.g., for ethnic stacking armies, or long-run economic benefits.

Another side of the coin is conceptual. In particular, we have omitted the feasibility of transition from coup-proofing Strategy 1 to Strategy 2 with time, or even vice versa. The first should be observed in the mentioned cases of Ghana under Rawlings and Togo under Eyadema - whereas the second in the aftermath of Burundi's 1965 abortive coup by Hutu contingents, when the Tutsi-dominated government embarked on systemic purges of the latter; or in Liberia post the 1985 foiled bid by Gio conspirators, whereupon this and related ethnicity were excluded from the army specifically. Besides, we strictly delineate both approaches to coup-proofing, which is surely a theoretical assumption since in reality they often go hand in hand.

An additional thing is that our theory cannot account for an outcome of subversion against very first indigenous leaders. They are cases with , where timely applied measures were able either to minimize plotters' capacities or to uproot the disposition to intervene. Those attempts (if they exist) cannot be explicated within the given framework since it necessitates the estimates valid for a last takeover, but not ascendance via post-independence elections. Due to that, for revealing circumstances of failure under those regimes (if bids are present at all), we have had to count on factors signified by controls.

Lastly, some of the results obtained may counter existing statistics-based explanations. First of all it concerns the paper by Collier and Hoeffler (2007) proving that military spending as a GDP percentage actually diminishes the amount of coup risk - which works against our findings on that indicator. Moreover, the critique can be referred to the claim about resources dispersion and subsequent empowerment of dissenters. For instance, Powell (2012b) contests such conclusion with regard to non-democracies. As he points out, the feasibility of increased military capabilities is linked to the transparency of systems, implying that raised expenditures in Africa go specifically toward meeting private needs, which therefore minimizes the chance of resources diversion.

Taken generally, however, this paper represents only one of possible approaches to studying military coups d'йtat. With the focus on Africa, we have tried to gain valuable insights in the logic of their failure, while taking into account local specificities. As a prospect for future research, it would be interesting to include the absence of attempts and thus pay greater attention to the willingness to intervene, as well as possibly incorporate supplementary characteristics going beyond the current coup-proofing-centered lens.



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Appendix

Table 1. Regression Results

	Dependent variable:
	Successful coup
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Change in expenditure	-0.200	-0.187	-0.204	-0.193
	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.127)
Expenditure per soldier	0.305	0.300	0.313	0.311
	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.267)	(0.267)
Ethnic stacking	-0.727	-1.058	-0.770	-1.154
	(1.751)	(1.735)	(1.791)	(1.770)
a	20.554**	22.689**	20.564**	22.479**
	(8.984)	(9.271)	(9.136)	(9.523)
cumulative ethnic threat	-16.617		-8.354
	(39.791)		(41.023)
ethnic threat		-38.371		-30.301
		(44.474)		(46.072)
Effective Number	0.605	0.607	1.647*	1.677*
	(0.835)	(0.842)	(0.964)	(0.966)
Expenditure as GDP%	-0.315	-0.338	-0.785	-0.793
	(0.512)	(0.510)	(0.550)	(0.544)
Ruling party	-0.631	-0.568	0.595	0.674
	(0.940)	(0.941)	(0.932)	(0.935)
b	2.093	2.292
	(1.823)	(1.844)
bt-1			4.604**	4.940**
			(2.181)	(2.213)
cumulative a	0.176	0.081	0.219	0.129
	(0.181)	(0.169)	(0.185)	(0.173)
First coup attempt	0.188	0.188	-0.018	-0.047
	(0.870)	(0.867)	(0.891)	(0.887) ...

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