4.1 Liberal Reforms

During its existence, the current political elite has repeatedly changed the general course of development. V.V. Putin, as the successor to B. Yeltsin, was little known to the general public before he was declared the "successor." Despite this, the future president was acquainted with all possible aspects of work in high political circles, including in cooperation with the oligarchy. It is worth noting that despite the undermining of confidence in liberal economic (and, as a consequence, other) reforms, the idea of the need to develop a democratic course, including close cooperation with the countries of Europe and North America, was still dominant. To this end, the Centre of Strategic Development has developed an appropriate program that meets these goals. Moreover, according to some reports, Putin and many other former associates of Yeltsin did not initially expect his presidency to last more than one term. To back his electoral campaign and to get guidance at the initial stages of his presidency, it was essential for Putin to receive support from an expert community with an actual knowledge of the political and economic situation in Russia. The main purpose of this community was to handle an economic sphere to develop a set of economic measures that could bring the country out of a difficult economic situation. For that purpose in 1999, the Center for Strategic Research (CSR) was created, and during his first presidential term it was the main knowledge provider for Putin's Administration. In 1999, CSR published its white paper “Strategy 2010” “Osnovnye napravleniya social'no-ehkonomicheskoj politiki Pravitel'stva Rossijskoj Federacii na dolgosrochnuyu perspektivu” Centr Informacionnyx issledovanij, 2000. // “Основные направления социально-экономической политики Правительства Российской Федерации на долгосрочную перспективу” Центр Информационных исследований, 2000.https://web.archive.org/web/20100918062948/http://budgetrf.ru/Publications/Programs/Government/Gref2000/Gref2000000.htm which became the ideological basis for subsequent reforms in the country, and was meant to last for the next 10 years. As it would turn out, these expectations were too ambitious, but people behind the organization at the time are currently widely known figures such as G. Gref, head of Sberbank and the former Head of the Ministry of Economic Development (2000-2007), and D. Mezentsev, a member of Federation Council (2002-2009, 2016-2019) and the Governor of Irkutsk oblast' (2009-2012) were nominated for notable positions in the GovernmentS. Subbotina. “Sovet Federacii Popolnilsya 16 Novichkami.” Izvestiya, September 30, 2015 // Субботина, С. “Совет Федерации Пополнился 16 Новичками.” Известия, September 30, 2015. https://iz.ru/news/592317..

4.2 Turnaround

However, already during his presidency, Putin faced many challenges, including numerous terrorist acts, as well as serious political competition from influential people in the 90s. All this was supplemented by disappointment in the position of the “Western partners” (this term will be introduced into the managerial discourse later, but, nevertheless, just personifies this disappointment), who were not ready to confirm their friendly intentions in practice (according to political historians, this is precisely the position that was gradually formed in the Kremlin by the end of the first term). Putin and his entourage, disappointed in the democratic course, accompanied by endless demands and criticism of the new president, there was a demand for increasing the ability of the authorities to control both public opinion and their own environment and government structures.

Putin approached the 2004 presidential election as a triumph - thanks to solving all the above challenges, he managed to gain 71.31% of the votes. “Postanovlenie Central'noj izbiratel'noj komissii Rossijskoj Federacii ot 23 marta 2004 g. N 99/799-4 g. Moskva O rezul'tatax vyborov Prezidenta Rossijskoj Federacii”. Rossijskaya gazeta. March 2003, 2004 // “Постановление Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации от 23 марта 2004 г. N 99/799-4 г. Москва О результатах выборов Президента Российской Федерации”. Российская газета. March 2003, 2004 https://rg.ru/2004/03/24/cik-dok.html However, such success could not be achieved with the continuation of the liberal democratic course. Outwardly preserving the democratic facade, the political regime in Russia took a serious step towards authoritarianism.

In this regard, the old, liberal advisers could no longer be of any use. To further strengthen the state. apparatus while maintaining a democratic facade - in other words, to create a hybrid regime - required expert knowledge of a different kind. The senior management did not yet come to a full understanding of this concept and the possibilities for its implementation, therefore, with the help of creating expert communities, including the Institute of Public Design, it was planned to receive expert assessment in various fields.

At the early stage of the emergence of the hybrid regime, the main role was still played by traditional media. In 2003-2005, they were all taken under control. However, not only the management, but also the experts themselves did not have experience in this area, so solving many issues required their testing in practice - in other words, case-law.

The development of this practice took time; therefore, far from all measures were put into practice. Moreover, according to some reports, the leadership has not yet developed a final idea of the need to build a new authoritarian regime. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, there was no unity among leading and aspiring people - besides conservatives, liberal views were also widely represented, which, against the backdrop of economic growth, again began to gain popularity in wide circles. In its reports, INOP, in essence, maintained a liberal orientation.

4.3 Medvedev's Rule and the “War of Publications”

One of the representatives of this wing was the 3rd President of Russia D.A. Medvedev. This castling is considered to be decorative, but in the highest circles there was almost never a consensus on the further political course. One of the manifestations of this “conflict” was the creation, under the patronage of Medvedev, on the basis of the “Center for the Development of the Information Society” of the Institute for Contemporary Development (INSOR). RIO Center was involved in the development and implementation of “national projects” launched in 2005 under the leadership of D. Medvedev; V. Putin. “Vystuplenie Na Vstreche s Chlenami Pravitel'stva, Rukovodstvom Federal'nogo Sobraniya i Chlenami Prezidiuma Gosudarstvennogo Soveta.” Prezident Rossii, September 5, 2005. // Путин, В. “Выступление На Встрече с Членами Правительства, Руководством Федерального Собрания и Членами Президиума Государственного Совета.” Президент России, September 5, 2005. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23157. this Center also took part in its presidential campaign. After winning the election, he was reformed in INSOR. In its reports, this organization suggested that without timely reforms and changes in the economic and political course laid down by Putin in his second term, Russia would have extremely sad consequences.

Experts from INOP came out with the defense of the policies of the former president and stated the need to maintain the old course. These positions were formed through a series of reports published from 2008 to 2011 - this period in the history of the development of expert knowledge in Russia is known as the “war of reports”. It is worth noting that, subject to the presence of two strong figures in dominant posts, whose positions on many issues diverge, and the need for cooperation nevertheless exceeds the strength of these differences, as well as the global financial crisis, which put the realization of any, including liberal programs at risk, the role of expert knowledge in making various decisions has greatly increased. The parties, in order to avoid entering into open conflicts fatal for the political situation, required a clear and high-quality examination not only to implement their own plans, but also to convince the other side of their immediate need.

The turning point in this mutual coexistence was 2011. It is worth noting that the CSR, which went into the shadows for a while, continued to actively publish its research and provide expert services. In its reports of 2010-2011, the Center predicted the threat of a political crisis in Russia and the growth of dissatisfaction with the current government, which could lead to mass rallies across the country. This prediction came true, and on this “the war of reports” for INSOR was over. O. Y. Malinova. "Jekspertno-analiticheskie organizacii i formirovanie obshhestvennoj povestki dnja: Analiz ideologicheskih praktik v sovremennoj Rossii." Politicheskaja nauka 4 (2013). // Малинова, Ольга Юрьевна. "Экспертно-аналитические организации и формирование общественной повестки дня: Анализ идеологических практик в современной России." Политическая наука 4 (2013). Despite the fact that Dmitry Medvedev had opportunities and resources, including expert resources, to reduce this discontent and to run for president for a second term, he did not take advantage of it. This marked the defeat of the liberal bloc within the government, and he was forced to temporarily fade into the background.

In parallel with this, in order to prepare for the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, it was necessary not only to develop a competent program, but also to restore the reputation of the authorities, at the same time settling contradictions within the ruling elites. This gave another surge in the field of political decision-making.

4.4 After the “War” - Conservative turn

This time, Putin and his associates in solidarity with him, having seen with a good example that the liberal course will not lead to positive consequences for them, approached the issues of forming the political agenda more strictly. Realizing the danger of flirting with liberal ideas and attempts to leave public opinion at the mercy of the public itself, the new government took a number of serious authoritarian steps. To provide a new policy with expertise in various fields, from economic efficiency to control of public opinion, two new organizations were created - ISEPI and the Civil Society Development Fund.

These organizations, created to conduct analytical work “outsourcing”, performed significantly broader functions than their predecessor, INOP. By that time, the understanding came to power that interaction with the people and the media is much more important than directly providing advisory services to those in power. Many experts insisted that new organizations need not only and so much to render services to the authorities - she is already aware of what she is doing, but also to develop a dialogue in a society that “is now... just not there” (D. Badovsky, director of ISEPS). Koshelenko, A., and Fedotova D.. “Yavnyj Sovetnik Vozhdya.” mk.ru: Moskovskij komsomolec. February 27, 2013. // Кошеленко, А., and Федотова Д.. “Явный Советник Вождя.” mk.ru: Московский комсомолец, February 27, 2013. https://www.mk.ru/politics/2013/02/27/819240-yavnyiy-sovetnik-vozhdya.html. Moreover, the organization had the obligation to sociologically determine the readiness of citizens for a “conservative turn” through a series of studies. They were implemented, and their results were actively covered in the media. These organizations also actively disseminated reports on the importance of conservative traditions, lack of democracy and the “duplicity” of the political system of foreign countries (primarily Western ones). Listeners and experts were invited to discuss these reports, spoke with them at conferences, and well-known politicians and experts actively commented on them. This preparation for the “conservative coup” was extremely successful.

It is worth noting that the defeat of the liberal wing, including the expert one, did not take place before the Crimea -- organizations of various kinds were in a state of “war of reports”, this time moving the discussion into a format accessible to the general public. However, the events of 2014 accelerated the onset of the “conservative coup” - an examination conducted by ISEPS and FoGRO, even in the most positive scenarios, could not predict such a possibility for its onset.

After that, in 2014-2015, in addition to their own research - which, in fact, were numerous and often did not directly serve the aforementioned tasks - these organizations began developing programs to “destroy” competition from liberal thought factories and expert communities. Certain measures - the laws "on the media" and "on foreign agents" - have already been adopted earlier, however, in the wake of criticism of the events of winter 2013-spring 2014, the government seemed insufficient. FoRGO and ISEPI, while continuing to issue and discuss “conservative” reports and in turn distributing Presidential grants to research projects (as yet another tool to control the expert and public agenda), began to smash the reports of their competitors with particular force, while taking part in evaluating various tightening state control of laws. It is worth noting that the FoRGO also engaged in the publication of a series of “Governors' Performance Rating”, which could easily be referenced not only by citizens, but also by senior officials, arguing for a particular decision regarding individual governors.

Absorbed in these “showdowns” organizations and some participating in them attracted extremely great public attention. Moreover, during their work, various permutations repeatedly occurred, and participants were forced to follow general instructions contrary to their own convictions. Ultimately, the head of the Presidential Administration appointed on March 5, 2016 decided not to understand the internal contradictions and reputation costs noticed by the above-mentioned organizations, and in order to carry out expert activities in 2017, he decided to create an Expert Institute for Social Research. Recruitment of leaders in various areas was carried out at his discretion to create a “favourable working environment” and a lack of bias. “EhISI: Celi, Zadachi i Bol'sheviki.” Davydov.Indeks // “ЭИСИ: Цели, Задачи и Большевики.” Давыдов.Индекс. Accessed May 22, 2020. https://old.davydov.in/region/eisi-ochevidnoe-i-veroyatnoe/eisi-celi-zadachi-i-bolsheviki/. Initially, the organization aimed at preparing for the regional elections in 2017, for which several regional studies were conducted and published. However, almost immediately, one of the most important tools for controlling political public discourse turned to EISR - the ability to distribute Presidential grants to political and political science research. Moreover, the presidential elections of 2018 and the elections to the State Duma were ahead, for the preparation of which the organization undoubtedly took part.

4.5 Evolving role of Expert Knowledge in Public Policy

The expert community can play different roles in the development and promotion of public policy, depending on the goals and degree of development of the expert community. At various stages of the political development of Russia in the XXI century, expert knowledge played different roles. Herewith it served not only instrumental, but also symbolic functions. In the early stages of his presidency, V.V. Putin, having resorted to the help of the CSR, drawn both of these functions at the same time - the “Strategy 2010” program, developed by the Center, was more of a symbolic function and served as a kind of guideline for achieving the сontempated goals, while offering concrete, instrumental steps for their implementation. It is worth mentioning that at that stage the new government had severe concerns over its legitimacy, hence had to legitimize its own authority, and the young team of the Center for Social Development, with the support of the new state leader, was an excellent platform for these steps. State institutions after the collapse of the USSR and further unfinished market reforms (eg. shock therapy, which was attempted in 1993 and withdrawn at the most crucial stage in the most extreme point) and liberal reforms were seen by general public as rather untrustworthy, therefore the expert knowledge produced by state institutions could not serve as a guarantor of legitimization, even despite the relevance of the data presented. At this stage, the CSR managed to demonstrate its authority and credibility, which allowed the state authorities to use this program as a foundation both to raise their own authority (referring to expert knowledge) and to ensure real reforms (instrumental use of knowledge).

Gradually, the tandem of Putin and CSR began to disintegrate. At the initial stage, the President and the government, and therefore, the CSR, were pursuing a common goal of “making members of the public... the stakeholders of the policy development process”“About us”. Center of Strategic Development, 2013 // “О Центре”. Центр стратегических разработок, 2013 https://web.archive.org/web/20131010072426/http://www.csr.ru/about-center, but by 2004-2005, according to the old version of the CSR's website (notably, this notion was deleted in 2013) cooperation between the authorities and the organization ceased and this dialogue “was practically over”. O. Y. Malinova. "Jekspertno-analiticheskie organizacii i formirovanie obshhestvennoj povestki dnja: Analiz ideologicheskih praktik v sovremennoj Rossii." Politicheskaja nauka 4 (2013). // Малинова, Ольга Юрьевна. "Экспертно-аналитические организации и формирование общественной повестки дня: Анализ идеологических практик в современной России." Политическая наука 4 (2013).

In 2004, CSR was replaced by several organizations, including INOP. The political agenda was somehow changing, but most of the Institute's research at that time was devoted to “studying socio-political problems,” and the initiative about the need for research most often came from within. Expert interview The organization was small in terms of number of staff members, therefore, and there were no disagreements on various ideas and areas of research. At the same time, the people involved in the fund have not yet held senior posts (as in the case of the Center for Social Development) and could devote more time to conducting studies and research on aforementioned topics. At some point during Putin's second presidential term, the organization was nominated to distribute presidential grants for social and political research. “Granty Dlya Budushhego. Institut Obshhestvennogo Proektirovaniya Gotov Platit' Za Novuyu Kartinu Mira.” Vzglyad, 2008 // “Гранты Для Будущего. Институт Общественного Проектирования Готов Платить За Новую Картину Мира.” Взгляд, 2008. https://vz.ru/politics/2008/6/10/176355.html. The abandonment of the CSR and the creation of the INOP can be associated with a number of political and social reasons. By 2004, the authority of V.V. Putin, whose first term has been under the pressure of numerous events, including political competition and terrorist acts, has appreciably strengthened, alongside with the notable partial political paradigm shift. The proposed `public dialogue' did not meet the initial expectations of the political elites, and was therefore narrowed due to its presumably low effectiveness.

Under the auspices of INOP, there have been many seminars, conferences and competitions for publications, including regular publications and events of the “Club on November 4” and “Russian Readings”. The model of the use of expert knowledge by the authorities has obviously evolved - a departure from the instrumental, applied function, reinforced by increased confidence in government institutions capable of producing statistical and analytical reports for applied use in political decision-making in relevant areas, meant an increase in the symbolic function of thought factories. The model of interaction between the authorities and society through expert communities was changed - if the goal of the CSR was to engage the parties in a dialogue to create a policy, now this policy was broadcast to the public through expert communities.

The authorities, as before, used the results of their work to legitimize their own theses and arguments regarding certain decisions. However, in order to successfully transmit these ideas in society, these organizations also needed to gain credibility among various circles of society. In particular, the practice of distributing presidential grants through similar organizations was developed and applied (to the present moment) - by funding research, the expert community devotes part of its resources to attracting new loyal cadres and creating a research base on various topics. Thus, we can say that the state began to use another symbolic function of expert knowledge (substantiating).

INOP was distributing presidential grants until 2012, when this role was transferred to the FoRGO, even despite the emergence of INSOR, which was founded by D. Medvedev as one of the main suppliers of expertise for the new president. The key concept during the years of his presidency was “modernization”. Despite the fact that this term was proposed only in 2009, it was present under various types in its election program. The use of this term will become key in understanding the role of expert knowledge throughout the entire presidential term of D. Medvedev.

Shortly before the end of his second term, V. Putin began to express the need for a gradual modernization of the current economic and managerial systems, which would ultimately enable the transition to an innovative development path. V. Putin. “Vystuplenie Na Rasshirennom Zasedanii Gosudarstvennogo Soveta `O Strategii Razvitiya Rossii Do 2020 Goda.'” Prezident Rossii, February 8, 2008. // Путин, В. “Выступление На Расширенном Заседании Государственного Совета `О Стратегии Развития России До 2020 Года.'” Президент России, February 8, 2008. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825. A detailed analysis of the discourse around modernization was made by O. Malinova (2012) O. Malinova. "Razgovory o «modernizacii»: analiz praktiki «obshhestvennyx diskussij» v sovremennoj Rossii." Simvolicheskaya politika 1 (2012) // Малинова, О. Ю. "Разговоры о «модернизации»: анализ практики «общественных дискуссий» в современной России." Символическая политика 1 (2012)., who managed to discover the contradictions between the president and the prime minister in understanding the term “modernization” and, as a consequence, the certainty of the direction of politics. Unlike Medvedev, Putin has already significantly interpreted the meaning of this concept, using it only to bring the economy and production to new, more modern standards. The social and economic modernization promised by D. Medvedev also did not coincide with his less radical course of political change.

This conflict of interest, coupled with the emergence of many different research projects and expert communities, has generated widespread discussion among experts. Since the conflict in the “tandem” was impossible to go public, they had to find an intermediary to express their beliefs. Hence, these two rival pirates were the conservative bloc headed by V. Putin and represented by the INOP (not conservative in the traditional sense of the word, but in the context of this dispute) and the liberal bloc of D. Medvedev with INSOR. These organizations, along with many others, acted as participants in this “roundtable war”. Specific political and social obstacles led to the situation where despite a huge number of proposed solutions, most of them were aimed at legitimizing suggested courses in the eyes of the general public. The proclaimed modernization never received instrumental expert support - not least due to the lack of real demand for such research.

Competing in the number of reports supporting and justifying one way of modernization or another, many experts, like many representatives of the government, the media and the public, may not have paid attention to the absence of any real changes. The symbolic function of expert knowledge overshadowed its original, instrumental function. Under these conditions, some organizations were able to spot this dangerous gap in time. Fascinated by the “war of reports”, the authorities and part of the public overly convinced themselves that modernization was really happening, but did not notice the growing discontent of another part of the public in the absence of any real changes. This was highlighted, in particular, by experts from the Center for Social Development, who in the summer of 2010 predicted a wave of rallies held in the country in less than a year. M. Dmitriev, S. Belanovski “Politicheskij Krizis v Rossii i Vozmozhnye Mexanizmy Ego Razvitiya - POLIT.RU.” Polit.ru, // Дмитриев, М. Белановски С. “Политический Кризис в России и Возможные Механизмы Его Развития - ПОЛИТ.РУ.” Полит.ру, March 28, 2011. https://polit.ru/article/2011/03/28/2011/.

Nevertheless, this period was marked by a rise in public interest in expert knowledge and a significant increase in its volume. The problem was that the quantity, apparently, did not turn into quality, which ultimately depreciated this knowledge (both its types).

After returning to the presidency in 2012, V. Putin outlined a much more conservative course. Liberal expert communities and organizations, most active under Medvedev's rule, and INOP, established in 2004, were ceased from being the main providers of expert knowledge. Moreover, after its alleged depreciation as a result of the “war of reports”, the authorities could no longer rely on old institutions and organizations, and the role of the expert communities was to rethink for both the political elites and the public. Most likely, for these purposes FoRGO and ISEPI were created in 2012. It is worth noting that the “war of reports” lasted until approximately 2014, and the FoRGO managed to participate in it with reports that had a conservative content with the notion of strengthening state control over economy and society. Also, FoRGO was the first of the two to receive the right to distribute presidential grants. An important role was played by one of the key areas of the Fund's work - the “Governors Performance Rating” series of reports. “Materialy.” Fond Razvitiya Grazhdanskogo Obshhestva. // “Материалы.” Фонд Развития Гражданского Общества. http://civilfund.ru/mat. Performing this instrumental function, the Fund managed to get some credibility in order to later be able to legitimize both itself from the external pressure, and to back state policies in the area (eg governors' resignation). Speakers from the organization were actively participating in the different conferences and spoke out their opinion (FoRGO is still active up until now). “SMI o Fonde.” Fond Razvitiya Grazhdanskogo Obshestva // “СМИ о Фонде.” Фонд Развития Гражданского Общества. http://civilfund.ru/article/mode/1. ISEPI gained public attention after this organization started to publish “Tetradi po konservatizmu” (“Conservative notebooks”) almanac “Al'manax `Tetradi Po Konservatizmu'”. ISEPI // “Альманах `Тетради По Консерватизму'”. ИСЭПИ. http://isepr.ru/almanah/., though, compared with all other organizations, reviewed in this study, the amount of available publications, released for the general public directly, is relatively low. “Doklady Fonda ISEPI.” ISEPI. // “Доклады Фонда ИСЭПИ” - ИСЭПИ, n.d. http://www.isepr.ru/analytics/. Although, the direction and an ideology those think tanks were complying with is clear, it could be said that the model of knowledge usage is pretty similar with the one used during Putin's second term with INOP, though the ideological background was slightly different this time.

The fourth Putin term continued what seems like a tradition after this period of time - starting a new expert community. EISR, founded shortly before the upcoming 2018 Presidential elections, consists of some notable figures. This think tank inherited the right to distribute Presidential grants for political research from its predecessors, this organization gained a significant amount of fame among general public due to its publications on regional governing practices, as well as growing influence over independent political research (due to its ability to distribute grants) E. Mukhametshina. “Raspredelyat' Prezidentskie Granty Stanut Blizkie k Obshhestvennoj Palate Organizacii.” Vedomosti, April 6, 2016. // Мухаметшина, Елена “Распределять Президентские Гранты Станут Близкие к Общественной Палате Организации.” Ведомости, April 6, 2016. https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/04/07/636733-raspredelyat-prezidentskie-granti-stanut-blizkie-obschestvennoi-palate-organizatsii. and appealing image with the presence in the social media and relatively young team of experts who are willing to share their opinion on the different topics. Because of the young team and the lessons, learned from the previous experience, EISR are not only provides a research, but also had a team of content managers to post information in the social media (eg. “Types of electoral observers”, posted in the organizations' Telegram channel, in which observers were given informal nicknames corresponding with their behaviour during the elections). “Tipologiya Nablyudatelej Na Vyborax Ot EISI.” Rossijskij Fond Svobodnyx Vyborov, September 4, 2017. // “Типология Наблюдателей На Выборах От ЭИСИ.” Российский Фонд Свободных Выборов, September 4, 2017. http://www.rfsv.ru/practice/proekty-programmy-anonsy/tipologiia-nabliudatelei-na-vyborakh-ot-eisi. It is worth mentioning that compared with the FoRGO and ISEPI, ideological (conservative) agenda is much less visible. It could be concluded that the symbolic knowledge is prevailing over instrumental one once again, though this organization is proven to be capable of producing one if necessary. Organization is also substantiating the state and its own resources in order to widen its field of research, hence utilizing all possible types of expert knowledge.

That is, the type of application of the expert knowledge evolved over time not only ideologically, but in its essence. Applied both in instrumental and symbolic manner, it served different purposes over the course of the past twenty years.

5. Conclusion

Expert knowledge came a long way alongside the political regime. Over time, different types of expert consulting were required to fulfill different functions. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the authorities have shown interest in both in attracting experts to discuss the forthcoming decisions, above all - economic, then stimulated offer in the market of consulting services and analytical developments. However, “approximately since 2005, opportunities for public personal expert dialogue began to narrow, and at the intersection of 2007 and 2008, the authorities' demand for such a dialogue on key issues of economic policy almost dried up. At the same time, the federal executive branch resorted to the services of many organizations.

Both the President (Medvedev) and Prime Minister (Putin) at the time were conceived as a strong tandem; however, during their public announcements and meetings, they have displayed different views on the desirable political course. Since, during the obvious political and public reasons, none of them, as well as their fellow party members, could not publically support one of them. Thus, this tension had to be released through some other structures, and both INSOR and INOP, strongly associated with Medvedev and Putin respectively, became a platform for this discussion. These organizations, directly related to the leadership, were main, but not the only actors in this “roundtable war”.

After Putin took office as president in his administration, it was decided to outsource the analytical work, adding to the pool of metropolitan expert and analytical organizations new centers designed to conduct research and interact with the expert community. Initially, it was planned to create four new centers, but only two were launched - FoRGO and ISEPI.

They both were established during the period of the “roundtables war”, and quite actively participated in it. However, by 2014, all these rivalries were over, especially after the “Foreign agent” law, successful Winter Olympics in Sochi, and the annexation of Crimea. It could be concluded that these organizations successfully fulfilled their mission.

The latest project, EISR, drew a lot of attention due the relatively new approach towards working with media, both old and new. This organization has strong connections with the leading universities in Russia, hence it is able to attract lots of people, related to political science through meetings and seminars, as well as through allocation grants for political research.

The question of different types of expert knowledge is under significant development right now. According to the latest research findings, there are two main types of it: instrumental and symbolic. Symbolic knowledge could be utilized though legitimization and substantiating. Discovered evidence suggests that all three of these types were utilized via four selected organizations at the different stages of the Russian public policy development in the XXI century. From utilizing knowledge instrumentally, think tanks simultaneously moved towards legitimization serving both the government as the means to justify its policies and evidently validate its claims and beliefs, and for organizations to prove its legitimacy to be a provider of expert knowledge for the government and to the public. Though ideological background significantly changed over time and many think tanks were no longer able to prove external legitimacy, the means of usage of think tanks and provided knowledge evolved over time. Latest example is the shift towards media-friendly organizations instead of the relatively enclosed ones to gain more appeal among the general public, hence providing studies appealing to be more trustworthy. The way the state utilizes expert knowledge directly reflects public policy if we consider them as independent and dependent variables in the multifaceted sphere of policy development process.

Bibliography