The Effects of Xi Jinping’s Cadre Policy on Incentives for Bureaucracy
Features of the influence of Xi Jinping's personnel policy on incentives in the career advancement of officials. Consideration of the career movements of regional officials in 2012-2018. Acquaintance with the economic performance of Xi Jinping's henchmen.
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The Effects of Xi Jinping's Cadre Policy on Incentives for Bureaucracy
Ovchinnikova Elena
Introduction
regional personnel policy
The nature and pace of economic growth in People's Republic of China (PRC) has become a topic of much debate since the beginning of reform and opening-up policy in 1978. China's average annual GDP growth from 1978 to 2018 was around 9,46 percent, which helped to lift people out of poverty, increase life expectancy, household net income and other vital social and economic parameters. This progress, however, would not have been achieved without major shifts in both economic and political autonomy of China's provinces.
In market Leninism systems such as PRC the implementation of a policy is contingent on bureaucracy. Therefore, continuous economic growth and development of each province largely depends on party and government officials. Additionally, regional officials are key figures for the implementation of the government's initiatives. Combination of these factors makes relationship between the center and regions in China extremely important.
To execute specific policies and avoid conflict, there should be a system of incentives for career growth of regional officials. Such system not only shows the immediate goals of national leaders, but also reflects the power dynamic between regional and national authorities. Analyzing officials' career incentives, therefore, will be able to exemplify real changes in power after 1978.
In recent years, research on evaluating the role of economic performances incentives for officials' promotion has added greatly to understanding this aspect of cadre management system. It also has provided evidence that officials who are able to increase GRP in given province are more likely to be promoted.
The present study theorizes and tests the role of economic performance in particular aspect of Chinese politics -- promotion of province-level officials -- at increasing economic growth. Prior to Xi Jinping becoming secretary general, the system of career incentives used to be defined both by economic performance and political ties. Li and Zhou wrote that Chinese cadre management system is aimed at increasing competitiveness among province-level officials. Moreover, recent studies show that political loyalty is an important aspect in promoting officials to national-level positions.
Jia, Kudamatsu, and Seim argued that political connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. Although some authors were able to measure factional affiliation among China's national leaders, it is still clear that political affiliation used to influence career advancement of a regional official. Therefore, province-level governors and party secretaries had built a clear career ladder that depended on effective implementation of the directives and on ties to members of the central government. a recent shift in China's domestic politics, e.g. anti-corruption campaign under the Xi Jinping administration, is yet to be analyzed.
The new personnel policy and anti-corruption campaign make loyalty to Xi Jinping a primary issue. Hence the question arises: How has the system of incentives on governors and party secretaries changed because of the growing leadership role?
This study aims to redress this gap in the literature on economic and political roles of politicians' careers. Specifically, we will assess how and in what ways Chinese province-level officials are influenced by their economic performance and political ties, using two data source that allow us to estimate this relationship.
The goal of this research is to determine whether there is a link between the career movements of officials and their economic performance after 2012.
Consequently, the objectives for this paper are as follows:
i. To study academic literature on the stated topic
ii. Set the problem
iii. Set the methodology
iv. Collect biographical data on officials who served in 2012-2018.
v. Collect the economic and social indicators of all provincial administrative units.
vi. Highlight key characteristics of cadre policy in PRC before 2012
vii. Conduct analysis of the collected biographical and economic data
viii. Interpret the results
The object of the study is cadre policy in China in 2012-2019. The subject of the study could be defined as career incentives for governors and party secretaries of provincial level during Xi Jinping's presidency.
This research may shed a light on how the selection process is functioning in authoritarian settings, and what adverse consequences of forming national leadership under this premise can there be.
1.Cadre policy and career incentives system of the People's Republic of China 1978-2011
With the time being, the priorities of Chinese government changed, followed by the logic of cadre management. The major shifts of PRC political objectives can be tied first and foremost to the economic performance of the country. However, the successful implementation of economic policies, as was mentioned before, depends on political stability. This chapter will cover basic shifts in economic policies and political conflicts with special attention paid to how those shifts effected cadre policy in the country.
It is worth mentioning that Chinese economy and politics are deeply intertwined and reforms in one sphere made changes in another inevitable. Government and party control over major resources is both an advantage and an issue in terms of effective economic reform. On one hand, a party can engage its members to target economic policies, on the other, there can be a resilient response from local officials who lose their rent sources due to new policies. Consequently, an effective set of incentives should be put in place to ensure that political interest of few coincides with national interest of many.
The initial stage of reforms was in 1978-1992 and ended due to the major conflict over course of economic policies in the top leadership. The beginning of the second stage was marked by Deng Xiaoping's Southern Trip in 1992 in which he pushed through the initiative to further China's opening and marketization. It was followed by the Third Plenum of the 14th Congress on which a new document outlined comprehensive reforms in 1993. The second stage of reforms ended in 2012-2013. As Xi Jinping started to step away from previous cadre management principles and exerted his influence over major strategic economic policies.
To understand how system of incentives was affected by economic reforms, it is useful to outline major shifts in economic policies and political equilibrium over those two periods (1978-1992 and 1993-2012). Presented outline and chronological periods are a modification of reform period timeline described by Barry Naughton.
After the purge of Gang of Four, the national leadership had to address important issues: economic disruption of country after the Cultural Revolution. First wave of reforms aimed at creating scheme for people to enrich themselves. Thus, household responsibility system emerged and township and village enterprises (TVEs) were permitted to engage in any revenue-generating business. While former allowed one of the poorest social groups to generate new revenue and escape poverty, the later created additional income for local governments. Moreover, regional officials were given opportunity to attract foreign investments and conduct economic experiments.
These permutations lead to disruption in the old patronage system that was functioning before 1978. According to B. Naughton, previous political hierarchy was based on rewards system provided by state's monopoly on goods and managerial jobs. Emerging TVEs, however, granted revenue to local officials regardless of their allegiance to the party. Managerial jobs were also no longer under control of the state as entrepreneurship job opportunities with alternative source of income were available. To address this issue, the central government had to introduce an updated system of incentives.
Although government introduced more fiscal autonomy to the regions, it was still in control over which provinces are granted autonomy. Therefore, selective withdrawal of reform policies became an effective tool for reinforcing patronage system. The entrepreneurship job opportunities outside state sector were few in 1980s and that made work in state-owned enterprises and in government more beneficial.
A case in point for updated sources of rents would be princelings of powerful Politburo members. Around 200 of them were working in Hong Kong which was full of ministry-run corporations and other opportunities for enrichment.
Additionally, both market- and plan-oriented dual-track system was set up, which allowed regional officials to negotiate easily achievable targets and receive additional resources once achieving them. Besides, the dual pricing system increased the gap between state-set planned prices and market prices. This instance allowed regional officials, who were sanctioning enterprises to trade with foreign buyers and gain a source of rent and administrative leverage. In 1988 the amount of rent was estimated from 20 to 30 percent of GDP.
Apart from the monetary incentives, new career-based incentives were introduced. First career-based regulation was an introduction of age limits for ordinary officials. Secondly, clear promotion criteria and promotion procedures were laid out which paved out more plain career paths for young regional leaders. Moreover, a large-scale promotion of local officials in 1982-1984 helped to establish new generation of leaders.
Simultaneously, changes in cadre policy have been made on a national level. Deng Xiaoping took a route to institutionalization of personnel promotion. In January 1986 a Circular on Selecting and Appointing Cadres Strictly According to Party Principles was released, setting new principles for cadre appointment. This Circular introduced a system of electing local officials and investigating their background. New system not only made a process of selecting officials more democratic and transparent, it also provided top party officials with administrative power and institutionalized it.
In 1989 Tiananmen incident political establishment decided that political liberalization would not occur. The Tiananmen incident resulted in surge of conservative drive in cadre politics and unstable future for further economic reforms.
In July 1990 State Council passed Regulations on Workers Evaluation which emphasized curated “political expression” as the number one priority in choosing appointees.
Additionally, in early 1990s Deng Xiaoping influenced conservative and powerful elders into retirement which served as a signal to further economic reforms. All in all, these changes furthered the flow of cadres and started the institutionalization process for career-based incentives. However, the route for continuing economic development was not pursued and a greater voice should have persuaded split national elites. In 1992 Deng Xiaoping's Southern Trip and unequivocal support from enterprises and citizens made further economic reforms possible.
As for cadre management, in 1993 the Temporary Regulations on State Civil Servants were passed. This document made further attempts in solidifying cadre selection process. Now, apart from previous regulations, civil service system was introduced. The decisive role of party officials was again inscribed in new regulations, which furthered the party's influence over cadre management system. Moreover, the role of “political expression” among party and government officials was highlighted which meant that political loyalty to the party and the regime itself was still a primary issue.
Sources of rents went to center and managerial jobs now had less authority. Political stability was also gained by compliance with Deng Xiaoping's ideas.
In terms of national economic policy, after the Southern Trip of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, a route for deeper economic reforms was taken. In 1993, on the Third Plenum of the 14th Congress a new document outlined comprehensive reforms. Tax and fiscal reform limited regions' financial autonomy. Specifically, agricultural tax was no longer existing which made local officials rely on central budgetary funds.
With increased recentralization efforts, central government gained more political leverage in form of patronage resources. Federal programs, such as Northeast Revitalization Program, Western Development Program and others, provided more performance-based monetary bonuses to the government officials.
To ensure not only economic, but also political allegiance, central authorities had to provide career perspectives for regional officials. Consequently, it was crucial to guarantee a continuous change of national leaders. This process was made more defined in following years. On September 1994, at the 4th Plenum of 14th CCP the power transit from 3rd to 4th generation was made and a communique about that fact was released. This set a precedent for future political generations and made possible for local leaders to strive for top leadership.
As a result of power transit, a lot of Shanghai party and government officials were appointed at top roles in central government bodies. Although it was mostly due to the fact that Jiang Zemin exerted his political influence in the appointment process, the system made it possible for new generation of local officials hold top positions in the country. However, collective leadership, meaning veto right for Politburo members and need for consensus, still was an essential principle of China's domestic politics. Later the system of voting for Politburo members was implemented in 2007 and 2012 which further institutionalized the transfer of power.
Additional principle that was implemented is that retired national leaders, such as members of Politburo, are untouchable. The power transfer could be successfully implemented only in the case that retiring Standing Committee Politburo members feel safe to leave their post. Therefore, no major investigations were conducted into retired leaders in 1990s and 2000s.
Expanding centralization of political power, fiscal resources and increasing institutionalization of cadre appointment system, regional authorities and lower-ranking officials needed compensation. Therefore, another source of rent-seeking, land privatization, was used as a compensation for fiscal centralization. Both regional officials and businessmen were using land-market to enforce political ties.
In order to exert greater national control over regions, in 2002 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was set up. Ultimately, it drew the line between central government's and local governments' property. Besides, it has formalized state ownership over 199 large central government firms, which retained almost all of their profits (in 2005 they were up to 5% of China's GDP). Federal programs as well as SASAC were also functioning as became a new source of allegiance incentive for successful officials. Thus, patronage system was restored with new sources of rent and new, more institutionalized career-based incentives.
For lower-ranking officials, fixed retirement age for were introduced. Although this age criterion was already an important one in 1980s and 90s, only in 2006 the General Office of CC CCP released new Tentative Regulations on the Term of Office of Party and Government Cadres which laid out tenure and term limits for party and government officials.
However, new stage of economy in 2010s made this system of career incentives inefficient. With corruption getting larger in scale, there were less discipline and ideology among regional officials. Along with the change in China's national interests, its interests in human resources have changed: it is now more important to maintain social stability and political legitimacy.
Additionally, social and economic disparities wage gaps got wider, and tension between cities and villages was threatening political stability of the regime. To establish further allegiance with regime, regional and other local officials would have needed new sources of rent as old ones (goods and revenues) got scarce. Banking system that served as additional source of revenue for regional leaders was unstable and inadequate after the financial crisis in 2007-2008. And regional land, another source of income for regions, was largely privatized. These permutations in China's economy posed crucial questions for new national leader.
2.Literature Review
Among many issues potentially raised, we concentrate on two main questions: Have incentives for bureaucrats' promotion changed? This leads naturally to a second question: if that is the case, what influenced such permutations?
The issue of cadre management remains one of the least understood aspects of China's domestic politics. On one hand, many scholars believe that the role of personal ties play a massive role in cadre management, especially in upper ranks of government [Landry, Lь, & Duan, 2017; Keller, 2015; Meyer, Shih, & Lee, 2016]. Others, however, argue that efficient performance far more greatly contributes to promotion [Rochlitz et al., 2015; Jia, Kudamatsu, & Seim, 2015]. Some scholars have found that the reason for such volatile growth is the system of incentives for regional officials. There is a consensus in scientific literature about two main factors influencing the advancement of regional officials. Promotion for provincial officials in China is based on two key components: economic performance of their region and political ties.
However, there are different groups of researchers that believe one type of connection to politicians is more affluent than others. First group can be characterized by a certainty that influential ties among Chinese officials are formed by factions. Another group of studies claim that connections are formed by learning or living in one place. Third group of studies focuses on political connections which are shaped by experience together. Other researchers explore the possibility that vital political ties are formed by kinship.
For example, Li and Zhou defined economic performance as provincial GDP growth. Political ties are often referred to as shared work experience or personal ties of one local official to the other. It is common that such ties occur not only between officials of the same rank, but also among provincial leaders and national-level officials.
As paper written by Rochlitz et al. stated, “Especially for the period since the beginning of China's reforms until the mid-1990s, regional economic performance seems to be the one measurable outcome with the strongest impact on the probability of promotion”. Other researchers support this point of view [Maskin, Qian, & Xu, 2000; Edin, 2003; Whiting 2004; Chen, Li, & Zhou 2005; Li & Zhou 2005].
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Xi Jinping anti-corruption campaign is altered the behavior of corrupt officials. For example, Chen et al. Have found that despite the efforts, a number of princelings are still prompt to seek rent.
The aforementioned research, however, uses observations made before 2012. For example, most notable work on political connection as a force behind promotion by Landry, Lь, and Duan is based on panel dataset of party secretaries and government executives that worked between 1999 and 2007. Other study also focuses on data gathered before drastic changes in China's domestic policy [Xiao, 2016; Rochlitz et al., 2015; Jia et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2019; Cai, 2017]. Although many studies observe later years of Xi Jinping's administration, there are few research conducted on modern-day data. Therefore, it is crucial to examine whether new findings correspond to the similar conclusions.
The drastic changes in China's domestic politics are twofold: one the one hand, the anti-corruption campaign and the strengthening of the party's rule on the other. As Shih stated in the report: “?Xi has used the anti-corruption campaign to strengthen his own power, and is poised to dominate politics at the highest level after the 19th Party Congress”. Overall strengthening of the party's role in domestic affairs has influenced political balance as well. As recent research by MERICS institution highlighted, Communist Party aims to fully integrate itself with bodies of the government and institutionalize its rule with new laws and regulations. Codifications of rules for the party means stricter requirements for all party members, which place a greater burden of responsibility on local officials.
From this review, it is clear that more research is needed to identify the change in incentives for promotion among regional officials. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that although promotion-oriented studies have proven correlation between economic performance of local officials and their elevation, the state of this research area is hampered by outdated statistics and the absence of tacking China's domestic politics shifts into account.
Most notable study using new data is one of Cheng and Kung, which analyzes land-marketing deals for princelings and non-princelings companies during 2004-2016. Results show that price discounts for companies with ties to Politburo members fell by 42.6%-31.5% in provinces targeted by Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) or Xi Jinping. The research shows that anti-corruption campaign is somewhat effective if it targets specific regions. However, there is yet no research analyzing the effects of anti-corruption campaign on regional officials' promotion.
Our study seeks to contribute to filling this gap in the literature on economic and political roles of politicians' careers by using two data sources that allow us to estimate this relationship. It will be tested whether each individual has been promoted, demoted or replaced under the same pattern as they used to be to. Moreover, this paper will introduce ten major categories of career movement, which will make the analysis of officials' career paths more nuanced. Also, the economic and social performance will be analyzed using 2012 -- 2018 data gathered by National Bureau of Statistics.
This study's main objective is to determine characteristics of promoted officials remained the same for governors and party. It also aims to define the effects of Xi Jinping anticorruption campaign on promotion of provincial leaders.
The aforementioned discussion and the lack of understanding about the cadre promotion in China after 2012 lead to the following research question: What influences the rise of officials under Xi Jinping?
To answer this question two main hypothesis are formulated:
1. Hypothesis 1. Criteria used in promoting local officials still defined by economic performance and social indicators (such as unemployment and poverty of rural regions) of the given province.
2. Hypothesis 2. Even based on common criteria used both for party secretaries and governors, those who used to work for or work with Xi Jinping are more likely to be promoted.
Methodology
To test these hypotheses quantitative comparative research is conducted. Population of all regional officials who served between 2012 and 2018 is analyzed by their biographical, career data as well as by economic and social data of their region. The analysis will distinguish between party officials and government officials, though these two groups can overlap.
The whole data-base of regional officials is compiled of biographical data found on chinavitae.com. Most of the data used in this study is quantitative data, except for “gov_name”, “region_name_1”, “region_name_2”, “next_post” and “regional_experience” values which are qualitative.
The dependent variable is a measure of career movements of regional officials. It is collected by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is the ultimate resource for biographical data on Chinese officials. The project divides personal information on individuals in three categories: “biography”, “career data”, and “appearances and travel with Xi Jinping”. Each of the categories provides comprehensive and verifiable data on a person's education, career path, and mentions by China's state media of official's joint appearance with First Secretary. Although the project supplies with an extensive list of career moves, sometimes information was examined with the Chinese search engine, Baidu, which also has up-to-date information on Chinese officials. The data on individuals presented on Baidu are confirmed with China's state media and cannot be altered as Wikipedia can, therefore it is a reliable source of information.
Independent variables are the outcome indicators for the time an individual was in office and detailed biographical information on each official. As proxies for economic performance, the GRP per capita, investments in fixed assets, and disposable household net income were taken. An average unemployment rate and poverty rate are the proxies for the social development. These statistics are used because they are targeted by Chinese government and, therefore, can play a role in officials' career path. Although data provided by National Bureau of Statistics are rather questionable, it is the only source with extensive datasets by region.
Recently, Chinese government began environmental regulation policy to ensure the quality of air, water and soil in the country. Some studies have analyzed the influence of these measurements on officials' promotion. However, results have shown that political ties are more affluent than reduction of CO2 emissions in terms of career perspectives. Other study also has shown that careers of high-ranking officials are not dependent on environmental measurements[Jia et al., 2012]. These findings suggest that while tackling air and water pollution is a concern of Chinese government, it is not yet crucial for officials to meet emission requirements.
Although environmental measurements, such as total waste water discharges, are available time constraints of one academic year yields less time than possible to pursue an analysis of complex environmental data.
The reasons for choosing to analyze data on government officials are as follows. First, regional officials are a group of future national leaders. They are also one of the most vulnerable parts of Chinese domestic politics as Xi Jinping's anticorruption campaign takes place. Consequently, policy and ideology shifts are best observed by analyzing government officials and their career paths.
The data will be collected through National Bureau of Statistics' official website. The site will be used because it will allow us to assess the official data from the government that party and government officials account for. The population, in turn, should strengthen the generalizability of findings. Moreover, accessing population of regional officials instead of using a sample would help us to gather full information on important anti-corruption efforts and how these measures affect promotion of officials.
Due to the fact that most of the data in current study are quantitative, statistical package STATA will be used to process and analyze both sets of obtained data (economic and biographical). Quantitative data analysis in this case will be conducted using descriptive statistics in order to determine whether any relationship between cadre's promotion and their performance or personal characteristics takes place.
For qualitative data in this work, each position taken by each individual will be analyzed and a code will be assigned depending on the amount of political leverage given position obtains. Compilation of codes and other quantitative data then will be tabulated to present itself in a clear and cohesive way.
To correctly interpret the movements of officials, it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of personnel management in China. Several features were revealed during the analysis. Firstly, a person can hold several important positions, but only one of them is a key one. In this regard, the basis of coding is taken only a key position, on which a person is appointed that year. For example, Wang Yang (CH058), in 2013 was appointed to six positions, but only one of them, the Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council, is the main one. Therefore, the move was coded as a promotion.
Membership in the CPC Central Committee and the Politburo also reflects the nature of displacement. If an official has been appointed to a position in the central bodies, but has not entered the new convocation of the CPC Central Committee or ceased to be a member of the Politburo, this appointment is interpreted as moving to the center without raising or an honorary pension, as in the case of Qin Guangzhong (CH071).
The quantity of career movements will be interpreted to see if there are any changes in fundamental principles of political governance (e.g., age limitations).
Economic performances of officials are compared and contrasted to determine overall picture of current regional development in China.
First hypothesis poses the question of how regional performance of official affects his or her career perspectives. In order to determine, whether economic and social measurements dictate the career move of regional leaders, each category of career movements will be analyzed and compared in terms of economic and social calculations. Additionally, age of officials at time they leave a position is estimated to determine whether age limit (ЋµЏг”Є‰є) principle is applicable.
Moreover, regional leaders that are considered outliers in any of three spheres (age, economic performance, corruption charges) are determined and their biographies are analyzed to see if there is a pattern in their performances or career paths.
To analyze the second hypothesis about personal ties with Xi Jinping, several variables will be analyzed. First, all joint appearances of regional official and Xi Jinping after 2012 were identified and variable “travelledwithxjp_2” was generated to reflect this fact. Based on this characteristic, all regional officials are divided into two broad categories: those, who publicly met with Xi Jinping or travelled with him on work affairs, and those, who did not. These two groups are to be analyzed in terms of their career movements, economic and social indices of region they were appointed to and age.
Many of current national leaders have extensive regional experience, including Xi Jinping himself. The number of current members of Politburo Standing Committee and other influential governmental bodies are known to have shared working experience with the First Secretary. To identify the role of ties with current national leader, the group of Xi Jinping's proteges that have had regional experience is analyzed. The comparison of economic and social indices is conducted to determine, whether performance of Xi Jinping's proteges differ from other regional officials.
2.Analysis of empirical data
To analyze gathered data and interpret results efficiently, major issues of Chinese politics should be discussed. First and foremost, it is essential to comprehend a context in which career movements and other appointments occur.
After Xi Jinping was elected First Secretary in 18th Party Congress, the cadre management principles began to change. First, age restriction and term limitations were regarded as obstacles for effective performance by Xi Jinping himself. Additionally, new regulations regarding vote-based selection process for government and party officials were loosened and the process of rigorous investigation into a candidate was made optiona.
These shifts in cadre management system do not coincide with previous policies realized under Hu Jintao's administration. In contrast, new rules and regulations place a greater emphasis on personal recommendations and the will of higher-ranking officials. All in all, influence of economic performance in officials' promotions is diminishing over time. Other principles also seem to be less essential than personal ties to politicians. Therefore, it is crucial to check average age, tenure, CC CCP and Politburo membership and economic performance of serving officials to determine which rules have been changed in reality.
As was mentioned in chapter “Cadre policy of the People's Republic of China 1978-2011”, promotion was not institutionalized and few criteria were available until 1988. Due to the lack of transparency and openness in promotion-oriented decision-maing, it is useful to use the political and biographical context of each individual. Political context in this specific case implies that the membership of individual in Central Committee of China Communist Party as well as in Politburo plays a crucial role. Biographical context implies that personal ties with Xi Jinping or shared government and party experience might influence persons' career path as well.
Consequently, biographical and political observations are analyzed as well as economic indices for local officials. That way alternative explanations for officials' career movements could be found. Although the scope of research is not wide, the paper is able to determine major criteria for career-based incentives under Xi Jinping's administration.
4.Career movements of regional officials in 2012-2018
To identify every career movement and interpret it correctly, data was checked with news sources (such as chinavitae.com) and codified accordingly.
Some of the categories are quite rare and almost never appear in the database. For example, there were no demotions and almost no officials being dismissed during observation. Only one governor was demoted during the time of observation which also paints a specific context for other groups of career movements.
Generally, regional officials follow three career paths: regional, central or out of political competition. Governors usually are promoted to serve as party secretary or they are transferred to another province. There are few instances of governors being promoted to the central government without serving as party secretary.
Older cadres usually serve in the National People's Congress (NPC) after they finish their regional service. That is considered to be an honorable pension, because cadres there do not bear significant political influence over the course of domestic politics.
All in all, it could be seen in the table that several peaks of career moves appear in 2012, 2016 and 2017. While the number of people who remained in their job (1) is lowest in 2017, the amount of regional promotions (3) is the biggest. This change as well as other permutations have a circular nature due to regular Party Congresses that finalize appointments and promotions. Same rule might be also applied to larger number of regional promotions in 2012. Similarly, the count of honorable pensions is also the highest in 2017. It is also possible that regional promotions in 2016 were made in anticipation of Party Congress.
Taking into account the surge in flow of cadres, two major presumptions might be made: first, increased amount of regional promotions and honorable pensions is a way of creating a base of political allies among regional officials. Another assumption might be that more people has reached age limits and got to be relocated and such high number of regional promotions is a result of it. Therefore, it is important to investigate average tenure and age of officials to test one of these estimates.
Table 1. Number of career movements of government officials in 2012-2018
5.Tenure of regional officials
The data of average tenure of regional officials by the year they began serving clearly indicates that average number of years spent in one office got smaller after 2009.
Cadre management system in China is known for dynamic turnover rate. This dynamic depends largely on the fixed age limitations for each rank of local and national posts. The other driving force for continuous turnover is a notion of fixed tenure. Research show that local officials used to serve no more than ten years before they were moved. Promoted officials used to serve less than two terms on average.
The change in average tenure legitimately raises the question of regional economic growth. If local officials serve less time, do they contribute to regional economic growth? Or is it not arbitrary to be promoted? To answer last question, average tenure for groups with various career movements should be analyzed.
Table 2. Average tenure of regional officials who finished their term by career move.
23 local officials, who were promoted, served around 4 years on average with one-year term as minimum and six-years term as maximum in their first regional post. Three officials who were laterally moved and promoted afterwards, served 3 years on average with two-year term as minimum and maximum of 5 years in their second office.
Specifically, local officials, who were appointed after 2012, serve around two years with maximum tenure of five years. The table 3 below shows average tenure for group of regional officials. From this table it is evident that the average time spent in office lessens for people who were appointed in 2012 and afterwards. It is noteworthy that 44 regional leaders, who took their office after 2013 have not yet finished working at their second office. Even in this case, the average number of years officials served on first term is reducing.
Table 3. Average tenure of regional officials who finished their term by year of appointment.
To sum up, average tenure of regional officials appointed after 2012 has reduced to two years. Promoted officials also serve less time before they are moved to the center. This may be a result of increased turnover rate which coincides with findings in the amount of career moves. Two waves of increased career movements appeared in 2012 and later in 2016-2017 before or during Party Congresses.
These findings also point to the idea that increased turnover rate is not necessary outcome of too many aging officials, but possibly a method of rejuvenating regional ranks and creating a larger support-base for Xi Jinping.
To measure exactly how much of these appointment and relocations leads to rejuvenation, average age of officials for each career move is assessed. Moreover, regional officials are compared in cohorts by the year of their first appointment on the regional level.
6.Age of officials
Since the introduction of age limits for lower ranking officials in 1988, the age criterion has been playing a crucial role in career-based incentives. Previously, 68 years old officials tend not to get promotion even in the most influential bodies of government. Age limitations were considered not essential criterion by new Some Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life under New Circumstance, however, it is yet hard to say whether this rule has been violated as well.
People who are regionally promoted leave their office in accordance with age limitations: maximum age of people appointed to the government is 63 and maximum age of leaving the office is 65.
Table 4. Average age of appointment for regional officials by career moves.
The age regulations in terms of promotions to the center are not as strict: local officials get promoted from their first regional post until they are 67 years old. Regional leaders who were promoted from their second office can be from 54 to 64.
Ages of officials who were later arrested with corruption charges follow the same guidelines: all of them were appointed at the first post from 46 to 60 years of age, one of them, Sun Zhengcai (CH079), has also served second term and was arrested at 54.
Seven officials who retired have done so as early as 54 and as late as 65 which suggests that age limitations for non-promising officials are intact.
Table 5. Minimum and maximum age of assuming and leaving the office by career moves
As can be seen in the table, maximums of age serving has exceeded the limit of 68 years. Officials, serving until 70 years old on the regional level are to be examined to understand the reasons of late relocation.
Although majority of appointments do not exceed the limits of 65 or 68 years, there are number of cases when this informal but consistently implemented rule is broken. One person, Guo Jinlong (CH019) was appointed as party secretary of Beijing at 65 and was moved to the center at 70. Another individual, Zhang Dejiang (CH121) became party secretary of Chongqing at 66 and promoted the same year to be the chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress and in 2014 became a deputy director of Central National Security Commission.
In terms of increased cadre flow, it is important to note that number of people appointed at their first post
Table 6. Number of people appointed at their first post
Another permutation can be observed in modern-day cadre politics. There are more older officials that are appointed to the region for the first time than there used to be. Around 46% of officials who started their term before 2012 were between 55 and 59 years old. However, the percent of older officials rose: 50% of those who are appointed after 2012 aged between 57 and 63.
While most of the appointment fall under the age limitations, late appointments seem to be more popular with time.
A study by Kou and Tsai suggests that age dilemma is a pressing issue in cadre management system. For example, a prospect of a person to become a governor fell considerably at the age of 55.
These findings suggest that despite somewhat rigid rule of age limitations, it is possible to avoid them after 2012. In this case, ages of people appointed before and after 2012 might differ.
As graph 1 shows, governors and party secretaries appointed in and after 2012 are older than those who entered regional politics before. There are around 30 people at the age of 60 appointed after 2012 which means they can serve only one term if follow the guidelines. Most common age of appointment before 2012 was 57 years old: 9 people became regional leaders at that age. This age is allows party and government officials to serve two terms of five years each, which makes more time to ensure economic development of a province. There are also considerate number of officials aged 61 and 62 that are appointed to the provinces. This is a rare case for pre-2012 appointees: only one out of 58 officials have been appointed in the age of 62 and six regional leaders at 61.
Graph 1. Number of appointments by age and group of appointment.
All in all, increased turnover rate could be the result of older officials leaving their jobs. However, aging body of regional officials does not have a natural cause: such officials are appointed deliberately, so they have less time in one office. This assumption is backed by decreasing mean tenure.
These results suggest that economic performance might not be a case of interest for Xi Jinping's administration, because greater economic performance is achieved over time and two- or three-year terms are not long enough.
Apart from avoiding guidelines and regulations, Xi Jinping's governance is notable for political consolidation. This means that two most influential bodies in PRC, China's Communist Party's Central Committee (CC CCP) and Politburo, can become a point of change in modern-day politics.
7.China Communist Party's Central Committee membership
China Communist Party's Central Committee (CC CCP) and Politburo have been crucial political bodies in China's domestic politics. Establishment of political support, nurturing of future national leaders and power transfer between political generations always happens among members of these organs.
Changes in CC CCP under Xi Jinping. Abother change in 18th Party Congress.
In this data-set only full members on CC CCP are codified because alternate members are considered to be a potential substitute for excluded or retired officials, not a driving force of a political decision-making process.
In 2012 there were 46 serving regional officials who were members of 18th CC CCP. The figures have not changed for 19th CC CCP, however, the total number of full numbers has. In the 18th CC CCP there were 205 full members and local officials constituted for 22,43% of Committee, but in the next Committee there were 204.
As for regions serving regional officials represent: serving regional leaders presided over 27 same regions in both Committees. However, two more regions are not fixed and change from one year to another. While in 2012 officials from Chongqing and Tianjin were members of CC CCP, it is not the case for 2017. Two new region gained representation in that year: Sichuan and Inner Mongolia.
Table 7. Regions represented by full members in 18th and 19th CC CCP and Politburo at the year of convention.
A governor of Inner Mongolia, Bu Xiaolin (CH004) is a newly appointed cadre: she became one in 2016 and serves there until now. Newly elected representative of Sichuan, Wang Dongming (CH087), has a more extended period of service. He served there as a party secretary from 2012 to 2018 and got honorable pension as a chairman of All-China Federation of Trade Unions.
The municipality that captures one's attention on this list, is Chongqing, which had not only two full members, but also one Politburo member representing it in 2012-2017 and lost it in the next CC CCP.
The governor of Chongqing (Zhang Guoqing CH123) was appointed in 2016 and as of 2017 was a full member of CC CCP. He was transferred to the other municipality two years later. The governor was replaced by newly appointed regional official, Tang Liangzhi CH082, who previously served as a mayor of Chengdu. He is not a full, but an alternate member of 19th CC CCP.
The share of CC CCP full members among serving regional officials has decreased, but not quite significantly. While Central Committee in 2012 elected 49,02% of regional officials, the figure for new Committee is 44,93%. Fewer full members among regional leaders might be the result of fewer members in total. These figures also change as tenures of newly appointed officials get shorter.
Although some variations between 18th and 19th CC CCP can be seen, these alterations do not reflect any significant or systematic change of region's role in domestic politics.
8.Politburo membership
When it comes to Politburo Standing Committee, there were 6 officials in the 18th Politburo and only 5 serving officials in 19th Politburo. All of the members who serve at regions are party secretary, which is typical of political system. The case of Han Zheng (CH022) suggests a clear pattern of this rule: first, he had served as mayor of Shanghai for nine years, was promoted to party secretary of the same region and only then got his Politburo membership.
All six members of 18th Politburo remained to be such at the 19th Politburo as well. Three of those officials were laterally moved to bigger and richer regions in 2012: Sun Chunlan (CH078) was appointed from Fujian to Tianjin, Hu Chunhua (CH024) was moved from Inner Mongolia to Guangdong while, Sun Zhengcai (CH079) became party secretary of Chongqing after working in Jilin.
Other party secretaries were not moved laterally during the time of observation, however, they all were heads of politically important regions: Guo Jinlong (CH019) was appointed as a secretary of Beijing in 2012, Han Zheng (CH022) was also appointed in 2012, as a secretary of Shanghai, and Zhang Chunxian (CH120) served as a party secretary of Xinjiang.
While all 18th Politburo members remained their membership in 19th Politburo, not all of them continued to serve as party secretaries. Sun Chunlan (CH078) was promoted to be a director of United Front Work Department in 2014. Hu Chunhua (CH024) was promoted as well and now serves as a Vice-Premier of State Council which is the seventh most powerful rank in China. Sun Zhengcai's (CH079) career path was not as successful: in 11th of April 2017 he was dismissed and later faced corruption charges.
New Politburo members are also party secretaries and are newly appointed at China's municipalities and other important regions. Specifically, all five of new Politburo members gained their membership after they were appointed in 2016 and 2017 to previously mentioned regions. Cai Qi (CH005) became party secretary of Beijing in 2017. Li Hongzhong (CH036) became a member after he was moved laterally from Hubei to Tianjin. Another party secretary, Li Qiang (CH040), also became a Politburo member in 2017 after being laterally moved to the municipally: Shanghai. Li Xi Liaoning (CH041) started to his post in 2017 in Guangdong after serving in Liaoning for two years. Chen Quanguo (CH012), as previously Zhang Chunxian (CH120), became member after he was appointed at Xinjiang in 2016.
These appointments suggest that not all regions are alike in terms of political weight: Xinjiang, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangdong are the regions who carry additional leverage in local politics. Appointment to one of these regions can be considered as promotions in itself. Therefore, it is important to further investigate the link between appointments to these cities and Politburo membership.
However, it is not clear whether the list of politically crucial regions changes in time. While appointment to Chongqing was contingent with Politburo membership for 18th Politburo in 2012, it is not the case for 19th. After the arrest of Bo Xilai in 2012, next party secretary of this municipality was Zhang Dejiang (CH121), who served for one year after being promoted to deputy director of Central National Security Commission. He also was 18th Politburo member. Then, in 2012, also an 18th Politburo member Sun Zhengcai (CH079) took over the office. After his arrest, Chen Miner (CH010) became a party secretary in 2017, but without membership of 19th Politburo.
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