The Effects of Xi Jinping’s Cadre Policy on Incentives for Bureaucracy
Features of the influence of Xi Jinping's personnel policy on incentives in the career advancement of officials. Consideration of the career movements of regional officials in 2012-2018. Acquaintance with the economic performance of Xi Jinping's henchmen.
| Рубрика | Политология |
| Вид | дипломная работа |
| Язык | английский |
| Дата добавления | 27.08.2020 |
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The case of Chongqing puts into question whether Politburo membership is granted with the region. On the contrary, it demonstrates that being a member also depends on a person, not only on a region one serves in.
Another argument towards this idea can be found in example of Tibet representation in Politburo. After Cheng Quanguo left his position as party secretary of Tibet, another official was appointed in that region in 2016. Wu Yingjie (CH102) is a full 19th CC CCP member, however, he was not elected a Politburo member even after a year of service in that region.
According to recent studies and analyses of Politburo composition, it is evident that Xi Jinping respects the age limitation rule.
9.Economic and social indices
The table below summarizes overall performance of all regional officials. Calculations were made for six measurements: investments in fixed assets, GDP per capita, per capita urban household income, per capita rural household income, rural poverty rate, unemployment rate. Indices were calculated as geometric average growth rate of a particular variable over the national geometric average growth rate during an official served.
Reasons to use geometric mean growth is that unlike the arithmetic average, this method of calculation accounts for compound from one period to another, making statistics more reliable. The reason to compare regional and national growth rates is that national growth measurements are widely available and are not subject to big fluctuations.
Due to the fact that average tenure has lessened it is more difficult to estimate regional performance of newly appointed officials as they don't have enough data. Another difficulty in calculating performance indices is that data is incomplete for some variables.
As can be seen on a table, there are a few variables that are missing. Due to the insufficient data, rural poverty and investment indices cannot be calculated for all individuals. However, not all cases of missing variables require the same treatment. Data for rural poverty is largely underreported and only available for 2010-2016. Investment measurements, however, lack data only for 2017, which makes it more assessable. Therefore, these variables will be analyzed only for those local officials, who have it.
Table 8. Average economic performance indices by career move.
On average, people who got promoted do not differ significantly from other career groups' performance. Average GDP growth of promoted officials is only 0.004% greater than the growth rate retired officials present.
Investment-wise, promoted officials present second lowest growth rate among six career groups. Largest investments growth rate is exhibited in retirement groups. Both honorably and regularly retired officials obtain investment growth up to 3.3% and 2.1%, more than national average, respectively.
All in all, for regionally promoted group no significant performance was found. Regional incumbents who were accused of bribery have a similar growth rates to other officials except for investments. The growth rate of this index is on average 0.3% lower than national growth rate.
Social indicators, among promoted officials distinct notably. Rural poverty and unemployment rates for those who have been promoted are 2.6% and 2.1% better than the national average, respectively. A group of regionally transferred individuals also exhibit good performance in terms of social indicators. However, rural poverty figures are not significant due to the small amount of observations.
Regarding unemployment rate, regional leaders who were moved to the center produced lower negative growth rates than national average. This measurement is around 2% higher than China's average, which indicates that unemployment rate was not falling, but rising during the times regional officials from this group held an office.
The difference in social indicators' growth rate is also present among officials, who were retired without honorable posts. Significant alterations can be seen in rural poverty negative growth rate: it is higher than average by 2.8% and larger by 3% than honorably retired persons produced.
As for officials with honorable pensions, they perform better on social indicators than the group of retired cadres. While growth rates of rural poverty and unemployment were negative for the first group, retired officials produced lower negative growth rate for these measurements on average.
All in all, economic performance of various career groups does not differ significantly. Promoted officials present average or sometimes worse economic indicators than their colleagues with other career paths. Social indices of promoted regional officials, however, distinct significantly. These findings present that old performance-based incentives system is changing. Economic performance is no longer a priority for regional officials, but social indicators for promoted officials reflect better performance. However, it is yet unclear what are the exact parameters of promotion for them after 2012.
Retired officials, however, present somewhat clear distinction in performance. Those, whose social indicators exhibit smaller negative growth rate tend to get retired with no honorable posts. On the other hand, old officials who are retired with honors, tend to obtain better results in social indicators. It is still debatable whether social performance influences a career path for honorably retired officials, because this career step is a clearer indicator for political prestige than performance.
10.Connections to Xi Jinping. Promoted officials and shared work experience with Xi Jinping
Personal ties with General Secretary are gaining more importance as power in PRC becomes more personalized. A group of officials who had long-term working relationship with Xi Jinping is a category of people who are most likely to benefit from changing regulations in cadre management system.
Although personal and political ties, especially work experience, have always facilitated careers of regional officials, they still were subject to regulations and investigation. However, this administration has more realized view on institutional process of promotion and appointment. Therefore, investigation of Xi Jinping proteges' career paths would shed some light on new patterns of promotion.
Based on detailed research conducted by Cheng Li, it is possible to compare economic performance of Xi Jinping's proteges and compare it with other promoted officials.
Out of 16 listed proteges, half of them has served as regional officials between 2012 and 2018. Apart from Li Zhanshu (CH044), who became the director of General Office on Central Committee in 2012, other proteges only started their regional-level careers after Xi Jinping's appointment.
After transition of power in 2012, four of claimed proteges were appointed to serve as government and party officials. Three governors, Chen Min'er (CH010), Bayanqolu (CH002), and Li Qiang (CH040) were newly appointed and ended their terms in relatively short period of time. Bayanqolu was promoted to the party secretary of Jilin in 2014, after only two years of serving as a Jilin governor. Chen Min'er, in his turn, served three years after being appointed as party secretary of Guizhou and then, only after two years of service, he was transferred to municipality of Chongqing. Li Qiang served the longest of Xi Jinping's proteges and was promoted to the party secretary of Jiangsu after four years of being a governor of Zhejiang.
The fourth protйgй who was appointed in 2012, was Xia Baolong (CH104). He had regional experience before his new appointment, he was an acting governor of Zhejiang in 2011-2012. After becoming party secretary of the same province, he served until the age of 65 and then was transferred with honorable pension.
Another wave of newly appointed proteges was in 2016-2017 when four more acquaintance of Xi Jinping were appointed as governors and party secretaries. Three of them, Cai Qi (CH005), Lou Yangsheng (CH057), and Li Qiang (CH040) started working in 2016. Another cadre, Ying Yong (CH113) was appointed in 2017.
Due to the recent appointments of those officials, it is difficult to evaluate their economic performance and career changes. However, one regional bureaucrat, Cai Qi, has a distinguishable career path. He was promoted to the party secretary post after only one year of serving. He is also the only regional officials who got transferred to Shanghai after only one year of holding the office. Although his economic and social indicators can be assessed, it is more likely that Cai Qi was rewarded not for his outstanding performance.
All in all, regional officials, who had work experience with Xi Jinping, tend to get promoted at a faster rate than others. Only three of eight people held their offices longer than three years. Almost all regional officials get either promoted or transferred to richer and more influential political regions. In one case, when a protйgй of Xi Jinping stopped working due to the age, the retiree got honorable pension in the NPC.
11.Economic performance of Xi Jinping's protйgйs
Although many Xi Jinping's proteges serve short term in their positions, it is still possible to compare economic and social performance of some. Three regional officials, who has served three or more years in one region and then moved, were chosen. Each of them is compared with average performance of a group with same career movements.
Two regional officials were regionally promoted and another one was given an honorable pension at the end of his service. Therefore, it is crucial to compare these regional leaders with an average performance in group of regionally promoted and honorably retired persons.
Table 9. Performance indices of Xi Jinping's proteges that ended their term.
Chen Min'er and Li Qiang fall in categories of their career movement: regional officials are promoted with average 1.006 GDP index where minimum is 0.86. While Li Qiang performance fall short by 0.02% from national average GDP growth rate, Chen Min'er exhibits above average growth rate for this group: 1.2%. Another index that Li Qiang lacks positive results is urban households' income which is lower than the average national by 0.5%. Apart from these two measurements, Li Qiang performance coincides with those that other regionally promoted officials show. Xia Baolong, who got an honorable pension, performed worse than the group in GDP growth and urban households' income as well.
All in all, Li Qiang and Xia Baolong might have gotten preferential treatment regarding their economic performance, but their average performance did not differ from their career movements groups significantly.
12.Regional officials who travel with Xi Jinping
19 people travelled with Xi Jinping or appeared with him on a public event. 10 of those individuals got promoted between 2012 and 2018 which could be an indicator for promotion of regional officials. However, it is important to compare their economic performance with those officials who were promoted and had no connections with Party Secretary.
Table 10. Economic and social indices for promoted officials who had and did not have public meeting with Xi Jinping in 2012-2018
It seems regional officials who met with Xi Jinping during their tenures got promoted with lower economic and social performance than those who have not met with the First Secretary. Most notably, the average growth rate of investments, rural households' income was 2 and 4 percent lower than national average. Social indices, such as rates of rural poverty and unemployment present better outcomes for those who appeared together with Xi Jinping.
Although it is not clear whether official meetings with Xi Jinping effect cadres' promotion probability, the correlation between two variable appears to be 41%.
13.The difference in economic performance between arrested and regular officials
Studies show that government control does not prevent corruption and rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, the systemic problem of corruption seems to be intact even after thorough anti-corruption campaign conducted by CCDI.
Table 11. Average economic performance of arrested and non-arrested officials.
Although the group of non-arrested officials is significantly larger, it is possible to analyze average performance of regional officials. On average, social and economic indicators of two groups do not differ significantly. Only investments' growth rates of arrested officials fall short by 1% from national average growth rate and by 5% from average economic performance of non-arrested regional officials.
There is a number of differences between arrested and non-arrested officials: those, who eventually got accused of corruption obtained smaller growth rates than promoted officials. While the gap of GDP indices amounts to 1%, the difference in investments measurements is considerable: investments grew 1% slower than national average.
Conclusion
All in all, this thesis obtained results in analyzing and interpreting latest permutations and trends in China's cadre politics. A total of 135 people and 172 observations were made during the time of study. Individual performance indices were developed to assess each official comparing with average national growth rate for six variables.
Moreover, academic literature regarding promotions of regional leaders and their career paths was studied. Although Chinese national leaders strived for institutionalization and formalization of basic cadre management principles, the implementation lacked continuity. In 2013, after Xi Jinping became a General Secretary of PRC, major principles of domestic politics were altered. Arrests of Zhou Yongkang broke an unspoken rule of untouchability of retired national leaders. Speeches made by Xi Jinping and his further actions proved that he puts loyalty to the party higher than age restrictions and nomination process.
All in all, economic performance of various career groups does not differ significantly. Promoted officials present average or sometimes worse economic indicators than their colleagues with other career paths. Social indices of promoted regional officials, however, distinct significantly. These findings present that old performance-based incentives system is changing. Economic performance is no longer a priority for regional officials, but social indicators for promoted officials reflect better performance. However, it is yet unclear what are the exact parameters of promotion for them after 2012.
Retired officials, however, present somewhat clear distinction in performance. Those, whose social indicators exhibit smaller negative growth rate tend to get retired with no honorable posts. On the other hand, old officials who are retired with honors, tend to obtain better results in social indicators. It is still debatable whether social performance influences a career path for honorably retired officials, because this career step is a clearer indicator for political prestige than performance.
Political representation of regions is another important factor in China. Three municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin) and two regions (Xinjiang and Guangdong) are represented by Politburo members in 18th and 19th CC CCP. However, it is likely that Politburo membership depends on the person serving, not on a province he or she is serving in. Cases of Chongqing and Tibet seem to prove this point.
Connections with First Secretary do not seem to have a significant influence over one's career or performance. Xi Jinping has a number of proteges who are serving in regions at the moment. Most of them were appointed in 2012, 2016 and 2017. While some of them have a traditional career path of serving in one region for more than two or three years, Cai Qi is a person with the most lateral movements and shortest tenures in this group. Officials who made public appearances with Xi Jinping seem to have lower economic performance than promoted officials with no connections.
Regional officials, who were accused of bribery at their time of service, show no major differences from their non-arrested colleagues. It is possible that selected officials were prosecuted for political reasons rather than for their economic performance.
In conclusion, it is evident that economic performance has reduced in significance for regional officials under Xi Jinping's administration. Other rules, such as age and term limitations, stay intact for non-promising regional leaders.
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Appendix 1
Account for mismatch between the number of career movements and people serving
Some of the categories are quite rare and almost never appear in the database. For example, there were no demotions and almost no officials being dismissed during observation. Only one governor was demoted during the time of observation which also paints a specific context for other groups of career movements.
According to last estimations, there are less people who stayed in place than there are government and party posts. There are several reasons for such results. First, most government officials and party secretaries are moved laterally in the same year they leave their previous post, therefore, move “2” also accounts for officials who are currently serving. Secondly, in analogy with lateral movements, some regional officials are moved out of regional level jobs in the last year they served. All cases of these instances will be covered here.
There are 31 regions in China observed in this study: 22 provinces (excluding Taiwan), four municipalities and five autonomous regions. Special administrative regions such as Hong Kong and Macau are not included. Each region has two officials in charge of its performance: party secretary and governor. If all positions are taken, then 62 regional officials should stay in place every year. However, it is not the case. Only 56-61 regional official stayed in place in 2012-2018.
If lateral move (2) occurs at the same year official ends his term, it means that he works on the same regional level continuously. Hence, moves 2 can be added to moves 1. However, not all years result in 62 after addition. 2012 and 2017 years still miss one person while 2014 misses two.
In 2012 there are 31 party secretaries and only 29 governors. Two governors, CH032 Jiang Jufeng (Sichuan) and CH019 Guo Jinlong (mayor of Beijing) were moved out of their posts. Jiang Jufeng ended his term officially in December 2012 - January 2013, however, chinavitae.com did not count 2013 as last year of his term. Therefore, his move was coded as demoted (10) for 2012 and his successor was appointed in 2013. Guo Jinlong, however, was regionally promoted and coded appropriately (3). His replacement also took office in 2013.
In 2014 31 party secretaries and 29 governors are coded as “stayed in place” (1) or laterally moved (2). CH067 Nuer Bekri (Xinjiang) was promoted to the center (4) and CH031 Jiang Dingzhi (Hainan) retired (9). Their replacements took offices next year, in 2015.
There are 31 party secretaries and 30 governors coded as 1 and 2 in 2017. One more governor, CH115 Yu Weiguo (Fujian) was regionally promoted (3) and his replacement was appointed to the office the next year.
Appendix 2
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for regionally promoted officials
Appendix 3
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for promoted officials
Appendix 4
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for officials moved to the center
Appendix 5
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for officials with honorable pensions
Appendix 6
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for arrested officials
Appendix 7
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for retired officials
Appendix 8
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for promoted officials without public appearances with Xi Jinping
Appendix 9
regional personnel policy
Average, minimum, and maximum economic and social indices for promoted officials with public appearances with Xi Jinping.
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