Process-oriented interactions of democracy in Ukraine

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Process-oriented interactions of democracy in Ukraine

Lotiuk Konstantinas,

PhD student at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,

Department of Public Administration and Political Science,

Klaipeda University.

Лотюк Константинас,

аспірант Факультету Соціальних та Гуманітарних Наук, Відділення Публічного Управління та Політичної Науки, Клайпедеький Університет

ПРОЦЕСНО-ОРІЄНТОВАНА ВЗАЄМОДІЯ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ В УКРАЇНІ

Анотація

Стаття являє собою цільовий аналіз прикладів демократії. Недавні дослідження політичних режимів переповнені глибоким розумінням процесів демократизації та де-демократизації. Процеси демократизації чітко визначені навіть у випадках консолідованої демократії, зважаючи на те, що доля нових демократій, що зазнають великих змін, є надзвичайно важливою. Стаття присвячена розвитку політичного режиму в Україні. Методологічний аналіз відношень демократизації та дедемократизації в Україні підкреслює різницю між позитивною неминучістю ліберальної демократії в транзитології та позитивним різноманіттям форм відносин між процесами демократизації та де-демократизації в трансформатології, включаючи несподівані. Увага притягується зрештою до гібридного політичного режиму, що існує в пост-демократичному просторі, внаслідок чого процеси демократизації та дедемократизації як заперечують та замінюють один одного, так і взаємодіють. Дана стаття зазначає, що існуючий політичний режим в Україні слід охарактеризувати за категоріями про-демократичний та пост-демократичний. В цілому, стаття щонайбільш базується на сучасному контексті та правомірності гібридного політичного режиму.

Ключові слова: демократія, відносини між демократизацією та де- демократизацією, гібридний політичний режим, внутрішні та зовнішні фактори політичного режиму, пост демократія, Україна.

democracy political regime

Abstract

This article constitutes a case study of democracy. Recent studies on political regimes are rich in insights into the relationship between processes of democratization and de-democratization. There are clearly identifiable processes of dedemocratization even in consolidated democracies, given that a fate of the new democracies, which are facing great challenges, is of high importance. The article is focused on the development of the Ukrainian political regime. A methodological analysis of the relationship between the democratization and de-democratization processes in Ukraine underlines a difference between a positive inevitability of liberal democracy in transitology and a positive diversity of forms of relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes, including unexpected ones, in transformatology. Attention is drawn to a hybrid political regime in the long run that exists in a post-democratic environment, whereby the processes of democratization and de-democratization either deny and interchange each other or interact. The article argues that the hybrid political regime, existing in Ukraine, should be characterised by categories of pro-democratic post-democracy. In general, the article focuses much on present-day contextuality and appropriateness of a hybrid political regime.

Key words: democracy, relationship between democratisation and de-democratisation, hybrid political regime, internal and external factors of political regime, post-democracy, Ukraine.

Introduction

Democracy is perhaps a universally recognised ideal to be pursued or, even, a natural and, in a certain sense, an ultimate condition of development for countries. S. Huntington's democratic waves have actively been in the forefront of studies on democracy for 30 years now. They claim to answer the question of what is really going on with democracy over the past 50 years. Whilst there were only about a third of states considered democracies in the 1960s and this was called the first wave of democracy, now the focus of discussion is the end of the third wave of democratization. It can be acknowledged that democracy has been an incredible success; nonetheless, the number of democracies stabilised in the first decade of the 21st century. Meanwhile, democracies themselves undergo unexpected changes. The latter are increasingly analysed using a post-democratic approach, from a perspective of the relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes, and involve the discourse of the hybridisation of political regimes.

It is both scientifically and practically important to establish a link of democracy, democratization and de-democratization processes with current trends such as postdemocracy and hybrid political regimes, as well as to see not just short-time undemocratic content in the latter. The continuity of the history of democracy should be seen only through the oldest prism of its «inevitability,» but from the perspective of its actual historical effectiveness, too. In particular, this makes sense when transformation and de-democratization processes take place in consolidated democracies. Another topical question arises of whether the countries that call themselves `new democracies' do not follow the traditional path of `pure democracy,' where democratic development is undergoing fundamental changes and the `new democracies' themselves have not become the consolidated democracies for a long time. Neither the separation of the vectors of democratization and de-democratization nor the analysis of their relationship is a scientific innovation. Scientific innovation means a description of the relationship between the above processes, aimed not only to show the outlines of current and future political conjuncture but also to assess the prospects for democracy regarded as the best form of governance to date in those cases when the processes democratization and de-democratization not only change, deny, and eliminate each other, but also when they interact with each other in certain situations and in a certain way, thus, complementing and restraining those extremes that hinder political stability and good governance. So, cases of theoretical modelling and practices of democratization and de-democratization as a one-way process for better political governance are not excluded.

Ukraine, as a focus of analysis of the relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes and a hybrid political regime, is a relevant choice. Ukraine is the right case for further construction and operationalisation of the theoretical model of the relationship between democratization and dedemocratization; it might become a tool for analysing the political development of not only those countries that are now known as `gray areas,' but also those countries that are failing to meet standard regulations for democracy, facing more and more challenges, though, argued to be called `consolidated democracies.'

The years 1989-1991 became a turning point for many countries of the Central and Eastern Europe in terms of choosing a historical perspective. As is well known, about a decade later, teleology of democratic transit was substituted by transformatology, which treated the establishment of liberal democracy only as one of the possible alternatives for the development of post-communist and other post-authoritarian countries. The Orange Revolution, which started in Ukraine as late as in 2004, inspired the first pro-democratic and pro-Western processes that began to decline after 2010. The pro-Russian unrest led to the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014. In that sense, pro-Russian and pro-Western political realities came into collision. The revolution became a challenge in political, social, economic, and even military terms. The years 2004 and 2014 marked the aspirations for democratization. The years 2008 to 2010 noted the frustration as democratization processes were not backed by its institutionalisation or restraint of corruption, oligarchisation, and other undemocratic processes. The recent years 2019-2020 also point to the complicated relationship between the democratization and de-democratization processes. So, in today's Ukraine, like in most other pro-democratic countries of the world, there are both the processes of democracy building and undemocratic processes taking place.

Based on the analysis of the situation in Ukraine, the article presents findings of the research, i.e., verification of the two following statements-hypotheses for the relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes that are relevant in scientific discourse:

1. In Ukraine, the processes of democratization and de-democratization interact not only as the ones denying or eliminating each other, but also as complementing and restraining those extremes that hinder political stability.

2. The relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes in Ukraine is subject to both internal and external factors, the interaction of which generates the peculiarities of post-democracy and hybrid political regime in Ukraine.

Methodology

The methodological «triangle» of the research is as follows: 1) the use of scientific discourse of the analysis of the relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes; 2) changes in indices for the political system in Ukraine for 2004-2020 based on The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, Freedom House Index (FHI), and Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI); 3) expert survey (interview) on the topic of relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes in Ukraine.

We have a particular interest in the democracy research strategy proposed by R. Dahl (2015-2014). Herein, we refer mainly to his book Democracy and Its Critics (1989). When using R. Dahl's concept of the limits of democracy, we will find that even so-called stable democracies (according to R. Dahl, polyarchies, i.e., real democracies, which are short of democratic ideals) have no chance of escaping dedemocratization processes. «We need to understand not only why democracy is desirable but also what its limits and its possibilities are» (Dahl, 1989, p. 2-3). So, further democratization of the real democracy, i.e., polyarchy, is necessary. According to R. Dahl, an undemocratic guardianship regime is a perennial alternative to democracy. We, like R. Dahl, do not divide the world into a priori good democracies and bad non-democracies -- we analyse theories and practices of democracy in the world in which we live now and will live in the foreseeable future. The powers of «good» democracies in introducing democracy in other countries, as R. Dahl suggested, are likely to remain restricted. At the same time, we increasingly gain insight into R. Dahl's arguments that the number of democracies in the world should not change significantly, in particular, when we supplement the insight with C. Tilly's concept of `long-run trajectories' of democratization and de-democratization.

The topicality of theorising the relationship between democratization and dedemocratization originates from the theoretical and empirical-analytical legacy of C. Tilly (1929-2008), mainly from his research work Democracy (2007). We draw attention to at least four major aspects of this legacy. First, C. Tilly does not agree that a political regime does not count as a democracy anymore if it lacks at least one of the six institutions named by R. Dahl. According to C. Tilly, this may work for annual count of political regimes, however, «If we want insight into the causes and effects of democratization or de-democratization, we have no choice but to recognize them as continuous processes rather than simple steps across a threshold in one direction or the other» (Tilly, 2007, p. 10). By the way, we borrow the definition of political regime from C. Tilly (2007) and T. Colton (2018) T. Colton links the origins of his definition of a political regime to a representative review of R. A. Fishman's (1990) studies on political regimes.: a political regime is state-society (citizens) relationship, the essence of which is who gets access to the sources of state power and in what way, and how those who use those sources of power treat those who do not have such power. This definition of a political regime is effective in outlining both the differences in its democracy / non-democracy and its hybridity. In addition, a political regime is deemed stable where the state and its citizens negotiate, have a dialogue and advising, and mutual trust prevails. On the contrary, a political regime is unstable (fragile) where the state and the citizens do not negotiate, do not trust each other, or are even in a state of struggle.

Second, C. Tilly defines democracy as «a certain class of relations between states and citizens, and democratization and de-democratization will consist of changes in those sorts of relations, <...> democratization (and of de-democratization as well) center on the state-citizen struggle, <...> regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation. Democratization means net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected, and more binding consultation. De-democratization, obviously, then means net movement toward narrower, more unequal, less protected, and less binding consultation» (Tilly, 2007, p. 12, 13-14).

Third, even though C. Tilly conceptually sees the opposition of democratization and de-democratization processes («In a democratic theoretician's ideal world, democratization and dedemocratization would move along the same straight line, but in opposite directions») (2007, p. 161), in reality, however, things are much more complicated («History abhors straight lines»), while irregular trajectories mean the intertwining of multiple democratization and de-democratization processes, with the domination of one achieved only after a continuous effort. Further, C. Tilly (2007, p. 195-196) emphasises «the asymmetrical patterns of support for and involvement in democratization and de-democratization.»

Fourth, C. Tilly distinguishes three fundamental processes of democratization and de-democratization: 1. Increase or decrease of integration between interpersonal networks of trust (e.g., kinship, religious membership, and relationships within trades) and public politics; 2. Increase or decrease in the insulation from public politics of the major categorical inequalities (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity, religion, class, caste) around which citizens organize their daily lives; 3. Increase or decrease in the autonomy of major power centers (especially those wielding significant coercive means) such as warlords, patron-client chains, armies, and religious institutions with respect to public politic. We are going to analyse the processes of democratization and de-democratization in Ukraine from the perspective of the above three processes. Before emphasising that the discourse of democracy studies is «richer» in propositions about democratization as inevitable and irreversible process, and that de-democratization is often described as a random and reversible process, in our opinion, we should look at the processes of democratization and dedemocratization through the present day's conductors such as political corruption, oligarchisation, growing socio-economic inequality, terrorism, global emergencies (climate change, COVID-19 pandemic), ethnic-cultural tensions caused by the mobility of the world's population, attempts of some democracies to democratise non- democratic countries and, conversely, attempts of some non-democratic countries to obstruct democratization processes in other countries. Looking at the today's world old democracies and new democracies from C. Tilly's point of view, we should acknowledge the stage of de-democratization. Without ruling out such possibility, we should note that two relatively new concepts have recently been competing in the scientific discourse of de-democratization: post-democracy and hybrid political regimes.

We seek a methodological solution with respect to the scientific discourse of a hybrid political regime. V Laurenas (2018) suggests assessing the diversity of the latter discourse by means of the democratization-de-democratization (D-D) analytical tool and argues that the processes of democratization and dedemocratization not only deny each other and, in this sense, follow each other, but they also directly interact, i.e., may complement and restrain each other's extremes that hinder the emergence of a stable political regime in a post-democratic environment. According to V. Laurenas' concept, aimed at the search for a more sustainable political regime, where relations between the state and citizens are free of any struggle, the processes of democratization and de-democratization are too closely linked to the dimensions of one-wayness (parallel) and unidimensionality. We are not completely putting aside V. Laurenas' analytical D-D tool, especially, the segment in which V. Laurenas derives his concept of post-democracy and hybrid political regime from the R. Dahl's (1989) guardianship regime and defines the D-D tool as a condition of a pro-democratic post-democracy and a pro-democratic hybrid political regime. We, however, opt for a methodological approach to analysing the relationship between democratization and de-democratization with is close to C. Tilly. We replace the integrity of the processes of democratization and de-democratization, expressed by the abbreviation D-D, with their totality, expressed by D&D.

There is an increasing focus on the hybridity of political regimes in scientific discourse. The principal definition of a hybrid political regime is as follows: The regime is hybrid because it combines both democratic (regular and direct elections) with autocratic (repression against political opponents, opposition constraints, media control) features (Karl, 1995; Diamond, 2002, 2015). The definition of the assumptions, preconditions for existence and scenarios of hybrid regimes provided by L. Diamond should be considered as a reference point. However, according to A. Cassani (2014), M. Mufti (2018), the scientific discourse still has no consensus on the hybrid regime. So, it makes sense to list several categories of a hybrid political regime: weakened democracy; weakened autocracy; a third regime between democracy and autocracy; open autocracy. It is, therefore, necessary to deepen discussions of inadequacy of the definition of a hybrid political regime as a «gray area,» for this purpose, to resort to separate arguments for describing hybrid political regimes as normal, where hybridity is typical not only for separate new democracies, but also increasingly emerges in the `old,' i.e., consolidated democracies.

Thus, it is important to deconstruct definitions of a hybrid political regime, to analyse the historicity, contextuality, and relevance of this regime. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to doing this is, as L. Diamond (2002) rightly points out, the following dilemma: on the one hand, democracy usually is a measure to outline other political regimes, to formulate their definitions and, on the other hand, there is still a lack of unified understanding what democracy itself means. We also resort to the time-tested insight of J. J. Linz (1973, p. 34): it is not efficient to use categories of democracy for describing hybrid regimes as the differences between democracy and the hybrid political regime are diminished. Moreover, such political regimes need to be distinguished from authoritarian dictatorships. Of course, such types might be supplemented by adjectives `competitive' or `electoral' authoritarianism (plg. Collier and Levitsky, 1997). This, however, is not enough to define a hybrid political regime itself. Given the multifaceted nature of this form of governance, we should further classify sub-categories of hybrid governance. Whatsoever, we seek to analyse hybrid political regimes in the context of their appropriateness rather than their a priori denial. In the current circumstances of chaotic processes, a hybrid political regime is promising not only because it becomes a counterweight to disorganised democracy, to politics in general and politics -- it also properly adapts the performance of democratic institutions through some undemocratic elements. Such a political regime is not a case of lacking representation of political interests or abuse of power but, unlike the so-called «gray area» regimes, it is responsibly developed and legitimate, may help in achieving long-term sustainability of the state-citizen relationship. Of course, this is just a theoretical vision. It does not means at all that the type of hybrid political regime so defined is numerous -- on the contrary, there are only a few regimes retaining such unique features. For instance, we can mention Poland or Hungary. So, an effective functioning of a hybrid political regime is not a matter of course.

A key element of the methodology is the application of post-democratic approach. Post-democratic theorists emphasise the increasing gap between the state (ruling elites) and society (citizens), where the usual political participation of citizens is diminished and the ruling elites are willing to govern in the same democratic way as the mass participation of citizens in politics (Crouch, 2004, 2011; Ranciere, 2007). It is just a matter of time before a large-scale social conflict escalates into an outbreak of violence. (Polokhalo, 1997). The biggest obstacle to Ukraine's faster democratization and economic transformation had been and still is an overly established nomenclature, which has accumulated vast economic resources in hand of a few big capitals as a result of to economic and political paralysis in the first five years of independence. (Polokhalo, 1997). The further evolution of political, economic, and social events in Ukraine can be argued to have greatly revealed the correct forecasts of such processes. According to J. Matsievski, neither of the quantitative changes of political organisations, that took place in 1991 and 2005, turned into qualitative change, i.e., transformations into the national elite (Matsievski, 2016). The nomenclature itself treated the processes of the country's independence as a chance to concentrate even more power and capital in its hand, at the same time, combining these steps with the prevailing need for social and economic security in society.

Post-democracy is not just a demonstration of power and role of elites -- it is also a gap between governors and citizens, at the heart of which is growing social inequality. The simplest definition of the elite presupposes that they are narrow groups of society that control the resources of power, such as workforce, decisionmaking, military resources, etc. The rest of the society, which are outstandingly larger, are those controlled who have no power to influence the people around them, and whose social status is much lower. The existence of a gap between the state and society is evidenced by massive protest movements, unconventional political participation in general. Post-democracy also exists in the elections of authoritarian political leaders in democracies (plg. Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). We mostly refer to the statement by K. Serpetis (2009) that post-democracy is an opposition to adverse cases of liberal democracy. At the same time, we supplement this statement: postdemocracy is not only a post-democratic but a pre-democratic political regime, too.

Post-democracy is considered a historical case of de-democratization, which, however, is temporary and eventually replaced by democratization or coming across and coexisting with democratization for a long time. It is commonly believed that populism is a sign of de-democratization. However, keeping in mind that neodemocracy as, among other things, democracy may coexist with unconventional and spontaneous participation, even with right-wing populism, without linking it to radicalism or extremism, K. von Beyme's (2013; 2018) argument that democratization and de-democratization are phases in relations between the state and citizens is subject to additional verification. Observations on the ending of postdemocracy associated with the rise of unconventional protest movements are valuable, as well (Miller, 2020). According to the Freedom House and The Economist (2019) indices, an overall political activity of citizens is increasing. At the same time, a mass emergence of protest movements was classified as exceptionally populist too hastily. However, as noted by Guy Peters and J. Pierre (2020), though the wave of populism remains sound in today's politics, actual dominant positions are occupied by a small number of politicians or political forces who are advocating populist ideas. A protest is becoming a key tool for changing the policy agenda, which the authorities do not grant access to as a platform for policy change. All of this is more similar to what we have called the D-D and D&D processes and relate to the foundation of a hybrid political regime.

The scientific challenge is that more and more political systems are gaining signs of hybridity. As the scope of decision-making and accountability decreases in society, the processes of de-democratization naturalise in a certain way, rather than just hinder democratization processes or deny democracy at all. This assumption stems from the evolution in the state of democracy as of the first decades of the 21st century, as well as from the interaction between democratization and de-democratization, i.e., the reverse process. Namely, the latter concept of interaction is lacking in the scientific discourse of democracy studies. So the fundamental question is whether do democratization and de-democratization deny each other and coexist temporarily or does their relationship suggest a new political regime -- hybrid and long-term?

It is time to emphasise that the article is based on the works of Ukrainian scholars. Publications by V Lebediuk (2018), Razumkov Centre (2020), J. Matsievski (2016), V Polokhalo (1997) present not only data of public surveys in Ukraine, but also the range of political preferences, by linking it with the sensitivity of the political regime in the context of external and internal political, social, and economic events. The publications of the English scholar T Kuzio (1998, 2005) who originally hails from Ukraine, have also been used. The works focus on the transition of Ukraine from the Soviet, communist state towards a democratic system, as well as the typology of political regimes in Ukraine.

A range of scientific and expert publications on the analysis of democratization and de-democratization processes in Ukraine is growing. Reports by L. Lindegaard, N. Webster (2018), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Jarabik, De Waal, 2018) in Ukraine Reform Monitor, Transparency International (2017, 2018, 2020), Fragile States Index, Ukraine (2020) analyse the trajectory of political reforms in Ukraine after the Euromaidan Revolution and the decentralization as one of the key vectors of democratization in the context of reforms.

Empirical data

Regarding empirical data on democratization and dedemocratization processes in Ukraine, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House (FHI), and Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI) were consulted for assessing the development of democracy in Ukraine. Opinions on the development of democracy in Ukraine of experts from the above institutions have also been used. Another source of empirical data has been a semi-structured expert survey. Nine Ukrainian political development experts were interviewed, six of them from Ukraine and three -- from Lithuania. The study was aimed to interview Ukrainian experts with residences in different regions of the country. This enables a more detailed analytical section of the above processes. Some experts from Lithuania were questioned in order to compare expert opinions and have a more diverse analytical approach.

The research questionnaire, used to construct a semi-structured interview, was formulated and presented nineteen questions, by dividing them into three groups: the nature of interaction of democratization and de-democratization in Ukraine, internal factors of D&D processes, and external factors of D&D processes. This structure of expert interview makes it possible to characterise perhaps the most affecting aspects of the political development of Ukraine of the 21st century. This allows for a more reasonable analysis on development of democracy in Ukraine, as well as observation that although Ukraine is formally recognised as a country positioning the features of democracy, in reality, democracy in it often faces existential challenges. Four stages of Ukraine's political development have been identified: the years 2004 -- 2008 -- 2014--2019. In collaboration with the experts, it has been acknowledged that this division into periods is not complete, but rather analytical and depends on the opinion of the experts themselves.

Expert opinion (not always with sufficient data for summarising it) is particularly sensitive and operative, interpreted in the context of both the scientific discourse of democratization and de-democratization in Ukraine and the sequences of indices of Ukrainian democracy (de-democratization). The aim is to identify those statements and data, to agree upon reliability of some of them and to disagree and discuss reliability of other ones.

Finally, we present a schematic diagram of the study:

Internal and external factors of democratization and de-democratization in Ukraine. D&D processes in Ukraine are significantly determined both by internal and external factors. Therefore, a better knowledge of peculiarities of the relationship between democratization and de-democratization processes in Ukraine requires analysis of D&D internal and external factors in a complex way, integrally. Among internal D&D factors, there are the following: the form of state governance, institutionalisation of democracy, oligarchisation and corruption, civil society, proRussian and partly pro-Soviet-union forces, nationalism, post-communist socioeconomic transformation. External factors include the configuration of Russian, US, and EU influences. In Ukraine, the sum of such factors creates a situation of a hybrid political regime.