Believers in the Ukrainian orthodox churches of Kyiv and Moscow patriarchates: sociodemographic differentiation and political opinions

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Annotation

УДК 316.74:2

BELIEVERS IN THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES OF KYIV AND MOSCOW PATRIARCHATES: SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENTIATION AND POLITICAL OPINIONS

Bogdan Olena - PhD in Sociology, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Sociology Department, Associate Professor.

Based on survey data of Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for May 2016, this article compares believers of the two largest Ukrainian Churches - the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates - in their essential sociodemographic characteristics, language preferences, national identity and opinions regarding desired Ukraine's international policies. Data shows no statistically significant differences in age or urban-rural distributions. There are minor questionable differences in levels of education and income as well as preferred language of communication (significant with probability 0.95 but not 0.99). Despite differences in macroregional distribution, national identity and views on international policy, an overwhelming majority in both Churches consider themselves "only Ukrainian", without combining this identity with Russian or any other. While a noticeable degree of differentiation exists along the lines of Russian identity (not including language preferences) and desired relations with the Russian Federation, this difference can hardly be interpreted as principally divisive since there is a strong support for Ukraine's independence among adherents of both Churches and noticeable levels of support for various policies within each of them.

Keywords: Ukraine, religion, Orthodox church, survey data, identity, language, political opinions.

Послуговуючись даними опитування Київського міжнародного інституту соціології, проведеного у травні 2016 року, у статті представлено порівняння вірян двох найбільших українських церков - Українських Православних Церков Київського та Московського Патріархатів - за базовими соціально- демографічними характеристиками, мовними уподобаннями, національною ідентичністю та поглядами щодо бажаної міжнародної політики України. Дані не показують статистично значущих відмінностей за віком або розподілом на сільське та міське населення. Під питанням незначні відмінності в рівні освіти, доходів, а також преференціях щодо мови спілкування (статистично значимі на рівні 0,95, але не на рівні 0,99). Попри відмінності у макрорегіональному розподілі, національній ідентичності та поглядах щодо міжнародної політики, переважна більшість вірян обох Церков вважають себе "лише українцями/українками", без поєднання цієї ідентичності з російською або будь-якою іншою. Хоча помітна диференціація має місце з погляду російської ідентичності (не включаючи мовні преференції) та бажаних взаємин з Російською Федерацію, ці відмінності навряд чи можна інтерпретувати як принципово розмежувальні, адже незалежність України має сильну підтримку серед послідовників обох Церков і різні типи політики мають примітну підтримку в межах кожної з них.

Ключові слова: Україна, релігія, православна церква, дані опитувань, ідентичність, мова, політичні погляди.

На основе данных опроса Киевского международного института социологии, проведенного в мае 2016 года, в статье представлено сравнение верующих двух крупнейших украинских Церквей - Украинской Православной Церкви Киевского и Московского Патриархатов - по базовым социально-демографическим характеристикам, языковым предпочтениям, национальной идентичности и взглядам касательно желаемой международной политики Украины. Данные не показывают статистически значимых различий в возрасте или распределении на сельское и городское население. Под вопросом незначительные отличия в уровне образования, доходов, а также предпочитаемом языке общения (статистически значимы на уровне 0,95, но не на уровне 0,99). Несмотря на отличия в макрорегиональном распределении, национальной идентичности и взглядах на международную политику, большинство верующих обеих Церквей считают себя "только украинцами/украинками", без объединения этой идентичности с российской или какой- либо другой. Хотя заметна дифференциация с точки зрения российской идентичности (не включая языковые предпочтения) и желаемых отношений с Российской Федерацией, эти различия вряд ли можно интерпретировать как принципиально разделяющие, поскольку независимость Украины имеет сильную поддержку среди последователей обеих Церквей и разные виды политики имеют заметную поддержку в каждой из них.

Ключевые слова: Украина, религия, православная церковь, данные опросов, идентичность, язык, политические взгляды.

Introduction

Controversies have surrounded the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates since the UOC KP Here and further UOC KP stands for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate and, respectively, UOC MP for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. Correspondingly, UOC KP and MP stands for the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates. emerged in response to Ukrainian clergy's aspirations for an independent church instead of remaining subordinate to the Russian Orthodox Church [1; 2]. Being the two largest churches in Ukraine and together encompassing an overwhelming majority of believers, they remain salient agents in Ukraine's social and political life. The annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, the military confrontation in the East of Ukraine, and changes in the UOC MP leadership in the past years heightened attention to the controversial status and impact of this Church in Ukraine. Concerns over Ukraine's sovereignty and national security prompted the Ukrainian government to seek ways to minimize the influence of the UOC MP in Ukraine through establishing a Unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church Also often referred to as the Unified Local Church of Ukraine. Recent academic analyses of this issue as well as inter-Church and Church-state relations in Ukraine can be found in publications of Viktor Elenskii [1] and Oleksandr Sagan [3]., which would be recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, to which the Kyivan Metropolia initially belonged before being transferred to Moscow in 1686 [4-7]. In the light of these developments, it is important to understand how different or similar current believers of these two Churches are.

In March 2016, Razumkov Center conducted a national survey focused on religious issues in Ukraine. However, its corresponding report [8] provides an interregional overview of changes over time and allows only very limited comparison of believers from the two largest Ukrainian religious organizations. At the same time, the Razumkov Center dataset is not available for independent analysis, thus its rich data cannot be used for an extended overview by other researchers.

In May 2016, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology conducted a national survey, which can be used to better understand how similar or different believers of the UOC of KP and MP are nowadays in its basic sociodemographic characteristics, language preferences, national identity and opinions regarding desired relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Thus, these data allow to address the problem of lacking knowledge about respective Churches' believers while this information is needed in the light of current practical challenges and respective national policies.

Hence, based on recent opinion survey data, this article aims to contribute to our understanding of how similar or different adherents are who currently comprise the two largest Ukrainian religious organizations. It draws on representative survey data of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) gathered from May 19 to 31, 2016. The dataset is available free of charge to any interested researchers through the databank "Kyiv Archive" [9]. The survey is representative for Ukraine's population aged 18 and older, except those Ukrainian territories that are not controlled by Ukraine. 2014 respondents from 110 cities and villages of all administrative regions participated in face-to-face interviews (except Crimea and occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions). The survey was conducted only in those parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Regions which are controlled by Ukraine and did not cover any territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The statistical sampling error (with probability 0,95 and design-effect 1,5) does not exceed: 3,3 % for indicators close to 50 %, 2,8 % for indicators close to 25 % or 75 %, 2,0 % for indicators close to 10 % or 90 %, 1,4 % for indicators close to 5 % or 95 %, 0,7 % for indicators close to 1 or 99 %. Respective data were previously presented by the author in a KIIS analytical report available through the KIIS website [10]. We shall compare several dimensions: selected basic sociodemographic characteristics (age, education, income level, settlement type, geographical distribution), language preferences (comfortable speaking Ukrainian vs. Russian), national identity and opinions regarding Ukraine's international policies.

Share of Believers and Methodological Clarifications

Unlike in most opinion polls, this KIIS survey contained two sets of questions regarding religious identity. First, a respondent answered one question about his or her religious identity. In about half an hour, after having answered questions on other topics, the respondent answered a set of questions on religious identity that were worded differently than the initial question but once again contained all the key religious organizations among response options. Corresponding questions are listed in the Annex of this article in English and Ukrainian. While most respondents declared the same identity both times, a sizable share did not provide a consistent answer. The percent of respondents who declared the same identity twice was 92.0 % for the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (the third largest religious organization in Ukraine), 78.6 % for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate and 73.9 % for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. More details on that are provided in the corresponding KIIS report [10]. This article offers a comparison only for those respondents who provided a consistent answer, i.e. declared both times belonging to the UOC KP or UOC MP respectively.

35,9 % of respondents consistently identified with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate and 9,8 % with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. Both times believers of the UOC KP exceeded more than three times those of the UOC MP. A similar ratio for the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches of Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates was obtained by KIIS in its earlier surveys. Corresponding datasets are freely available through the databank "Kyiv Archive" [9], which was mentioned earlier in this paper. believer church opinion policy

These data differ significantly from the shares of believers reported by Razumkov Center [8]. Access to the Razumkov Center dataset would be needed to explore possible causes for this difference (as was mentioned before, the Center's dataset is not available for independent analysis). The most likely cause for this discrepancy seems to be the procedures of weighting data upon their collection. KIIS does not extrapolate data on the Crimean Peninsula and those occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions where the survey was not conducted. Instead, Razumkov Center uses data weighting procedures to extrapolate results even on those territories, which were not accessible for the actual survey. At least two more factors contribute to data discrepancies: differences in the wording and sequence of questions as well as an overall instability of religious identity in Ukraine (a number of people are hesitant about their identities).

Comparing Essential Sociodemographic Characteristics

Sociodemographic characteristics of respondents affiliated with the two largest Churches are rather similar. There are no significant differences between adherents of the UOC KP and the UOC MP by age or rural vs. urban population categories (Tables 1 and 2). However, compared to the UOC KP, the UOC MP has a somewhat larger share of adherents in cities with the population of 100 to 499 thousand The difference is statistically significant with the probability of 0.99. (Table 3).

Table 1. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Age Categories

Table 2. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Rural vs. Urban Population

Table 3. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Settlement Type and Size

Compared to the UOC KP, adherents of the UOC MP declared a somewhat higher level of education and somewhat lower level of income. However, these differences are statistically significant only with probability 0,95 but not with 0,99 (Tables 4 and 5).

Table 4. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Level of Education

Table 5. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Level of Family Income

Compared to the UOC KP, adherents of the UOC MP have a stronger presence in the Eastern macroregion; at the same time, adherents of the UCO KP have a somewhat stronger presence in the Southern and Central macroregions¹⁰ (Table 6).

There were no significant differences in language preferences among respondents affiliated with the UOC KP and MP. UOC MP adherents declared somewhat more often that they would feel more comfortable speaking Russian (Tables 7-А and 7-B; differences are statistically significant with probability 0,95 but not 0,99).

Table 6. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Macroregions Language Preferences It should be stressed that the language preferred for speaking with a stranger (such as an interviewer) is not necessarily the same as the language preferred for speaking with someone familiar. Also, in Ukraine, the language preferred for speaking is not necessarily the language preferred for reading or watching a movie. Thus, these data provide only limited information on language preferences in Ukraine and a series of questions would be needed to provide a comprehensive picture.

Overall, response distributions are rather similar and, if combined into two major categories - preferring the Ukrainian or Russian language, it can be interpreted that, regardless of their Church affiliation, the majority of survey participants preferred to speak Ukrainian: 64,0 % of UOC KP adherents and 58,6 % of UOC MP adherents (Table 7-B).

Table 7-А. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Language Preferences¹²

Table 7-B. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Language Preferences

* Includes the following responses: "Ukrainian", "Equally comfortable but speaks Ukrainian more often", "Not sure - answers in Ukrainian".

** Includes the following responses: "Russian", "Equally comfortable but speaks Russian more often", "Not sure - answers in Russian".

National Identity Please consult the Annex of this article for detailed explanations on how respondents were asked about their language preferences. It would be conceptually more accurate to write about ethnic rather than national identity in this context. However, unlike "nationality", the term "ethnicity" is not widely used in Ukraine in everyday language. Therefore, surveys ask about national identity to avoid using concepts that might be unfamiliar to many respondents.

Although most adherents of both the UOC MP and UOC KP declare Ukrainian national identity, UOC MP adherents report it somewhat less often (the difference is statistically significant with probability 0.99). However, in both Churches, an overwhelming majority indicated that they consider themselves "only Ukrainian": 89.7 % adherents of the UOC KP and 75.7 % of the UOC MP (Table 8).

Those who consider themselves "only Russian" or "both Russian and Ukrainian but mainly Russian" belong to the UOC MP with very few exceptions: respondents with this identity constitute 10,1 % of all UOC MP believers and less than 1 % (only 0,6 %) of all UOC KP believers. Overall, the share of people with these identities was not large among respondents: 3,4 % of all survey participants. However, it would be larger if Crimean Peninsula and occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk territories could be included into the survey. Those who consider themselves "equally Ukrainian and Russian" are considerably more likely to belong to the UOC MP than to the UOC KP. Thus, as we can see in Table 8, while people with Russian identity are considerably more likely to belong to the UOC MP than to the UOC KP, the overwhelming majority of believers in both Churches declare only Ukrainian identity.

Table 8. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: National Identity

Opinions on Ukraine's International Policy.

The above analysis shows only minor differences between believers of the two major Churches and mainly demonstrates similarities. However, opinions regarding desired Ukraine's international policy reveal wider differences than any of the indicators considered earlier in this article.

While adherents of both Churches do not support the idea of Ukraine and Russia uniting into one state, their preferences regarding Ukraine's international policy towards Russia differ substantially. Most UOC KP adherents choose the response "Ukraine's relations with Russia should be the same as with the others" (53,8 %) while most UOC MP adherents opt for "Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states" (58,9 %). The percent difference for "Ukraine and Russia should unite into one state" is statistically significant with probability 0,95 but not 0.99 and only a small fraction of people in both Churches expressed this opinion: 2,2 % of UOC KP adherents and 5,6 % of UOC MP (Table 9).

Table 9. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Preferences regarding the Relations between Ukraine and Russia

Ukraine's joining the European Union is supported by the majority of UOC KP adherents (58,2 %) and by one third of UOC MP adherents (33,0 %). About one fifth of respondents affiliated with the UOC MP (21,3 %) support Ukraine's joining the Customs Union: this is three times higher level of support than among UOC KP adherents, among which a respective indicator constituted 7,5 % (Table 10).

Table 10. UOC KP and MP Affiliated Respondents: Preferences regarding Ukraine's International Policy

While the above differences are substantial, they should not be misinterpreted as a deep dividing line between the believers of the two largest Churches. We still see an overwhelming support for Ukraine's independence in both of the Churches and a third (33,3 %) of the UOC MP adherents would like Ukraine to join the European Union while only one fifth of them (21,3 %) is in favor of a customs union with the Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (Table 10). The possibility of the Customs Union was widely discussed in 2013. It is no longer on the political agenda but there is an ongoing monitoring of public opinion regarding this issue. Thus, while we see that UOC MP believers are more inclined towards particularly close or friendly relations with the Russian Federation than their UOC KP counterparts, there are no divides that allow to interpret these two categories of the faithful as strongly opposing or contrasting.

Unfortunately, this survey did not ask for opinions regarding the ongoing efforts to create the Unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The recent data from Razumkov Center (4-9 November 2016) shows that 37,7 % of the entire adult population and 44,3 % of the Orthodox express approval of creating the Unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church; 25,6 % of all the respondents and 25,0 % of the Orthodox are not supportive of this initiative while 36,7 % of all and 30,7 % of the Orthodox are hesitant about this issue [11, p. 4]. However, the report does not compare attitudes from the two major Churches although it is specifically these two Churches that would be affected the most. Hence, for further survey monitoring, it would be of practical importance to compare opinions of UOC KP and MP believers regarding the future of their Churches.

To conclude, adherents of the two largest Churches in Ukraine are rather similar in their essential sociodemographic characteristics and language preferences. In particular, we do not see any explicit stratification in terms of either income or education. While their national identity somewhat differs, their overall identity similarities by far outweigh their differences. We can see a rather explicit differentiation of believers when it comes to opinions on Ukraine's international policies related to the Russian Federation. However, even in this case, the differentiation can hardly be interpreted as deeply divisive: uniting into one state with the Russian Federation has only marginal support in both Churches and, at the same time, every other policy option has a sizable support in both Churches (although the level of support for a particular policy does differ significantly). Monitoring of attitude dynamics in each Church towards creating the Unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be advisable, taking into consideration current political challenges.

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