Expert-layperson communication: asymmetry of knowledge

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Expert-layperson communication: asymmetry of knowledge

There are numerous situations in everyday life in which one must rely on expert knowledge. Knowledge is often communicated between experts and less or non-experts. Hence, expert-layperson communication has become a ubiquitous phenomenon. However, sometimes expert knowledge is an obstacle to effective communication with laypeople. Traditional research on expertise has yielded important insights into the cognitive basis of expert performance in complex domains [1]. A differentiated knowledge base, including multiple representations of problems, enables a rapid conceptualization of problems and the activation of routine problem solving strategies.

When `expert' is understood as `professional' and when their interaction with laypersons is examined, the question arises which knowledge and skills are necessary to cope with the demand of cooperation and communication and how this knowledge is related to the domain-knowledge.

We are interested in communication between experts and laypeople and in communication within interdisciplinary work-settings.

We focus on the analysis of experts' ability to anticipate a layperson's perspective for communicative purposes. We propose that the study of such anticipations is an important step to learn more about the nature of the `additional' expert knowledge needed for successful communication with laypersons.

For example, consider the following utterance of a power engineering expert:

According to the first law of thermodynamics, the internal energy of the system keeps unchanged.

Only the expert in thermodynamics can conceive the meaning of the utterance and correctly interpret it.

Common cognitive ground of experts and laypersons can be shown with Euler diagram (figure).

We see that the intersection area is not large enough for efficient communication.

In order to establish what is common knowledge, a speaker should be able to reasonably assess what the addressee already knows.

Euler diagram: A - an expert, B - a layman, intersection area - common cognitive ground

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Experts typically exhibit specialized knowledge in communication with laypersons. For example, many patients personally experienced the situation that a doctor takes a short look at the X-ray photograph and starts to explain his/her diagnosis, presupposing that his/her addressee spontaneously perceives what he/she is perceiving while in fact the patient sees nothing but some darks spots on a screen. Moreover, it violates the quantity principle suggested by Greis [2], for example if the expert provides less information than is necessary for the layperson to understand what is meant or on the other hand, if more information is provided by the expert than the layperson can process.

We can use the notion of `talking down' to describe situations in which an expert paraphrases the same content several times without noticing that his/her addressee has already well understood the point. It should be noted that sometimes such miscommunication may be promoted in order to demonstrate the exclusiveness of expertise, or it may arise from the expert's unwillingness to communicate with laypersons.

According to Clark [3], any communication is an act of cooperation. All contributions are understood on the basis of background assumptions about the situation in question, the object of conversation and its goal: “Two people's common ground is, in effect, the sum of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions” [ibid., p. 93].

Mutual knowledge is based on the community membership. Two persons, being co-members of the same community, can assume that they have a certain amount of mutual knowledge.

If Bob, a power engineer, meets Tom and learns he is a power engineer, too, she can assume that Tom knows what he refers to, should she mention Freud's laws of thermodynamics.

Misunderstandings between experts and laypersons are more likely since the communicative demands are much higher than in everyday interactions. From this perspective, communication problems like the above-mentioned violations of the quantity principle can be explained as a failure of establishing common ground. Miscommunication such as talking down thus occurs when experts hold false assumptions about the knowledge the layperson brings into a given situation [1].

We argue that successful communication depends on how accurate are peoples intuitions about what others know. Communication of knowledge between professionals and laymen is fundamental, as this corresponds to the communication of knowledge between experts and non-experts.

The comprehension of a text is obviously much more complex than the comprehension of its words and our understanding derives from, and is based on, our “mental models” [4]. The receivers of a text activate a set of cognitive processes, and draw on their world knowledge in order to construct a representation of a text that is characterised by coherence, consistency and plausibility [ibid]. Therefore, drawing on the same text, people can make very different assumptions and come to very different conclusions. Although these considerations are then consolidated, when the perception and the interpretation of a text may determine crucial decisions and have important consequences, reflecting upon the role played by knowledge and knowledge communication in specific fields.

It is clear that knowledge communication does not correspond to a mere knowledge or information transfer. From a linguistic point of view, as Fauconnier affirms, “language, as we use it, is but the tip of the iceberg of cognitive construction. As discourse unfolds, much is going on behind the scenes: new domains appear, links are forged, abstract mappings operate, internal structure emerges and spreads, viewpoint and focus keep shifting” [5, p. 22].

These features of language are clearly displayed in specialized discourse as well. This is evident, as the communicative process is intrinsically based on the communication of beliefs, principles, assumptions, frames of mind, ways of thinking and reasoning, feelings, emotions, empathy, sympathy, etc. In particular, in order to make the communication effective, the process requires the ability to utilize this knowledge of the listener's previous experience and background and this is one of the reasons why, in a jury trial, an accurate knowledge of the jurors and their respective background experience is fundamental in order to be able to activate the most effective communicative strategies and make the communication/persuasion process convincing.

Indeed, knowing what our interlocutors know is one of the essential elements upon which communication is based [6-8]. Therefore, in order to make communication with laypersons successful, professionals should be aware of what kind of background knowledge laypersons possess.

The process of establishing the receiver's level of background knowledge is omnipresent in communication, but in experts' communication this may be particularly complex and may develop into an overestimation of the receiver's knowledge.

Several studies have been devoted to the analysis of how and to what extent the awareness of the recipients' knowledge background influences the way in which the communication process is constructed [1, 9]. This awareness determines an adaptation to the laypersons' knowledge and receptive skills and needs. Consequently, the need to adjust and modify the way and the extent to which knowledge is communicated leads to a process of apparent “grading of communicated knowledge” based on the interlocutor's level (or assumed level) of knowledge.

Defining how (specialized) knowledge is communicated in texts, whose receivers are (in general terms) experts or laypeople, represents an important aspect. Several studies have analyzed the differences in knowledge and expertise between laymen and professionals in different disciplines and professional contexts [8, 10]. In particular, Noordaman et al. [11] remark that the three areas which distinguish the expert's knowledge are the quantity of knowledge, the way the knowledge is structured and the way the knowledge is used.

In certain cases, the knowledge asymmetry and the decisional power asymmetry between the participants in the communication process play a crucial role.

Implicit in communicating through a text is the necessity of communicating knowledge; in communication processes between people who possess different types and levels of knowledge a process of compensating for a surplus or a deficit of knowledge takes place. In particular, the explanation of certain domain-specific concepts underlying the text is a highly-used means of activating a process of reduction of the knowledge gap, or to convey an appearance of such a process. In order to facilitate the accessibility of the text by the receivers it is important to create a link between the text and the receivers' cognitive background. Nevertheless, the professionally-specific information available to the encoder of the message is not (entirely) available to the receivers. The former apparently provides the latter with detailed and specific information but the amount of information transferred (or so perceived) is carefully dosed.

Thus, to communicate effectively with laypersons, experts must take into account the knowledge of their communication partner. Although prior research has shown that experts tend to over- or underestimate laypersons' knowledge, little is known about the particular impact of such over- and underestimations on communication. experts' false assumptions about a layperson's knowledge might cause serious miscommunication.

References

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1. Bromme R., Rambow R., Nьckles M. Expertise and Estimating what other People Know: The Influence of Professional Experience and Type of Knowledge // Journal of Experimental Psychology. 2001. № 7 (4). P. 317-330.

2. Grice H.P. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press, 1989.

3. Clark H.H. Arenas of Language Use. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1992.

4. Johnson-Laird P.N. Mental Models. Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

5. Fauconnier G. Mental Spaces. Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

6. Крапивкина О.А. Законодательные механизмы самопрезентации субъекта в законодательных жанрах юридического дискурса // Вестник Иркутского государственного технического университета. 2011. № 7 (54). С. 243-248.

7. Bakhtin M.M. “Discourse in the Novel” The Dialogic Information / Ed. M. Holquis. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981.

8. Lundquist L., Jarvella R.J. Language, Text, and Knowledge. Berlin: Mounton de Gruyter, 2000.

9. Nickerson R.S. How we know - and sometimes misjudge - what others know: imputing one's own knowledge to others // Psychological Bulletin. 1999. № 125. P. 737-759.

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