Let me summarize several points and outline where and how concepts of political realism and just war theory differ, and after that move to the next paragraphs which consider the critique of just war principles. At first, if just war theory claims that war may be justified, the tradition of realism skeptically claims that no moral concepts such as justice can be applied to the conduct of international affairs and warfare. Probably, yes, but if the idea of absolute justice is inapplicable in this case, can the idea of relative justice be applied, i.e. less just and more just?

Secondly, adherents of the classical just war theory believe that moral concepts should prescribe a state's behavior, while realists claim that state should place an emphasis on state security and self-interest and leave behind normative moral considerations which cannot fully cover the specificity of each conflict. And finally, if just war adherents consider the conflict or war through the prism of ethical and apply the ethical judgement to the political business, realists operate with the political judgement only and perceive conflict as a natural and normal condition of politics. In this way, the choice can be made on the ground of moral judgement or political judgement depending on the tradition (or theory).

If considering a war not only as a standalone series of violent events, but also as a historical structure (thus violent acts become a war in historical perspective after they acquire such a “label”), the method and way of moral judgement regarding a war of the past might reflect not the necessity to judge or condemn war, but the style of moral judgment inherent to the demand of the epoch in which war happens. In other words, no matter how normative just war theory might seem and safe against those who seem to try to violate these rules in the realm of international politics, the theory filtrates, detects and interprets only those war cases which embed or “build in”, i.e. satisfy the temporal interpretation of the normative components of the theory, and this is also why just war theory fails to reconcile violence and politics on the ground of connecting schools of thought of political realism and political idealism.

On the other hand, just war theory “protected” Christians crusaders who were perceived as the liberators of Jerusalem and were allowed to enter the war under the light of just war theory principles like just cause, right intention, and especially competent authority (which ironically can be classified as divine). As Michael Walzer claims (2004, 3), “he [Saint Augustine] replaced the radical refusal of Christian pacifists with the active ministry of the Christian soldier. Now pious Christians could fight on behalf of the worldly city, for the sake of imperial peace (in this case, literally, pax Romana); but they had to fight justly, only for the sake of peace, and always, Augustine insisted, with a downcast demeanor, without anger or lust”. On the opposite, it can be said that just war principles are being adjusted to the recent politics, and do not serve only as the interpretive instrument of war history. In my opinion, this might be both used in terms of interpretation of past war for application of ex post moral judgement and also in the process of policy making, thus the “home” and main goal of just war theory is the moral judgement ex ante, i.e. when and why to fight the war.

But on the other hand, and this point is crucial here, just war theory, like any other theory or normative morality, omits not only the moral judgement towards the war (it is relatively secondary problem regarding the issue of violence), but omits such types of violence that could not be detected by any just war rules, not ex post, and especially nor ex ante, what creates blind spots of the just war theory. On the other hand, these types of violence might be reflected ex ante by the military genius, in the sense of bringing breakthrough to the military art. For instance, the famous horse was the purely unexpected manifestation of violence for Trojans. In terms of just war theory this might be called an art of the preemptive strike. Coming back to the issue, in my opinion, the problem is not only that “generals are preparing for the last war”, but also that they miss the point where war intersects with violence, which substance infiltrates not only through war, but also “poisons” (or nourishes to some extent) the temporal structure of war.

The critique of just war theory, in my opinion, should begin with the consideration of what kind of ontologies, not ethical rules or violent events, just war theory overlooks and omits. At first, this relates to the old contradiction between politics and morality which seems unresolvable to some extent as well as attempts to reconcile politics and morality through such concepts like the “dilemma of dirty hands” (Walzer, 1973), “emergency ethics” (Walzer, 2004, 33-38), and through the just war theory as well. The attempt to reconcile them takes the origin from the naive question “can politics be morality and to what extent?” This question is based on the idea that universal private morality which helps to define and set criterias of goodness of intentions, consequences and deeds is applicable to the realm of politics. In my opinion, the emergence of just war theory was such an attempt, the attempt to apply universal ethics of good intentions, just cause, proportionality, and especially last resort to act violently to the domain of politics which has completely different nature. In this way, while one political morality attempts to adapt morality to the specific conditions and requirements of politics, the other one offers a rejection of conventional or universal morality in favor of a special, purely political one (Kapustin, 2015).

But before I give the critique from the ontological position, it is worth considering and assessing just war theory principles on the “item by item” approach from the point of how they are applied in the realm of political action. Here, I would prefer to avoid the detailed examination of historical cases thus such approach would lead us into the false assessment of consequences of application of just war theory, where it is usually evaluated in quantitative as well as qualitative indicators, e.g. how many combatants and non-combatants died during military operations (proportionality), what was the justification of the operation (just cause), was the military operation the only chance to resolve the conflict (last resort), etc. Such a retrospective approach, which is usually used in the ex post assessment by political actors themselves would not allow us to access the core omissions of just war theory.

In this way, let us assess the just war theory “from within” at first, based on the presupposition of that political morality which claims that normative criterias of universal private morality of intentions and consequences can be applied to the body of politics externally. Probably, the first thing to outline here is the excessive focus on the “do no harm” connotation which invokes political actors to weigh the consequences of the measures they use in the political action from the point of necessity to act in this way. Both sections of just war theory, jus in bello as well as jus ad bellum are focused on the attempt to act in war less violently towards “others”, both combatants and non-combatants. But we also have to take into account that the goal of any political actor which enters the war is not to decrease the number of casualties, but to win the war, and just war theory prescribes that the price of the victory should not be high, given the principles of proportionality and military necessity.

But what if we face the situation when the necessity to enter the war and act violently towards another entity remains the last available alternative? Here we approach the idea of last resort, and Michael Walzer (2004, 160) in his meditation on the Iraq war of 2003 claims the following: “force [is] necessary to every aspect of the containment regime that was the only real alternative to war--and it was necessary from the beginning. Force is not a matter of all or nothing, and it isn't a matter of first or last (or now or never): its use must be timely and proportional”. What is worth mentioning here is that even force remains the measure which should be used timely and proportional, according to just war theory and its criterias, we face not only the excessive use of force in military actions, but also the potential inability of a political actor who base their ideas and decisions on the normative morality and its prescriptions to predict where and when exactly to use the force properly.

And here, by considering this case of indecisiveness of a political actor, we return again to the idea of the proper use of force and face the old contradiction between morality and politics caused by the attempt to apply universal morality of “do no harm” (avoidance of excessive use of force). The problem here, in my opinion, is not only that use of force is a last resort or it might be excessive, but also that political actor, being armed with the just war theory and its principles, might be trapped in the endless reflection on the consequences of his or her deeds against others, comparing what is good or bad, what leads to the disruption of the key element which constitutes a body of politics and the essence of a political actor as such. This key element is the political action, and it might be put in a simple way, action per se. Of course, it might be argued that such an approach of priority of a political action over universal morality disrupts the conventional idea of justice, i.e. that justice means fairness and there are several gradations of less just and more just.

On the other hand, there is one more argument which is worth mentioning here against the appropriateness of a last resort principle which is widely accepted jus ad bellum criterion for a war to be considered and accepted just. For instance, Eamon Aloyo argues that such criterion must be “jettisoned from the just war tradition because adhering to it can require causing or allowing severe harms to a greater number of innocents than if an alternative, violent policy were enacted” (Aloyo, 2015, 187). The argument around this idea can be built the following way. The first idea which comes here is that non-violent actions and policies are preferable to violent ones which can be used as a last alternative. The second point, and most important in my opinion, is that just war theory detects only those cases of violence which include physical harm and extermination of an enemy, and the origin of such detection emerges from the nature of war itself, and here we get back to the point which was mentioned in the first chapter of the work, that such detection is based on the assumption that violence equals war.

And here I would repeat my point again, that yes, wars are violent, but violence are not warlike. And, in this way, a political actor who perceives physical harm as the only violent act, who is aimed with the principle of a last resort (and such last resort principle can be prior to the proportionality, or last resort to enter the war is used as the attempt to achieve just cause) might use less violent or non-violent actions towards the enemy which can be much more harmful and lead to a more damage of the opponent side. For instance, this might be sanctions against the other side. As Aloyo (2015, 197) claims, “nonviolent policy options that many politicians and scholars advance as preferable to violent policies can harm as severely and affect as many people as violent ones”.In his examination of potential harms of 1990s Iraq sanctions as non-violence policies and postponing the last resort measure (use of direct force) to the latest moment, Aloyo (2015, 197) emphasizes that such non-violent measures killed from 200,000 to 500,000 Iraqis, many of whom were children.

On the other hand, such information should not lead us to the false conclusion that direct use of violence and jettisoning of last resort principles out of the just war theory would be preferable to the use of non-violent policies. It rather tells us that the excessive focus on the “do no harm” connotation which structuring the just war theory might lead to the omission of important facts that postponing military actions to the latest moment, which is probably caused not only be the indecisiveness of a political actor but his or her unreadiness to seem cruel and despotic in the eyes of the public, leads to the infiltration of violence in manifestations of poverty, famine, democide which, coming back to the point of Slavoj Zizek mentioned in the first chapter, becomes a manifestation of an “objective violence”, a normal state of things.

To summarize, can modern just war theory omit the concept of institutional violence? Not only Michael Walzer (2004, 9) slightly mentions about in terms of justification and legitimization of war which has to be just if it is about to win the “hearts and minds” of people, which are according to him is the true battlefield of a modern warfare. In this sense, authorities and politicians prefer to use not such bright methods of violence not to shock the public and media. Nowadays, the political cost of public shock scenes of direct violence towards several people might be more negative than the cost of the silent death of thousands as a result of economic sanctions. The second problem is the intangibility of violence as such which manifests itself in new hitherto unknown forms, and subsequently interpellates new social structures to be filled by the substance of violence.

And here we approach the idea of institutional violence, which can be discovered in two styles, e.g. structural violence which can be traced directly in the policymaking as the attempt to provide less physical harm towards the enemy, and a broader concept of violence of institutions which capture, structure and organize political field in a certain way.

Chapter 3. Institutional violence and just war theory

The issue of institutional violence as such can be explained in both manners, and two of them would be considered in this chapter. The first one refers to the concept of the structural violence presented by Johan Galtung, while the second concept relates to the idea of violence of institutions based on the ideas of such thinkers like Pierre Bourdieu, Michel Foucalut, Alain Badiou and others. In case of structural violence, institutions might be perceived as the set of rules artificially created and set by the social group in order to maintain the governance, to provide the redistribution of power and resources, who might use non-violent practices to achieve political goals. While in case of violence of institutions, the institution might be considered as fields, not mechanisms, but exactly fields where the struggle for power might be detected, the struggle for the right to be called an authority, the struggle for the opportunity to influence the social per se.

Let me begin with the consideration of the first concept of institutional violence, which is called “structural violence”,as Johan Galtung calls it in his work “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”. The main idea which underlies this concept is that social institutions whose aim is to contribute to the development of society, do not allow people to meet their basic needs by creating special restrictive conditions. However, in my opinion, the basic idea which underlies the concept of structural violence of Galtung is the spirit of egalitarianism, thus the core subject and focus of Galtung`s theory becomes the statuses of social agents in the existent social system, not the relations embedded into the societal hierarchy, even Galtung claims that the peculiarity of structural violence is based on its relative stability, its embeddedness into the social structure. If examining methodological differences, it might be claimed that yes, Galtung recognizes the existence social structure besides the existence of individuated social agents, but he does not dive into the critique of the structure and social relations per se, and this is the first difference between concepts of Galtung` structural violence and institutional violence.

Thus, structural violence affects people in social structures in different ways, the structural violence is closely linked to the notion of social injustice. In this way, structural violence might be defined as injustice and inequality that are embedded in the structure of society as such, what leads to inequalities in the distribution of power distribution and therefore to the restricted access to resources. For instance, this idea might find commonalities with such concepts from political science and political economy as “extractive institutions” (Robinson & Acemoglu, 2015), or in the concept of “limited access order” (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). Speaking of limitations, Galtung (1969, 168) writes:

“Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is. Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance. Thus, if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition.”

Even the concept of structural violence might seem more useful in the consideration of issued in the field of domestic politics and how restrictive policies affect society, the notion of structural violence might be used in the consideration of international politics as well (Aloyo, 2015, 188), for instance, in case of sanctions which might be more harmful than the direct use of force.

There is also one more concept introduced by Galtung (1990, 291) which is worth mentioning here, this is the concept of “cultural violence”. It can be defined as any aspect of culture, particularly religion, language, ideology, science and art, that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. In this way, the existence of prevailing or known social norms makes direct and structural violence natural, or at least acceptable, and explains how certain beliefs can become so embedded in a given culture that they function as absolute and unavoidable and are reproduced between generations without criticism, and such a notion might refer to the concept of habitus by Pierre Bourdieu (2000, 67). And finally, Galtung shares one more argument, which, in my opinion might help to reveal how issues of structural and cultural violence might furtherly correlate with the issue of legitimation of violence and, in turn, with just war theory. He writes (1990, 292):

The study of cultural violence highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society. One way cultural violence works is by changing the moral color of an act from red/wrong to green/right or at least to yellow/acceptable; an example being 'murder on behalf of the country as right, on behalf of oneself wrong'.

Now let us refer to the second concept of institutional violence, the violence of institutions (Vladimirov, 2019a). Referring to the social ontology of Pierre Bourdieu, it is necessary to outline here how structures and elements of social being which take the key part in such an ontology (agent, field, habitus) constitute and reproduce violence, particularly institutional violence. Speaking of how it functions, it is worth beginning with the “political field”(Bourdieu, 2000, 113). The structure of the field is a state of power relations between the agents or institutions involved in the encounter where the distribution of specific capital was accumulated during the preceding encounters, and such distribution has control over future strategies. This structure of the field which is represented by strategies of agents and which are aimed at its transformation is itself at risk. The field becomes a place of struggle for a monopoly on legitimate violence, which characterizes the field. And, as a result, such encounter of agents in the field provokes the preservation or change of the distribution of social capital. In that way, several social and political fields might be considered institutions.

It is also worth mentioning that Bourdieu avoids the concept of institution as a rigid apparatus and claims (1991, 200) that certain kinds of habitus find the conditions of their realization, indeed of their blossoming, in the logic of the apparatus; and, conversely, that the logic of the apparatus 'exploits' for its own profit tendencies that are inscribed in the different kinds of habitus. even there are still formal and official institutions where the explicit struggle for political power might be observed; beginning from school where the teacher is making his or her career by influencing students, influencing syllabus, influencing the principal of the school in order to influence personnel agenda; to the well-known places and official institutions such as party, government, local authority office, but all of these `places' are not considered as rigid `apparatus; thus the field or institution might have the physical form, for instance, the form of building where agents of the field are situated.

And probably in that sense in the modern age, the internet might be perceived as a new form of the field or institution, which provides agents with much more influential potential than common fields and models of influence. It is obvious to state, but nowadays, the acceptance of the social agent in YouTube or Twitter who has no classic symbols of power and authority, for instance, a simple blogger, might be more influential and noticeable than the well-known politician even he or she also makes posts in Twitter.

Coming back to institutions themselves, it is necessary to raise a question, what makes institutional violence function this way? In order to answer this question, it would be more fruitful to consider how institutions produce violence and why detecting institutional violence is more difficult than detecting explicit and reflected forms of political violence. At first, it is necessary to emphasize that institutions act anonymously by restricting or reproducing sets of rules which are or should be accepted by the field and its agents, and further become an integral and inherent part of habitus. Such rules might be informal and seem to be quite peaceful but even simple rules, principles or rights do coerce thus they put limitations and limit the previous rights and principles. A simple example, when travelling from one country to another, a traveler obeys to a set of cultural norms, principles and rules in order to be accepted by the natives.

Considering the more sophisticated example from the realm of politics, the government might raise taxes, raise the retirement age, reform several executive offices, reconsider the social policy which would reduce the access to social lifts and resources. Such reforms might face a moderate or high level of resistance from the society; moreover, disappointment and complaints are not directed towards authorities as individuals here, even slogans and complaints are referred directly to the individuals. The struggle is directed at the institution of power, at the field from which the oppression comes, as a niche which oppresses. And such anonymity of institution contributes to the reproduction of the oppressive habitus thus it becomes a repeated and unreflected cycle of behaviours and actions towards the institution. For instance, the equal dialogue with the oppressive authority becomes impossible because both oppressed and the oppressor constitute their actions out of the thought that there is an oppression and there is an oppressed, and being sure of their roles “I am oppressed” or “I am a victim” which reproduces their habitus and their acceptance in the political field.

The main problem of institutional violence remains the problem of recognition of manifestations of institutional violence as such. And the more complicated and more complex such manifestations become, the more difficult it becomes to recognize these markers, and sometimes the identities and institutions themselves. For example, in the discourse such complexity may be hidden in words like “diversity”, “VUCA”, “complex world”, and in populism as well - behind the idea of a fake urgency, e.g. “there is no time to think about this complexity, you have to act,” (Žižek, 2008, 7).

As already mentioned, the political analysis usually distinguishes two types of agents of violence - state and non-state actors, and the classification of this actors relies not only on the idea of legitimation, but on the idea of recognizability of agents as such. In other words, the clearer and palpable the shape of a social group, whether it is a union that struggles for its rights, or whether it is a state represented by a Cabinet of ministers, the more likely that the agent will be described and classified.

But when it comes to institutional violence as a form of political violence, we might ask how does violence of institutions differ from the violence of common agents of political violence? And here we inevitably return to the ontological differences. Terrence Ball (1978, 208), who was previously mentioned, argues that violence is not an attitude or intention of one actor towards another, but rather the relation or set of connections between which binds them. And, in this way, we may continue Terrence Ball`s thought, that such a set of connections, for instance, between “master” and “slave” contributes to the anonymous and incessant process of reproduction of habitus and might be also called here as an institution. Ball writes (1978, 106):

To begin with, there can be neither master nor slave without the institution, or social practice, of slavery (and of course vice-versa). Nor can a "master" exist unless a "slave" exist: in order to be a master, A must have a slave (B); conversely, if A does not have a slave he is not a master. <...> All these are "institutional" or "societal" facts, i.e. they are (recognizable as) facts only within social and institutional contexts and settings. In any case A and B do not meet as the atomic individuals of liberal theory but as role-players and bit-players in a collective drama written by no one and by everyone.

To summarize, before proceeding to the consideration of interrelation of institutional violence and just war theory, I would like to give a short meditation and definition on what is institutional violence and how it works. It is necessary to emphasize that the definition is not related to any specific type of institutional violence, e.g. economic violence, discrimination, de-jure segregation, etc. but relates to a general notion of institutional violence as such. As long as political violence is perceived as one of the instruments to achieve political goals in the set of other tools, the institutional violence, in my opinion, is a less forceful, and subsequently implicit tool of coercion due its anonymity, unnoticeable and unreflected domination of rules, principles or interconnections, and finally due to its adaptability and concealability to the inherent features of political fields.

3.2 Institutional violence, just war theory and challenges of political ethics

The major goal of this final sectionis to demonstrate how just war theory, being an attempt of the normative morality to be applied in the domain of politics, fails to capture manifestations of both concepts of institutional violence and how this issue might be resolved.

The attempt of just war theory, being a form of normative morality, is to encounter as many types of “subjective”or “visible” violence, whatimplies the typology or classification of violence. As we mentioned it earlier, such a typology considers only cases of direct physical coercion and direct struggle towards “the enemy”or the “other” what, in turn, omits indirect manifestations of violence. In the first case, referring to the concept of structural violence of Johann Galtung and analysis of last resort principle performed by Aloyo (2015), such excessive focus on the direct forms of coercion inevitably leads to the emergence of “blind spots” of just war theory, which, in my opinion, can be reduced to the inability of the theory to detect the potential threats of postponing the decision to use direct violence, and using sanctions instead, what subsequently leads to greater social, economic and political costs.

Moreover, coming back to the notion of cultural violence, “another way [how cultural violence works] is by making reality opaque, so that we do not see the violent act or fact, or at least not as violent”(Galtung, 1990, 292). In this way, the excessive focus of just war theory on direct violence, enhanced by the incessant attention of media, ideology and art to sensations of war, diminishes the significance of other types of violence and their aftereffects. For instance, as mentioned above, this might be famine, democide (Rummel, 1994), limiting access to education, medical care, etc. Such argumentation does not imply the assumption that just war theory is an unnecessary or dangerous instrument in the realm of politics, but it invokes to the necessity to extend the just war theory with the principle of “danger non-action” or “inappropriate use of alternatives to the use of force”, even it might misalign and conflict with principles of last resort, proportionality and military necessity.

In this way, we might summarize, that normative morality being applied in politics fails to capture those manifestation of violence which lie behind the focus of such morality and ethics, and, probably, the notion of “emergency ethics” or “situational ethics” attempts to reconcile violence and politics. But here I need to mention again the argument, that politics and violence are inevitably interconnected and violence cannot be deleted from the politics, as well as one cannot be “applied” to the other thus they are already intertwined in the social field.

This leads to the inevitable meditation on the nature of politics and why it requires a special, a specific morality, and why it cannot also be “applied”. The first, and probably false step here, would imply the rejection of morality and ethics in the realm of politics. But even realists, particularly Hans Morgenthau (as cited in Kapustin, 2015, 79), claimed that in political ethics there is only “ethics of evil”, thus the mention of ethicscannot be jettisoned or erased from politics as such. On the other hands, it might be said that the universal morality cannot be combined with the ethics of politics due to the key immanent features of politics, i.e. power, hierarchy of relations, process of structuring a society and action. This also requires the meditation on the nature of politics, which, subsequently, might help us to define what kind of ethics is inherent to politics, if the universal and normative morality are alien to the substance of politics.

AsBorisKapustin (2015, 77) claims, “no matter how we specify [politics], it is clear that politics is impossible and unthinkable without differences between the ruling and the subject, as well as without the relevant organizations in which the power would operate (but also the resistance to it). In politics, only structured groups of people act, and only they, not individuals, are actual political forces”. If we perceive politics in such a way, we might still think, what could be the function of moral reasoning in politics, one of which is the just war theory?

Here I refer again to Pierre Bourdieu and his concepts of “doxa of government”, “monopolistic of universal” and “the historicity of reason”. Bourdieu (1994,17)claims:

The universal is the object of universal recognition and the sacrifice of selfish (especially economic) interests is universally recognized as legitimate. <…>. This means that all social universes tend to offer, to varying degrees, material or symbolic profits of universalization (those very profits pursued by strategies seeking to "play by the rule"). <…>The profit of universalization is no doubt one of the historical engines of the progress of the universal. This is because it favors the creation of universes where universal values (reason, virtue, etc.) are at least verbally recognized and wherein operates a circular process of mutual reinforcement of the strategies of universalization seeking to obtain the profits (if only negative) associated with conformity to universal rules and to the structures of those universes officially devoted to the universal.

In the spirit of Bourdieu, we might claim thatthe attempt of justification of violence through the normative morality and just war theory might be counted as one of universalization, the emergence of doxa in in the field of justification of violence which cannot infiltrate and detect “unknown” forms of violence or those types of violence which do not satisfy criterias of just war theory. The reproduction of such doxa constitutes the ongoing mutual reinforcement towards conformity and inability of universalization to capture those types of coercion which lie behind the universalization. In other words, "self-evident", "doxa", as Bourdieu puts it, is artificially created by the society, and such doxa has its own historical genealogy, its origin. To summarize, universalization might be considered as a function of moral reasoning in politics.

One more concept which is also worth mentioning here is the “historicity of reason” and the critique of the notion of principle as such, which claims that whatever the principles may be, including the most rational principles of the most "pure" reason, for example, mathematical, logical, or physical, they are always ultimately reducible to their origin, and therefore to an arbitrary source, and moreover, “law is law and nothing more” (Bourdieu, 1990, 94). But I also emphasize, that according to Bourdieu (1990, 94), “theorigin of the law is arbitrariness” rooted into the history,originating in the unpredictability of new forms of social relations. In this way, it might be claimed, that one more function of moral reasoning in the realm of politics is not the deterrence of unexpected forms of violence, but the extension of taxonomy of violence.

Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to give the examination of how just war theory, being a type of normative applied ethics is correlated with the issue of institutional violence, by considering core mechanisms and principles which constitute political violence. The paper examined how violence and war differs and where they find intersection, what are the key differences towards issues of justice and violence, what represents two concepts of institutional violence and how are they related to the issue of just war. Finally, paper reflected the critique of just war theory from both positions of institutional violence - structural violence and violence of institutions, and how the omissions of just war theory might be revisited in the realm of political ethics.

The major question of the paper, why just war theory fails to detect certain types of violence, might be reapproached not only through the critique of institutional violence, but also in a slightly different manner with the reference to the idea of jus post bellum - what just war theory omits in the stage of peacemaking and establishing new order and rules after the humanitarian intervention, whether jus post bellum requires to take the responsibility not only to “clear up” the destructive aftereffects of war, but can policies made in the spirit of justice after war detect and work with the aftereffects of structural violence, which might be more dangerous than the direct one.

On the other hand, coming back to the issue of violence of institutions, let me mention, that maintaining the image of eternal peace, especially by constant reference to the just war theory in policy making, requires maintaining a state of perpetual war. This is how erasing the aleatority of war through its impermanence infiltrates every aspect of life, achieves self-evidence, and consistency, by escaping the eventfulness of war, through the irresistible acceleration of militarization in fields of politics and media (Virilio, 2006). In this way, violence, being by nature aleatory and disastrous, might take its extreme forms.

References

1. Aloyo, E. (2015). Just War Theory and the Last of Last Resort. Ethics & International Affairs,29(02), 187-201.

2. Arendt, H. (1972). Crises of the Republic: Lying in politics; Civil disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on politics and revolution. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

3. Ball, T. (1978). Two concepts of coercion. Theory and Society, 5(1) 97-112.

4. Benjamin, W. (1996). Critique of Violence. Selected writings vol.1., 236-252. Retrieved online from https://criticaltheoryconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Benjamin-Critique-of-Violence-1.pdf

5. Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power. Ed. Thompson, J.B. Polity Press.

6. Bourdieu, P.(1994). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. Translated by Loic J. D. Wacquant, & Farage, S.. Sociological Theory, 12(1), 1-18.

7. Bourdieu, P.(2000). Pascalian meditations. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

8. Bufacchi,V. (2007). Violence and Social Justice. Palgrave Macmillan.

9. Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (1993). A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

10. Descartes, R. (1998). Regulae Ad Directionem Ingenii. eds. Heffernon, G. Retrieved online fromhttps://books.google.ru/books?id=fZvuT6Q76GAC&pg=PP9&hl=ru&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=2 - v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://books.google.ru/books?id=fZvuT6Q76GAC&pg=PP9&hl=ru&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false

11. Dilts, A., Winter, Y., Biebricher, T., Johnson, E. V., Vázquez-Arroyo, A. Y., & Cocks, J. (2012). Revisiting Johan Galtung's Concept of Structural Violence. New Political Science, 34(2), e191-e227.

12. Estlund, D. (2016). Just and Juster. In Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 2.: Oxford University Press.

13. Fotion, N., & Coppieters, B. (2008). Moral Constraints on War: Principles and Cases (Vol. 2nd ed). Lanham: Lexington Books. Retrieved fromhttp://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=234589http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=edsebk&AN=234589

14. Frazer, E., & Hutchings, K. (2008). On politics and violence: Arendt contra Fanon. Contemporary Political Theory, Vol. 7, 1, 90-108.

15. Hardt, M., Negri, A. (2001). Empire. Harvard University Press.

16. Honderich, T.(2014). Violence for Equality. Routledge.

17. Hutchings, K. (2019). From just war theory to ethico-political pacifism. Critical Studies on Security 1-8.https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2019.1672481

18. Galston, W. A. (2010). Realism in political theory. European Journal of Political Theory 9 (4): 385-411.

19. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3) 167-191.

20. Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. Journal of Peace Research,27(3), 291-305.

21. Kapustin, B. (2010). Kritika politicheskoj filosofii. Izbrannye esse [Critique of political violence. Selected essays]. Moscow: Territoriya Budushchego.

22. Kapustin, B. (2015). Machiavelli i problema politicheskoj morali [Machiavelli and the problem of political morality]. Philosophical and literary journal "Logos", vol. 25, no. 6, 68-104.

23. Kumankov, A. (2019). Philosophy of war: a brief history. Philosophical and literary journal "Logos", vol. 29, no. 3 (130) 99-116.

24. Lakomski, G. (1984). On Agency and Structure: Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron's Theory of Symbolic Violence. Curriculum Inquiry, 14(2), 151-163.

25. Lazar, S., & Valentini, L. (2017). Proxy Battles in Just War Theory:, the Site of Justice, and Feasibility Constraints. In Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, Volume 3.: Oxford University Press.

26. Morgenthau, H. J., & Thompson, K. W. (2004). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace. Beijing: Peking University Press.Mouffe, Chantal. On the political. Psychology Press, 2005.

27. Mouffe, C. (2015). On the Political. Routledge.

28. Naverson, J. (1991). Terrorism and Morality. In Violence, Terrorism, and Justice. Cambridge University Press.

29. Niebuhr, R. (2003). Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics. Accessed 2019.http://media.sabda.org/alkitab-2/Religion-Online.org Books/Niebuhr, Reinhold - Moral Man and Immoral Society - Study in.pdfhttp://media.sabda.org/alkitab-2/Religion-Online.org Books/Niebuhr, Reinhold - Moral Man and Immoral Society - Study in.pdf.

30. North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. R. (2009). Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge University Press.

31. O'Driscoll, C. (2019). How I learned to start worrying and love the just war tradition. Critical Studies on Security 1-9.

32. Ricoeur, P. (2010). Power and Violence. Theory, Culture and Society, 27(5) 18-36.

33. Robinson, J., Acemoglu, D. (2012). Why nations fail? Crown PublishingGroup.

34. Roshwald, M. (1971). Realism and Idealism in Politics. Social Science, 46(2), 100-107.

35. Rummel, R.J. (1994). Death by Government. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. Retrieved 25 May 2019, fromhttps://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM

36. Schmitt, C. (2007). The concept of the political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

37. Van de Veer, D. (1973). Marx's View of Justice. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 366-386.

38. Vladimirov, K. (2019). Political Violence and Institutional Violence. Term paper of the MA student of PEP programme. Higher School of Economics: Moscow.

39. Vladimirov, K. (2019). Just War Theory vs/and Political Realism: The Issue of Choice and Moral Judgement. Essay of the MA student of PEP programme in "Public Choice Theory". Higher School of Economics: Moscow.

40. Virilio, P. (2006). Speed and Politics. The MIT Press.

41. Waldenfels, B. (1991). Limits of Legitimation and the Question of Violence. In Justice, Law, and Violence. Philadelphia: Temple Univserity Press.

42. Walzer, M. (1973). Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 2(2), 160-180. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265139

43. Walzer, M. (2002). The Triumph of Just War Theory (and the Dangers of Success). Social Research, Vol. 69, No. 4, International Justice, War Crimes and Terrorism: The U.S. Record 925-944.

44. Walzer, M (2004). Arguing About War. Yale University Press.

45. Walzer, M. (2015). Just and unjust wars. Fifth edition. New York.

46. Wenar, L. (2017). John Rawls.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved online from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/

47. Whitehead, N. (2007). Violence & the Cultural Order. Daedalus, 136(1), 40-50. Retrieved January 14, 2020, fromhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20028088www.jstor.org/stable/20028088

48. Wolff, R. B. (1999). On Violence. Violence and Its Alternatives, an Interdisciplinary Reader.

49. Zehfuss, M. (2018). War and the Politics of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

50. Z?iz?ek, S. (2006). The parallax view. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

51. Z?iz?ek, S. (2008). Violence: Six sideways reflections. New York: Picador.

Ðàçìåùåíî íà Allbest.ru