Civil identity of the russia’a scientists’ under the contemporary context

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Civil identity of the Russia's scientists' under the contemporary context

Barash Raisa Eduardovna Cand.Sci. (Pol.Sci.), Senior Researcher of the Centre for Complex Social Studies, Institute of Sociology of the FCTAS RAS; Antonovskiy Alexander Yurevich DSc in Philosophy, Leading Researcher of Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences

The authors judge upon the place, functions and prospects of the scientists' protest, interpreting it as a part of the communicative macro system. In order to fulfil the research goal and to illustrate the analytical theses the authors apply to the systemic communicative methodology as a scientific toolkit to analyze a real theoretical problem and thereby to legitimizes the importance of the new communicative system of social protest.

Applying to the idea that very discourse of true knowledge of the world is often served as the absolute value of scientific discourse, the authors note that the value of such a “true perception” is used to be considered as the orienting model of behavior and communication as for the scientists as for other "less advanced" social communities. In such a context the politicians if seeking the independent authoritative judgments about the external world used to apply to a dedicated cohort of observers (i.e. to the scientific community), who are disinterested in the competitive struggle. In their turn the scientists apply to the external world either to confirm the accuracy of their own judgments or to guarantees the democratic structure of society itself. Thus the observational perspective of the scientists combines the collectiveness and consensus with truth.

So, as it is postulated in the article, the external world requires a detailed prescription of verification and justification, and the expert communities, universities and academies used to restore the principles of social control. Stressing that the scientific/academic communication combines both cognitive (impartial observation) and normative (value production) dimension of science the authors resume that scientific communication can qualify for the status of an emerging communicative macrosystem. The authors argue that the protest movement in science could be considered as a practical resolution of the Merton - Popper paradox offering as the best samples of social order as the possibility to be the best observer of cognition.

Key words: Protest, Science, Scientist, Academy, University, Communication, Philosophy of Science

A "republic of scientists" and collective veracity

It is believed that scientists are specially trained observers, capable of seeing more than an average person can see. By stating the results of their observations, which they call knowledge, they claim priority before others, marking them with an additional index, veracity, an indicator of objectiveness, necessity, and collectivity. Indeed, any statement of a scientist, in his opinion, concedes that any member of a scientific collective can verify it. In this sense, it initially appears that a consensus (collectivity) and veracity accompany each other and do not exist without each other The paper is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RFBR), under grant no. 18-011-01179 «Sociological, historical-ethnological and philosophical-anthropological factors of the formation of the identity of the Russia's citizens under the multicultural context»; under grant no. 17-03-00733-OGN «The systemic- communicative approach of N. Luhmann, applied to Russian society». Later it began to be argued using the thesis of the impossibility of a "private language" [3], but this argument is obviously superfluous [4]..

It appears that this coupling radically distinguishes science from other communities, say, from political associations, in which the collective nature of binding decisions does not at all certify (of course, in terms of an outside observer) its correctness or veracity (recall the decision of the Athenian court of law regarding Socrates).

This - characteristic of all weakly differentiated societies - unity of collectivity/veracity, for which politics and religion were responsible (true, beginning with debates on investiture, they were unable to agree who of them was the main guarantor in stating veracity and collectivity), splits into two quite self-contained types of communication, which use different tools of observation and, consequently, design of their own reality.

A scientist, climbing his "ebony tower" [1; 2], obtains, although only in his own point of view, a higher observing position. He sees what is inaccessible

to other observers and, primarily, captures the finiteness of their field of view and their dependence on their own imperfect observing tools. Thus, the statements of rulers, in a scientist's opinion, do not contain an image of reality, a passive or dispassionate intersubjective emotional feeling, induced by the external world itself as it is, i.e., truth. Passive "emotions" alone would not be sufficient to initiate collective will for action, behind the will (in opposition to the scientist's dispassionateness) lying partisanship or an interest of authorities, which are not obliged to consider what, in fact, exists in reality but proceed from the absence of wishful realities.

The single position of observing collective veracity, previously reserved for politics/religion, is now split into the prospects for the proactive and the passively emotional, "practitioners" and "theorists," "people of action" and "people of knowledge" [5]. However, such "contemplative passivity" of a scientist is as if compensated by his better observational resources. Now he can compare and put himself in the place of other observers (N. Machiavelli In fact, only this freedom of oscillation between a ruler's observational perspective and a researcher's perspective explains in itself the mysterious constant oscillation of Machiavelli's views from the apology of arbitrary rule to the assertion of almost a theory of the division of authorities in The Prince.); he analyzes observation (communication) tools that for politicians - like any instrumental tools (like M. Heidegger's Zuhandene) - are conceivably unaffected by reflection.

These tools are primarily those distinctions that have the main orienting and motivating meaning for participants in a political communication, namely, differences in their authoritative statuses, which for them and their career prospects mean much more than challenges of the external world (fates of people and fates of nature).

Gradually, this external world is as if passed for consideration and pronouncing judgments (or, to put it better, becomes available) to a dedicated cohort of observers, disinterested in their authoritative positions, from whom politicians now seek advice without fearing scientists as rivals capable of cheating them or displacing them in the competitive struggle. Moreover, this external world as a referee, common denominator, or truth-maker to whom any member of the scientific community has the right to address to seek assistance, does not only confirms the utterances of scientists but also guarantees, as an objective judge, the democratic structure of society itself.

In this sense, collectivity and consensus are again coupled with truth, but this time, in the observational perspective of the scientific community. Meanwhile, we gradually come to understand that the external world itself cannot just be appealed to as a referee but requires a detailed prescription of verification, justification, and monitoring procedures for its arbitral functions on the part of scientists themselves. Expert communities, universities, royal societies, academies of sciences, academic councils, etc. appear for this function, restoring the principles of social control over the field that definitively required the minimization of such control and - paradoxically - solitary thinking. Restrictive bonds - the rules of the scientific method and scientific discourse - are again imposed on the freedom of theorization.

Hence, numerous ideas arise that not only true knowledge of the world is the final and absolute value of scientific discourse, but, on the contrary, this very discourse (verification procedures and specially socially regulated appeals to the external world as the ultimate source of knowledge and as a tool of validating veracity) has this orienting value and, therefore, can and should serve as a model of behavior and a standard of communication not only for scientists but also for other "less advanced" communities. Hence, the Renaissance-Enlightenment idea of Respublica literaria with its own principles and "prosecutors generals" and a chiefly written language of communication [6].

This idea has survived to this day. Thus, in the 19th century, F. Schleiermacher, for example, developed systematically the idea of a "scientific union" as a model way of communication and a new integrator of the ever-differentiating society "On the contrary, nowhere, except for research, a. In the 20th century, the question of the best way of teaching society to live according to the rules of scientists took the theoretical form of a special dilemma of breach/continuality (or liberalism/communitarianism) regarding society and science.

Some (M. Weber, A. Whitehead, and P. Sorokin among them) consider science as a dedicated observer who is critical and even negative in his judgments to the norms and values of other communities that they can to some extent transform, "retrain," or "cure" from their deficit of observation and attention in line with their own cognitive norms and goals.

Others (J. Dewey, O. Neurath, J. Bernal, and B. Hessen and N. Bukharin in Russia) asserted the opposite cause-and-effect relationship. Science itself should allegedly be subordinate to society, since it expresses societal and not its own or self-contained needs: "Any science you take grows from the needs of society... Nobody counts flies on the window or sparrows on the street, but cattle is counted" [9, p. 7].

Paradoxically, but in an attempt to formalize communicative advantages of the ethos of science [10, p. 267-278] using liberal argumentation (and thus to justify the autonomy of science from societal control), community manifests itself so deeply, a community that states should comprise?" [7; 8].

Merton's ethos of science mirrored negatively the normativity of the political community, and it can be presented as the following dilemmas: scientific rationality/political populism; horizontality and decentralization of scientific communication/centralized social control; scientific universalism of judgments/political participativity (patriotism, partisanship, etc.); organized scientific skepticism/politically inculcated ideology; communist this dilemma of liberalism/communitarianism lost its definiteness altogether. The question arises as to what extent the norms of scientific communication proclaimed by Merton are antecedent or contingent.

Of course, science in its self-reflection formulates the claim to create an unseen foundation for social consensus and acceptance of its communicative propositions: they are universal, nonpartisan, adogmatic, and objective; they do not mask and often unmask personal and collective interests. Any request for contact on this foundation appears to be received without special risks. However, the question arises whether these setups should be the basic values of a liberal society in addition to the traditional values of freedom, justice, equality, and democracy.

In this case, the activity of researchers should have been subordinate to value-based limitations, banning reflection and doubt in the norms of scientific communication. What would the difference be in this case between science and the equally nonreflexive activity of other communities that are integrated using uncritically accepted norms and values? This scientific ethos, if only its real authority and importance is acknowledged, should have the same traditional importance for science, hence, value-based sacral importance. In this sense, all procedures of inclusion into the scientific community (defenses of dissertations, examinations, conferment of degrees and academic ranks, etc.) are little different in their rituality from traditional initiations that accompany all - so risky for the normative order of society - transitive states.

If the "ethos of science" is assumed as a gradual historical "sedimentation" (A. Schьtz) of the cultural tradition of science as a social institution, then what is the difference between science and any other community with its own cultural (traditional historical and local) rules of life? This directly contradicts the idea of the priority of scientific observation and communication. How can science claim the universality and exemplarity of its existence if its own cultural identity is based on locality, contingency, and historicity?

Thus, the liberal argument in favor of the autonomy of and breach between society and science, ultimately only asserts the idea of scientific communitarianism: understanding science as a community amid other equal communities. Even acclaimed Merton's "organized skepticism" can, in this sense, be understood as a local historical value that cannot predetermine the life of other communicatively self-contained communities, since in this case the very idea of their autonomy as the foundation of liberalism is leveled off.

Moreover, internal contradictions within the axioms of scientific ethos themselves have emerged, primarily, between the norm of anti-dogmatism and organized skepticism, on the one hand, and the norm of objectivity (authenticity) of scientific observation, in particular, the authenticity of the very ethos of science, on the other. For this very claim of a better vision and understanding, which science offers to society, is definitively dogmatic and ideologic, since it is a priori removed from the criticism of science. Then it is necessary to consider this "ethos" as a genuine ideology and dogma.

Popper, as is known, proposed to eliminate dogmatism in scientific research, preserving all scientifically relevant procedures of translating truth by falsifying them (by modus tollens). However, if the "propose risky hypotheses" and "falsify established truths" requirements were included into the system of universal imperatives, this would undermine the whole sought-for foundation of social consensus, including both Merton's ethos of science itself and, more broadly, all fundamental values of liberalism: freedom, equality, democracy, and justice.

Thus, the idea of scientific communication as a standard for other communities ran into paradoxes.

First, the attempt to highlight science as a model community of skeptics, independent of the rest of society, which, in this sense, would carry out observations objectively and anti-dogmatically, required the creation of a normative register of requirements, or an "ethos," which in this function would transform itself into an ideology and dogma, tabooing skeptical and anti-dogmatic interpretations of its own provisions. This would turn the liberal understanding of science into its opposite - communitarianism.

Second, the requirement of "organized skepticism" and universal falsification as a method of scientific observation cannot serve social consensus because it relativizes any foundation of the social order and, in this sense, turns science into a socially destabilizing element.

It is possible to resolve these paradoxes? And thereby to save such claims of veracity that could simultaneously serve as the foundation of consensus for the remaining communities? Or, formulated differently: is the scientist's best cognitive and observational ability compatible with his claim for moral righteousness in matters of social structure?

Our thesis is that Popper's and Merton's paradoxes can be resolved using the systemic-communicative approach to find a binary (i.e., simultaneously both normative and cognitive) setup as a standardized reaction to corresponding communicative failures or problems (disappointments in the normative order)5 A cognitive setup requires that the norm be changed if a circumstance refutes it. A normative setup requires that reality be changed, customized to the norm, and thereby restore the importance of this norm. (The Hegelian "so much the worse for the facts" is a typical expression of a normative setup.) distribution of research results/political guarantee of private ownership of material goods; pluralistic (unassignable) scientific reputation/political authoritarianism (the authority of those appointed to positions) [10, p. 267-278].

Such communications, on the one hand, would belong to the scientific communicative system, in a sense that they would be oriented toward corresponding programs (which we understand as methodological and theoretical requirements of science).

On the other hand, they would be bound to "go beyond the limits" of the scientific system under certain conditions and react effectively (and not only meditate) to scientific (and other - political, economic) problems and events in terms of normative expectations, i.e., proceed not only from self-limitations (the above "ethos," mediascientific communications, etc.) but also consider a broader general societal perspective and view the actual conditions of the existence of science in terms of restoring the disturbed (corrupt) normative order.

In particular, such a communicative system should require improvement in research funding not so much in terms of science (since this does not predetermine the veracity or falsehood of scientific proposals - the key internal self-limitation of scientific communication) but would proceed from society's external need for science, as a condition for societal reproduction.

In other words, there should exist a form of sociality or communication that would simultaneously (or alternately) concentrate around standard scientific topics as well (would stylize itself as generally valid emotions of the objective reality and would express a cognitive setup); would appear as civil activism, like political activity; would represent a bond of real actions; and would express a normative setup.

In our opinion, the domestic situation, the conditions of underfunding of and even apathy to science in society and politics allow a slant in this communication toward more rigid criticism of other systems and less self-critical reflection of science.

In a standard situation, such radical criticism and activism should have largely been aimed at science itself, demanding that science democratize its institutions, liberalize the rules of membership and inclusion, pay attention to the social relevance of scientific achievements and their risks, etc.

However, we must admit that the sought-for cognitive-normative binarity is manifested by a special Russian phenomenon, a unique protest movement, which is objectively crystallizing around the theme of scientific research underfunding, i.e., more outer- referentially than self-referentially, while the criticism of external-to-science communicative systems dominates over the criticism of its own scientific institutions.

To this end, it would be important to get an answer to the question how strong this or that type of the protest movement in science has differentiated itself from the traditional types of communication (and correspondingly, from the types of social observation) within large communicative systems. Here we have to admit that such an intermediate communicative system of scientific protest has not differentiated itself definitively and has not created a symbolic binary code for itself (like the symbolic media code of money for the economy, the media code of authority for politics, the media code of faith for religion, the media code of love for the system of intimate communications, and that of beauty for art). The topic of underfunding is too local and contingent to become a generalizing symbol of protest communication in science.

Therefore, the scientific protest either uses moralizations (the media code of "justice") [11] or acts as a "support" for other systems of communication (e.g., for a political system as opposition).

Theoretically, protest can for a while stay within interactions: the private communication of protesters alarmed by structural consequences of societal inattention to the needs of science; it does not need to use media instruments: publications, the mass media, the Internet, and social networks. Protest can take more advanced communicative forms, for example, as organizations. It, however, can utilize traditional communicative grand systems: the mass media, politics, and the economy). All these opportunities, we think, have been used in Russia as corresponding protest institutions. Proceeding from this theoretical background, we, in view of the Russian reality, can distinguish the following types of scientific activism.

First, we are speaking about an interactive type of movement, to which we can primarily refer the Society of Scientific Workers, devoid of rigid organizational structures. Second, a rigid and very conservative type of protest movements, organizationally bound by membership rules, can also be referred to this movement with reservations. The trade unions of RAS organizations and other scientific and educational establishments are referred to it. Finally, the most advanced form of radicalism in science is system- integrated forms of protest, primarily, at the mass- media communicative grand system level (television, Internet broadcasting, newspapers), to which we may refer the newspaper Troitsky variant, and finally, the social-network type of scientific protest - the Dissernet community.

The Society of Scientific Workers (SSW) is an organizationally nonformalized type of social movement that mostly corresponds to the true nature of "protest movements." This means that it is not limited to a charter and membership rules, which predetermine the life in a specific organization. Therefore, participants in the society do not fear sanctions from their comrades-in-arms either for excessive radicalism or for moderation and conciliation.

Despite the "looseness" and ambiguity of participation conditions, such structures in the present- day conditions are more stable to discords and breaks. This "macrolocalization" allows focusing on a broad range of issues, the main point being the general social need for science, as well as internal issues of science organization and development. Correspondingly, the SSW declares the reasons for its association in terms that characterize moral media codes (justice, alienation, exploitation, etc.).

First of all, we are speaking about "alienation of authority from scientific workers, unseen either in developed or in catching-up countries. The opinion of actively working scientists on science and scientific policy... is ignored. The leaders of scientific establishments and the rectorates of universities are often appointed by authority without coordination with the scientific and educational public... the unprecedentedly low one percent of the country's budget for science is used inefficiently... long-term projects and programs do not pass international and domestic scientific examinations, and open competitive procedures are not observed" [12].

Thus, the appeal to society and the requirements on the state combine two perspectives: internal cognitive and external normative. On the one hand, these are requirements on internal democratization toward science itself (the transparency of funding procedures, the adequate assessment of scientific achievements, and the elaboration of scientific reputation). However, on the other hand, political and economic requirements are formulated simultaneously (the criticism of inefficient budgetary expenditures and inefficient external management) proceeding from the external normative perspective of an observer- moralizer, who pinpoints a "defective" norm (primarily, of course, of a fair distribution) and demands to have it repaired.

In this sense, the SSW also expresses the self- referential properties of a meta-observer-scientist with his cognitive setup: the anticipation of the transformation of the social structures of science; simultaneously, however, he takes the outer referential position of an observer-activist.

The SSW activity should probably be analyzed in the context of the "structural-critical" approach to the investigation of protest [13]. At least the participants in protest themselves think that this activity reveals some structural dysfunctions of communicative macrosystems and associate them with their own deprivations, which act as sources of their activism. In addition, the disappointment in normative expectations (from the functioning of state and science institutions) requires that the disturbed order be restored but does not require structural changes in politics, the economy, and science itself: as is seen from the program citation, they see the archaism of contemporary scientific administration in the lack of rights for experts but not in structural dysfunctions of the very institution of expert evaluation, which obviously requires a substantial democratization. The normative orientation of this protest institution in this case, obviously, dominates the cognitive orientation in relation to both science and external-to-science institutions.

The SSW correspondingly declares the following goals and forms of activity: "the monitoring of the condition and funding of research; the expert examination of scientific programs and projects; the struggle against pseudoscience and violations of scientific ethics; surveys among scientific workers on urgent problems; the preparation of proposals and appeals to the authorities of different levels and to society; the encouragement of talented youth in scientific career building; the involvement of nongovernment sponsor funds for the benefit of science and education; and the mediation of conflicts between scientists and administrations " [12].

These declared goals and forms of activism express the dualism of the cognitive-normative setup. On the one hand, it is obvious that this type of protest largely advocates the communicative autonomy of science. It demands transformations and, primarily, the negotiation of the functionally undifferentiated (and in this sense, archaic) structure of Russian society in general, where the economy, science, and policy depend on politics and politicians are motivated economically. This systemic dependence of science on excessive external and internal administration is the main topic that consolidates this type of protest communication.

On the other hand, strange as it may seem, this protest is also characterized by the opposite peculiarity. In fact, this autonomy is in a way assumed to be removed by introducing intermediary institutions between science and authority (the preparation of recommendations and expert examination for state bodies) and between science and the economy (engaging independent funding), activists proposing themselves to the role of this intermediary. In this context, of course, this type of protest must be referred not to the "structural-critical" but to the "resource- mobilizing" type.

Overall, this type of protest does not yet advance political demands, does not demand civil disobedience, not being ready to shift to "extralegal" forms, and even meetings and demonstrations are not its main argument in pushing its own protest topic.

The RAS trade unions represent the least radical and the most conservative type of scientific activism, its organized form, and in this sense, it can only conditionally be referred to institutions of scientific protest. The RAS trade union does not formally proclaim goals associated with the topic of protest, does not (in its normative documents - the charter and others) assess the current situation in science. The charter and the interindustry agreement regulate relations with employers, although situational protest actions in defense of science are weakly related to the charter goals of this organization. At the level of the charter and formal goals, there is no understanding that science should be defended as a social system of society and not only focus on the protection of economic and, in this sense, extrascientific interests of "workers of science."

At the level of real actions and situational declarations, we, nevertheless, see that the interests of science as an impersonal, social system are partly declared but are hardly accompanied by calls to participate in mass actions or other appeals to society. On rare occasions, when the possibility of communicative negotiation of the boundaries of the science system is formally proclaimed Thus, clause 2.2.20 of the Charter speaks about sociopolitical organizations and movements, as well as participation in the formation of social and interaction whh partes intematmnal and social and sociopolitical organizations and movements., the actual interaction even with the "systemic opposition" tends to zero. At the time of writing this article, the latest document about such cooperation was dated 2011.

We reserve the third type of institutionalized protest in scientific communication for the most "advanced" communicative media of scientific activism. The Internet newspaper Troitsky variant can be referred to such media. The fact that this type of protest is structurally coupled with the mass-media system proves that the protest movement in science is actually localized at the general societal level (its macrosystems) and has already negotiated the boundaries not only of simple systems of interactions (face-to-face communications) but also of organizationally formalized communications. In this sense, this newspaper appeals to society as such and acts as an egalitarian system amid other grand systems (politics, the economy, education, etc.).

However, for all that, we do not find in this mass medium what is usually called «the media concept, the definition of its mission, the scope of topics, and reflection regarding its target group. Its participants, as its editor-in-chief Boris Shtern claims, deliberately reject the organizational "type of administration, which, as is known, cannot exist for more than two months. It does not have a single staff member and a clear-cut distribution of responsibilities, briefings and a hardline policy. The editorial staff work mainly on principles of spontaneous self-organization of independent participants, who interact nonlinearly through the Internet" [14].

What does this media project represent? Is it a temporary association to solve a specific protest objective or a community very indefinite in terms of time and subject matter?

Note that this is the only institution that explicitly formulates the protest topic (as a hashtag) and explicitly directs its invectives at the scientific establishment. The main targets of criticism are high-status people in the scientific community and officialdom. This type of scientific activism reflects most adequately what sociologists mean today by protest (new social movements). First of all, radical protest happily avoids burdensome forms such as an organization and localizes at the macrosystem level, i.e., society in general. This means that the protest movement can reckon practically on inexhaustible resources (social energy and time, crowdsourcing and fundraising), appeal to diverse communities but not to a parent donor organization (the state, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations, etc.).

Finally, the most radical type of protest movement in science is the Internet-based Dissernet community, identifying itself as a "free network community of experts, researchers, and reporters who dedicate their work to the exposure of swindlers, falsifiers, and liars" [15].

The first thing that strikes the eye is that the selfdescription of this system refers not to the scientific ethos as an internal systemic communicative landmark (Merton). On the contrary, a generalized value-oriented rationality is formulated to appeal to justice and not to the systemic media code of scientific truth (as a generalizing symbol of the search for new authentic knowledge), requiring only indirectly the functional independence of scientific communication.

All emotions concerning the observance of systemic normativity are uttered not from the perspective of the science system (in whichfalsity is, as is known, normalized and can be even considered a reflexive side of the truth/falsity distinction) but from the perspective of an observer in an outside-of-science position. Not falsity but plagiarism is the main problem and delimiter of such a delimitation-from-outside of scientific communication on the part of society. The Dissernet, in this sense, takes the position of society itself, as if concerned about the fact that its integral component, science, degrades and brings discredit on itself.

Here we come across an amazing requirement, when the boundaries of the communicative system are propped not from within (i.e., by the strength of the community of scientists who stand against external attempts to establish the thematic and methodological scope of research) but from without, on the part of political opposition forces, which, however, are compelled to use resources of scientific communication itself. Supposedly, this type of protest communication is rooted in the position of observation from the perspective of the political system. Here, politics (in the person of opposition) engages science and couples with it structurally to solve its own political tasks.

In this sense, the target of criticism gets significantly fuzzy, but the main invective remains aimed against "political and social activists who have attempted to improve their reputation and gain additional respect of fellow countrymen by defending dissertations and receiving official diplomas of candidate's and doctoral degrees" [15].

Thus, entering structural bonds with science, this type of protest simultaneously adopts scientific autonomy and, consequently, infeasibility of uniting scientific and political communication. It is aimed against "utterances" stylized as a scientific discourse (as research works and dissertations of politicians and functionaries) and thereby makes impossible the justification of political authority (in the worst case, authoritarianism) through references to the scientific reputation of politicians.

Despite the radicalism of this activism, here, no doubt, the normative setup is implemented to a larger extent and as a certain final goal. Such a normative goal is the restoration of "shattered justice" (as "incorrect borrowings") given that cognitive resources and setups of scientists themselves are used as means toward this end (through analysis of the texts of dissertations). This is primarily manifested in the requirements that the order and procedures of awarding scientific degrees and titles be changed (and not restored).

Conclusions

Thus, the presence of several types of the newly forming protest movement, crystalizing around topics of autonomy and protection of the interests and prospects of the scientific system, proves our thesis that a type of communication that is simultaneously oriented toward cognitive, as well as normative, setup in observing reality is at least possible.

We showed that this type of communication is reproduced relatively stably and can qualify for the status of an emerging communicative macrosystem. This circumstance can be characterized as a practical solution to the paradoxes of Merton and Popper, who theoretically pointed at the incompatibility of two opposite assertions: on the one hand, to be the best observer or institution of cognition, and on the other hand, to offer the best samples (values, norms) of social consensus and social order.

As a matter of fact, this article is also a contribution to this movement, since, on the one hand, it uses a scientific toolkit (systemic communicative methodology) to analyze a real theoretical problem, and on the other, it clarifies, justifies, and thereby sort of legitimizes, the importance of the new communicative system of social protest.

scientist protest social cognition

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