From the "Influx of the Yellow Race" to "Migrant Workers": Dynamics of the Languages for Describing Cross-Border Migrations in Russia

Ðàçìåùåíî íà http://www.allbest.ru/

From the “Influx of the Yellow Race” to “Migrant Workers”: Dynamics of the Languages for Describing Cross-Border Migrations in Russia

Victor I. Dyatlov³'¹⁵ and Elena V. Dyatlova^a

“Irkutsk State University Irkutsk, Russian Federation

^bNational Research Tomsk State University Tomsk, Russian Federation

Abstract

The phenomenon of mass cross-border labour migrations to Russia of the late imperial and post-Soviet periods was in an urgent need of comprehension in order to build relationships (for the population) and to “manage the process” (for the authorities). The novelty of the phenomenon required the formation of a corpus of migration terminology, both ordinary and official, public one. The importance of studying the issue lies in the fact that both the understanding of the phenomenon and the relation to it are implied in the terms, and a discourse is formed with their help. In the late imperial era, the familiar terminology of citizenship and social class was used, and ethnic categories started being applied. However, the key metaphor was the term “the influx of the yellow race”. It implied the idea of migration as a natural spontaneous process and of migrants as a part of racially alien persons. The Soviet era preserved the dominance of primordialist ethnic discourse, which prevailed at the first stage of the post-Soviet era migration process. However, it was soon supplemented and then replaced by social and, particularly, migration terminology. A “Chinese” becomes a “Chinese migrant”, and then simply a “migrant”, followed by a “migrant worker”. These dynamics did not mean a complete replacement of one system of representations and the description language with another; the hierarchy of discourses changed. However, it clearly demonstrates a change in the attitude of the host Russian society towards migrants and the migration situation in general.

Keywords: migrations, migrants, late imperial Russia, post-Soviet Russia, migration terms, “influx of the yellow race”, “Chinese migrant”, “migrant worker”, “Tajik”.

The late imperial and post-Soviet situations in Russia formed not only new ways of life, but also new words, images, metaphors, new understandings and discourses. And the situation of the “two waves” of cross-border migrant workers, separated by the era of the Iron Curtain, when they were completely unnoticeable in everyday life and historical memory, provides great opportunities for comparison and analysis. Of course, it is necessary to take into account the difference in scales - the cross-border migrant workers of the late imperial era concentrated in one, although strategically important region. They were critically important mainly for the development and simply for the existence of the Far East. For the post-Soviet era, it was already the factor of national importance. The scale and structure of migration flows radically differ. Accordingly, the situation of mass, daily and ordinary contacts with migrants expanded to the scale of the whole society.

It is impossible to say that by the end of the 19^th century Russia did not have experience in regulating cross-border migrations. Engagement of foreigners in the public service, resettlement of entire religious or national groups from other countries as agrarian colonists on newly developed lands, and their endowment with special rights, privileges and obligations - all this contributed the formation of relevant legal norms, state mechanisms and systems of practices.

Nevertheless, both waves of cross-border migrant workers became an absolutely new problem for Russian society and the authorities, and as a result - a big shock. And there is more to it than the scale and burst nature of the migration flows, the novelty of their cross-border nature, the huge impact on the host society and the negative reaction of this society to the problem. This is, of course, also the case. But the main thing is the spontaneous, independent on the state will nature of these migrations that was unique to the Russian experience. For the first time, a huge number of people crossed and cross the Russian border of their own choice and decision, outside the framework of state-organised, regulated and sponsored programmes.

In addition, the state border is acquiring a new quality, its role in the regulation of interstate and intrastate relations and processes is increasing immeasurably. The fact of crossing the border and related formalities are acquiring tremendous symbolic and practical significance.

The state could have a positive, negative or neutral attitude to external migration, but in any case, it should have developed and implemented a certain policy, created normative and institutional tools, and formed a system of bureaucratic practices. And to do this following the rapidly developing process, stressed by the intolerable for the bureaucracy feeling of losing control over the situation.

Society, ordinary people and average citizens can also experience a state of frustration facing with an unexpectedly appearing mass of new aliens that differ in their appearance, behaviour, lifestyle, language, a system of moral standards, taboos, etc. In the conditions of urban mass society, migrants can no longer exist in the form of territorially and/or socially isolated class type groups, in a situation of minimal communication with the host society. The scales of everyday and common contacts and interaction in the economic, social, and cultural fields radically expands. And not only at the level of groups, but at the level of people, individuals. There is an urgent need to build a typical model of relationships and to develop a set of relevant stereotypes.

Therefore, the phenomenon is in an urgent need of comprehension in order to build relationships (for the population) and try to “manage the process” (for the authorities). To comprehend it is necessary to name. But to name also means to assess. Therefore, the formation of migration terminology, both common and official ones, is an important indicator of the “state of minds”. An aspect of the problem that was called by R. Koselleck ideologisation and politicisation of the term (Slovar' osnovnykh, 2014: 27-32) is even more important. It is a situation when terms form an attitude and encourage actions. It is important for us to understand how the description language reflected and shaped public moods, to reveal the possible dynamics of the process, and to raise the question of its continuity or discreteness. At the same time, there is no task of criticising how the “linguistic formation of migration terminology” and, moreover, participation in the important work of “forming a unified semantics of the migration field” took place (Gulina, 2016).

“The influx of the yellow race”: cross-border migrants in the pre-revolutionary Far East

The annexation of the Far East to Russia in the second half of the 19^th century, the development of this vast and incredibly remote from the capital city region (the “distant outskirts”, according to the common definition of those years), required the creation of a primary administrative, military, communication, and economic infrastructure, its maintenance, and the support of elementary life-sustaining activity of the emerging population. This fact created a huge solvent demand for labour, which was simply impossible to satisfy using only Russian resources. It created a big and constantly growing influx of labour migrants from neighbouring countries: from China and, to a lesser extent, from Korea and Japan. Their role in the strategically important region was so substantial that it was perceived as an overall imperial problem which required introduction of a special policy.

The predominant flow from China consisted of temporary, mostly seasonal male migrants. Hence the migration strategy, aimed at temporary stay in Russia and minimal adaptation to the host society. There are no accurate estimates of their numbers due to constant changes, seasonality, as well as poor recording and control. But in some years, it was more than one hundred thousand people (according to A.G. Larin, 200-250 thousand in 1910), i.e. it accounted for 10-12% of the region's population (Larin, 2009: 20-21).

By 1912, the number of migrants from Korea was estimated at 65 thousand people, including 17 thousand who had Russian citizenship (Petrov, 2001: 46). According to the form - migrant workers but, in fact, almost refugees from the unbearable living conditions. They strived for Russian citizenship, and for this purpose they massively converted to Orthodoxy, sought to give their children Russian education and knowledge of the language. Being the lowest paid and disenfranchised layer of labour force in gold mines and in the urban economy, they occupied a prominent place in agriculture. A lot of them managed to get Russian citizenship, the right to land and the possibility to create their own villages. Small, but energetic Russified elite with modern education was being formed.

There were few Japanese migrants, about five thousand people in 1902, but they found their niche in the economy, taking up occupations that required modern education and craft skills.

This was, apparently, the first case of mass cross-border labour migrations in the history of Russia not organised by the empire authorities. This labour force was the basis of agriculture, gold mining, construction, the service sector and personal services, as well as trade and catering.

This situation required comprehension and verbalisation. The main producers of meanings and words were military and civil servants of the capital and the region, as well as journalists, travellers and scientists. They usually had great colonial experience, a high humanitarian culture, excellent analytical skills, and good knowledge of the regional situation. This allowed them to freely use, and if necessary, to create, predominantly domestic conceptual and terminological resources.

The problems of migrants' naturalisation were solved in the usual categories of nationality and citizenship (Pozniak, 2004; Lohr, 2017; Glebov, 2017). This is not to say that the small and only emerging state apparatus of the “far outskirts” coped with this extremely difficult thing perfectly, but the mechanism for issuing visas, documents, registration, collecting duties, etc. functioned. In solving these problems, it was necessary to enter complex, sometimes conflict, negotiations with the authorities of the Qing Empire, Japan and Korea (before the establishment of the Japan's protectorate). The problem of receiving and naturalising Korean migrants was particularly controversial. All this formed a set of routine bureaucratic practices and procedures, developed records management and relevant terminology.

The social class approach was customary. It is no coincidence that conversion to Orthodoxy was an obligatory condition for granting Russian citizenship. The future Governor General P.F. Unterberger noted that “Kore- ans-ploughmen who were granted Russian citizenship were equated with peasant societies and peasant public self-government was extended to them” (Unterberger, 1900: 116). They were ranked to the social class of state peasants and in many cases were described in this way.

In a sense, the so-called “Zazeiskie Manchurians” can be considered as a social class group. It was a sedentary peasant population (about 7000 Chinese, Manchu and Daur in 1900) of the Zazeisky district, adjacent to Blagoveshchensk. Under the Treaty of Aigun, its inhabitants remained under the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities.

The widespread use of the term “manzi” can be considered in the same context. This is not exactly an ethnonym (since both the Hanzu and Manchu were called manzi), but it is not a characteristic of citizenship either. This was the first name of all settled and “wandering” Chinese of the region at the time of its accession to Russia, and then of all immigrants from China, including seasonal migrants.

Ethnic discourse (“nationality”) was intensively gaining influence. The terms Chinese, Koreans, Japanese were widely used, as ethnonyms as well. This is especially noticeable in the case of Koreans, many of whom were born in Russia, had Russian citizenship, converted to Orthodoxy, and were assigned to the peasant class. But they were habitually considered as Koreans.

However, the traditional categories of citizenship and social class, as well as ethnic discourse and terminology that were quickly entering into circulation, evidently did not satisfy society and the authorities. Ethnic categories seemed to be too particular and not operational at all. On the other hand, the authorities did not consider migrants from the neighbouring states of the Far East as ordinary foreigners, subjects of general policy and legal regulation. This was directly formulated during an attempt to introduce the first migration legislation in the history of the country at the initiative of Amur Governor General P.F. Unterberger. According to his categorical assessment, “our laws concerning the rights of foreigners living in the Russian territory are in many ways absolutely inappropriate for the Chinese” (Unterberger, 1900: 274).

The response to the formed request was given by a worldwide complex of ideas about the world, ideologies, stereotypes, fears and prejudices, known as the “yellow peril”. It was based on a racial approach, proceeding from the presumption of the natural, organic belonging of a person to the “race”, in which biological characteristics predetermine intellectual, moral and spiritual qualities, as well as a person's lifestyle, behaviour, value system and group loyalty. Belonging to the “race” as a natural object is not a matter of personal choice, since you cannot choose skin colour or eye shape.

Using this approach made it possible to transfer the principles of legal regulation and specific management practices from the categories of citizenship, ethnicity and socio-economic status (“migrants”) to the category of race. And that means getting the basis for a specific attitude and a specific policy.

The most striking manifestation of the racial approach was the generally accepted use of the epithet “yellow”. It was used widely and freely, as a normal and habitual word in everyday speech by the representatives of both ordinary people and the elite class. It was used by journalists, researchers, departmental analysts, officials and senior administrators. At the same time, the word “yellow” could have different implications - from emphasising racial connotations (“yellow race”) to convenient aggregation of the total of Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese. The word “yellow” could imply an assessment (most often negative one), but it could also be neutral. However, in any case, it is a manifestation of an absolute and natural foreignness. The nature and essence of relationships and fears are concentrated in the epithet “yellow”. This is the dominant discourse, but not just a part of a randomly formed term and concept.

The widespread not only in Russia practice of evaluating the Chinese as “The Jews of the Orient” complements it. The King of Siam, for instance, wrote a book with such title. For Russia, such a comparison was at the intersection of class, ethnic, and racial understanding, which was based on the category of “petty trading”. Assessment of these groups as natural (“race”) carriers of the entrepreneurial principle, assessed as an inevitable, but undesirable and condemned element of reality.

The epithet “yellow” is used along with ethnonyms. Literate audience, as well as a significant part of illiterate population, especially in the Far East, knew that there were Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Mongols, etc. A lot of them understood the differences between them. When analysing specific phenomena and processes in the region, officials, military men and professional experts were traditionally applying these categories.

They clearly saw the difference in migration strategies of different ethnic groups. The administration policy was often formed in accordance with this. The anti-Korean campaign of Governor General P.F. Unterberger, a well- known researcher and expert of the region, was based on a clear understanding of the fact that Koreans are excellent colonisation material: hard working, loyal, ready for integration, useful, and simply irreplaceable people in the agricultural sector. However, unlike his predecessors, he was afraid of precisely these qualities. The essence of his policy was concentrated in the phrase that he prefers to see the Far East as a desert for the Russians, but not a blooming garden for the “yellow”. He saw the region as a reserve territory and a place of residence for the future generations of Russians. Therefore, he did not welcome the settlement of their potential competitors in the region. He preferred temporary guests, “migratory birds,” the Chinese, who were not looking for a new home here, but an opportunity for earning money (Grave, 1912: 137).

The language strategy of his project - restrictive measures against the Koreans, as a tool to combat the “yellow”, were relevant. Koreans, whose adaptation efforts were obvious, were not recognised as future Russians because they were “yellow”.

Asian subjects of the empire, like Buryats or Yakuts, were not rated as the “yellow”. A class system of categories was used, and in the last years of the empire, the ethnic system appeared as well. Although, the racial approach could arise in some cases here. The idea of resettlement of the Transbaikal Buryats into the inner regions of the empire due to the fact that “in the impending war with Japan, they were considered as potential allies of the yellow race” (Dameshek, 2016: 41) had been discussed in the highest government spheres, but it did not find support.

Assessing the situation generally, it can be mentioned that specific problems of the region's development and the issues of its management related to migrants, were usually considered in terms of social class, ethnicity or citizenship. But as soon as the analysis concerned formation of geopolitics, strategy and a general vision of the region's role in the country and in the world, the “yellow” discourse started its domination. This fact can be confirmed by the works of such insightful and competent analysts as V.V Grave and V.K. Arsenyev. This can be clearly traced in such strategic documents as the Annual Most Humble Reports of the Amur Governor Generals.

Here is a distinctive and almost typical assessment from the Most Humble Report of the Amur Governor General (dated 1893, 1894 and 1895), “The yellow race that had been resting on the Pacific coasts for many years, has now been disturbed by intrusive strangers and involuntarily perked up... They faced the impending European domination. The head of this race, Japan, has risen. Its population, based on its island position and the mix of energetic and intelligent Malay blood, is the brain and nerve centres of the giant body - China and Korea. The battle, while still indistinct, between the five hundred million yellow race and the European descendants has begun” (Vsepoddan- neishii otchet Priamurskogo..., 1895: 167). “The Race” appears as a single living organism that can rest, perk up and raise its head. It is distinctive that this is a thorough and detailed analysis of the situation with migrants in the region. The benefits and risks of the presence of the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese, but not the aggregated “yellow”, are assessed.

Not everybody in Russia shared the idea of the “yellow peril”, but it was typically not accompanied by protests against the use of the epithet “yellow” itself or its neglect in their own texts. Even an opponent of the racial theory, a political exile-populist and an outstanding researcher of Siberia D. Klements, fundamentally and reasonably rejecting the “yellow peril” and the possibility of uniting such different nations as Chinese, Japanese and Mongols for joint expansion against Europe, habitually uses this terminology, even without quotation marks (Klements, 1905).

Thus, there is a predominance of racial terminology, while using the categories of citizenship, social class and ethnicity. And, at the same time, there is no conflict, all these words can be used in the texts of one author, depending on the context and situation.

However, the need for migration vocabulary itself was obvious. The terms used to describe internal migration processes were not suitable in this case and were hardly used. The word migrant itself was hardly ever used; the apparent lack of socio-economic understanding of the problem was insignificantly compensated by the widespread use of the category '“yellow labour”. Specialists publications contain its expert analysis: sectoral and regional dynamics of the use of Chinese and Korean labour, its wage level, cost structure, as well as the scale of export of the rouble supply from the country (L.G., 1916; Mezhduvedomstvennoe soveshchanie...; Grave, 1912; Matsokin, 1911; Panov, 1910; Predvaritel'nye itogi., 1925). Herewith, the word “yellow” was not less but, perhaps, even more important than the word “labour”. The position of M. Kovalevsky is a clear exception here: “while Chinese labour is of seasonal nature, it does not threaten a permanent Chinese settlement in our eastern outskirts, and, therefore, it cannot cause serious political concerns” (Kovalevsky, 1909).

The metaphor “influx”, which was widely used in everyday speech, the public sphere, bureaucratic practice and documents of the highest level is the closest to the migration discourse. For instance: “Journals of meetings of the commission to develop the measures to stop the influx of foreigners into our western suburbs” (Lohr, 2017; 118). There was a clear tendency for transforming the metaphor into a term.

The choice of exactly this metaphor says a lot. The meanings of spontaneous, almost natural (like a flood, for example) and catastrophic nature are concentrated in the word “influx”. There is no reverse movement, and therefore, the idea of a constant spontaneous unregulated inflow that threatens to become a flood of biblical proportions is formed. Hence the negative connotation: the “influx” is a flood, a disaster that must be fought. And since it is a cataclysm, a natural phenomenon, in this case there is no migrant, no decision-maker and no subject of action here. The movement is dehumanised; it does not appear to be the result of people's conscious choice and activity.

The “influx”, as an almost natural and tectonic movement, it is organically linked with the category of the “yellow race” and with the racial approach. It was verbally implemented in one of the most common phrases of that situation, country and era - “the influx of the yellow race.” These words became a key working metaphor, almost a term.

An attempt to combine the understanding of citizenship, race and migration could sometimes create serious political and administrative problems. The draft of the first migration law in the history of Russia, proposed by the Far Eastern administration of P.F. Unterberger and the Ministry of the Interior, was based on the need to limit the influx and use of the “yellow” migrants' labour. There was an attempt to create a special legal status for them, different from other foreigners. This led to the resolute opposition from the Foreign Ministry, since for the ministry they were citizens of China, whose status could not be different from the status of other foreign nationals and citizens (Sorokina, 2009; Dyatlov, 2000).

Thus, within the framework of the dominant discourse of the “influx of the yellow race”, ethnic, socio-economic (“yellow labour”) and migratory approaches were gradually formed. And despite all the obvious contradictions, they did not go beyond this common discursive field, they were sometimes considered as its essential and integral parts, but they were preparing the ground for the formation of independent approaches and conceptions for the future. This work was interrupted by the socialist era, which made the topic of mass cross-border migration irrelevant for a long period.

“Aperson of geographical nationality”: the Soviet era vocabulary

In the early years of the Soviet regime the situation with cross-border migrants was largely a continuation of the pre-revolutionary one - there was a combination of mass migration with attempts to establish state control in the Far East. This was complemented by a policy of forcing migrants out of commercial entrepreneurship. The category “yellow” can sometimes be found in the Soviet texts of the 1920s. The “Great Break” became a dividing line in this case as well. The pendulum labour migration was stopped and the Chinese who remained in the country were partially forced out, deported or destroyed. They were completely forgotten for a long time. Koreans and Chinese (as groups) were forced out or deported from the Far East for the fear that they might become the “fifth column” for Japan. And the only thing that gave reason to believe in such a collaboration was their “yellowness”.

Then the country was closed for many years and the problem of cross-border migrants disappeared from social practice and mass consciousness. Cross-border migrations were sometimes practiced in the form of transfers organised by the authorities during the establishment and change of borders.

And when a new, massive, time-compressed influx of cross-border migrants began, a weak willingness to comprehend, and for this to name a phenomenon, appeared again. The process went on spontaneously, by trial and error method. As it usually happens, new words and images originally came from earlier times and realities. What could the Soviet era offer in this sense?

The category of citizenship, naturally, did not disappear. However, the situation of closed country formed in the Soviet society additional complexes of “abroad” and “foreigners”, which were oversaturated with meanings and connotations that went far beyond the legal relationship between a person and the state (On The “Unique Soviet Concept Zagranitsa” see: Yurchak, 2016: 311-314). A “foreigner” is not just a citizen of another state. This is a person from “abroad”, from another world, another culture, a bearer of a different lifestyle. The incarnate “different” and “alien”. In a way, a “repatriate,” a person, although of Russian origin, but who arrived from “abroad”, from an alien world, who experienced its influence and, therefore, aroused cautious and suspicious curiosity, adjoined this complex.

The complex of a “petty trader” - a carrier of alien values and a lifestyle is indirectly connected with “abroad”. Official propaganda and mass traditionalist anti-market mindsets united and gave a powerful effect in its formation and functioning. Taking into account the development (especially during the “era of stagnation”) of shadow market relations, their status and prestige, as well as their place in the social hierarchy (both official and unofficial ones) were low. Probably (but this requires a separate study), the attitude was different in some national Soviet republics, especially in the Caucasus. On the whole, moral condemnation of “petty traiding”, coinciding with its ideological condemnation and legal prohibitions prevailed.

This attitude also partially extended to the “shabashniks” - seasonal workers of the 1960-80s. This was a mass and stable migration phenomenon of those years, which actually formed the labour market in the period its legal prohibition and ideological condemnation (Valetov, 2008; Siegelbaum, Moch, 2014: 16-65). And the noticeable role of the people from the southern republics of the country with manpower-surplus, noted and marked by the population through the generic name “Armenians”, gave this phenomenon a national and sometimes racial connotation.

Directly or indirectly, all these images, ideas and words were correlated or directly derived from the key for the dominant ideology discourse of the “ideological issue”, “national relations” and “national policy”. “National policy” was an essential part of the state policy and state formation, and the view of life, of social relations and relations through the prism of “national” (i.e. primordial-ethnic) is a natural and almost monopolistic position of the vast majority of Soviet people.

The direct link of “nationality” to origin and “blood” spur into racial connotations. Hence the massive use of such explicitly racist and offensive words as “blacks”, “blackheads”, “khachiks”, “jiggaboos”, etc. in everyday speech (Merlin, Radvani, 2003). However, this was officially condemned by the authorities. The preliminary censorship institute allowed them to keep this discourse outside of public space.

In concentrated form in the late Soviet years these discourses merged in the image of a “Caucasian” - a temporary migrant from a Soviet, but culturally alien province. In the 1960s and 1980s, there was a flow of labour migrants from there that mainly escaped state control and regulation: the “shabashniks” and vegetables, flowers and fruit market traders. This created the image of a person who is actively and successfully engaged in semi-legal entrepreneurial activity, not approved by the authorities and condemned by public opinion. In addition to that this person had specific appearance, behaviour and domestic culture characteristics. “Profiteers”, “strangers”, “blacks” (as a marker of cultural alienation) are the main components of this stereotype.

The power bureaucratic discourse “imprinted” into the odious formula “a person of Caucasian nationality.” The phrase was invented in the Soviet era either by army political workers or by officials of the labour camp system or the services of the Ministry of the Interior (Levinson, 2005; Pal'veleva, 2008), who tried to comprehend and formalise the most complicated system of social relations and ties in national categories. All of a sudden for them, it turned out to be oversaturated with meanings. Moreover, the meanings were pejorative. This was facilitated by the overlapping of the meanings “face - person” and “face - physiognomy”, and the obvious absurdity of distinguishing “geographical nationality”. All these transferred the phrase into an obviously racial and racist field. Although, according to the director of the Institute of Linguistics of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Maxim Krongauz, it was a bureaucratically clumsy, but still a way to remove offensive or simply insulting implication when naming ethnonyms.

The word “Caucasian” (in quotation marks and without them) is widely used, but with a tinge of doubt about its political correctness. Theoretically, it is in the same semantic tier as a “European”, for instance, including not only geographical, but also sociocultural and sometimes even racial connotations. However, the word “European” does not cause protest and is widely and freely used. It is more difficult with a “Caucasian”...

The Post-Soviet situation: “There is such a nationality - migrant workers”

A new massive influx of cross-border migrant workers started in the late 1980s - early 1990s. In a short period of time they managed to become both an extremely important element of the economic and social structure, and an annoying, heatedly debated problem for the society, authorities and the research community. It already concerns millions of people, immigrants, mainly from the countries of Central Asia and China. They may be radically different from each other in a cultural sense but occupy the same social niche. Most of them were temporary migrants, but a layer of people that are oriented towards prolonged or permanent residence was gradually formed. The problem was intensively studied, there was already a more or less adequate idea on the dynamics and structure of the migration flow, on the importance of migrants for the economic and social life of the host society (Migratsiia v Rossii, 2013).

The migration theme was actively mastered by the authorities and the population. It has been already noted that initially they were not ready for this, did not have the corresponding images, words and stereotypes. Great pre-revolutionary experience was almost completely lost, it disappeared from historical memory. Nevertheless, despite the relatively young age of the phenomenon, Russian society had already gone through several stages of its comprehension and verbalisation. These stages, which were both models and strategies of understanding, can be very arbitrarily described through the images of the “Caucasian”, “Chinese migrant”, “Tajik” and “migrant worker”. The change (but not complete elimination) of the prevailing discourse depended both on the dynamics of the actual migration situation and the intensity of the host society attention. These factors could coincide, but there was no complete correlation between them.

The image of the “Caucasian” was directly inherited from the Soviet era. It was updated and strengthened by the “bulk” influx from the Caucasus (both Russian and gaining independence) of hundreds of thousands of new migrants. Massive and everyday contacts with new migrants, mostly carriers of traditionalist rural culture, created a situation of a sharp contrast and a conflict of types and manners of behaviour. The differences between rural and urban cultures were evaluated in the usual “national”, that is, primordial ethnic categories. The conflict intensified the orientation of most migrants to employment in highly competitive small and medium-sized businesses, as well as the visible success of some of them. A part of the Russian elite deliberately formed the “image of the enemy” from immigrants from the Caucasus.

All the fears of the transitional era were concentrated in the image of the “Caucasian”: a sense of defencelessness against the “rampant market”, against mass individual violence, which replaced state violence, and against the collapse of the old hierarchy of values and social relations. It was a frustration of people who suddenly found themselves in a world where previously pursued, condemned and despised qualities and abilities (individualism, community and community solidarity, an entrepreneurial lifestyle and related skills, abilities and values) turned out to be a key resource for survival and capturing resources. Now “Caucasians” are “guests” and “arrogant strangers” who do not want to respect the orders and customs of the “hosts”. “Petty traders” who were imposing a hostile system of values. People connected with the mutual responsibility of community relations, therefore bearing collective responsibility (Dyatlov, 2008). The factor of citizenship does not play a significant role, the society is getting used to the existence of a “new expatriate community” and does not perceive it as a real foreign country. To a large extent, the “Caucasian” complex is a product of the “national discourse”.

As a result, the annoyance of the late Soviet era and domestic grumble became almost a paranoia. However, by the late 1990s, “Caucasian phobia” paled into insignificance. The migration wave decreased and lost its former “bulk” nature. As a result of the quick adaptation of migrants, they ceased to be distinguished by their behaviour and lifestyle. It became clear that it was not “Caucasian ethnicity”, not appearance or racial characteristics (“black”) that disturbed people earlier and stimulated fear and hostility, but a model of behaviour, way of life and lifestyle. The negative image of a “petty trader” was disappearing. The opening of borders, as well as mass and daily contacts with the previously mythologised “abroad” pushed the stereotype of the “foreigner” far aside.

All this revealed weak tool capabilities of the construct of “nationality” and “national relations”. The authorities, which rushed to pursue a “national policy”, creating appropriate institutions and developing regulatory documents for this in the 1990s, quickly lost interest to this. The corresponding ministry was closed, relations with national and cultural societies were routinised and lost their former significance.

The sudden appearance of numerous migrants from China in the early 1990s was an absolute surprise for the vast majority of Russians. Moreover, it was a huge shock. The old Chinese diaspora disappeared, was forced out or destroyed during the Soviet era. This case has gone to the outskirts of historical memory and is perceived as a completely new one by the current generation.

The massive presence of Chinese migrants did not form the atmosphere of everyday habitual, routine human contact with them, even as conflict as the one with the “Caucasians”. At least relatively individualised contact - through colleagues, business partners, permanent and personally familiar traders, and through joint work. Therefore, perhaps, there is no special incentive to form an individualised image of a Chinese. This seems strange against the background of a huge number of journalistic publications, social and political essays, statements by politicians and officials, and the growing number of scientific studies. Chinese migrants are regular characters of television programmes, as well as news items and special films. But there are practically no faces even in television footage. There is no interest to an individual person, to his/her face, life and fate. There is interest to function, to mass, to undivided and not individualised mass. It is the mass that is feared, precisely the mass, the quantity that underlies the formation of various constructs about the “demographic expansion” and the “yellow peril.” The metaphor of the “ant”, so widespread before the revolution, arises now - the truth is used less often.

Petty traders, construction workers and all labour migrants from China, immediately started to be called the “Chinese.” And this word was also used, for example, for Chinese Koreans, quite numerous at first. A “Chinese” in this sense is an ethnic Chinese, a resident of China, and a citizen of the People's Republic of China. This, of course, is not a “foreigner” in the Soviet sense, but a representative, a part of a giant power, with which, not a long time ago, relations were on the verge of military confrontation. It was this acutely felt presence of a huge and growing country behind the migrants' backs that almost immediately pushed the ethnic side of the category “Chinese” aside and highlighted and emphasised the sovereign side and the problem of citizenship. This was a significant difference from the “image of the Caucasian”, where the problem of citizenship was insufficient, if it presented at all.

If at the turn of the 19^th and 20^th centuries China was seen more as a space, rather than a real carrier of sovereign power, now such a view is basically impossible. Now, in the ideologists' concepts and in the mass consciousness, this is a superpower whose economic and military power was initially directed outward, at least under the pressure of a gigantic and rapidly growing population and the general limited nature of its resources. Migrants are regarded as an absolutely loyal and obedient instrument, a tentacle of this giant state. In the constructs of the turn of the 19^th and 20^th centuries a Chinese looks much less etatised, dissolved not in the state, but in the group, in the “race.”

The epithet “yellow”, which was fundamentally important for the turn of the 19^th and 20^th centuries, was almost out of use. It is preserved in the phrase “yellow peril”, but rather as a component of an established term. This is hardly the result of political correctness. Rather, it is a consequence of the fact that a powerful and, possibly, predominant in the late 19^th and early 20^th century racial discourse in the analysis of social relations and problems became not so relevant. Racism, of course, survived, and racial differences are observed and really affect the nature of human ties and relationships, but mass ideas about the insurmountable abyss between races and perception of representatives of a different race as aliens, generally became a thing of the past. The transition from “yellow” to “Chinese” seems to the authors of the present paper to be a fundamental difference in the most basic characteristics of the image of a Chinese of the two eras under consideration.

The obvious shift from ethnic, “national” understanding and assessment of the problem was expressed in the fact that the definition of “a Chinese migrant” entered the socio-political circulation, the mass media, and the ordinary ideas and speech of ordinary people and quickly became dominant. This is an indicator of a clear shift of attention from the sphere of cultural characteristics to a socio-economic function, to the role of the Chinese in the Russian society. At the same time, there was a process of shifting from “Chinese”” to “migrant”” within this formula. “Chinese nature”” remained a significant marker of belonging to the state, rather than culture and ethnic group.

The next powerful migration wave was connected with Central Asia. Residents of Tajikistan, Tajiks by ethnicity were its pioneers. A brief but bloody civil war of the early 1990s stimulated them to migrate. The refugees organically became labour migrants. They quickly formed a migration infrastructure - from the organisation of traffic to the mechanism for the providing intermediary services in Russian cities.

As newcomers, they could not count on the starting opportunities of the people from the Caucasus who had accumulated significant material resources, experience, business and social relations since Soviet times. Starting from scratch, they could count only on the most unattractive, dirty and low-payed professions and areas of employment. Public servants, doctors, scientists, teachers, skilled workers, and people with secondary and higher education became labourers. A Tajik loader in the market, a seasonal construction worker, and a migrant worker, became typical, even iconic figures. A few years later, partly relying on the migration infrastructure they had created, the inhabitants of neighbouring Uzbekistan, whose migration potential is much higher than that of Tajikistan, set in motion. And they occupied the first place in the number of officially registered labour migrants, surpassing the previously prevailing Chinese.

The pioneering role of Tajiks, their massive, daily and constant presence in the life of the host society, formed the “image of a Tajik.” This word itself gained new meanings. It remained a usual ethnonym and a reference to a resident and citizen of Tajikistan. However, it is now spread to all immigrants from Central Asia who come to Russia in search of work, mainly temporary, seasonal one. And the reason for this is not only in the fact that few people in the host society distinguish, for instance, a Tajik from Uzbek. The “Tajik” became a mass and familiar figure, a part of everyday life, routine. This implies massive personal contacts with migrants, and hence the formation of relationships. Such fixed expressions as “Tajik labour”, “Tajik wage” “work like a Tajik,” and even “work a Tajik” appeared.

Accordingly, the image and stereotype of “a Tajik” was also formed. This was, naturally, a person from Central Asia, not necessarily a Tajik. With the numerical predominance of Uzbeks, for example, they are practically absent in public opinion and consciousness. Although, of course, everyone knows about the existence of Uzbekistan and Uzbeks. It is not Russian, or, according to the widespread definition, not a “Russian-speaking” person. The implication is - not a European. However, not a Central Asian Korean or Tatar. Racial characteristics are explicit, although not verbalised, and often not realised. This person is not just a visitor, but a temporary “migratory bird.” This understanding does not interfere with the fact that many migrants come to the same place for many years and join the system of local social ties and relations. And sometimes they stay here for permanent residence, move their family or start a family in the country. But they are also endowed with the characteristic of temporality. When the degree of their integration crosses a certain line, they cease to be “Tajiks”, although their Tajik origin and culture are fully recognised.

This is a second-class, low-status and disempowered person, not claiming to anyone else's place in the social hierarchy, ready for any work, just for anything for the sake of earning. This person is not just at the bottom of the social ladder - he/she is outside it. There is more rejection and a desire to distance, rather than fear in relation to a Tajik. Tajiks are only feared as competitors for jobs, but a weak competitor. This person is not supported by the power of the state or energy, hard work and strength, that the Chinese are feared for. This person does not have any aggression typical for the “Caucasians”, readiness and ability to use physical force and resources of the bribed state apparatus.

A Tajik ceases to be ethnicity and even citizenship. It becomes a synonym for “labour migrant”. The fact that social connotations acquired by the word “Tajik” actually mean its movement towards the original meanings of the word, which were also social (class), but not ethnic, is of special interest.

In this case it is possible to see a tendency to gradual substitution of previously prevailing national discourse by social migration discourse. Migrants took such a huge place in the life of Russian society and turned out to be such a unique phenomenon that a need for their own, separate attitude and stereotype arose.

The answer to this need was the entry of the word “migrant worker”, which was previously extremely rarely and exclusively used in specialised literature, into everyday speech. According to S. Abashin, “the imperceptible transition from a “migrant” to “migrant worker” shifts the topic from the issues of geographical movement to the issues of social interactions in the labour market” (Abashin, 2012: 6). Having appeared in Germany, this word (German Gastarbeiter, Russian ãàñòàðáàéòåð) also reflected a shift in understanding and perception of the problem by society, in particular, a radical transition from the ethnic principle of stereotyping to the migrant one. This transition is remarkably captured in the heading of the article “There is Such a Nationality - Migrant Workers,” published in Komsomolskaya Pravda (July 17, 2007), the most widely circulated and read Russian newspaper of that period.

The main features of a migrant worker are revealed through the huge amount of the most diverse texts of the recent years. In many ways, this is the continuation and development of the concept of “Tajik”. This is a newcomer, not a local person, a “migrant” who came from another country to earn money and leave. No one is interested in this person's ethnicity, culture, country of origin and personal qualities. This person's presence is not welcomed, it is annoying, but people have to put up with them, since someone has to do dirty and low-paid work. This person must “know his/her place”, and this place is outside the social hierarchy of the host society. The less you see this person, the better.

With such an attitude ethnic, racial, civil characteristics and differences fade away. The socio-economic function a “labour migrant” is becoming important. This group is endowed with general social and psychological characteristics, an idea of a common way of life and lifestyle of its representatives is formed. Their specific legal status is implied. The parameters and criteria for this status are not limited to citizenship. The real differences existing in this legal sphere (visa and non-visa nationals' migrants, migrants from countries with preferential migrant regimes and those without them, etc.) play no meaningful role. A foreign citizen with a highly paid job and high-status position working in Russia is not a migrant worker at all. As an object of specific legal regulation they are emphasised precisely as labour migrants. And this makes us recall the class system.

mass labour migrations migration terminology racially alien

Conclusion

Two waves of mass cross-border labour migrations in the eras, separated by the Soviet regime and its “Iron Curtain”, provide a unique opportunity to reveal both general and specific in the reaction of the host society to them.

We can see constant attempts to comprehend this phenomenon through the system of ethnic categories in late imperial and post-Soviet Russia. The attempts, as a rule, were not very successful, motivating to look for words and images in other problematic areas. It is impossible to understand the descriptive and evaluative role of ethnic discourse without a simultaneous analysis of the role of concomitant - racial, class, legal and normative (nationality and citizenship) and socio-economic (“labour migrants” and “migrant workers”) approaches.

We can see how in the late imperial era the “national approach”, which was gaining its strength and heuristic opportunities, was hiding “in the shadow” of the racial one or was used as its complementation. The way it relates to still functioning class discourse and the language. How it can conflict with the categories of law, and especially international law that are developed and deeply rooted in the sphere of state functioning.