Joseph Broz Tito: social project of the SFRY through the prism of visual analytics and social systemology in international relations (part 1)

Behind this position was not only the interference of the party in Tito's intimate life, but also his more mature (in comparison with Pavelic) attitude towards women as a biological or social fetish object. Relations with Zdenka did not remain without evaluative reactions to her antics on the part of Djilas, Rankovich and other Titovites, who were by no means going to indulge Zdenka in her tantrums. This, however, did not prevent Tito from burying her in the garden of the White Palace. and, according to the Minister of the Interior Rankovic, to be “very upset” by the death of Zdenka. In the Stalinist USSR, the condition for the success of sexual harassment was the administrative status of the harassment. If it was significant, then sexual success was guaranteed both due to the motives of banal physical security and economic interest (when “harassment” took place on the part of representatives of the nomenklatura or non-nomenklatura officials who held positions in the trade apparatus or other sectors related to the redistribution of material benefits).

But Tito's Yugoslavia was markedly different from Moscow and Leningrad in the level of despotic omnipotence of the nomenklatura. Yes, and Tito, unlike Stalin, was a supporter of a different gender morality, since he passed gender inculturation in the European environment, which means he knew a lot about flirtation and the advantages of sexual liberalism. It is also worth noting that after the hysterically unbalanced Zdenka, as well as after the end of the war and the struggle for power, supporters of the leftwing pseudo-Puritan “ideological asceticism” prevailed in Tito's entourage.

In general, the attitude of the communists to the problems of sexuality and gender fluctuated in a wide continuum from the promiscuous harassment of the 20-30s, when each Komsomol member had to provide her own body like a glass of water to the Komsomol on demand, to the Stalinist political and criminal homosexuality and false asexuality, which became an arrangement for any repression against biological sexuality, implemented outside the class-corporate “communist morality”. As R. West notes, “Belgrade was not like Stalin's Moscow, where the party bosses just had to point a finger at any ballerina from the Bolshoi Theater they liked. There were no problems, since everyone knew that the disobedient women and their families were awaited by the Gulag”[27, Ch. 10].

The head of the protocol service, Tito, says that the affair with Jovanka Budislavljevic-Broz, whom Djilas described in 1946 as “a spectacular, beautiful, extremely attractive, full of health Serb woman, dark-haired and white-faced”, was quite harmonious. Relations with Tito went wrong on the eve of another visit to China, when Yovanka issued an ultimatum to Tito that if a number of members of his political entourage went to China as part of a delegation, she would not go there. The head of the protocol service notes that Yovanka, like many wives, preferred to gossip at home, until this gossip began to overlap with politics. After the designated visit, Jovanka's obstinacy exceeded the limits of Tito's tolerance. She stopped communicating with him at all, until his death in the Ljubljana hospital in 1980 [38].

However, Yovanka's behavior changed from initial modesty to pathological lust for power and permissiveness. Putting pressure on the propaganda press in Yugoslavia, Yovanka made sure that, instead of the protocol-impersonal “president with his wife,” individualizing phrases such as “the president with his wife Jovanka” began to appear in the newspapers. Moreover, she “interfered in the work of important state bodies, personally got acquainted with secret documents,” which “in the end” ... provoked the opposition to take decisive steps [38].

According to the version voiced in both scientific and publicistic sources, Jovanka allowed herself not only to rotate the staff of Tito's residence, but also to make a selection surrounded by ministers. In 1976, she allegedly entered into negotiations with a group of Serbian generals and tried to participate in a coup. She was also brought forward unproven suspicions of espionage in favor of the USSR. Tito triedto educate Jovanka with the use of communist-Makarenko technologies “in the collective and through the collective”, creating a special commission, in which, rather, he achieved not success, but a fiasco. Tito's entourage presented him with the same dilemma as Jovanka: “Jovanka or the state.” In order to finally get rid of any presence of Yovanka in politics, in 1980 she was placed under house arrest, in which she remained until 2000 [7].

Jovanka's influence on the politics of the SFRY was part of the internal conflict of identities of Tito himself: already under pressure from the environment, he had to choose between a power-hungry female sensibility that interfered with politics (as is the case in matriarchal societies, whose Slovenian identities were represented in Tito's psyche) and a rational-state the expediency of patriarchal and androcratic Austro-Germanic societies. During Tito's tenure in power, the latter steadily “prevailed” over the former.

Conclusions

Tito's set of identities shows the features of the autopoiesis of the so-called fragmented society, a society - a social aggregate that was created as an imitation of the disappeared Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which, in the final period of its existence, the confederal social project of the United States of Greater Austria was articulated. Tito in Yugoslavia, in a shortened historical perspective, first implemented an aggregate pan-Yugoslavist “gluing” of six republics in an imperial manner, and in the 70s he took a course towards regional decentralization.

The traits that brought two seemingly different societies closer together was dictatoid political absolutism, which Tito tried to eclectically combine with “revisionist” Marxism, cultural-regional pluralism, industrial self-government, hedonistic and consumerist social morality, and the economy of labour export and mass consumption based on external loans. Historical and psychobiographical events, in particular - the Balkan genocide of Croats against Serbs during the NGH period and the emergence of a poor family in conditions - contributed to Tito's disidentification with the ethnic identity of the Croats.

Being in a left-wing radical (communist) environment contributed to the combination of imperial and communist cosmopolitanism in the propaganda metanarrative of the SFRY, which will become for Tito an ideological instrument for integrating the non-integrating ethnic groups of the Yugoslav federation, artificially kept together during his reign. For the religious and national-ethnic self-identification of Tito, the key event was the move to Vienna, which, as the capital, represented the cultural space of ritual Roman Catholicism. Tito's biographical frustrations in individual attempts to make a career as a minister were recursively reinforced by secular Christian- Catholic values, which contributed to the final formation of an atheist-conformist and ritual-Catholic religious identity. The latter circumstance in socialist Yugoslavia resulted in the practice of simultaneously converting Catholic and Orthodox churches into houses of culture, warehouses and barracks, and Tito's guest visits to Orthodox and Catholic monasteries with generous gifts. For most of his life, Tito positioned himself as an atheist, from time to time blurting out about himself as a Catholic, which, however, was typical of the bearer of a diffuse religious identity. In national-ethnic identities, the same recursion of diffusion, ritual and duality took place.

Tito's philosophical, ideological and moral identities reflected attempts to combine inconsistent nationalism / chauvinism with communist cosmopolitanism. The ideology of equality of all national and ethnic communities in Yugoslavia was more of a decorum for the nationalist and ethnocratic course of non-alignment in international relations and confederation within the state than a real vector of the development of society. The attitude of Tito himself and the Titoites to communism as an ideological doctrine was more cynical, nihilistic and pragmatic than consistently accepting. Tito's characteristic deficit of value consciousness presupposed the use of philosophical and ideological linguistic games rather than reliance on Marxism as a real philosophy and ideology.

Using the geopolitical authority of the USSR, Tito initially tried to implement the pan-Yugoslavist project of a consocialist aggregate society Bogards, Haymes and Leiphart [47] state the growing importance of consocialism as an ideology for the peaceful settlement of conflicts in a society of increasing polarization and fractionation. It is the ideology of a society made up of “deeply polarized and divided societies” within itself. According to the authors, “consocial democracy” as a special political regime in such societies arises as an alternative to “majority rule with its inherent polarizing features” and political populism (since “...him, “based on the division of power between political elites”). In Yugoslavia, a consocial project was implemented on the basis of the division of power between regional political elites, but after Tito's death, these elites switched to destructive ethnocracy, which turned Yugoslavia into a failed state.

Brendan O'Leary in his article [48] examines the contradiction between the supporters of the consocialist and centripetal (“centripetal” in the author's terminology) paradigms (D. Horowitz, B. Reilly, A. Wimmer), believing that “both philosophical schools recognize the possibility of a long interethnic conflict; share a similar sociology of such conflict; and criticize the transfer of Westminster-style arrangements, especially the “selection of winners” in single-member constituencies, into the post-colonial world. “ Tito, being more of an unconsciously pragmatic supporter than an ideological apologist of the consocialist paradigm, in the logic of Brendan O'Leary, considered the unalloyed “majority approach” of Soviet despotic Bolshevism (with the physical elimination of all social groups potentially dissatisfied with the socialist order) “potentially catastrophic”; as a politician, he recognized “constructive opportunities in agreements on the division of powers in the center” of the SFRY political system “in combination with territorial decentralization”; and rejected the “ethnic extremism” of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, etc.

Tito, as a pragmatic consocialist in the last decade of his rule, gave “preference to collegial executive institutions such as a collective presidency, double premiership.” make statements “from more than one party,” seeking to “encourage more moderate hardliners to negotiate and support power-sharing,” thus avoiding ethnic radicalization and ethnic conflict in the SFRY. in the form of an unrealized version of the «united states» of Greater Austria, which, in addition to six socialist republics and two autonomous socialist territories, would also include Bulgaria and Albania. Later, due to disagreements with Stalin, Tito had to confine himself to a society-aggregate of a quasi-imperial type, which, again, was represented in Austria-Hungary before the reformer Franz-Ferdinand, who did not manage to implement the territorial-political reform.

In Tito's social status identity, nomenclature identity was realized as a reverse-revanchist form of eclectic mixing of peasant and proletarian social identities (with incomplete identification) with the identity residues of social groups in a transitional (modernizing) society that combines feudal institutional superstructure and social stratification with elements of a market economy culture and consumerism. Tito's nomenclature identity, in contrast to similar identities of political elites in the USSR and neo-Stalinist societies, did not acquire a pronounced despotism and malignant torture.

The latter circumstance was due to the fact that the Tito party nomenklatura was recruited not from criminal-ochlotic elements, but from representatives of the industrial working class and peasantry, urban philistinism and the intellectuals, as well as from two ethnic groups-leaders of the Yugoslav federation, who managed to smooth out interethnic contradictions and temporarily tame the radicalized ethnic periphery. On the other hand, Tito's national-ethnic identities prevented the complete criminalization and oholisation of the Yugoslav party nomenklatura, since Tito himself was neither a consistent opponent of the bourgeoisie, nor the feudal patriciate, but secretly imitated both the first and the second with his way of life.

Tito converted his professional identity as a metalworker into a political party nomenclature capital, in which this professional identity was only a legitimizing segment of his biography, which allowed him to receive unlimited privileges from the government. All that remained of her was fanatical car collecting.

In family identity, Tito hesitated between inconsistent patriarchy (quasi-patriarchy) in the scenario of official promiscuity (choosing a partner based on the criterion of her “reliability” for the nomenclature environment), which was combined with elements of domestic prostitution and political favoritism (when it comes to Tito's last two wives). At the same time, the first type of identity dominated the second, while Tito's political entourage consisted of a part of the party nomenclature, with which he went to the conquest of power. As it will become clear from the second part of the article devoted to this topic, Tito's inconsistency in family choice, on the one hand, and the peculiarities of his character structure led either to a breakdown in relations, or to political favoritism and attempts by wives-mistresses to influence the selection of his entourage and, in part, on politics (the influence on the latter can hardly be considered significant in comparison with attempts).

Bibliography

1. Вселенский М.С. Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза. - М.; Берлин: Директ-Медиа, 2019. - 662 с.

2. Дедиер В. Говорит Тито: его автопортрет и борьба со Сталиным. Лондон, 1953

3. Д.В. Ефременко, Е.Ю. Мелешкина. Югославский метанарратив и современная югоностальгия в странах Западных Балкан.- Политэкс. 2020. Том 16, № 1, с. 78-100

4. Иосип Броз Тито. - Электронный ресурс.

5. Иосип Броз Тито. - Электронный ресурс.

6. В.В. Костенко, А.А. Новик. Отношение к соседям другой расы: кейсы Албании и Косово Этнография / Etnografia. 2019. №2 (4), с. 101-127.

7. А. Куге. Где жила последние 30 лет Йованка Броз. - Электронный ресурс.

8. Лассуэлл Гарольд Д. Психопатология и политика: Монография / Пер. с англ. Т.Н. Самсоновой, Н.В. Коротковой. - М.: Издательство РАГС, 2005. - 352 с.;

9. Лоуэн А. Физическая динамика структуры характера. - М.: Корвет, 2016318 с. - с. 135-315; Райх В. Психология масс и фашизм. - М.: Университетская книга, 1997. - 379 с

10. Луман Н. Социальные системы. Очерк общей теории / Пер. с нем. И.Д. Газиева под ред. Н.А. Головина. - СПб.: Наука, 2007. - 648 с. - (Классика социологии)

11. Матонин Е.В. Иосип Броз Тито. - М.: Молодая гвардия, 2012. - 462 с.

12. Мёртвый бог. Почему в экс-Югославии так любят покойного Иосипа Броза Тито. - Электронный ресурс.

13. Тито на работе и дома. - Электронный ресурс.

14. З. Фрейд, У Буллит. Томас Вудро Вильсон, 28-й президент США. Психологическое исследование. - М.: Канон+РООИ «Реабилитация», 2016. - 336 с.

15. Э. Фромм. Анатомия человеческой деструктивности. - М.: Биг-Пресс, 2012. - 488 с

16. Шилз, Э. Общество и общества: макросоциологический подход // Американская социология: перспективы, проблемы, методы. - М.: Прогресс, 1972. - С. 341-359.

17. Эйзенштадт, Ш. Революция и преобразование обществ: Сравнительное изучение цивилизаций. - М.: Аспект-Пресс, 1999. - 415, [1] с

18. Wolfenstein E.-V., The Revolutionary Personality. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967. [Portuguese edition, 1968: Paedos Press, Buenos Aires, Argentina.];

19. Wolfenstein E.-V., Personality and Politics. Los Angeles: Dickenson Press, 1969.

20. Райх Вильгельм Анализ характера: Пер. с англ. Е. Поле. - М: Апрель Пресс, Изд-во ЭКСМО-Пресс, 2000. - 528 с.

21. Романенко Ю.В., Яковенко А.К. Основи візуальної аналітики та соціології візуального символізму. - К.: Вид-во ДУІКТ., 2008. - 318 с.;

22. Романенко Ю.В., Яковенко А.К., Огаренко Т.О. Основи візуальної аналітики та соціології візуального символізму в міжкультурних комунікаціях. - К.: Вид-во ДУІКТ., 2009. - 275 с.;

23. Романенко Ю.В., Скідін Л.О. Механізми символічної інтеракції в комунікаціях, політиці, мистецтві: візуально-аналітичний та соціосимволічний аспекти. - Київ, ДУІКТ, 2011. - 380 с.;

24. Романенко Ю.В., Святненко І.О., Зінченко А.А. Візуалізації в медійно-комунікаційному просторі: соціо-системологічний підхід. - К.: Видавничо-поліграфічний центр Інституту міжнародних відносин», 2014. - 458 с.;

25. Романенко Ю.В. Осевые символы идентичности в государственной атрибутике. - Монография. - К.: Меркьюри-Подолье, 2017. - 296 с.;

26. Романенко Ю.В. Основи візуальної аналітики і прогностики. - Навчально- методичний посібник для проведення лекційних та семінарських зайнять, організації самостійної роботи для студентів відділення «Міжнародні комунікації». Ю.В. Романенко. - К.: Видавництво «Меркьюрі-Поділля», 2019. - 327 с.

27. Уэст Р Иосиф Броз Тито. Власть силы. - Электронный ресурс.

28. Banac, Ivo National Question in Yugoslavia. -Cornell University Press, 1988. - 456 р.

29. Banac, IvoThe Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999. Misha Glenny. New York: Viking Penguin, 2000, 726 pp.

30. Banac, Ivo. Sorting Out the Balkans: Three New Looks at a Trouble Region Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000- Электронный ресурс.

31. Dedijer V. Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita. Rieka, Zagreb, 1980. T.2.

32. Evans, Arthur John (1876) Through Bosnia and the Herzegdvina on foot, during the insurrection, August and September 1875, with an historical review of Bosnia, and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the ancient republic of Ragusa (2nd ed.). London: Longmans, Green and Co. - Электронный ресурс.

33. Evans, Arthur John (1878). Illyrian letters: a revised selection of correspondence from the llllyrian provinces of Bosnia, Herzegdvina, Montenegro, Albania, Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia during the troubled year 1877. London: Longmans, - Электронный ресурс.

34. Ridley, Jasper. Tito: A Biography (англ.). - London, England: Constable and Company, 1994.

35. Djilas Milovan. druzenje s Titom Пер. с сербскохорватского Я. Трушновича.- LEV 85,Rue Rambuteau 75001 Paris. -226 с.

36. Nestale Titove najvrednije stvari. - Новости. - Электронный ресурс.

37. Talcott Parsons. The Concept of Society: The Components and Their Interrrelations. In: T. Parsons. Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall, 1966, p.5-29

38. TITO - Film by Janja Glogovac. - Электронный ресурс.

39. Vinterhalter, Vilko. In the Path of Tito... (англ.). - Tunbridge Wells, England: Abacus Press, 1972.

40. Josip Broz Tito. Autobiografska kazivanja. Cetinje, Skopje, Beograd, Ljubljana, 1982. T. l.S. 33, 34, 63, 64.

41. Гугнін Е.А. Теоретичні засади дослідження зовнішнього впливу в соціології: монографія. Запоріжжя: КПУ 2020. 180 с

42. Иосиф Броз Тито, Диктаторы. - Электронный ресурс.

43. Zbornik secanja aktivista jugoslovenskog revolucionarnog radnickog pokreta, knjiga prva (str. 225), Beograd 1960.

44. Josip Broz Tito in Bihac in 1942, Marxists Internet Archive.

45. Автомобили, принадлежавшие бывшему президенту СФРЮ И.Б. Тито, будут проданы с аукциона. - Электронный ресурс.

46. Matthijs Bogaards, Ludger Helms аnd Arend Lijphart. The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty-First Century Politics and Political Science. - Swiss Political Science Review (2019) Vol. 25(4): 341-356.

47. Brendan O'leary Consociation in the Present Swiss Political Science Review (2020) Vol. 25(4): 556-574.