Iranian oil export to the EU constitutes 92,4% of country's total export to the EU and 18% of its total oil export. Oil remains important energy source for the EU and the union's Member States highly depend on export from outside the EU. While discussing the oil embargo, several countries, especially those, hit by the economic crisis, Greece, Italy and Spain were against sanctions, claiming that Iran would easily find other importers for its products.

“Iranian officials continue to try to make European states reverse their position by highlighting the long-term costs Europe will face if it continues to isolate the Islamic Republic”.

Indeed, Iran managed to change the structure of its exports and now among its primary partners one will find Asian countries, such as China, India, Turkey, South Korea and Japan, although absolute majority of exports' structure still constitutes petroleum. As for imports, major partners are United Arab Emirates, China, Turkey and South Korea. Moreover, new partners established some ways for avoiding the effect of sanctions, which affect not only the crude exports of oil, but also the transportation and insurance, which makes it more difficult to avoid them: supporting infrastructure of the oil transportation is way better developed in the Western countries, although India and Japan were trying to the provide necessary support to the Iranian vessels, transporting oil. Although the EU managed to find other sources of energy (e.g. Greece replaced Iranian oil with Russian), there were some cases of breaching the sanctions, and for example the case of Greek businessman, supplying tankers to Iran, was even heard before the ECJ in 2011.

According to the UK Foreign Office, “EU sanctions against Iran are not intended to affect humanitarian goods and payments - we have no quarrel with the people of Iran. This is why there are a number of explicit exemptions to allow Iran to purchase humanitarian goods such as medicines. The UK issues, as a priority, licenses for transactions for humanitarian goods”.

Still, the effectiveness of sanctions is quite controversial, since Iranian economy was not crushed, and the popular opinion was still supporting the Government and the nuclear program.

2.3 The EU-led negotiations with Iran

In 2002 the reveal of the fact that Iran operated two nuclear sites at Natanz and Arak has worsened the relations between Iran and the EU. The nuclear question became for some time a main issue in a dialogue between countries.

The US immediately wanted to address the issue to the UN Security Council, but the EU3 disagreed and insisted on continuation of the dialogue. While the EU was trying to negotiate, the US “labeled Iran part of the “Axis of Evil” along with Iraq and North Korea”.

When the IAEA wanted for the first time to address Iranian issue to the UN SC, the EU representatives “decided instead to find a way forward that would give Iran an opportunity to dispel concerns and prove that the aims of its nuclear programme were entirely peaceful. The IAEA's Board of Governors agreed to delay a report to the Security Council to give the European initiative a chance”.

Thus, from the very start, when the nuclear problem in Iran just emerged, the European Union was trying to avoid any coercive measures and to settle the dispute peacefully. At the moment such approach presented a contrast to the US actions, the EU acted as a mediator between the US and Iran, in a way, even advocating the Islamic Republic.

As it has been mentioned already, in 2003, foreign ministers of the EU's “Big Three”, and Javier Solana, the Union's representative for foreign affairs and security policy, managed to persuade Tehran to agree to several quite important steps, namely, to suspend uranium enrichment, present detailed plans of their nuclear activities and to sign the Additional Protocol to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, allowing more IAEA control over any nuclear activities. The so-called Paris Agreement became a major success of the European diplomacy, adding legitimacy to its approach.

Yet, the relations with Iran are highly dependent on the country's internal situation. The compromise reached in 2003 was not accepted unilaterally among Iranian authorities and public. The nuclear energy (since the country never admitted making any type of nuclear weapons) for Iran is a question of technological progress, and independence of its programme is important for national sovereignty. Taking into account such perception, it is impossible to imagine that Iran would ever agree to abandon any nuclear activities, since it could lead to destabilization and even possible crush of the regime. Nuclear energy and independence of nuclear programme have become a national idea, a national interest, which the whole nation has to defend. This should be remembered also while analyzing the impact of economic sanctions.

After the election of Mr. Ahmadinejad, Iran did not only change its rhetoric, but also did not adhered to previous agreements and refused to present information about its nuclear facilities to international authorities.

Once again the Iranian question was presented in the UN Security Council, and the US demanded quick and tough actions. For some time the EU, impersonated by its foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, remained the only negotiator with Iran.

In 2005 EU-3 offered a package of incentives for Iran, “Framework for a long-term Agreement” and even “secured the backing of the US for this package, which included the lifting of a US sanction on Iranian WTO entry and the sale of spare parts to Iranian civilian airliners”.

In 2006, the EU managed to persuade its partners in EU-3+3 negotiations to join its new proposal to Iran. The proposal was approved by as representatives of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union, highlighting the role of the EU along with three European nations. The negotiators assured that their goal was “the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme”. As preconditions for starting negotiations the EU3+3 admitted the Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as stated in the NPT, and, even more important, provide active support to building light water reactors through international projects in accordance with IAEA and NPT. Iran, in return, was supposed to suspend all enrichment activities and cooperate with the IAEA. For its part, EU proposed also negotiation and implementation of a Euroatom-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement. As for other terms, the EU suggested specific help in integrating Iran to international economy, namely, through concluding a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with EU.

These proposals could be seen as part of the EU “stick and carrot” method, meaning acceptance some key points of Iranian position and help in realization of Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy in exchange for guarantees of its adherence to NPT principles and rules. The EU never questioned Iran's right to peaceful usage of nuclear energy, and, moreover, was ready to accept Iranian guarantees, that always strengthened its negotiating position, compared to, for example the US, influenced by the hard-edged Israeli position.

The proposals were agreed on the 1^st of June and backed by the UN SC Resolution #1696, once again expressing the UN's concerns about the Iran nuclear programme and necessity to deal with it through the IAEA.

Yet, Iran declined this proposal, and its nuclear dossier in the UN Security Council for the first time lead to approval of the UN sanctions, by resolution #1737. The Resolution said that all member-states should prevent the supply, sale or transfer to Iran anything (including items, materials, goods, technology, technical or financial assistance) that could be used for Iran's enrichment activities, related with production of nuclear weapons. This was the first time when the UN SC actually agreed on a wide range of sanctions, for now related to the nuclear enrichment processes and production of nuclear weapons.

The EU could not, though, abandon the demand for permanent suspension of the nuclear enrichment, the main demand of all negotiators. Only Germany tried to leave Iran some enrichment capacity, but its European partners and the US didn't agree.

Despite the sanctions, the EU was willing to continue negotiations with Iran and Javier Solana was often meeting with Iranian authorities. Yet, the deadlock in negotiations encouraged France and Great Britain to support introduction of new sanctions, the EU sanctions, separate from the UN. These proposals were rejected by several countries, such as Germany, Italy and Austria, which claimed that “separate EU sanctions would only serve to undermine the standing of the EU as a negotiator and also fail to provide new solutions”.

In 2006 the EU was Iran's major trading partner with approximately 30% of market share. Also, the EU, dependent on import of fuel, could not ignore the role of Islamic Republic in energy supplies.

Later, the EU constantly underlined its adherence to the principle of using both dialogue and pressure, being always ready to negotiate, yet not putting the sanctions completely off the table.

In 2008 the group of negotiators launched a revised package of proposals, yet, due to worsening of bilateral relations with the US (still considering Iran as a part of “Axis of Evil”) led to the absence of the US during the meetings in 2008. After the change of the US administration in 2008, it proclaimed a different approach towards Iran, more moderate and opened to negotiations.

Unfortunately, Iranian leadership was not ready to collaborate with international community. Aggressive rhetoric of Mr. Ahmadinejad, contested results of presidential elections and refusal to stop enrichment processes made the negotiations in following years more difficult, and did not lead to any results. The parties put on table new proposals, but Iran refused to let any control over its enrichment facilities to international bodies.

In 2011 IAEA found information about Iran developing activities for acquiring military nuclear technology, which contributed to the existing concerns about Iranian nuclear programme.

In 2012 the persistent refusal of Iran to let international observers to its nuclear facilities led to an escalation of the conflict, which resulted in introduction of non-nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. There could be actually spoken of the 2 set of sanctions: the UNSC sanctions and the autonomous EU sanctions.

The EU sanctions have been adopted in a form of Council regulations. Actually the sanctions have been approved during the whole period from 2010 to 2012, aiming firstly at arms and related materials, all dual-use goods and technology and all products that could “contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems or to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns”.

The list of various trade sanctions imposed on Iran could be long enumerated, yet, since the main item of trade between Iran and the EU was oil, all measures taken before 2012 could hardly have any significant impact on the bilateral trade balance.

In 2012, however, despite serious internal disagreements, the EU finally adopted a ban on the most sensitive item of bilateral trade with Iran - crude oil. Even more important could be measures prohibiting providing by the EU banking and insurance assistance to Iranian oil export, due to the dominance of the EU and the US insurance and banking systems in the world.

Despite the sanctions, the EU didn't abandon the desire to solve the problem by diplomatic means. Moreover, “the thinking among EU member states is also that heavy sanctions should help to stave off the threat of a pre-emptive strike by Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities, with all its imaginable consequences”. At the same time the EU kept proposing to Iran a package of incentives such as technological support for peaceful nuclear programme and the normalization of economic relations.

Unfortunately, any talks with Iran ended without any success, due to the position of Iranian government, unwilling to negotiate its right to pursue nuclear programme without any international control. Whatever incentives the EU could offer, they would not break the deadlock, caused by the inability of parties to agree on crucial issues.

Yet, in the summer of 2013, there have been some major changes in Iran -tough negotiator Mr. Ahmadinejad during the presidential elections was replaced by much more moderate Mr. Rouhani. This change was immediately perceived as a new chance to finally reach some progress in the on-going negotiations process. The EU declared its readiness to act as an intermediary between the new Iranian government and the USA. Yet there were even expectations of possible improvement of Iran-US relations.

For the first time after 2005 the Iranian government expressed willingness to return to negotiations and trade the nuclear issues on the repeal of the sanctions regime.

There could be spoken of not only the role of the change of leadership, but also of the effect, that the sanctions had on Iran. Although the estimations of the sanctions effectiveness vary, they gave the European negotiators another incentive for the talks with Iran. Before the sanctions were introduced, there have been a certain misbalance of the proposals presented by the parties. Thus, the EU always set some preconditions for negotiations, which Iran refused to accept: these preconditions were almost unilateral, since Iran was demanded to stop the enrichment activities and in return was offered only an acknowledgement of its right to pursue its peaceful nuclear programme. Surely, that was too weak an offer for an equal exchange. The lifting of the sanctions is, however, a point strong enough to propose in exchange for stopping the uranium enrichment activities.

Although the negotiations didn't go smoothly, during the 23-24^th November 2013 Geneva talks the parties finally came to an agreement, which was immediately called a new step in the process and a way out of the conflict. EU was definitely playing a role of peace-broker among Iran and the US and its success couldn't be denied. According to Geneva Agreement Iran is going to stop its enrichment activity (enrichment of the uranium over 5%), won't introduce any new activities for the enrichment and let the IAEA experts and inspectors in. In exchange the EU and the U.S. are going to suspend all sanctions related to export of oil - which is apparently the major concession to the country, since petrochemical export is vitally important for its economy. The EU will put an end to some of the sanctions already in December. It is interesting to observe the difference in the document: while the EU takes an obligation not to impose any new nuclear-related sanctions, the US obligation sounds somewhat more ambiguous:

“No new EU nuclear-related sanctions”

“The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions”.

Thus the US government merely agrees not to impose any further sanctions on Iran - which may be explained by the strong opposition to the agreement with Iran by a Republican Congress. It remains a question, whether the President would be able to make Congress comply with the Agreement reached in Geneva, for its violation of the Joint Plan would put at risk the whole negotiations process. Although the EU has to bring together the positions of 28 countries in comparison to one U.S. Government, surprisingly enough it appears to be more able to promote a single position and guarantee its realization. Therefore the EU seems to be more reliable partner. The US had tough debates in Congress, while discussing the adequacy of reached agreement with Iran. Namely, there were raised questions of national security, claims about the disproportional sanctions reliefand the risks, world is taking, suspending sanctions regime. Though it did not prevent the US government from holding its end of the deal now, such discussions in Congress may indicate that reaching final Agreement with Iran will not be easy and the US will demand more concessions from the Islamic Republic.

Yet, for now, as a result of the Agreement, highly welcomed by international community, mostly as a sign of final ending of a deadlock, there could be spoken of a gradual downgrade of tensions. Iran and its Western partners seem to stick to agreed obligations: the Iranian compliance to the deal has been confirmed by the IAEA report, the EU and the US have, subsequently, suspended their sanctions.

Thus it can be concluded, that while tackling the Iranian nuclear problem, the EU was favouring the diplomatic solution to the crisis, was constantly trying to avoid any escalation and sometimes even remained the only intermediary between the U.S. and Iran. As long as diplomatic measures alone were not able to change the position of Iranian government, the EU imposed several series of economic sanctions, under the mandate of the UN, but going further than the United Nations. Yet, with the change of political leadership in Iran and shift to a more moderate politics, the EU immediately returned to the negotiations, claiming its readiness to put an end to the regime of economic sanctions.

3. The Iranian nuclear problem as an example of European Union's handling international crises

The situation with Iran and the EU dealing with it has often attracted attention of scholars studying the European common foreign and security policy. When it comes to CFSP, the EU is normally criticized for the lack of coherence, for the inability to react when it comes to issues of world politics, for not having enough resources to pursue its interests, if, in fact, it manages to elaborate common interests. It was noted, that “Iran has to some degree become a test case for the CFSP”, though it could be argued that while the European common foreign and security policy is being formed, almost any crisis will be testing its viability and effectiveness. Yet, Iranian case does have certain peculiarities, which make it special for the European foreign policy. Some specific conditions of the Iranian crisis made it possible to say that “Iran offers Europeans a chance to give substance to the idea that there is a European approach to managing security issues”.

Throughout the whole period of the Iranian nuclear crisis there could be indeed seen a distinct European approach, which did not change much during the years. The EU has steadily promoted cooperation and negotiations, and backed diplomatic solution of the Iranian crisis. This approach has often been described as “sticks and carrots”, highlighting the European attempt to unite diplomatic and coercive measures, balance between persuasion and demands.

There could be formulated some key characteristics of the European involvement in the Iranian crisis:

-the EU was in a better negotiating position as compared to some other partners: it had close and long established relations with Iran and yet, these relations are not openly hostile, rather based on mutual interests. The EU always had certain pragmatism dictated by its energy and economic dependence on Iran, it is more interested in stability in the Middle East, and, finally, is relatively free from any kind of lobby of anti-Iranian Middle East states (such as Israeli lobby in the US). iranian crisis international

-The EU has been better regarded in the Middle East as a whole and in Iran particularly than the major Western power - the US. Despite all tensions, the EU has better reputation in an Arab world, though it is often accused of lacking its own initiatives and acting the way the US tells it to act. For instance, its position in the Middle East Quartet is quite distinct from the US, which should be remembered. Although the relations with the US have always been a priority, “while the European states and the US grew more unified in their approach to Iran, Tehran remained reluctant to negotiate with Washington without the major European states at the table.” Thus, the EU basically secured the role of mediator between the US and Iran: though Iran did not regard the EU as a friendly power, it still got more trust than the US.

-the EU managed to come up with a single position and with a distinct group of negotiators + official representative of the Union for foreign affairs. In some periods of the crisis the EU-3 was the sole negotiator with Iran. The representative of the EU is, actually, considered to be the leader of the E3+3 negotiations. This both reflects and emphasizes the role the EU foreign chief has in the process, and gives the additional publicity to the person holding this position.

-the much spoken of “dual approach” - combination of sticks and carrots, using both diplomatic and coercive measures, trading technological support in exchange for nuclear safety guarantees, readiness to make concessions. There could also be noted the concentration on the nuclear issue - without the demand of the regime change “While the various post-1979 US administrations have repeatedly emphasized that the primary problem with Iran is the regime, the EU3 have always emphasized that since 2003 their primary concern has been the nuclear issue and not the regime per se”. The EU has proven itself determined to speak to any Iranian leadership, however anti-West it may seem, and however difficult it may be to negotiate with.

This position included the recognition of Iranian right to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the international law and the IAEA regulations, the approach, which is applicable to any country, pursuing a nuclear programme, without any referring to the Iranian regime.

In general, the EU approach could be described as combination of constant negotiation process and determination to solve all conflicts peacefully with a readiness to apply strict measures, even self-limiting (in case of oil export sanctions). The EU did not question the right of Iran to develop its nuclear programme as long as it provided the firm guarantees of its peaceful character. Moreover, in exchange for such guarantees, the EU was even ready to help Iran with technologies and materials - at some point it was ready to supply to Iran the enriched uranium in order to prevent Iran from development of enrichment activities on its soil.

In terms of the internal cooperation among European member states, there is evidence of a certain disagreement namely when it comes to oil-related sanctions. If we look at the situation from the point of view of nuclear non-proliferation, on a global level it demonstrates a high level of cooperation, despite the differences in the Member States nuclear statuses. When it comes to global issues, when we look at, for example, voting in the UN Security Council, all the EU members have always voted the same way for the resolutions concerning nuclear non-proliferation and Iran.

It is interesting to note, that the Iranian crisis didn't cause or lead to any change in terms of the EU foreign policy organization. The EU CFSP didn't become less intergovernmental, the common threat did not lead to any drift to supranationalisation; on the contrary, there has emerged a certain triumvirate of Germany, France and the UK, which alongside the HR have officially represented the EU during the negotiations. The group is not officially appointed, neither written down in the Treaties - thus, it is a step forward in intergovernmental cooperation, since the decision-taking process moved literally from 28 countries in the Council to just 3, the most powerful in terms of external representation. The balancing instrument may be the HR, but for now the holder of the post mostly acts as a mediator among the negotiators, including the E3 countries. Yet, the crisis contributed to the strengthening of the role of HR -Solana was able to gain for the EU international presence mostly on occasions, related to the Iranian crisis.

So, basically, there could be seen two tendencies: more intergovernmental cooperation, narrowed to the EU-3 (since it's easier to get to one position in a group of 3, rather than in a group of 28) and the role of the HR, as the spokesperson of the Union increased and its recognition in the world improved. Actually, it may be even presumed, that the HR was representing the EU while talking to the EU-3, and helping them to come together with a single Union position, taking into account the positions of other states.

The format of negotiations, having three European countries presented independently and the EU foreign policy chief allows presuming, that despite all the innovations to the CFSP, it is still formed not in Brussels, but in national capitals, and the EU officials do not have any position, distinct from those of the member states.

As it comes for now, the EU handling of the Iranian nuclear crises may be considered a success, since the parties have come to a sort of agreement. The role of the internal changes in the Islamic Republic in 2013 is quite important and it could not be predicted how the situation would develop in case the Ahmadinejad government stayed at power.

The other thing, that should necessarily be mentioned, are the certain unique conditions of the Iranian case, which may well make it a single example of such Union's diplomatic success. These unique conditions are:

1) Absence of the US-Iran direct contact left the EU as a sole Western negotiator and a sort of mediator between Iran and the US;

2) historically the EU has intense and quite good relations with Iran, being its important economic partner, having tense economic, political and cultural relations with the Islamic Republic, having both incentives and leverages to negotiate with the Iran;

3) unity inside the EU about the nuclear proliferation danger and concerns about Iran's possible acquiring of nuclear weapons, especially taking into account the geographic proximity of the Middle East to the EU - much less concern about, for example, India and Pakistan or North Korea; relative unity, indeed, but not the case of Iraq - all EU Member States - members of the UN Security Council always voted the same way in case of Iran, which didn't work out in almost all other crises, so close as Iranian;

4) the change of Iranian government, when the Rouhani government agreed to negotiations and some concessions, which made it possible to declare the success of the sanctions as part of the European approach, to demonstrate, that political solution is indeed possible.

3.2 EU and its partners

Each actor of international relations should be recognized by other major players, otherwise all its efforts would never be met with support. In case of the EU it is vital for it to be recognized as equal participant of negotiations by its partners, namely, the US, Russia and China, and, undoubtedly, by Iran.

There are two major issues: 1) the EU should be seen as actor as whole, not European countries separately. This idea is complicated by the dual representation in the board of negotiators - there are three European countries with active foreign policy positions unable and unwilling to give them up and a representative of top European bureaucracy, the top European diplomat - in the beginning, Mr. Solana, and, lately, Baroness Ashton.

2) The ability of the EU to influence the positions of the other negotiators

Since it could be stated, that the EU did have its own approach to tackling the crisis in Iran, it is important to see, whether it was able to persuade its partners. There could be several crucial moments: first of all, the very beginning of the crisis, then, 2006, and 2013 with a change in Iranian government. At first - the EU was against bringing the Iranian dossier to the UN SC, wanting to solve the problem using only diplomatic measures and, what is even more important, was able to persuade its partners and the IAEA to postpone this measure and to give Iran chance to prove that its nuclear programme presented no threat to international peace and security. In 2006, the EU was left to be the only negotiator on behalf of the West, since the Iranian government was not very cooperative. Even for the EU it was hard to continue to restrain from coercive measures, which finally were imposed in 2008. In 2013 the EU once again played a very important role, while shortly after the change of the Iranian regime it claimed its readiness to act as a negotiator between the US and Iran, wishing to facilitate the would-be historic reconciliation. Although the idea didn't quite work out, the effort was remarkable and contributed to the EU's “glory” in terms of forging its common foreign policy.

Interesting to see the difference in the positions of the EU and the US (the EU was more pro-dialogue, the US - more proactive). The problem for the EU is developing its own position, independent, or, at least, less dependent on the US. For many EU Member States the US is quite important, as, for example, for one of the most powerful EU countries - the UK. “Historically, Europe had taken an independent approach to Iran, often acting as a counterweight to the US”. The EU has always kept in touch with the US and never proposed anything that the US would find inacceptable. Yet, there is also an opinion, that a too close siding with the US, sharing its position “will not necessarily preserve the EU's interests and can perhaps even undermine Europe's stance on a number of regional issues”.

The possibility for close cooperation between the EU and Russia - the positions had some points in common, for instance, the support of diplomatic approach over military and even coercive. It is so often spoken of difference between the EU and Russian positions, though initially they were quite close, indeed, they had some common grounds. Russia was involved in the nuclear programme of Iran; it was actually building the country's first nuclear reactor and, therefore, was not interested in sanctions of any sort towards its partner. In the same time, Russia too did not want to have nuclear power at its doorstep, and even less - any armed conflict close to its borders and the region of strategic importance - Central Asia. Since the very beginning of the crisis, Russia was constantly against any attempts to introduce sanctions against Iran, as did the EU, though European rhetoric was more critical. In the most difficult periods of the crisis, however, both Russia and leaders of the EU3 were opposing any idea of military intervention to Iran, both from the US and Israel - such measures were considered absolutely inacceptable. When it comes, however, to the perception of the EU as a single actor, Russia is an example of how this perception does not work. During the negotiations' process, Russian officials considered the EU foreign policy chief as merely a technical figure, having not enough authority to handle issues of international security. Thus, Russia tended to discuss Iranian crisis directly with the representatives of the EU Member States, namely, the EU-3, as it used to do in tackling issues of bilateral cooperation between the EU and Russia.

It is vital also to see the Iranian perception of the EU as a negotiator: was Iran ready to accept it as a negotiator, was it eager to negotiate with the EU, more than with for example, the US. There could be said of a certain idea of the EU as “lesser evil” than the US, yet, part of the West: “traditional conservatives and reformists argued for an agreement to be reached with the Europeans to divide the West and maintain European support as a counterweight to US ambitions in Iran”. Iranian leadership tried to stress the benefits of economic cooperation, which should have brought the parties to an agreement. There is also a notion of geographic proximity of the EU to Iran - when compared to the US. Iranian government has always promoted the idea, that regional issues should be solved without international (American) interference. Iran regards itself as a regional power, and is determined to undermine the US influence in the region.

According to the research, conducted by Sh. Pakfar, Iran considered the EU could not be seen as an independent power, its credibility was questioned because of its close relations with the US and “double standards”, if compared, for example, its attitude towards nuclear programme in Iran and North Korea or India and Pakistan. Also it was quite unclear who is responsible for the EU decisions, taking into account the Lisbon Treaty reforms and a complicated structure of the EU itself.

To draw a conclusion, the EU partners in the EU3+3 negotiations lacked common perception of its role. It is often said that the US left the Iranian problem on the EU, wishing to distance itself further, having its hands tied by Iraq and Afghanistan, lately, by Libya and Syria. The EU, thus, had a unique chance to present itself as a chief western negotiator, presenting the common position of the West. Russia did not share the position with the US, but usually was able to arrive to some sort of common grounds with the EU, though having doubts in the EU independence and actorness, preferring to speak to the EU Member States.

As for Iran, it did regard the EU as a more confortable partner to negotiate with, as compared to the US, due to economic ties and the apparent unwillingness of the EU to use force and get another active conflict in the neighbouring region.

Thus, it could be said, that the EU partners had different perception of its role in the negotiation process and its ability to act independently.

3.3 The prospects of EU approach in the final solving of the Iranian case and in future international crises

There could be again spoken of two dimensions: perspectives and limits, applicable to Iran on the one hand and other crises on the other. In the Iranian case there should be said of the perspectives to solve the Iranian nuclear problem “once and for all” and the growing role of the EU in the process. The important question is still whether the sanctions' regime was a success or the main reason for progress in negotiations is the change in the Iranian government.

Actually, the success of the negotiations much depends on the Iranian party and the relations among Iran and negotiators often changed according to the changes in the Iranian government. There are certain limits as for the final solving of the Iranian crisis:

1) Military intervention is no option since Iran is too big a country, a regional leader, with large army and population; no resources for military intervention;

2) As for the coercive measures, almost all of them, including the most severe sanctions, have been already imposed;

3) Idea of compromise, possible to be achieved right now; Iranian government is ready to finally get to compromise, to make some important concessions, so there is a certain “window of opportunities” for peaceful solution, which the negotiators are likely to use. Neither of the parties is now interested in any escalation of the conflict, not least since there are other crises, demanding immediate attention.

Thus, for the nearest future, the major prospects are the continuation of the negotiations, keeping the obligations taken under the last plan of actions, negotiating over the details of final agreement, monitoring the situation. For now both the Iranian government and its partners in the EU3+3 fulfill all the necessary obligations. The EU adopted the decision to suspend its oil-related sanctions for the next 6-months; Iran suspended all its enrichment activities. During these 6 months the parties are supposed to reach the final agreement, which is highly possible in case there are no accidents.

The acquisition of a nuclear weapon of any kind is not only a threat in itself, it would “trigger a wave of proliferation in the Middle East”, thus burying the idea of Middle East as a nuclear-free zone. The idea was first presented to UN General Assembly in 1974 by Iran itself and Egypt and may be revived now with the support of major international powers.

This idea has already been questioned because of the de-facto nuclear Israel, but as a reaction to Iranian bomb there may be even further escalation in the region with Saudi Arabia and Turkey following in the Iranian and Israeli footsteps. Though, for example, there is an idea of nuclear Iran as counterbalance to nuclear Israel, it is still a risk that majority of countries isn't ready to take.

Iran persistently denies the accusations of working on getting a nuclear weapon, but unstable situation in the region and hostile environment make highly possible that this idea have crossed the minds of Iranian leadership, since the nuclear bomb is the best way to guarantee the country's safety and independence.

Still, in case of successful resolution of the current Iranian crisis, there could be the resurrection of the idea of Middle East as a nuclear-weapon free zone at least as an issue for discussions. Unfortunately, the perspectives of this idea being realized are quite vague until the final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which remains the major Middle East security problem.

The question remains: would the EU enjoy the same success in future crises, applying the same approach, combining negotiations and coercive measures such as sanctions? There are two crises at present with active European involvement: one, Syrian, is ongoing and the other, Ukrainian, may well be only emerging. In both cases the EU plays an important role and has to deal with other powers, namely, Russia and the US.

The Syrian crisis lasts already for several years and has turned into a full-fledged civil war. In the beginning of the mass protests in Syria, the EU openly sided with the rebels, protesting against the policy of president Bashar-al-Asad, and openly confronted Russia and China on the issue in the UN SC. The EU has blamed the regime of Bashar-al-Asad in violation of human rights and suspended all the negotiations on bilateral programmes with the country. Also the Union gave a lot of money in humanitarian assistance. There were severe sanctions adopted against Syrian leadership, bans on import of arms, on export of oil and petroleum products, financial restrictive measures. Yet the situation in Syria remains critical, the civil war is going on.

Apparently, the EU is imposing the same set of measures as it did in the case of Iran, but the situation is different. First of all, Syria lacks the component of international security issue, such as nuclear non-proliferation (especially after the solution of the chemical weapon problem), and it becomes an internal conflict with hardly any implications to European security. The economic ties with Syria are not that intense as with Iran, so they could be much more easily cut off. It seems obvious that the EU has either no means to influence Syrian regime, or no real interest in the crisis. Moreover, main negotiators in this case remain the US and Russia, presenting opposite position. It could be said that existing status quo, preserving the current state of civil war and failure of any attempts to stop it clearly indicates the absence of common position among key players and inability to influence the situation in any way.

Ukrainian crisis presents even a more complicated case - Ukraine is part of European continent, the EU clearly has interests in a country, in fact, it is one of the key players in the situation. On the opposite side, there is Russia, willing to keep its influence over Ukrainian state or territory, which can be accepted neither by the EU, nor by the US. The Union declared its support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, yet, the legitimacy of present Kiev leadership, and, thus, presidential elections they conduct seems questionable. Moreover, in the various parts of the country flourish separatist movements and Kiev seems unable to exercise control over them.

Russia has been regarded as a principal opponent in this case, especially due to its annexation of Crimean peninsula. Though the case was clearly perceived as a violation of international law, the reaction of both EU and the US was quite moderate, and so was a set of sanctions, finally adopted.

Calm reaction to the situation in Ukraine seems even stranger, taking into account the extreme geographic proximity of a country to EU's borders and real threat to European threat and security. If not regulated, Ukraine and, possibly, Moldova, may constitute new Balkans, which is hardly desired by any of the EU Member States. On the other hand, risk of confrontation with Russia makes set of tools, available to the EU quite limited: Russia is too important as global security actor and economic partner. As for Ukraine, the EU is trying to negotiate with Kiev government, offers economic support.

There could hardly be spoken of any single position of all European member States about Ukraine, since it appears that some Member States, notably, the neighbours, may have their own interests in the region. Other Member States are too concerned with their bilateral relations with Russia and have no desire to worsen it over Ukraine.

The two crises, briefly overlooked above, may as well become test-cases for European common foreign policy, indeed, they do put to a test European approach to tackling crises. As for Syria, the EU participated in negotiations and imposed sanctions, yet its position was far less balanced than in case of Iran - it openly sided with Syrian opposition. As for sanctions, EU lacked necessary incentives - its economic ties with Syria were not crucial for both economies. Finally, the outbreak of a civil war made peaceful diplomatic solution imposed from outside even more complicated.

In Ukraine the crisis is only moving towards its apex, so it is hard yet to say, how the situation will develop. For now, the EU failed to come up with a single, clearly articulated position and to do anything against practical annexation of Ukrainian territory. The memory of Balkans may, as well, play its role, leading to reluctance of European Member States to intervene in regional conflict at its doorstep.

The new conflicts present new challenges to the EU CFSP. As in case of Ukraine, the EU is expected to act as a single body, since its main “carrot” for Ukraine always was and remains the membership, though it is quite impossible in the nearest future. Yet, it is much harder to stick to negotiations and coercive but not military measures, when the EU is no mediator, but a side of a conflict.

The same in Syria - by siding with Syrian opposition, the EU practically abandoned any chance to negotiate with Syrian leadership. As it was shown, the position of mediator was one of the key reasons of European success in Iran. The EU can play between interests of sides of conflict, but is not cohesive and strong enough to actually be a part of a conflict and defend its interest. That sort of action demands better resources and degree of cohesion, that EU possesses at the moment.

During the Iranian case, The EU proved itself capable as a negotiator, promoting peaceful, civilized, diplomatic solutions to the crises, ready to enforce coercive measures, even though they may not have widespread support in the Union. Also, it has once again demonstrated its activity in the field of international peace and security - the field, which is traditionally considered to be reserved only for the states. This does not mean, however, that the EU turned into a some sort of state and will now and later on pursue a common foreign and security policy. The EU could rather be considered as an alliance, acting together for better securing its interests which happen to be common for this particular case. This “alliance” is presided by a kind of triumvirate of 3 its leading powers and the High Representative for CFSP as a mediator, ensuring this compromise is adhered to.

However there are still some limitations to the EU actions, too many specific conditions, applicable only to Iranian situation, including the common position on the problem (more or less) - at least, absence of major and visible disagreements (such as in cases of Libya or Iraq). There was a common position on the global issue (nuclear non-proliferation) - in the end, none of the EU countries wished and wishes to have a nuclear-capable regional power at its doorstep. There have been no changes in intergovernmental format of pursuing common foreign policy, which is a limitation, since the activity of the EU in any future crisis will depend on the ability of 28 (or at least the EU-3) to find a compromise among themselves, which is not an easy thing to do, as previous crises have proven.

In general, though the Iranian case could be seen as a success, and has can offer some positive directions for the development of the EU CFSP, it is still rather an exclusive situation, offering the EU a good chance to prove itself as a negotiator. Yet the conditions for this crisis were determined by many factors and there are few chances that they would appear again in other crises. The EU needs to have more of positive examples of its foreign activities and to strengthen its own approach to make it less dependent on external variables. In the Iranian equation, the main element, and the main variable, de-facto, was Iran, and the Iranian government, since finally the success of the negotiations always depended on its will and readiness to cooperate. Whether the EU and US - led coercive measures contributed to some internal changes in Iran is a question for further investigation, but it is quite obvious, that permanent negotiations-oriented position of the EU has indeed contributed to high probability of the Iranian crisis being solved peacefully.

Conclusion

The aim of the research was to assess, whether the EU may have potential for successful handling of international crises, based on the case of Iranian nuclear programme.

The international surroundings, emergence of new powers and new conflicts as well as the world economic crisis, have become a serious test for the EU and once again invigorated heated debates about its future as an international actor. European common foreign and security policy has often been criticized for lack of coherence and reluctance of Member States to drive these issues on supranational level. Indeed, it could hardly be argued, that the CFSP is other than intergovernmental. Yet, the EU is more and more seen as a single actor (though of ambiguous nature) and invests some efforts to form its perception as such. For demonstration of these attempts, the crisis management seems to be a perfect example, since,

`In order to reach serious external political actorhood, critically, Europe has to hold together in times of crises and tensions'.

The Iranian case represents almost a unique example of successful handling of the international crisis by the EU. Three EU Member States have been part of the group of international negotiators with Iran and High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy was considered to be a head of this group. The EU demonstrated quite an attractive approach, combining sticks and carrots and adhering to diplomatic solution to the crisis, strongly opposing to military actions. Most importantly, key European powers managed to come up with a single, `European' vision of the possible solution of the crisis and this consensus gave it additional weight in negotiations.

The Iranian case is considered as a success also because the approach, Europeans pursued, has led to an agreement with Iran and at least for now, lessened the degree of tensions between the country and international community. It remains, however, doubtful, whether this success could be signed up to the European CFSP.

In case of Iran, there had been several conditions, which made the EU participation more efficient: firstly, from the very beginning it had a mediator position between Iran and the US, which positively contributed to its perception in the Islamic State; secondly, due to the importance of the global issue (nuclear non-proliferation) the EU Member States managed to arrive to a unified position, which, in turn, allowed them to apply common coercive measures, and finally, these coercive measures were useful, since the EU did have close economic relations with Iran and, thus, ability to influence it by economic sanctions. The “European approach”, based on negotiations and coercive measures, worked out in Iranian case mainly, due to the above-mentioned reasons.

Yet, the format of the EU participating in the negotiations should be of specific interest: in the EU3+3 the EU was presented by three member states on their own initiative, and by the EU foreign policy chief. Thus, it again could be spoken of a strong intergovernmental basis of EU common foreign policy, leading even to emerging of a triumvirate of countries as representatives of the EU and strengthening the role of the EU High Representative as a mediator, both between the EU3+3 participants and the EU member states as well. Unfortunately, it also means that EU common foreign and security policy is determined by the states and effective cooperation is possible only in the cases, when positions of key states are alike, or, at least, close. Then, Member States act together as a Union to make their position sound stronger, so there is no evidence of any further integration in CFSP, based on Iranian case. On the contrary, the form of leading triumvirate for handling foreign affairs signals, that so-called EU position is the position of three major states, and may rather encourage other actors to speak to these three capitals, than to Brussels.