Chapter II. Status and perspectives of nuclear energy in four countries of interest

2.1 Status and perspectives of nuclear energy in Russia

Russian nuclear industry traces its roots since 1954, when the first world NPP was launched in Obninsk, Kaluga region, USSR. During 63 years of development, Soviet and later Russian nuclear industry has undergone significant changes and improvements. In 2007, the Rosatom state corporation was established to unite hundreds of different departments, plants and firms working in the nuclear field. Rosatom is one of the global leaders on the nuclear market. During 2016 the corporation provided 196.37 bln kW, i.e. 18.3% of all produced energy in Russia. Rosatom takes 1^st place in the world by the number of NPPs constructed abroad, 2d place in the world by uranium supply and 4^th place by the amount of its extraction. State Corporation provides 36% of world market by uranium enrichment and 17% of nuclear fuel market Rosatom. http://www.rosatom.ru/about/ .

Rosatom deals with projecting and constructing NPPs, developing energy machinery, producing equipment and isotope production for nuclear medicine, conducting scientific research, producing different nuclear and non-nuclear innovation products. Rosatom unites more than 300 companies and organizations, including the production of military nuclear complex and the only atomic icebreaker fleet in the world. The corporation takes charge of implementing one state policy in the nuclear industry and is responsible for fulfilling international obligations of Russian Federation in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy.

To get a better understanding of Russian nuclear industry, it is worth to analyze data from Rosatom annual reports for past seven years, including official statistics of 2016 results from the official website.

Table 1.

The uranium as the main source for nuclear energy plays an important role in the industry. In 2016 according to WNA data on uranium production from mines, global leaders are the following countries: Kazakhstan - 24 575 t/year, Canada - 14039 t/year, Australia - 6315 t/year, Niger - 3479 t/year, Namibia - 3654 t/year, Russia - 3004 t/year World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx . Russia has 10 NPPs that need sustainable uranium supply, and the country also exports quite a significant amount of light-enriched uranium abroad. To provide all necessary uranium Russia created two companies - all submitted to Rosatom - Uranium holding ARMZ “JSC Atomredmetzoloto” that extracts uranium in Russia and “Uranium One” that extracts uranium in foreign countries.

ARMZ Holding is “the mining arm of ROSATOM, one of the leaders of the global uranium market. The Holding controls Russian uranium mining assets presented in the Trans-Baikal Territory, Republic of Buryatia, Kurgan region and the Republic of Yakutia” ARMZ Uranium holding. http://www.armz.ru/eng/company/about/ . Since 2008, the Holding controlled all mining assets of Rosatom in Russia and abroad, but since 2013, foreign mining assets were put under the company “Uranium One”. Thus, former Canadian mining company “Uranium One” in 2013 was acquired by Rosatom that purchased 100% shares. Nowadays “Uranium One” is a Canadian corporation which main business is focused on extraction, reprocessing, purchase and sales of uranium, and also “on purchasing, developing mining field in order to extract uranium in Kazakhstan, USA and Tanzania”Uranium One annual report 2016. http://www.uranium1.com/upload/Uranium%20One%20Inc%20FS%202016%20FINAL%20BoD%20with%20Audit%20Opinion%20protected%20-%20Filing%20Copy.pdf [accessed 20.02.2018].

Over the five-year period, there was a constant rapid growth in uranium production starting from 4624 tons in 2009 and reaching the highest level of 8300 tons in 2013. That was the result of government policy and favorable market conditions. However, in 2014 the figure dropped drastically by 450 tons to 7850 tons, it stagnated the next year and went up slightly to 7900 tons in 2016.

Firstly, there was a decrease in uranium extraction from domestic mining fields: from 3,135 t in 2013 to 2,990 t next year. That decrease was not only in Russia but in foreign countries as well, such as Canada, Australia, Niger, Namibia, etc. That was related to production optimization and some problems with the number of large plants.

Secondly, the company “Uranium One” had one company in the USA, one in Australia and seven jointly controlled companies in Kazakhstan with 30% - 70% shareholding, and one joint company in Tanzania (13,9%Uranium One. Annual report 2015. http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/u/TSX_UUU_2015.pd f [accessed 20.02.2018]). While in 2013, “uranium output reached 4629 t in Kazakhstan, 362 t in USA and 95 t in Australia” Rosatom annual report 2015., in 2014 the situation changed significantly, as Australian project was temporarily stopped and in the following year Uranium One sold all its stocks and shut down the project. In addition, uranium output in USA dropped from 362 t to 217 t, whereas Kazakhstan uranium output figures remained almost the same with only slight increase from 4629 t to 4640 t. In 2015 and 2016, as we can see from the Table 1, the uranium output figure remained on the similar level that indicates another drop in American uranium output and constant increase in Kazakhstan subsidiaries.

Therefore, Rosatom managed to make the uranium output stable and relevant to the market needs by means of correcting its aims on domestic mining fields and on foreign ones. It should be noted that Russia takes “the third place in the world by the amount of uranium 722,200 t” Rosatom. http://www.rosatom.ru/about/. Such amount will provide sustainable supplies to NPPs for many decades ahead. All enriched uranium is delivered to Russian consumers (60%), to North America (16%), to China (12%), to Europe (8%), to South-East Asia (3%) and to the Middle East and Africa (1%) Rosatom Annual Report 2014..

Rosatom also is one of the leading corporations on the market of conversion and enrichment of uranium. Enrichment of uranium is one of the main phases of the nuclear fuel cycle's primary stage. Products offered on the market are based on enriched uranium. Main Rosatom's competitors in this area are joint British-German-Netherlands company “URENCO” and French company “AREVA”. Their market shares account for 36% and 31% respectively. Rosatom's share is 10%, and another 6% belongs to Chinese companies Ibid..

In addition, Rosatom is one the largest actor on the market of nuclear fuel fabrication, delivering it to 17% of all functioning power units in the world. Leaders in this sphere are the American “Westinghouse Electric Company” with 31% of a total number of world nuclear power units and French “AREVA” with its share of 30%. Thus, having a high-tech base of uranium output and enrichment, nuclear fuel production, Russia successfully implements projecting, engineering and construction of NPPs.

According to 22.04.2017 IAEA data, in Russia there are 10 NPPs with 35 power units, seven units are being constructed, six units were permanently shut down. In 2016 nuclear share of total electricity production accounted for 17,14% that by 1,46% less than in previous year International Atomic Energy Agency. https://www.iaea.org.

It should be noted that after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1990s nuclear industry experienced a stagnation - at that period only one power unit in Balakovo NPP was constructed, and several projects were frozen. However, in the late 1990s, Rosatom signed contracts on power units' export to China, India and Iran, that had a positive impact on domestic nuclear energy. After that Russia began intensifying and modernizing its NPPs capacities. In 2001, 2010 and 2014 on Rostov NPP three power units started to function, in 2004 and 2011 Rosatom launched second and third power units on Kalinin NPP. Apart from constructing new power units, there was a better use of NPPs capacity. If in 1990-s NPPs were used only by 60% of their total capacity, in 2010-s this figure reached more than 80%.

In February 2010 Russian Government approved Federal program oriented on new tech platform creation for nuclear industry based on fast neutron reactorsWorld Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx . Rosatom long-term strategy until 2050 implies a shift to fully safe NPPs, using fast neutron reactors with complete nuclear fuel cycle.

The implementation of that program is extremely important, as a large number of reactors should be dismantled soon: operating life of 11 reactors exceeded 40 years while operating life of another 14 reactors accounted for 30 years (30 years is the average life expectancy of a reactor). There is a widespread practice of extending operating life by 15 years, but this method cannot be applied to all reactors and, thus, cannot solve the problem completely. Due to the fact that there inevitably will be some loss of total nuclear capacity, Russia planned to build 25 new reactors in the nearest future, approximately one reactor per year.

All NPPs in Russia belong to “Rosenergoatom” company that is a subsidiary of Rosatom. Rosatom's strategy is based upon “Energy strategy up to 2030” released by Government in 2009. The main aim of the Strategy is the creation of innovative and effective energy field, adequate to growing economy's demands for energy resources and to Russia's foreign economic interests, making a necessary contribution to the country's socially oriented innovative development Energy strategy of Russia until 2030. P.5 https://minenergo.gov.ru/node/1026 [accessed 20.03.2018]. Therefore, Rosatom is implementing policy towards building up the domestic nuclear energy capacity and towards international expansion.

Russian nuclear industry in XXI century undergoes fast-moving development. Nuclear industry is a powerful complex consisted of hundreds of companies doing their businesses in such spheres as nuclear energy field, nuclear weapon field, nuclear medicine, etc. Russia possesses rich uranium supplies, mining and chemical combines for its enrichment and nuclear fuel production, all necessary equipment to transport it safely and all up-to-date infrastructure throughout the country.

Russian reactors proved its reliance by long-term fail-safe operation. Their constant modernization and improvement makes them competitive and well-sold items on the global market. Thus, Russian nuclear industry will move forward: there will be increase of domestic electrical capacity by means of optimization of operating power units and by constructing new ones.

2.2 Status and perspectives of nuclear energy in East Asia countries

China

Fossil fuels, predominantly coal - 73% in 2015, are the main source for electricity in mainland China. The consumption of coal was so enormous that in 2007 China had to import coal for the first time in history Smikovsky A. Russian-Chinese Energy Cooperation: Problems and Perspectives. Russia and China: history and perspective of the cooperation. Materials from the IV international research and practice conference. Edition 4. Blagoveshensk. BGPU.2014. P.244..Recently the amount of hydro energy was increased by realizing two large projects: Three Gorges of 18.2 GWe and Yellow River of 15.8 GWe. Wind energy produced 3.3% of total electricity World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx.

Previous fast growth in demand led to power shortages, and the dependence on fossil fuels resulted in much air pollution, e.g. widespread smog in the east of the country because of coal burning. The air and water pollution cause both health problems and economic losses, as a contaminated coastal water damages fishing industry, while seafood became poisonous. While in 1970-s Chinese could drink and use river water for cooking, in 1980-s this water was not even good enough to water fruits and vegetables Kuzyk B., Titarenko M. China - Russia 2050: codevelopment strategy. IDV RAN. - M. 2006.P.189. Chinese authorities, admitting pollution problems, initiated policy towards increasing share of non-fossil energy sources, including nuclear energy. They intend to reduce CO2 emissions by 60-65% until 2030 compared to the level in 2005 Stroganov A. Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Energy Field. Fundamental Research. №11б 2016. P.1069.

The nuclear industry in China traces back to 1970, when “Mr. Zhou Enlai, who was the Premier of the State Council, pointed out the necessity for the peaceful use of atomic energy and development of nuclear power, which was the curtain raiser of nuclear power development in China” International Atomic Energy Agency. https://www.iaea.org. That year the first plan of development was published. The main research center to develop Chinese NPPs and adapt foreign technologies became the University №728, which is now Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI). It took Chinese more than 20 years, before the first Qinshan NPP was connected into the grid in 1991 Lukonin S. The strategy of nuclear power development in China after the accident at the nuclear power plant “Fukushima-1”. Ecology and energy: local responses to global challenges. M.: IMEMO RAN.2012. P.96. Units 1 and 2 of Daya Bay NPP were imported from France and began operation in 1994. In the 1990s China implemented moderate development of nuclear power, while in 2000s this industry underwent vigorous and efficient enhancement.

In 2006 the long-term plan on development of Chinese nuclear industry 2005 - 2020 was published. According to this plan, China decided to purchase AP-1000-type reactors designed by the American company “Westinghouse “. In order to master technology and develop their own III Generation reactor, Chinese authorities founded “State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation” (“SNPTC”).

In July 2007 American companies “Westinghouse” and “The Shaw Group” signed the Agreement with Chinese companies “SNPTC”, “Sanmen Nuclear Power Company Ltd.”, “Shandong Nuclear Power Company Ltd.” And “China National Technical Import & Export Corporation” on the construction of four AP-1000-type reactors. In 2008-2009 “Westinghouse” and “SNPTC” signed another Agreement on constructing more powerful CAP-1400-type and CAP-1700-type reactors, based on AP-1000, with installed capacity of 1400 and 1700 MWt respectively Ibid. P.97. According to this Agreement, Chinese side became the owner of intellectual property that enable them build NPPs based on these reactors abroad, though in cooperation with “Westinghouse”.

Nowadays the most common reactor in China is a 1250 MWt AP-1000-type light water reactor (PWR), designed by “Westinghouse”. As it has been mentioned before, China received the right to produce and modernize it.

The particular feature of Chinese nuclear energy development program is diversity and simultaneous use of American, French, Russian and domestic technologies. The main condition of an agreement with a foreign company on the NPP construction in China is the compulsory transfer of technical documentation to the Chinese side.

Another distinctive feature is the establishment of joint ventures between Chinese and Western companies for adaptation, construction and modernization of reactors. Moreover, in most cases, such joint venture receives the intellectual property right on a reactor and the right on its construction abroad. Currently, China possesses different type-reactors, built jointly with foreign companies, and continues constructing new ones.

As of the beginning of 2012, in China there were 15 operating reactors, seven of which are the intellectual property of China, four ones - of France, two ones belong to Canada and the other two to Russia Lukonin S. The strategy of nuclear power development in China after the accident at the nuclear power plant “Fukushima-1”. P.100. Over the period between 2012 and 2017, there was a dramatic growth of nuclear capacity, as by the end of 2017 the number of operational reactors soared up to 39, while 18 reactors are under construction. The nuclear share in total electricity production increased from less than 1% in 2011 up to 3.9% in 2017 International Atomic Energy Agency. https://www.iaea.org.

Currently, nuclear share in Chinese energy balance comprises less than 4%, while the main energy source remains coal with 2/3 of all electricity. Moreover, China takes the first place by the volume of greenhouse gases' emission Ibid.. The territory around coal-pits in North China is a zone of ecological disaster.

However, the future of nuclear power in China is under question now, because what was true in the 2000s, i.e., previous setting, meeting and further increasing ambitious goals, is no longer the case in 2016. In 2002 China's short- and medium-term plan for nuclear expansion implied reaching 40 GW of nuclear capacity by 2020, in 2009 that figure was drastically risen to 70 GW, whereas in 2016 it dropped to 58 GW Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.104. Why did that target figure experience such significant fluctuations?

The first factor is the growth rate for electricity demand. Since Chinese economy began to undergo structural changes, from being oriented on export-led industrial production to one focused on the service sector and domestic consumption, electricity demand has leveled. This change led to energy and electricity demand decrease. There was also a decline in the average amount of electricity produced at different kinds of power plants. Provided such circumstances, it is very unlikely that China still needs a fast increase of nuclear capacities.

The second factor that had an immediate dampening effect on Chinese nuclear plans became the Fukushima disaster. After this accident State Council claimed the suspension of adopting new projects on NPP construction and modernization and a complex inspection of all operating NPPs. This action required all courage and determination by China's authorities, “as the government was in the midst of urgently adopting low-carbon-emitting energy strategies” Marie-Helene Schwoob and N. Jayaram. Fukushima: Towards a reconsideration of China's nuclear plans? P.64. In December 2011 State Council published a report on safety and investments in nuclear energy Lukonin S. The strategy of nuclear power development in China after the accident at the nuclear power plant “Fukushima-1”. P.100, which main statements were the following. To enlarge the Emergency Commission in case of nuclear incidents, to limit the planned volume of NPP electricity, to increase the number of projecting III Generation (Gen) reactors, to increase the number of specialists who maintain a reactor.

The main consequence of that accident is introducing slight technical changes in construction of 22 II Generation reactors that concern safety increase in case of natural disasters. The construction of 16 projecting II Gen reactors, which were approved before the “Fukushima-1” accident, will be adapted to new tougher national safety requirements Ibid. P.103. Some projects with II Gen reactors might be substituted by III Gen reactors. The Fukushima disaster accompanied by energy demand decrease and growing government's concerns about public opposition to nuclear energy will have a significant influence on the future of Chinese nuclear capacity.

There is also a limit on nuclear expansion in China which is stated in the choice of sites. Previous to the Fukushima Accident there were plans for a vast increase of NPPs' inland sites. However, after the Accident such plan was banned due to safety reasons because NPPs need a huge quantity of water to cool radioactive cores. Thus, only coastal sites remained available for NPP construction, but they are quite limited.

Another limit for nuclear expansion became the new safety requirements by Chinese State Council implemented after 2011-12 review that obliged all producers to make III-generation reactors. The problem is that these latest reactors cost much more and take more time to construct. China developed its own technology to build II-generation reactors but still lacks experience to build III-generation ones. For instance, “in 2011, the 27 reactors then under construction in China included the following rector models: CNP-600, CPR-1000, AP1000 and the European pressurized reactor (EPR)” Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.113. Chinese reactors - the CNP-600 and CPR-1000 - were classified as II-generation reactors, so that their safety is less reliable than European and American models.

However, several months later after the Fukushima accident the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) received government approval to sign contracts with foreign companies to import III-generation reactors to guarantee the use of safe technology. The SNPTC convinced officials in Westinghouse Electric Company that Westinghouse will dominate the Chinese nuclear market. That declaration triggered other Chinese players, e.g., China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CHNPC), to intensify activity not to lose their market share.

In November 2011 the CGNPC announced that it developed the newly designed ACPR1000, a reactor that meets the standards of international III-generation nuclear power technology Ibid. P.115. A few months later in January 2012 the CNNC announced its own reactor, ACP1000. Moreover, both corporations jointly developed the new III-generation reactor - the Hualong One that was certified by the National Safety Administration in 2014 Ibid. . They started promoting this reactor overseas as its most advanced technology, exploiting Xi Jinping's initiative “Belt and Road”.

However, the fast rapid of constructing new III-generation reactors causes questions of its true advancements. It is doubtful that Chinese newly designed reactors meet III-generation safety requirements. For example, “the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor, which was approved for construction in the United States in February 2012, received approval only after 19 revisions to its reactor design were examined by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission” Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.115. Therefore, there is a high possibility that these Chinese models may be III-generation in name only, being just a mere improvement of the II-generation reactor - CPR-1000.

In addition, III-generation reactors are costlier, which also results in slower pace of nuclear capacity construction. “Estimates by China's Nuclear Energy Agency suggest that the cost of constructing Generation III reactors is significantly higher (US$ 2,300 per kilowatt (kW) for the AP1000) than Generation II reactors (US$ 1,750 per kW for the CPR1000)” Ibid. P.117. Thus, considering the high cost of nuclear reactors' construction and slower demand growth, it may be assumed that Chinese authorities will emphasize developing alternative cheaper energy sources, such as wind and solar energy. That may result in more modest targets of nuclear energy compared to the 2000-10 decade.

Another constraint on the nuclear power expansion that should be mentioned is the increasing role of public opinion on authorities' policy concerning the sites of nuclear capacities' construction. For instance, two surveys of residents who live near the Tianwan nuclear power plant, conducted in 2008 and 2011, after the Fukushima accident, showed the significant decrease in support for nuclear power by two-three times. In result, the number of supported was shortened from 23% to the 8 %, while the number of opponents rose from 13% to 54%. In August 2016 there was an outbreak of large-scale public protests in the city of Lianyungang, which is near the Tianwan NPP Ibid, P.118. Despite all traditional methods, such as censorship, arrests and coercion of local labor, used by local and government authorities, they also responded in a positive way heeding the public's concerns. They suspended the construction of the Lianyungang reprocessing plant, proposed regulations oriented on increasing decision-making transparency and public participation in decision-making process. It is still not clear whether government's sensitivity to the public opinion will increase or decrease, but it ma by expected that public opinion itself will play its role in slowing the further expansion of nuclear industry in China.

The future of nuclear energy in China is not what it was seen a decade ago, when China set very ambitious targets for nuclear power in the country, met them and then increased them to a higher level. Since then the Chinese economic nature has changed that caused the precipitous decline in the growth rate of energy demand. The decline has been so sharp that, compared to previous years, many power plants are being forced to run for fewer hours. However, new power plants that will come into operation during next several years will enlarge this mismatch between electricity demand and installed capacity. Thus, it can be expected that the growth rate of nuclear power will be also lowered.

Chinese nuclear operators and reactor constructors will try to compensate possible losses on domestic nuclear market by exporting their technologies. However, entering the global nuclear market for Chinese companies is not easy, because their reactors may not meet the international Generation III safety requirements and the companies themselves have lack of experience in constructing nuclear facilities overseas.

One counter-argument might be that China is implementing the policy on reducing its reliance on fossil fuels, coal, particularly, that will be stated in closing old coal plants and developing non-fossil fuels power plants based on renewables and nuclear power. That is definitely true, but such arguments as the longer time period for construction, the higher costs, the problems with imported nuclear reactor designs and development of their own adequate nuclear technology, all along with the limited number of available coastal sites to build NPP, make it more likely that Chinese authorities will prefer to replace fossil fuels with cheaper and safer renewables - wind and solar - rather than nuclear reactors.

A second counter-argument might be that nuclear power is a baseload source of electricity, while solar and wind cannot perform in this way. Nevertheless, the shift in Chinese economy and the move away from manufacturing industries with high-energy consumption, such as steel and cement, imply that this argument has less merit now. In any case, China is not moving away from nuclear energy, but its role on global nuclear arena will not be so huge as it was assumed earlier.

Japan

Japan has a longer history of nuclear industry than China. Japan started its nuclear research program in 1954 World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx. The first commercial reactors were imported from foreign companies: GEC (UK), Westinghouse and GE (US), and Areva (France). Nuclear fuel was purchased from uranium mines in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere Sebastian M. Pfotenhauer, Christopher F. Jones… Learning from Fukushima. P. 81. In the beginning of 1970s Japanese conglomerates such as Hitachi, Toshiba and Mitsubishi purchased designs of light water reactors (LWRs) from US vendors and built them together. Later, Japanese conglomerates developed the capacity to design and build LWRs by themselves. By the end of 1970, the Japanese nuclear industry had enlarged significantly, Japan started exporting its technologies to other East Asia countries.

In their more recent energy policy in 2002 - 2011 Japan intended to keep nuclear power as the main source of electricity production, recycle plutonium and uranium from spent fuel and promote safe nuclear energy to the public. However, Japanese could not accomplish their goals due to the Fukushima Daichi accident in March 2011 that became the second worst after the Chernobyl disaster. The main problems happened at “Fukushima-1” were triggered by drawbacks in systems that ensure reactors safety and by bad timing in rectification of accident consequences. According to the official report of the Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission, it was a “manmade” disaster, “the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties” The official report of the Fukushima nuclear accident independent investigation commission. www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf. P.16. [accessed 20.02.2018]. Key causes are considered to be the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty decisions and actions, rather than issues referring to the any individual's competency. Thus, Japan's authorities do not only have to rectify the accident consequences, which may last up to 40 years, but also reorganize management system of nuclear industry.

After the Fukushima accident Democratic party of Japan under pressure of the public opinion claimed about plans to stop using nuclear energy by 2030. However, leaders of Liberal-democratic party of Japan, who came to power in December 2012, did not support that idea, emphasizing the necessity to reach the optimal energy balance for the country. The task was to create an environment for recovering nuclear industry in changed circumstances.

In Japan, there is no unified electrical system. There are around ten large private electricity companies that divide Japan by ten electricity regions, that are barely interconnected. This poor interconnection had a negative impact on the situation after the accident, when regions where electricity was provided by Tokyo Electrical Power Company, the operator of the “Fukushima-1” NPP, remained without electricity. Meanwhile, other electric companies that have extra electricity could not fully ensure the demand of the regions due to the lack of connection between electrical regions.

After the accident the government decided to temporarily shut down the operation of all existing nuclear reactors in the country. That resulted in huge financial losses for the electric companies that had to spend a tremendous amount of money on fuel to ensure the operation of combined heat and power plants (CHP).

According to 2012 data, the total expenses on fuel by nine Japanese electric companies accounted for 70 bln $, that doubled the figure in 2010. Rapidly increasing demand in traditional energy sources led to the significant rise of their import. The amount of imported fuel in 2012 was higher by 50% the amount in 2010 Voda K. Nuclear energy in Japan: problems and perspectives after the Fukushima-1 accident”. Energy safety: national, regional and international aspects. IMEMO RAN. 2013. P.97.

TEPCO took the biggest losses that accounted for 7.8 bln $ in 2011 and 6.8 bln $ in 2012 so that it had to raise tariffs on electricity by 17% for a legal entity and by 10% for the natural entity Ibid.. The Japanese government had to provide significant financial aid to TEPCO so that it could avoid bankruptcy. However, TEPCO's expenses and loans are still growing as the most of finances goes to pay works concerning decontamination of the area and to store radioactive waste, all along with compensations to the population. The Japanese government suggested to divide a production sector from an electricity transmission sector inside TEPCO and also within all energy industry.

After the Fukushima accident many Japanese and foreign experts criticized the structure of nuclear energy in Japan. It is also called “nuclear village” that reflects the tight cooperation among electrical companies, financial corporations, regulatory government organizations, members of a ruling party, all along with scientists and mass media, which foster development of nuclear energy. Regulatory organizations acted for the benefit of electric companies, turning a blind eye to the violation of instructions by the latter.

The Fukushima accident led to the loss of public trust in nuclear safety regulation. Trust has not been completely restored even when a newly independent Nuclear Regulation Authority was formed in 2012, and regulatory standards became much tougher. “According to poll results, the proportion of the public that wants to shut down all NPPs immediately increased from 13.3% in June 2011 to 30.7% in March 2013” Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.13. Moreover, this polling suggested that government agencies were precepted as the most untrustworthy organizations. This loss of faith is the most severe problem that nuclear policymakers and the Japanese nuclear industry now face. Although six years passed since the accident, this problem has not been adequately addressed.

Two important developments have happened that have further eroded public faith. First, on 20 December 2016, the TEPCO Reform Committee released a new report about TEPCO reform, where total accident-related costs were newly estimated. The total estimated cost of the accident is now about US$200 bln, that is two times higher than the former estimate Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.13. The report announced that most of the costs should be covered by TEPCO, but almost one-third of the total sum should be financed by other electrical companies.

The second issue happened during the Cabinet Ministers' Meeting on Nuclear Energy Policy in 2016 that was held without open debate and a thorough review of the Monju project, which is the fast reactor prototype. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority decided to decommission Monju from 2017, while fast reactor development would be continued without Monju. Thus, credibility and feasibility of a fast reactor program are currently in serious doubt.

The Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry (METI) Advisory Council set up one working group to define the future energy mix targets for 2030, and another working group to re-evaluate the generation cost of nuclear energy in comparison with other energy sources. In July 2015, METI released its new long-term energy outlook which is based on Strategic Energy Plan of 2014. According to that outlook, the nuclear energy share in total electricity generation will be around 20-22 % that is slightly lower than in 2010 (26%), while the share of renewable energy will account for 22-24% Ibid. P.15. Keeping the nuclear share of 20-22% is likely to require an extension of the 40-year operating period of current NPPs or construction of new NPPs. This policy has been criticized as inconsistent with the target of decreasing the reliance on nuclear power as much as possible.

However, the key word that describes the features of new energy policy is pragmatism. The pragmatic approach can be seen in three main directions of the policy which are ensuring stability of electricity supply, stabilizing electricity prices and accepting liabilities on reducing CO2 emissions at the level of developed states. The main consequence of this pragmatism policy became the decision to restart NPPs, introducing the strictest safety standards in the world. By March 2016, among 48 reactors, 26 were submitted to certification by modern safety standards, four reactors were restarted, two of which began commercial production of electricity, while the other two were stopped by technical and juridical reasons right after the restart Belov A. Perspectives for Russia - Japan cooperation in the energy field. Japan's research. 2016. №1. P.34.

Despite new pragmatic energy policy, Japan still has several important issues to solve: spent fuel management, plutonium stockpile management, securing human resources, high-level waste disposal, and restoring public trust.

Even before the Fukushima accident, the issue of the management of accumulating spent fuel on-site at NPPs was a major problem for nuclear utilities and the government. By the end of 2011, in storage there were approximately 17,000 tonnes of spent fuel, out of which around 14,000 tonnes were at NPP sites and 2,900 tonnes were at the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The total capacity of spent fuel pool storage at NPP sites is about 20,630 tonnes, and this is approximately 70% fullPeter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.16. For some reactor sites, the pool will be full in a few years if reactors restart operation. The Rokkasho reprocessing plant, which can reprocess 800 tonnes of spent fuel per year, has only one storage pool with a capacity of 3,000 tonnes. The plant is now shut down after the period of hot testing and the repair of certain equipment, and it is not clear when the commercial operation will be restarted, due to new regulatory standards. As the storage fool is almost full, if the plant does not start commercial operation, it might not be able to reprocess further spent fuel. Therefore, finding extra storage capacity is a top priority task for the Japan's government, to raise the flexibility of spent fuel management, while uncertainty regarding reprocessing remains.

The main policy for spent fuel management in Japan has been reprocessing and recycling plutonium for energy use. As plutonium can also be used to produce nuclear bombs, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) introduced a “no plutonium surplus” policy from 1991 and intensified its policy in 2003 by releasing new guidelines to enhance its transparency when the Rokkasho commercial reprocessing plant was expected to begin operations. According to the guidelines, utilities are supposed to submit a `plutonium usage plan' annually before they reprocess and recover plutonium. This policy is intended to ensure that Japan will not have plutonium without plans for its use. Nevertheless, in reality, there have been significant delays in realizing the plutonium usage program. As a result, by the end of 2015, Japan has around 48 tonnes of separated plutonium, which is the largest stockpile among non-nuclear weapon countries, “and could increase further if the Rokkasho reprocessing plant starts operation, and if its recycling program into 15-18 reactors as currently planned does not smoothly move ahead” Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.17.

Like many other states, Japan has not found a final repository site for high-level radioactive waste (HLW). Since the adoption of the Law on Final Disposal of Specified Radioactive Waste and the establishment of the Nuclear Waste Management Organization in 2000, all efforts to find a candidate for possible investigation were not successful. The principle was that towns should voluntarily suggest their site, but none of the Japanese towns did so. Thus, it was recommended that long-term temporary storage should be used instead of geological disposal, but the organizations in charge have a different view on this problem, so it is still not solved.

Since the future of nuclear energy has become uncertain, it may get difficult to attract new young and capable talents to the nuclear industry. Moreover, there is a growing demand for new tasks to decommission Fukushima reactors. Thus, it is extremely important to secure human resources to meet new challenging issues in the coming decades. It is also necessary to re-examine research and development programs, so they could meet new challenges and provide future human resources. To meet these challenges, the JAEC released policy statements on human resources and on research and development in 2012, where it recommended drawing a human resource demand/supply map: when in what areas and how much workforce is needed based on operational plans.

Nuclear energy policy after the Fukushima accident needs to be changed in order to reflect learned lessons, and different priorities and targets required, such as the decommissioning of the Fukushima site and restoring livelihoods for people in that region and other affected areas; improving safety and security; spent fuel management, plutonium stockpile management, waste disposal, and human resource development, and, above all, restoring public trust. Japan's government ought to initiate a national debate to re-examine the risks and benefits of the nuclear power including various stakeholders and civil society. It would be desirable to establish an independent commission to carry out a comprehensive, non-biased assessment of nuclear energy policy. While overcoming the consequences of the accident, Japan is expected to gradually restore its nuclear energy capacities.

South Korea

Since its post-Korean War (1950-53) beginning, energy policy in the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been driven by the necessity to push economic growth, lower dependence on imports, and ensure long-term energy security. In the late 1950s, the government ROK decided to develop a nuclear energy program as a means to foster the restoration of its war-shattered economy. Officials assumed that nuclear reactors would ensure a sustainable source of energy, facilitate export-oriented growth, and decrease the nation's dependence on expensive oil, coal, and gas imports. After that, ROK began the member of IAEA in 1957, next year the Framework Act No.483 on Atomic Energy was passed, and in the following 1959 Nuclear Energy Agency was founded International Atomic Energy Agency. https://www.iaea.org.

Nuclear energy legislation evolved mostly unhindered by public resistance under the iron grip of authoritarian leaders from the 1960s to the late 1980s. The dictatorship of Park Chung-hee (1961-79) was quick to charge would-be demonstrations with national security and anti-communism laws and resorted to martial law to restrain barrages. The first small research reactor was manufactured in 1962, some ten years later, Park Chung-hee began construction of the Kori NPP in Busan, which started operating in 1978.

Additionally, to the authoritarian ruling, ROK's alliance with the United States (US) became a further driving force in the development of nuclear industry. A clash of interests between the American nuclear industry, business conglomerates (chaebol), and officials in ROK emerged, once Seoul embarked on its nuclear energy program. American nuclear power companies had a special agenda to promote the improvement of nuclear technology in non-communist countries and viewed ROK as a perspective business prospect. The fact is that the American company Combustion Engineering (later incorporated into Westinghouse Electric) supplied ROK with its first nuclear reactor - the Kori-1 unit - in 1978, and after that imparted technological know-how to the fledgling industry Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.136.

Meanwhile, the US government looked for a degree of control over South Korean nuclear energy policy, which partly reflected in dissuading its ally from developing and independent nuclear weapons capability. Being under circumstances of military pressure from Pyongyang and the withdrawal of thousands of American troops from ROK in 1971, Park Chung-hee began considering the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Through the signing of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United Stated of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy in 1972, Washington intended to cut Park's ambitions by pledging to supply nuclear materials and technology to Seoul on the condition that that they be used only for power production purposes Ibid.. The terms of this agreement further reduced ROK's nuclear weapons potential by banning uranium enrichment and constraining its fuel cycle options and supply of raw material. When in the mid-1970s the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute attempted to go around these terms by means of purchasing Belgium reprocessing plants, the US and Canadian governments exerted financial leverage on Seoul, by threatening to cut off support for ROK's nuclear energy program. Under such pressure. Park Chung-hee by the end of the decade eventually abandoned plans on nuclear weapons development.

Throughout the early to mid-1980s, there was almost no public resistance towards to further expansion of nuclear energy capacity in the country. That time the state-owned firm Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) oversaw the building of additional eight reactors, with the assistance of American nuclear companies. By the end of the 1980s, ROK's nuclear energy had evolved to provide 45% of the nation's energy needs and had virtually gained technical self-reliance Peter van Ness, Mel Gurtov. Learning from Fukushima. ANU Press. 2017. P.137. Thus, nuclear power became closely associated with ROK's fast industrialization and economic growth.

In the first decades of the nuclear program development, most of the NPPs were constructed based on American technologies without real participation of Korean companies. Nevertheless, the same as in machinery, in nuclear industry the share of Korean companies in projecting, constructing and maintaining NPPs was constantly growing. That resulted in the construction of first 100% Korea made reactors 3 and 4, 1000 MW each, on Hanul NPP. They were named as Korean standardized nuclear reactor, then were renamed into OPR1000 and launched into commercial production in 1998. After that, during several years another OPR1000 type six reactors were constructed. The construction of third-generation reactors APR1400 began in 2007 on Shin-Kori and Shin-Hanul NPPs. New reactors are characterized as hi-tech, safe and efficient.

The main Korean corporation in the field of building and operating reactors KEPCO actively promotes OPR-1000 and APR1400 reactors in the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America. The big achievement for the company became the tender victory on NPP construction in UAE in 2009. 20.4 bln $ contract implies the construction of “Barakah” NPP with four reactors up to 2020. Besides the UAE deal, Seoul has secured a US$173 million contract to construct a nuclear research reactor in Jordan and to build several reactors in Saudi Arabia worth a total of US$2 billion. Other target export countries for ROK's nuclear industry are China, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Vietnam. In January 2010 KEPCO claimed to build 80 rectors up to 2030, which looks rather ambitious and hardly reachable task World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx.

Nowadays KECPO leads 32 projects in 17 countries. 11 projects are connected with the joint power production that are implemented in seven countries: Mexico, Niger, UAE, Philippines, China, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Ten projects of joint uranium mining and exploration are held in Canada, Niger, Indonesia and Australia. Moreover, there are another 10 projects of training and development in Dominican, Egypt, Cambodia, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, etc.

The main aim of KECPO is to become a global leader among energy companies, by means of providing good quality technologies, entering new markets and intensifying cooperation with other countries. KECPO plans to get 15% of its profit from overseas operations up to 2020.