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Government of the Russian Federation

FEDERAL STATE AUTONOMOUS EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION FOR HIGHER EDUCATION NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

“HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS”

Faculty of Social Sciences

MASTER THESIS

Field of Study 41.04.04 Political Science Master's Program “Politics. Economics. Philosophy”

Green energy as a tool of Germany's smart power

Andrey Zakharov

Scientific Supervisor

Anna Efimova, PhD

Moscow, 2020

Table of Contents

energy germany green policy

Introduction

1. Defining smart power

1.1 Hard power

1.2 Soft power

1.3 Smart power

2. Green energy agenda in Germany's domestic politics

2.1 Historical background of the green energy in Germany

2.2 German energy strategy and policies

2.3 Energy transition results and effects

3. Green energy agenda implementation by Germany on the regional and the global levels

3.1 German governmental institutions on foreign policy

3.2 European dimension

3.3 International dimension

3.4 Сase of Morocco-German energy partnership

Conclusion

Bibliography and Sources

Appendices

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3

Appendix 4

Appendix 5

Introduction

Climate change and pollution from traditional energy sources are nowadays the mainstream both in academic studies and media coverage. Concerns about possible outcomes of continuous hydrocarbon fuel usage have been considerably increasing, meaning the growth of green and renewable energy significance. Thus, green energy has become of great importance, changing the political agenda of developed countries and their international political strategies In this paper, we understand green energy as renewable energy sources. They include solar, wind, bio-, water and thermal energy sources.. The leading role belongs to the world's economically strongest states that can develop and maintain technologically innovative energy systems and realize energy transition to noncarbon energy sources. On the one hand, putting a value on green energy may result in the positive development of country's image, but on the other hand, a green energy strategy can also be implemented to enforce or change the behavior of actors through the mechanism of ecological sanctions, import tariffs, fines, etc. It means that the green agenda is suitable for both persuasive and coercive actions, depending on specific situation.

Taking that into account, we can examine green energy as a promising tool of “smart power”, conceptualized as a combination of these two different aspects of international strategy. Green energy as a source and tool of smart power is becoming more and more influential, making it a valuable subject for research. Moreover, this very precise tool, as well as the smart power policy, is often associated with Germany. This country, due to its history, current strategy in world politics and strong internal green energy sector has adopted and projected both soft and hard aspects of power, stressing the importance and benefits of green energy transit and offering assistance in its implementation.

The relevance of this paper lies in the fact, that the current situation in the world requires the decision-makers to combine both influential and coercive policies, with the green energy as an emerging instrument of such an approach being on the edge of soft and smart power. Considering the fact, that Germany now is the world leader of green energy transition, actively promoting its environmental actions as a possible example for the rest of the world, and actively participating in adoption of EU energy framework, we argue that green energy transition has been used by Germany as a measure of not only achieving more positive image making Germany an international leader in environment protection, but also increasing its coercive potential through influence on the adoption of legally binding energy targets and increasing its economic capabilities for promotion of energy transit, including green energy investment and support for domestic German green energy entrepreneurs (both technologies and electricity producers) to reach foreign markets.

The theoretical framework of neoliberalism is be applied to conduct research. It stresses the importance of cooperation between actors, which perfectly describes the promotion of energy transition and creating partnerships with different states. Moreover, the neoliberal approach considers the impact of domestic politics on international politics, which is the very specific case of Germany, because its foreign policy has been greatly influenced by German history and internal societal demands. The energy transition has originally been the agenda of domestic politics as a part of the Green party ideology and coalition agreements.

The paper applies qualitative methods of research: the empirical analyses of related sources used to cover the implemented environmental strategies and plans; the historical analyses to determine the development of green energy.

First, the theoretical basis of the paper should be emphasized. To understand “smart power”, we should examine ideas of “soft” and “hard” power. J. Nye in his seminal book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power” Nye J. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. Harvard, 1990. and the chapters in the Oxford Handbook on Modern Diplomacy by S. Changhe Сhagne S. Soft Power // The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy / Ed. A. F. Cooper, J. Heine and R.Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. and J. Nye Nye J. Hard, Soft and Smart Power // The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy / Ed. A. F. Cooper, J. Heine and R.Thakur. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. elaborate on the concept of soft, hard, and smart power. Mainly, these researches focus on the definition of soft power as a specific concept, its difference from so-called “hard” power and the areas in which the soft power can be useful. J. Nye Nye J. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 204 p. argues that soft power is the ability to persuade or influence other actors to perform certain actions or conduct specific policy, making them genuinely believe that it is the best way, while hard power is coercion - it affects others directly (military deployment, economic sanctions, etc.) Soft power is applied utilizing communication. So, soft power can be implemented through the actor's image: culture, values, human rights, etc. They also contain a response to the critic of soft power and bring some arguments to support the importance of soft power. The concept of a smart power as a combination of "soft" (persuasive) and "hard" (coercive) power was brought out in the works of J. Nye Nye J. The Powers to Lead. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 241 p. , J. Nossel Nossel S. Smart power // Foreign Affairs, 2004. Vol. 83. №2. P. 131-142. and J. Wilson Wilson J. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power // The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008. Vol. 616, №1. P. 110-124. . These papers argue that it is not efficient to rely only on one of them because it can be not useful in some situations and define how these two different aspects can be put together to conduct more productive foreign policy. J. Nye Nye J. The Powers… claims that the soft and hard power are bond together because they are used to achieve the same goals “by affecting the behavior of others”. Moreover, additional attention needs to be paid to the Center of Strategic and International Studies research by R. Armitage and J. Nye Armitage R., Nye J. CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007. 82 P. , where the authors describe the specific methods of combining different power approaches in five different areas, including Alliances, Global Development, Public Diplomacy, Economic Integration, Technology, and Innovation. Although these recommendations were developed to the United States in 2008, they are applicable to applying smart power elsewhere. Besides, it is also noteworthy for our work, that the authors stress out the necessity of a proper “Energy and Climate” policy, which points out, how important these issues are nowadays.

The theoretical works cited above focus on the case of the United States. Thus, we need to adjust their ideas to Germany's case. Patterson Patterson W. Smart Power in reunified Germany // Journal of Power, 2008, Vol. 3, №1. P. 339-354. focuses on the implementation of smart power in Germany's international relations. He examines how Germany uses not only the soft power to influence the other actors, but also its evolving capacity of using coercion when necessary. The usage of soft power has been a proper choice for Germany because of its history: the terrible outcomes of two world wars left no other options. However, the reunified Germany faced the inevitable need to reinforce its soft power decision with the instruments of hard power. Avoidance of using hard power tools such as military force or economic sanctions may harm Germany's image and make it look weak. There is also a concept of “civilian power”, often used by European researches, developed by H. Maull Maull H. Germany And the Use of Force: Still A 'Civilian Power'? // Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 2000. Vol. 42, № 2. P. 56-80. and S. Stavridis Stavridis S. “Militarising” the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited // The International Spectator, 2001. Vol. 36, № 4. P. 43-50. . In their view, “civilian power” relies on multilateralism, liberal values, human values and pacifism. A collection edited by O. Zimmermann und T. Geissler Zimmermann O., Geissler T. Die dritte Sдule: Beitrдge zur Auswдrtigen Kultur und Bildungspolitik. Berlin: Deutscher Kulturrat, 2018. 552 P. describes the German foreign cultural policy and the way it attracts foreigners to Germany and forms a positive image of a country using transfer student programs, promoting German language and culture. Germany's soft power in the educational and cultural fields is analyzed in the works of T. Lanshina Lanshina T. The Goethe Institute and Soft Power // International Organizations Research Journal. 2015. Vol. 10. №1. P. 86-104. and C. Schmid Schmid C. The Goethe-Institut's Soft Power. Handelsblatt. Retrieved from: https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/politics/cultural-diplomacy-the-goethe-instituts-soft-power/23567358.html?ticket=ST-4790583-NuQynULDMZevvS6H7Si3-ap3. C. Schmid puts emphasis on the importance of the Goethe Institute as an exporter of German language and culture.

Green and renewable energy is becoming a very pertinent topic due to the increasing importance of climate change and pollution issues. In this context, German energy policy, as one of the most successful and influential in the world, should be taken into consideration. Germany's green policy and the so-called “Energiewende” (energy transition) were examined in the papers by L. Mez Mez L. German Climate Change Policy: A Success Story With Some Flaws // The Journal of Environment

& Development, 2008. Vol. 17. № 4. P. 356-378. and O. Renn Renn O. Coal, nuclear and renewable energy policies in Germany: From the 1950s to the “Energiewende” // Energy Policy, 2016. Vol. 99. P. 224-232. , who describe its evolution, and M. Woerter Woerter M. The Adoption of Green Energy Technologies: The Role of Policies in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland // International Journal of Green Energy, 2017. Vol. 14, № 14. P. 1192-1208. , M. Ringel Ringel M. Towards a Green Economy in Germany? The Role of Energy Efficiency Policies // Applied Energy, 2016. Vol. 179. №1. P. 1293-1303. , who study Germany's green energy policies, legal framework and their implementation in Germany. These works have a great value for our research, mainly because it describes the success in energy transition made by Germany and analyzes its green laws, such as Renewable Energy Sources act (EEG). Thus, the claim of Germany's leadership in the renewable energy sector is supported by many data and examples of its efficiency. Ringel concludes his work by confirmation of the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NAPE) effectiveness.

The research of K. Steinbacher Steinbacher K. Exporting the Energiewende: German Renewable Energy Leadership and Policy Transfer. Berlin: Springer, 2018. 447 P. shows how Germany benefits from the leadership in the renewable energy sector considering the cases energy partnerships with Morocco and South Africa. This paper examines different hypotheses of energy transition leadership necessity for Germany. According to the study, Energiewende forms Germany's unilateral leadership in d energy transition, which is an interesting assumption, because it differs from the habitual German multilateral policy. The author claims, that Germany is playing the role of policy-setter, creating a network of policy recipients, which lets Germany control energy transfer. The German energy and climate laws are made so to be a model for the other countries so that they could use Germany as an example, and further - as a partner in their energy transition. Thus, Germany becomes the main green energy technologies and legal standards model, making it a trendsetter in solving climate problems and efficient energy use. Consequently, this improves Germany's image, which is a soft power tool, but also makes Germany economically stronger through the development of partnerships and technology exports, and able to control green energy transition in the world, which can be classified as hard power. Thus, Energiewende can be examined as a tool of smart power, combining both `soft' and `hard' characteristics.

The research question can be stated as follows: In which way the green energy agenda is being used in Germany's foreign policy and to which extent can it be described as the combination of influence and coercion?

The object of the study is smart power in Germany's foreign policy. The subject of the study is the green energy as a part of smart power strategy in Germany's foreign policy.

The purpose of the work is to examine the application of transition to renewable energy sources in Germany's foreign policy and its compliance with the smart power strategy. To achieve the stated objectives, the following tasks have been performed. First, we define the concept of smart power and describe, how the soft and the hard approach are being used together. Second, we examine the green energy agenda in international relations: its current position and which role play the green energy sources. Finally, we analyze the implementation of green energy policy by Germany in its foreign policy, including “Energiewende”, energy partnerships and the environmental legislation of the EU.

To conduct the research, numerous empirical sources have been examined, including energy strategies, policies, agreements, visions and actions plans on one hand and the statistical data showing changes in power generation sources distribution, the evolution of renewable sources share, the consumption of energy by the energy source, taken from Eurostat and Agora Energiewende. Such sources as the reports and the prospects of different German governmental institutions like Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety with the addition of reports of different international organizations, including International Renewable Energy Agency.

This research has the following hypothesis: energy transition and climate protection are consciously and systematically used by Germany to increase presence in the renewable energy field and enhance its status as international agenda-setter.

Digging deeper into specific details, Germany uses its green energy policy as a smart power tool by creating an network of international partnerships, shaping their policies by policy transit during cooperation and influencing decision-making process in international organizations; also actively participating in developing of legally binding renewable energy targets on the European level to increase the long-term targets of renewable energy share increase, thus utilizing environmental legislation - it would put Germany in a position of leader of energy transit. In addition to that, setting targets for increasing renewable share makes possible for Germany to additionally promote its own energy solutions, both in institutional field (political cooperation) and economy (technology exports, infrastructure building). By that, Germany profits from loan-giving and exporting its own technologies. In general, Germany usually acts through international institutions (the EU, international forums, participation in international treaties) where it uses its power of influence, which allows Germany to influence decision-making and, at the same time, give legitimacy to the line it is promoting through a multilateral format.

The structure of the study is determined by the tasks set previously: the paper is divided into Introduction, three Chapters, and Conclusion. The first chapter is theoretical and examines the concept of smart power by defining the soft and hard aspects and how they both are being combined. The second chapter explores the green energy transition in Germany and analyzes the achievements of this process, using empirical and statistical data. The third chapter focuses on the usage of green energy agenda in Germany's foreign policy. It studies how the Energiewende is being promoted through bilateral cooperation with different states as long as through the institutionalization of the energy transition in the EU.

1. Defining smart power

Power has always been central to the study of IR. However, what is meant under this term is not as easy to understand as it seems. Power has been examined as the sum of the state's resources and capabilities (e.g. territory, military capacity, wealth). But this is not the only existing approach to define power. Modern researchers consider these not as power itself, but as power resources: meaning, that they can be used in exercising power. Researchers in sociology and political science developed so-called “relational” approach, which describes the power relations between actor A and actor B. As Robert Dahl stated on this subject: «A has over B to the extent that he can get B to do anything that B would not otherwise do» Dahl R. A. The concept of Power // Behavioral Science, 1957, Vol. 2, P. 201-215. Retrieved from: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/bs.3830020303. Though, later some researches contested this definition, claiming it to be too straightforward, which caused the “faces of power” discussion and then bringing out two new definitions, thus making “three faces of power” existent. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz claimed in 1962, that A can also make B do anything by changing the agenda: making some actions seem unpreferable or taking them out of attention, which limits the set of choices for B to those preferential by A Bachrach P., Baratz S. M. Two Faces of Power // The American Political Science Review, 1962. Vol. 56, №4. P. 948. . Then in 1974 Steven Lukes added the "third face": he stated that A can influence and change the preferences of B, determining what B would want to do following A will, which he called "Ideological Power" Lukes, Steven. Power: A Radical View. London: Macmillan Press, 1974. p. 25.. Taking all these points of view into account, one can claim that power means the capacity of one party to achieve their interests regardless of circumstances or interests of other parties. This concept will be used in this paper, as it fits in the interactions between different actors and can describe how behavior or actions of an actor are influenced by others. It is not the purpose of this study to describe the relational power approach, but for conducting our research, we also need to outline some basic aspects of it, which are called “dimensions of power”. Baldwin highlights five of them: scope, domain, weight, costs and means Baldwin D. A. Power and International Relations // Handbook of International Relations, P. 275 / Ed. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. A. Simmons. London: SAGE Publications, 2013. . Scope means the field of activity, in which power relations are happening (e.g. economics, military); domain describes the necessity of actor/actors B being influenced by A (how many of them, how necessary it/they are); the weight of power refers to how influential the power of A towards B is; costs, obviously mean expenses of power relations; and means are the ways to exercise power. This paper will stress the latter and distinguish between different methods and approaches to use power. To understand what smart power is, we need to distinguish its components: hard and soft power. One needs to put attention to what differentiates them. It also may seem useful to imagine them as the opposite ends of one spectrum of power, which was proposed by Nye in his latest work on the matter of power "The Future of Power" in 2011.

1.1 Hard power

For Nye, hard power is based on command and coercion, implementing the use of force (military) and payment as its methods Nye J. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. P. 20. . Hard power lies in direct positioning of someone's will to achieve a certain goal: it means, that A makes B doing something to get some specific outcome. Ernest Wilson describes hard power as coercion of "another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise" Wilson J. Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power // The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2008. Vol. 616, №1. P. 114. . It does not mean exclusively only methods of compulsion. Hard power is also associated with a commonly known “sticks and carrots” concept: A may not only punish or threaten B, but also induce it: via economic help, or by offering military support. But of course, “sticks” are also being used: through coercive diplomacy, military threats, and economic sanctions. Consequently, one can say that with the help of hard power A pushes B.

Hard power certainly has many advantages. First, it is easy to implement, because hard power resources are easily measurable and policymakers can easily choose, how to use them. Besides, it has a direct short-term impact: there is no need to wait for the results, and the outcomes are simpler to evaluate and predict. Putting it that way, hard power is a convenient tool for politics.

Despite these positive sides, hard power is not without flaws. It can be very deceptive to predict that straightforward measures will always work and provide the desired outcome, so policymakers can think, that it is enough to rely only on hard power methods, which eventually will limit the choice of solutions furthermore. Moreover, using too much pressure can inflict damage to the country's reputation and image, which will also have impact on the acceptance of such behavior by other states, making them see you as an aggressor. The point is, that there is no need to push all the time, sometimes it is necessary to give a break.

Exercising hard power in the green energy sector may include ecological trade barriers, green energy legislation (prohibiting the pollution, making it obligatory to look for less pollutive energy sources). So, hard power in green energy can be described as pushing the others to be eco-friendlier in terms of energy productions: if you pollute too much, the fines will be imposed. European Union has introduced directories of EU and other legislation that induces European countries to make energy transition and sanctions will be imposed on those who disobey.

1.2 Soft power

The term “soft power” was first introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990 and developed in his later publications in 2004 and 2011, slightly changing the definition and making it more precise. In his latest work on this subject, Nye states the following: “Fully defined, soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes" Nye J. The Future... P. 21..

For Nye, the focus of soft power is attraction: to obtain your specific goals by changing the perception of you and your goals through the generation of attractiveness Nye J. The future... P. 21. . So, technically, soft power serves the purpose of changing the preferences in a way to shape them to comply with your goals. It means, that soft power appears to be indirect: A does not order or make B to do something, but rather B performs anything on its own will, as this decision seems to B the most suitable or preferable one. For that to happen, B should perceive A as an attractive and legitimate source. How can it appear to happen? Nye determined three different ways of projecting soft power: agenda-setting, attraction and persuasion Ibid. P. 90. . Attraction seems to be the main among them because persuasion and agenda-setting will work only if A tends to be attractive to B. With attractiveness, one can easily persuade others or set the required agenda for their purposes. By persuasion Nye means changing the perception of B by A without coercion: one can achieve that with the help of proper argumentations, rhetoric or verbal and written manipulations of facts and events. Agenda-setting is the way of formulating a set of issues or points so that they fall under the requirements of A.

Bearing in mind what we have defined previously, it is obvious that soft power is a sort of power interaction between A and B which requires A to create attraction and be perceived positively. Which resources could be used to achieve it? Nye defines three sources of soft power: culture, political values, foreign policies Ibid. P. 84. . Culture as the combination of social behaviors is seen as a tool to generate attraction, because some parts of it may be perceived positively by other states. Thus, direct interaction between different cultures may be beneficial to one or both parties, as it would influence the other one. It would work the same way with the political values of the state. The political system could be interpreted as effective and the other side would like to incorporate some parts of it in their politics, which consequently would facilitate the dialogue between them. Foreign policies are the last, but not the least. In terms of soft power, it would be very valuable to conduct proper public diplomacy, as it would make possible to persuade a huge number of people and change the minds not only of political elites, but also the society itself, which would consequently affect the decisions of the ruling class.

However, soft power is less measurable than hard power: It is hard to evaluate attractiveness because it is more abstract and subjective. Soft power is far more abstract; hence it is harder to implement. Therefore, decisionmakers have less accurate estimations of the effect that their actions have had. As it was already stated in this paper, attraction depends on those who perceive, so the same actions could be interpreted differently in Europe or the Middle East. Besides, soft power is even less universal, than hard power: many issues are simply impossible to be resolved via soft power, like terrorist attacks, the nuclear crisis in Korea and many more of them. Thus, it can be stated, that soft power and hard power are at different levels of problem-solving: hard power complies better with the tactical level of momentary problems, while soft power is more suitable to achieve strategic long-term goals.

Green energy and soft power: Setting a green energy agenda, promoting the green energy transition, making it more likable to the people and politicians, so they would use green energy sources willingly. Creating an image of green energy as something especially good. So, speaking about the soft power approach to green energy, “Energiewende” of Germany fits maximally well: Germany positions itself as an example of green energy user and promotes the benefits of green energy transition.

1.3 Smart power

Smart power should be viewed not as another dimension of power or a distinct theoretical concept, but rather as a policy, which would be the most effective way to exercise all the means of power and power resources that an actor has. As Joseph Nye states: “The ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy is smart power” Nye J. The Powers to.... P. 43. . Similarly, Wilson describes smart power as the capacity to adopt both soft and hard power so that they would be “mutually reinforcing” and serve the actor's goals more effectively being combined. E. J. Wilson. Op. cit. P. 115.

Interestingly, both Wilson and Nye while designating their view on smart power to introduce the so-called "core considerations" or "questions", which are very similar to each other and dimensions of power, mentioned earlier in this paper Ibid. Nye J. Op. cit. P. 208. . Thus, as a combination of hard and soft power, the smart power policy would mean considering all these dimensions: what power resources we have, in which area we would like to operate and what goals we would like to obtain, what the positions of our counterparts are, what the chances of success and what forms of power we need to succeed are. So, the main point of smart power is an adequate management of resources that a state has to choose the means and the ways, tailored to the exact situation, considering all given data.

This policy seems to be reasonable because it does not rely solely on one dimension and accounts for all the existing possibilities. We also should outline, that hard or soft power can be inappropriate in some situations, for example, one can hardly fight terrorist groups with persuasion or attraction, but it is also impossible to make your culture more attractive during military warfare. It means, that these aspects of power are not universal and that is why we should consider smart power policy. Besides, Nye argues, that power resources of both hard and soft power often reinforce each other, meaning that they can be used differently depending on the context. He provides an example of the US Navy helping to deal with the consequences of the tsunami in 2004 Nye J. Hard, Soft… P.131. . US Navy is part of military forces that are usually seen as providers of hard power, but in these concrete situations, they were used to create a positive image of the USA helping those who were in need, which strengthened American soft power. Power resources are fungible: their further usage is not predetermined and is dependable on the specific situation. That is why the concept of smart power is very actual: it helps policymakers to choose among the best options. It incorporates the best aspects of both hard and soft powers: on the one hand, it can use more tangible resources and sources than soft power and can lead to more long-term outcomes will less frustration than hard power.

So, the main goal of using smart power would be a proper implementation of all given power resources and methods to benefit whatever the conditions are. Of course, using this strategy requires decision makers to become more flexible and have a full understanding of their goals, accessible resources and world politics itself. Consequently, politicians should always define the scope and domain of actions and evaluate the possibility of success.

In the context of green energy, a `smart policymaker' would use every method, described in previous parts, depending on the situation and the given goals. For example, discussing the position of Germany on energy transition, one could say, that it would be efficient to push other members of the EU to bring in new environmental legislation, which would be obligatory to comply with and which would set targets for renewable energy share for other Member States. Thus, by achieving that Germany would spread its energy transition on the European level and could increase its political power. In addition to that, it would be useful to promote energy transition as a preferable solution on both the European and international levels, setting the agenda of green energy worldwide and then benefiting from contacts with partners. This will be examined in the next sections.

2. Green energy agenda in Germany's domestic politics

Before examining the Germany's green energy foreign policy, we should first analyze its development within the state itself, because it is impossible to promote renewable energy agenda without your own experience. The goal of this chapter is to trace the evolution of renewable energy policy in Germany and the reasons which led to its usage. Three tasks need to be performed to complete it: First, the history of green movements and the Green party with the addition of energy production and consumption changes is described to outline the social and political environment of green politics and how it became mainstream in German politics. Second, the political and legal background for current Energiewende will be analyzed, as we should examine the reasons for such policy and its goals. Finally, the process of energy transition itself will be put under examination because we need to evaluate, how successful it is being performed.

2.1 Historical background of the green energy in Germany

To emphasize the evolution of green movement in Germany, we need to outline the historical environment that surrounded it and the sources of its development. To begin with, one could point out to the 1973 oil crisis: many analysts have outlined this event, claiming that it led to significant changes in German energy policy by demonstrating the unreliability of energy importsWustenhagen R. Green energy market development in Germany: effective public
policy and emerging customer demand // Energy policy, 2006. Vol. 34. P. 1682.. It led to the increase of governmental interventions in the energy sector and adoption of the 1973 Federal energy program with further revisions concentrating on energy conservations Renn O. Op cit. P. 229.. At that moment the main energy source in Germany was coal, both hard and lignite, with the addition of nuclear plants. The government considered nuclear energy as a further addition to the coal and the second pillar of energy production in Germany. Because of the oil crisis, nuclear power lived through a huge boost Nuclear power in Germany: a chronology. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/nuclear-power-in-germany-a-chronology/a-2306337 . However, the construction of nuclear plants caused large social disputes and unrest. Consequently, opposition to nuclear energy usage became the first green movement in Germany in the 1970s. During this decade the German government faced massive anti-nuclear rallies and demonstrations. In his work, Renn provides an example of the environmental movement in Baden-Wurttemberg, opposing the construction of the Wyhl nuclear power plant Renn O. Op. cit. P. 229. . It is stated that demonstrations gathered more than 30,000 people Nuclear power in Germany: a chronology. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/nuclear-power-in-germany-a-chronology/a-2306337. There were also mass rallies against the Wackersdorf power plant in Bavaria in 1980 and the Brokdorf plant in Schleswig-Holstein in 1981 with approximately 100,000 participants Ibid. . Despite the large number of people involved, the anti-nuclear movement failed at the country level: it had some local victories like closing down constructions in Wyhl and Wackersdord, but it did not change the trend itself. The oil crisis of 1979 made the position of nuclear power supporters even more solid and the situation remained the same until the Chernobyl accident in 1986, which will be discussed further in this text.

Even so, these events led to the consolidation of the environmentalists with the creation of the Green party in 1980. The foundation and structure of the Party were quite turbulent, but this is not the subject of this work. The focus on the Green party can show the institutionalization of environmentalism in Germany and the strengthening of its political power. The fact, that party entered the Bundestag in 1983 with 5, 6% of votes and gained 8,3% votes in 1987 clearly shows, that the influence of environmentalism grew up since the 1970s. With 44 seats in parliament in its second election party appeared to become a part of Germany's political process, despite its low electoral support and number of seats in contrast to the traditional parties. Except for the 1990 elections, the Green party always remained in parliament since then. In 1993 the Green party converged with the Bundnis 90, which originated from East Germany. Moreover, while the party always had strong ties with the left link of German politics, namely the Social Democratic Party, they created a coalition government after SPD success in 1998 elections, which was in power from 1998 to 2005. During that period the Green party, as SPD's smaller partner, took three seats in the cabinet, including of course Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety. Most notably, in that period the Renewable Energy Sources Act was adopted by the coalition government with amendments made in 2004, which was a successor to the previous renewable legislation. It reformed the previous law in many ways and developed renewable energy on a larger scale. So, it can be stated, that the environmental movement managed to gain more power and evolved into a participant of the political and legislative process. The legislation of renewable energy will be examined later in this section.

In addition to social and political aspects, we should also cover the development of environmental institutions, academic research on this subject and support of innovations in the energy sector. Until the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, all these fields in Germany were relatively small. The overall investment in renewable energy sources Research and Development was only 10 million in 1974 and by 1982 only DM 150 million were spent in this area Lauber, V., & Mez, L. (2006). Renewable Electricity Policy in Germany, 1974 to 2005. // Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 2005. Vol.26(2). P. 105. By 1986, the funding was even cut by half Ibid. Some research programs were in progress such as wind turbine GROWIAN, but they were not quite successful: the government did not believe in the renewable's success and estimated that its share in overall consumption would reach only 2% by 2000 Hake, J.-F., Fischer, W., Venghaus, S., & Weckenbrock, C. The German Energiewende - History and status quo // Energy, 2015. Vol. 92. P. 538 . It is claimed that the renewable energy programs were in progress only because of social stress and the need for energy diversification, while all the major political powers in Germany supported the expansion of nuclear program Ibid. P. 537. . However, the Chernobyl accident changed this approach. This event completely changed the perception of nuclear energy in the German society: after this catastrophe, 86% of the population began to approve the nuclear phase-out Wustenhagen R. Op cit. P. 1683. . The negative perception of nuclear power became a trend, which a survey conducted by Federal Public Relations Office since 1984 till 2003 clearly shows: the share of people who supported the contribution of nuclear power in the energy sector in the next 20-30 years (at the moment of conducting the survey) fell from 68% in 1984 to 42% in 2003. In contrast, the share of those, who advocated the usage of renewable sources increased dramatically: from 17% to 46% for wind energy and from 48 to 52% in 2003 for solar energy Ibid. .

Taking this into account, the environmental agenda became much more powerful in politics. First, it is indicated by the foundation of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety in 1986, only five weeks after the Chernobyl events. As was stated by Melanie Arndt, it was a reaction on Chernobyl Arndt M. Auswirkungen der Katastrophe von Tschernobyl auf Deutschland. 2016. Retrieved from: https://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/umwelt/tschernobyl/225086/auswirkungen-der-katastrophe-von-tschernobyl-auf-deutschland. The future of nuclear power became more controversial, as SDP turned to pro-nuclear phase-out while the ruling coalition under Helmut Kohl remained to be supportive of nuclear power. Thus, the nuclear phase-out became apparent only in 1998 under Red-Green Alliance. The most important is the fact that energy disputes began to grow, and the previous coal-nuclear policy appeared to be unpromising.

Interestingly, the possibility of energy transition was first conceptualized in 1980 in the work “Energiewende - Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdцl und Uran”, published by the Oko-Institute, a non-governmental research institute supported by the Green party. This was the first time the term “Energiewende” appeared in the public discourse, but neither the term nor the concept itself gained much attention at the time. There was no policy promoting energy transition until 1991 when "Stromeinspeisungsgesetz” (StrEG) or Electricity Feed-in Act was adopted. The main features of this legislation were an obligation to connect renewable energy producers to the grid and purchase the electricity; a guaranteed price for the electricity producers for 21 years; a cost settlement system for balancing regional disparities Wьstenhagen R. Op. cit. P. 1685. . This legislation was then reformed by the Red-Green coalition in 2000 with the adoption of “Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz” (EEG) or Renewable Energy Sources Act. It modified the promotion of renewable energy sources by adding a nationwide compensation scheme for the renewables: so-called “EEG Umlage”, which is a surcharge, put on grid operators to fund feed-in tariffs Was ist die EEG-Umlage und wie funtioniert sie? // Bundesnetzagentur. 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/FAQs/DE/Sachgebiete/Energie/Verbraucher/Energielexikon/EEGUmlage.html. EEG was also amended in 2004, which added clear goals for renewables shares in certain times period. This surcharge is being collected by the grid operators, as they sell electricity on different prices than they buy it from the renewable producers because of feed-in tariffs. To compensate for this difference, the grid operators place this surcharge on electricity consumers, mostly on households, because the electricity-intense facilities are free from these payments due to the law. Ibid. EEG was later amended in 2009, 2014 and 2017. It will be examined closely in the next subchapter.

The Red-Green coalition also managed to achieve some additional progress in the environmental agenda by structuring approach to the energy sector concerning renewable energy sources, energy conservation, and more sustainability. The energy overall and renewable sources particularly occupied a huge part of the coalition's agreement in 1998: for example, a goal was set to reduce CO2 emissions by 2005 for 25% in contrast to the year 1990, as long as to promote the renewable energy sources Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bьndnis 90/Die GRЬNEN. 1998. P. 13. Retrieved from: https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Beschluesse/Bundesparteitag/koalitionsvertrag_bundesparteitag_bonn_1998.pdf. The nuclear phase-out was also introduced in this agreement, planned to be achieved until 2021. Notably, since that moment the renewable energy sources, reduction of emissions and further energy transition were presented in all the later coalition papers, even with the Green party getting excluded from the government. For example, the 2005 coalition agreement of Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union and Social Democratic Party included the increase of renewable share to 12.5% in 2010 and 20% in 2020 The 2005 coalition agreement of CDU/CSU and SPD. 2005. P. 42. Retrieved from: https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=16f196dd-0298-d416-0acb-954d2a6a9d8d&groupId=252038 ; the next agreement of these parties in 2013 set the goal for the renewable energies to achieve 40-45% share in 2025 and 55-60% in 2035 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD 18. Legislaturperiode. 2013. P. 51. Retrieved from: https://www.isl-ev.de/attachments/article/1048/koalitionsvertrag-FINAL.pdf . Interestingly, after the 2009 elections, the plans for the nuclear phase-out were close to being postponed, as the “conservative” wing of the coalition still was not completely satisfied with that strategy, but after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 and increasing public concerns, the initial strategy for the phase-out became inevitable. Besides that, we also can point out the significant changes in political discourse concerning renewable energy over time: CDU/CSU opposed both nuclear phase-out and renewable legislation, adopted by the SPD/Green coalition, but after winning the 2005 election they took the similar stance. In this period the climate concerns became one of the main topics of Angela Merkel's political position both on national and European levels. The Integrated Energy and Climate Program adopted by Merkel's cabinet in 2007 is a great example of it: The program's goal was to achieve 30% renewable share till 2020 and reduce CO2 emissions by 40% The Integrated Energy and Climate Programme of the German Government. 2007 // Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. Retrieved from: https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/bmu-import/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/hintergrund_meseberg_en.pdf. The Renewable Energies Heat Act of 2009 is also an interesting case: it obliges to cover a part of heat supply in new buildings, both residential and non-residential, with renewable energies German Renewable Energies Heat Act (EEWдrmeG). 2009. Retrieved from: https://www.buildup.eu/en/practices/publications/german-renewable-energies-heat-act-eewarmeg. The latter programs and strategies will be examined in the second subchapter.

Considering the given facts, we can acknowledge the following: the energy transition in Germany is a versatile process. Analyzing the preconditions of the energy transition, we can observe, how social movement politicizes itself into a strong political force. Environmental problems in the 20th century arouse concerns of a relatively small group of activists - now it is the mainstream topic and one of the cornerstones of Germany's politics. The green energy in Germany emerged rapidly and the reason for it may be found in the German society itself: it can be seen, that first the Chernobyl and then Fukushima disasters raised the awareness of nuclear danger, which then converged into wider concerns about CO2 emission and climate pollution. However, these would not develop if it was not for the German political system. The conclusion to this chapter should be formed this way: the process of energy transition needs both social and political support, ameliorating each other. Without social discussions and organizations on climate change, it cannot enjoy political support; without political support, the energy transition cannot be completed successfully. With the realization of this coexistence, the next subchapter will examine the energy policies and strategies.

2.2 German energy strategy and policies

This subchapter will review goals, stated in the German energy strategy and policies aimed to achieve them with additional focus on renewable energy sources and their development. To achieve it, we will need to outline the existent energy programs and show which purpose they have. With the existing sets of policies and plans, there are two main documents, which provide the overall view on this subject: the Energy strategy, adopted in 2010 and Climate Action Plan, developed in 2016. First, we will introduce these 2 papers and describe their purpose. Secondly, the coalition agreements of 2013 and 2018 will be also analyzed. After that, we will examine the remained programs and their attachment to the goals set in previous documents. The evaluation of achieving these goals by the German government will be provided in the next subchapter.

The Energy concept of the German government was introduced in 2010 and set very ambitious goals: to achieve 30% share of renewables in gross final energy consumption by 2030, 45% - by 2040 and 60 % - by 2050; to reduce final energy consumption by about 10 % by 2020 and by about 40 % by 2050 Energy concept for an Environmentally Sound, Reliable and Affordable Energy Supply // The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) and Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. 2010. P. 5.. The share of renewables in energy supply should reach 80% by 2050 Ibid. . To support the expansion of renewable sources the following measures were presented: the additional legal support of Photovoltaics in EEG 2012 amendment; the 75 billion Euros investment program to increase offshore wind capacity by 25 GW by 2030; the additional support for onshore wind and bioenergy; the plans to boost energy R&D by creating Energy Research Programme Ibid. P. 8. .