The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) contributes to German green energy foreign policy too. In 2008 BMU launched the International Climate Initiative (IKI). The Initiative is aimed to finance projects, mitigating climate changed, including renewable energy as well. Since 2008 to 2019 over 730 environmentalist projects were launched under IKI with overall funding of around 3.6 billion Euros The International Climate Initiative. Retrieved from: https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/fileadmin/Dokumente/2019/20191021_The_International_Climate_Initiative.pdf. IKI provides support in 4 different areas: Mitigating greenhouse emissions; conserving biological diversity; conserving natural carbon sinks; Adapting to the impacts of the climate change. As we are interested in renewable energy, it is covered under greenhouse mitigation and is mentioned as “sustainable energy supply”. Overall, BMU spent approximately 1.5 billion Euros on greenhouse mitigation projects from 2008 to 2018 Minderung von Treibhuasgasemissionen Retrieved from: https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/de/themen/minderung#prettyPhoto. In the area of sustainable energy supply 28 million Euros were spent in 2017 by BMU Ibid. . Interestingly, IKI realizes not only infrastructural projects, but also institutional ones: for example, under IKI BMU granted both 12 million Euro to construction of solar thermal plant in Morocco from 2013 to 2018 New solar thermal power plant in Ouarzazate under Moroccan solar plan. Retrieved from: https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/details/project/new-solar-thermal-power-plant-in-ouarzazate-under-moroccan-solar-plan-11_I+_044-2754 and 4.8 million Euro for promotion of renewable energy in the Dominican Republic to be realized from 2017 to 2022 (conducting political and economic reforms in order to increase climate targets) Promoting a low-carbon energy system for the achievement of the climate objectives of the Dominican Republic. Retrieved from: https://www.international-climate-initiative.com/en/details/project/promoting-a-lowcarbon-energy-system-for-the-achievement-of-the-climate-objectives-of-the-dominican-republic-17_I_262-548. Implementation of these projects has been done by the Deutsche Gesellschaft fьr Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). In contrast to BMWi or BMZ spending, BMU funding of renewable energy sources is relatively small, but we must consider, that energy is mostly BMWi's area of responsibility, while BMU provides support for other environmentalist projects.

Taking a closer look on the green agenda of various German institution and ministries it is possible to admit, that green energy appears to be an important part of their activities. The green energy foreign policy's activities, events, and projects function is to promote Germany as a pioneer in energy transition. Moreover, with the help of positive perception of Germany as a successful Energiewende achiever, it becomes possible for Germany to increase its international presence on energy market and gain tangible economic profits. The overall funding of all 4 the ministries regarding energy transition is impressive. Considering the 2020 increase in funding of environmentalist projects (500 million for BMZ and 100 million for BMU, as stated previously) we can expect, that green energy promotion in German foreign policy will become even more active in the short term.

3.2 European dimension

Talking about European level of Germany's foreign policy, we should first mention, that the development of EU environment policy was made under presidency of Germany. The 2020 package, which called for 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels) 20% of EU energy from renewables and 20% improvement in energy efficiency was developed under German management and was largely promoted by Chancellor Angel Merkel. Besides of that, German officials continue to support the development of renewable energy and continuation on environment matters on the European scale. As it is stated: “The energy transition can only be successful when it is successfully embedded in a European framework. This is the only way to bring together climate protection, security of supply and competitiveness. Important focuses in this context include the EU's 2030 climate and energy framework, which, among other things, seeks to reduce greenhouse gases and to increase energy efficiency. Efforts to reform emissions trading are another project. Moreover, the EU intends to grow together as an energy union in accordance with a framework strategy submitted in 2015.” The energy transition around the world // Federal Foreign Office. Retrieved from: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/energie/energiewende-node Germany has also been active in decision making process concerning post-2020 targets, as it ultimately affects Germany's own Energiewende. As 2014 research points out, Germany was against any possible slowdown of energy transit process in the EU and was outlining the need for further development in this sphere Geden O., Fischer S. Moving Targets Negotiations on the EU's Energy and Climate Policy Objectives for the Post-2020 Period and Implications for the German Energy Transition. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2014. P. 13..

However, considering German domestic Energiewende progress, we should also point out that despite taking active part in elaboration of European policy Germany has not always been successful in promotion of its own approach to the renewable energy development on the EU scale. The European Commission favored a different mechanism of renewable energy promotion, tradable green certificates or TGCs, while Germany was trying to push forward the feed-in scheme on the European level Solorio I., Цller E, Jцrgens H. The German Energy Transition in the Context of the EU Renewable Energy Policy // Im Hьrdenlauf zur Energiewende / Ed. A. Brunnengrдber, M. Rosaria di Nucci. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedia, 2014. P. 192. . Thus, during negotiations on common EU energy policy in the 2000s Germany opposed any possible harmonization of TGCs systems, existing in European countries so far: Germany put veto on possibility of such harmonization during process of creating RES-directive of EU in 2009. Thus, the 2009 Directive did not offer any possible unified scheme of renewable energy promotion, neither preferred by Commission nor by Germany, and only included obligatory targets of renewable's share for member countries and the Commission monitoring their implementation. Despite the fact, that Germany was not able to promote its own policy on the European level, Germany was more successful as pioneering state for energy transit. Given its reputation of renewable energy innovator since the first adoption of feed-in tariffs by Germany in 1990, various forms of such tariffs were implemented by 27 out of 28 EU countries by 2013 Ibid. P. 196. . That can be explained both by the influence of Germany's reputation in this sphere and non-existence of supranational policy by European Commission, which made it possible for EU member states to take example from Germany.

Germany and EU Commission also had contradicting interests even in beginning of the 2000s concerning EU Emission Trading System (ETS). Germany opposed the idea of obligatory EU ETS, which would require businesses to decrease their emissions on a mandatory basis. It contradicted the German EEG and its approach: German legislation did not oblige industry to decrease emissions, it just favored renewable energy addition to the Common EU Energy policy, Germany and European producers and granted them benefits to increase renewable share, while energy intense industries in Germany were free from renewable surcharge. According to researchers, German promotion of renewable energy share was based on voluntary agreements with businesses Skjжrseth J. B., Wettestad J. The Origin, Evolution and Consequences of the EU Emissions Trading System // Global Environmental Politics, 2009. Vol. 9. No 2. P. 110.. Besides of it, Germany always has been and remains the highest CO2 polluter of Europe due to its industrialized economy Ibid. P. 111. . Thus, it was not in the scope of German interests to establish obligatory European cap and trade system. However, as German position was mostly outnumbered by other Member States, it did not have any possibility to change the situation.

Germany also took active part in development of the EU 2030 energy framework. It was predictable, that Germany would stress the need for further development of renewable energy production, but other EU countries did not have the same enthusiasm. First, the target for renewable share was set as 27%, which was considered insufficient by the German side. They advocated of an intensified energy transit and eventually the targets were increased up to 32%. Interestingly, the study, conducted by German institution, claims, that 32% share of renewables, while being impressive, can be increased even further Breitschopf B., Winkler J. The EU 2030 Renewable Energy Vision - Can it be more Ambitious? // Advances in Environmental Studies, 2019. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 175. . We can assume that it shows the will of Germany to continue the trend for further renewable development. The adoption of new EU 2030 energy framework showed changes in Members States positions on energy transit. First, the supranational institutions began to lose its power in decision-making process in favor of intergovernmental ones: most compromises on the 2030 Framework were achieved in ministerial consultations at European Council Geden O., Fischer S. Op. cit. P. 26.. The shift to intergovernmental institution may reflect disruption in European position on energy transition and growing independent governmental policies. This may affect Germany's Energiewende in both positive and negative ways: intergovernmental approach at energy may increase Germany's position in bilateral negotiations with other Member States, but the skepticism towards higher renewable share may diminish the possibility of further success in this field Ibid.. East European countries, led by Poland, do not favor the possibility of further increase and are mostly concerned not by emissions, but energy security and the prospects of the Energy union Ibid. Because of that, Germany is also increasing its bilateral consultations on energy transition. For instance, energy transition was discussed in bilateral relations of Germany and Netherlands in 2019. BMU and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy of Netherlands signed Joint Declaration of Intent on energy transit. According to the Declaration, both parties consider their national energy policies affect each other because of integration of energy market. Germany and Netherlands adopted common NECP chapter and continue expert dialogues on carbon prices Joint Declaration of Intent between the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the Energy Transition. 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/J-L/joint-declaration-on-energy-transition.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 .

In addition to bilateral cooperation, Germany has also focused on regional cooperation with other countries in Europe, especially in the North Sea region. In 2016, the North Sea Energy Cooperation was founded and included Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, and United Kingdom. According to the Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries, they seek to accomplish Paris Agreement targets of mitigating global warming. According to European Commission, before establishing of Energy Cooperation, around 15 million Euros were invested in this region Transnational energy cooperation between North Sea countries. Retrieved from: https://northsearegion.eu/northsee/e-energy/transnational-energy-cooperation-between-north-sea-countries/. The Declaration on energy cooperation established a working plan on offshore wind cooperation, including Maritime spatial planning; Development and regulation of offshore grids and other offshore infrastructure; Support framework and finance for offshore wind projects; Standards, technical rules and regulations in the offshore wind sector Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Political%20Declaration%20on%20Energy%20Cooperation%20between%20the%20North%20Seas%20Countries%20FINAL.pdf). It was estimated, that coordinated work can save these countries 5.1 billion U.S. dollars in creation offshore wind installations Political Declaration on energy cooperation between the North Seas Countries Retrieved from: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Political%20Declaration%20on%20Energy%20Cooperation%20between%20the%20North%20Seas%20Countries%20FINAL.pdf). In 2019, the Ministerial meeting agreed to increase cooperation in offshore wind installation North Seas Energy Ministers reinforce cooperation on offshore wind // Wind Europe, 2019. Retrieved from: https://windeurope.org/newsroom/press-releases/north-seas-energy-ministers-reinforce-cooperation-on-offshore-wind/ . It was calculated that approximately 380 GW of offshore wind capacity can be installed in North Sea region. A new work programme for 2020-2023 was developed - cross-border offshore wind projects will be realized in this period Ibid.. One of these projects is creation of artificial islands, on which wind power plants with capacity of 15,000 MW will be installed. Since January 2020, Germany has taken presidency of the Energy Cooperation. Interestingly, since July 2020 will take over presidency of the EU Council. Some publications consider this as a possibility, that Germany will use this possibility to strengthen regional cooperation in North Sea What exactly is the North Seas Energy Cooperation? // Energiewende Direkt, 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.bmwi-energiewende.de/EWD/Redaktion/EN/Newsletter/2020/01/Meldung/direkt-account.html.

Another noticeable study covers subject of renewable energy transit of Germany and Europe from geoeconomical perspective. Researcher claims, that all the possible transformations of Germany's energy system should be examined from the regional perspective because of interconnectedness and dependency of EU member states energy infrastructure and electricity grid. In this context it can be seen that most EU member states are connected to Germany, which is the biggest consumer and producer electricity in Europe. Given that credit we can also state that any changes in Germany's energy mix have direct effect on the other member states and, creating thus the spill-over effect. Continuing energy transit in Germany makes its electricity infrastructure more intermittent, thus resulting in increased load on the European grid from electricity production fluctuations. The energy instability also makes Germany increase its ties with European countries: it rents reserve plant in Austria, for instance, in order to supply enough electricity when renewable production is low and sells excesses of electricity in times when generation is on peak performance. When the increased amount of electricity is being pushed to other EU countries, such as Poland or Czech Republic, it often causes the inconveniency and strains electricity grid with additional load, causing possibility of infrastructure problems Sattich T. The International Reverberations of Germany's Energiewende; Geoeconomics in the EU's Geo-Energy Space // The Geopolitics of Renewables / Ed. Scholten D. Delft: Springer International Publishing, 2018. P. 173.. However, it is noticeable, that affected countries do not want to strengthen transnational cooperation in energy sector, but rather tend to implement their own protective measures. Energiewende also affects EU electricity market: the cheaper German electricity results in exports gain and affects electricity spot prices on the market. Moreover, the study shows increase of Germany's electricity in the share of other Member states electricity consumption: as for example, imports from Germany account for 20% of energy consumption of electricity in Netherlands Ibid. P. 176. . The overall trend in Europe is similar: one can notice that Germany's share in other countries energy systems increased from 1990 to 2015 considerably, including Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, and Denmark. Considering the given data, we can assume that German has not only institutional, but also infrastructural and economic influence on other EU member states Ibid. P. 177. . As long as Germany remains the first electricity producer in Europe and has links with other countries electricity grid, the changes of its own energy mix will affect the other Member states directly.

Obviously, Germany cannot develop energy transition on its own because the country is still dependent on the energy imports from other countries and common EU electricity infrastructure. Considering these facts, we can assume that German energy agenda in its foreign relations will be strengthening throughout the time. Besides economic and political gains from bi- and multilateral cooperation project, Germany, if it is interested in more clear energy and ecologic situation both in Europe and the world, still needs to promote such approach to EU states and other countries. In addition to that, Germany increases its political influence on the world decision-making part from being actively involved in the green and environmentalist issues, as the popularity of these topics is constantly growing. Taking that into consideration, Germany can also profit from being a renewable energy pioneer because it ultimately increases its soft power and image of country that takes care of nature.

3.3 International dimension

Since the 1990s Germany has took active part in international organizations, events, and negotiations on agreements regarding global warming, emissions, and renewable energy. It is necessary to cover Germany's involvement on global warming mitigation on the international level, since such participation widens political potential for further cooperation with countries apart from European Union.

First, Germany was strongly involved in negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1994. The goal of Convention was reduction of carbon emission, but it does not specify any legal instruments or targets to achieve - they were discussed and negotiated during conferences of the Convention member states. The first conference took place in Berlin in 1995. During this conference, the parties agreed on the “Berlin Mandate” were achieved - an arrangement to further discuss measure to curb emission in industrialized countries Sprinz D. F. Germany's International Environmental Policy // Germany's Uncertain Power. Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic / Ed. H. E. Maull. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. P. 216. . This led to negotiations in Kyoto in 1997, during which the concrete targets for emission reduction in period of 2008-2012 were first introduced. They were embodied in Kyoto Protocol, which made these targets legally binding for those who ratified Protocol. For example, 15 Member States of EU were obliged to reduce their emission by 8% in comparison to 1990 during 2008-2012 Kyoto Protocol to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations, 1998. Retrieved from: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. Interestingly, even during the last decade of 20^th century Germany was in favor of even larger reductions - during preparations to Kyoto negotiations, German representatives in EU offered 15-20% of CO2 emissions reduction for European Member States from 1990-2010 Sprinz D. F. Op. Cit. P. 217. . In 1995 Germany announced its will to decrease CO2 emissions by 25% in comparison to 1990 level until 2005 Sprinz D. F. Op. Cit.. However, German industry agreed to curb energy related emissions by 20% till 2005 Ibid.. In 2001, at the moment, when the Marrakech Accords on Kyoto Protocol implementation were signed, Germany announced even greater reduction - by 35% until 2012 Ibid.. Talking about the Kyoto Protocol, the reduction of emission was not distributed equally among the member states - Germany, for instance, had to reduce its emissions by 21% according to the Protocol, which accounted for 80% of overall EU reduction Ibid. P. 219. .

The 2015 Paris Agreement reflected the continuous commitment of Germany to adhere to its green policy. Before the beginning of conference, Germany's representatives had specific position, which needs to be outlined in this paper. First, during G7 meeting in Germany in June 2015 G7 countries published a common statement, in which they supported further decarbonization and supported a 40-70% decrease in emissions by 2050, which was summarized by Angela Merkel again in her conclusive speech Germany to push environmental agenda at G7 summit // Deutsche Welle, 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-push-environmental-agenda-at-g7-summit/a-18494867. Before signing of agreement Angela Merkel also insisted, that responsibility for mitigation of global warming lies both on industrialized and emerging countries, which also should take more active role in emission decrease. But despite this, the responsibility of each country should be viewed separately, depending on its economical capabilities, as Karsten Sach, a leader of German delegation on the conference, stated. In addition to that, German politician declared the necessity of creation of transparent climate review and measuring mechanism Appun K, Controversial climate summit issues - positions in Germany // Clean Energy Wire, 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/controversial-climate-summit-issues-positions-germany. German representatives, including BMU Minister Barbara Hendricks, supported the further development of nationally determined contributions assessment mechanism and emphasized the need to increase the emission reduction targets, which states put in their contributions Ibid.. Barbara Hendriks also mentioned, that long term goals should be embodied in the Agreement, including limitation of global warming to 2° Celsius and other ambitious commitments, as goal for creation of carbon-zero economy Appun K. Controversial… .

As the Agreement was finally adopted in the end of 2015, negotiating parties mostly came to following terms. The long term goal of limiting the global warming to the 1.5° Celsius was embodied in the past, but no concrete measures were mentioned, excluding “balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” Appun K. Paris Climate deal - does Germany get what it hoped for? // Clean Energy Wire, 2015. Retrieved from: https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/paris-draft-climate-deal-does-germany-get-what-it-hoped. Thus, German willingness to bring in further operationalization of this process was not fulfilled Ibid. . However, an obvious progress towards better transparency, accountability and reporting was achieved. The parties of Paris Agreement, according to Article 4, need to present their nationally determined contribution every 5 years (the mechanism of Intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) was first introduced at Warsaw Conference in 2013, and as INDC were evaluated in the 2015 Report, it was stated, that they are insufficient to mitigate global warming). The first NDCs, as it is obvious, are due to be published in 2020. Article 4 also mentions that the further NDCs should depict progression in national targets on emission reduction, which was largely supposed by German representatives Ibid.. In addition to NDC system, a transparency and Measuring, reporting and verification system was introduced in Article 13 of Agreement. According to that, all parties are obliged to report on the fulfillment of targets, written in their NDCs Paris Agreement. United Nations, 2015. Retrieved from: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf. The reporting system, however, is very flexible and puts different countries in different conditions, depending on their economic conditions. As Barbara Hendriks stated: “China and Germany have to report more intensively than Tuvalu” Bid.. Thus, we can claim, that most of Germany's vision was included in Paris Agreement. The increased decarbonization plays into Germany's hands: it positions itself as green energy pioneer not only within the EU, but also worldwide, which can positively affect German renewable energy industry. When other countries will face the need of further decrease of CO2 emissions, they will need to develop their renewable energy infrastructure as well, for which Germany can offer its assistance. Considering this, the further mitigation of CO2 emissions is very profitable for Germany's position at the international level.

Besides involvement in international agreements and intergovernmental negotiations held by the United Nations, Germany is also an active member of international organizations dealing with green energy. Moreover, Germany has been trying to become an international renewable energy agenda-trendsetter. First step on this path was International Conference for Renewable Energy in Bohn in 2004, which was organized by German government Steinbacher K. Exporting… P. 151.. During that conference, the first measures for institutionalization of renewable energy promotion were taken. 154 participant countries signed the Political Declaration, which paved the way towards further cooperation in increasing renewable energy capacity. According to the Declaration, the signees agreed on the increase of renewable financing and adopted action program for renewable projects, which included around 165 different projects by various countries. Germany pledged 500 million Euro credit volume for financing these projects; previously, the German government already pledged 1 million Euro to increase of renewables' capacity Ibid. P. 152..

In addition to that, German government during the Bohn conference also initiated creation of Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) Ibid. . REN21 is often described as a “community” or “network” that facilitates renewable energy cooperation, experience exchange and dialogue with addition of creating energy reports and organizing International Renewable Energy Conference. Besides of REN21, Germany is actively involved in International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which office is in the UAE. The creation of such agency was part of the coalition agreement between Christian Democratic Union, Christian Social Union, and Social Democratic Party in 2005, when the parties agreed to continue international promotion of renewable energy and initiate creation of this organization Gemeinsam fьr Deutschland - mit Mut und Menschlichkeit Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 2005. Retrieved from: https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=16f196dd-0298-d416-0acb-954d2a6a9d8d&groupId=252038 IRENA: promoting renewable energy worldwide. Retrieved from: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/energie/irena-gruendung-node . Moreover, the IRENA's Innovation and Technology Centre, created in 2011, is located in Bonn is supported by German government Ibid. .

Germany has been trying not only to promote renewable energy, but also to facilitate its own promotion scheme, used domestically in Energiewende, or the feed-in tariff, which was examined by us in the previous chapter. To achieve that, Germany together with Spain and later Slovenia established the International Feed-In Cooperation (IFIC). According to the Initiative's declaration, the main target was to promote the feed-in tariffs to third parties, harmonize the legislation between Cooperation members and improve effectiveness of such policy Steinbacher K. Exporting... P. 155. . IFIC activities, however, were mostly limited to workshops, the 10^th and the last of them was held in 2013 Ibid.. Overall, we can assume that organization did not show any effectiveness. Interestingly, the study claims, that IFIC can be observed as opposition to European Commission skepticism towards feed-in scheme and thus was created as an alternative way to facilitate its adoption on both European and international levels Ibid. P. 156. .

Thus, we can point out, that Germany is mostly successful in multilateral leadership on the renewable energy agenda, but not without its flaws. On the one hand, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement results mostly match with German interests and German representatives had much influence on decision-making process in the UN structures. But despite this, Germany's own multilateral initiatives have not been that successful and often fail to set the agenda or institutionalize the international environment. German bilateral contacts, however, do not follow the same trend.

3.4 Сase of Morocco-German energy partnership

Energy partnerships and dialogues are the core of German green energy politics. Basically, energy partnership in this context means both political, economic, and technical cooperation, based on the governmental agreement. Germany provides political expertise on energy system reformation, adoption of laws promoting green energy sources, while German institutes also offer economic aid and provide German specialist to assist on the ground. Germany had partnerships with 19 different countries around the globe as of 2018. As we cannot examine all the partnerships, we will take a closer look on of them, the Morocco-German partnership. The Morocco-German case was chosen, because it is one of the broadest and deepest cases of German energy cooperation with the 3^rd states and because the dynamics of common work are quite interesting. First, we should consider, that German-Morocco energy cooperation has a long story - although the energy partnership agreement was officially signed in 2012, the first contacts concerning energy were made during the 80s, and later German technicians were helping Morocco government to reform its energy system Steinbacher K. Drawing Lessons When Objectives Differ? Assessing Renewable Energy Policy Transfer from Germany to Morocco // Politics and Governance, 2015. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 35. . Besides of it, the scale and level of contacts are also very noticeable - KfW development bank, as of 2019, allocated around 1.3 billion Euro in form of loan for establishment of renewable infrastructure (829 Million Euro Projectinformation Ouarzazate - Marokko // Kfw Entwicklungsbank. Retrieved from: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Entwicklungsfinanzierung/L%C3%A4nder-und-Programme/Nordafrika-Nahost/Projektinformation_Marokko_NOORo-I-IV_2018.pdf were given to Noor concentrated photovoltaic plant and issued approximately 200 million Euro Projectinformation Wind - Marokko. Kfw Entwicklungsbank. Retrieved from: https://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/PDF/Entwicklungsfinanzierung/L%C3%A4nder-und-Programme/Nordafrika-Nahost/2019_Projektinformation-Wind-Marokko_DE.pdf for increasing capacity of Moroccan wind energy park) Deutschland und Marokko unterzeichnen “Reformpartnerschaft” // Maghreb Post, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.maghreb-post.de/wirtschaft/marokko-deutschland-und-marokko-unterzeichnen-reformpartnerschaft/. In terms of energy, approximately 650 MW of wind energy and 1500 MW of solar energy are financed by Germany Deutschland und Marokko unterzeichnen “Reformpartnerschaft” // Maghreb Post, 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.maghreb-post.de/wirtschaft/marokko-deutschland-und-marokko-unterzeichnen-reformpartnerschaft/. The cooperation is also well organized and active: the coordination of German-Morocco partnership is held by the Secretariat, located in the Ministry of Energy Mines and Sustainable Development of Morocco in Rabat Jahresbericht Energiepartnerschaften Und Energiedialoge // Bundesministerium fьr Wirtschaft und Energie, 2018. P. 27. . The common work is being controlled by a high-level committee, which consists of government representatives and organizes the work of two work groups: for Development cooperation and low-emission strategies through energy projects and for Cooperation in energy policy and support for investment and research projects Deutsch-Marokkanische Energiepartnerschaft. Retireved from: https://www.energypartnership.ma/fileadmin/user_upload/morocco/media_elements/Factsheet_MAR_deu.pdf. To understand the nature of German-Morocco partnership, the energy situation in Morocco should be considered: country faces enormous energy import dependency. Dependency on net energy import reached the level of 93% in 2010 Steinbacher K. Drawing… P. 39. Thus, by increasing renewable capacity Moroccan government seeks for energy independence in the first place. The Moroccan government also considers the social importance of renewable industry by creating new jobs Ibid. P. 40. . The paper, however, also outlines some key differences between German Energiewende and Moroccan case: first, Morocco did not need any nuclear exit; the climate protection also did not play any significant role and the overall project was mostly top-down implemented, while Germany used more decentralized approach Ibid. P. 42.. The differences did not harm German influence, though: according to the interviews, which author conducted with participants of the partnership, notice considerable German interference in decision-making process. Interestingly, interviewed mention, that such influence has its roots in success of German domestic energy transit: German experts were relied and trusted because German model and expertise proved to have impressive results at home Ibid.. In addition to that, German implementation agencies, such as GIZ, proved to have close ties with local authorities, which also significantly helped to establish contact Steinbacher K. Drawing… P. 43.. We should also note that Morocco developed new energy strategy in 2008 due to rise of fossil fuel price. As a result, adopted energy strategy included increase of renewable share in primary energy consumption from 5% in 2009 to 20% in 2030 Ibid. P. 39.. The Moroccan government also launched Moroccan solar plan in 2009 and Integrated Program for Wind Energy in 2010, aimed at expanding capacity of solar and wind energy to 2000 MW for both till 2020 Ibid. . To achieve these targets, private investors could take part in development, and power purchasing agreements via tenders are allocated by government Ibid.. German research institutes conducted studies prior to adoption of this strategy, concluding that a balanced fossil-renewable power mix with increased share of wind and solar energy, especially concentrated solar energy, is most suitable for Morocco Ibid. P. 43.. Interestingly, the studies provided 4 different scenarios, but the increased share of renewables was presented as the best solution Ibid. . The scenario was presented to country's energy authority and then transmitted to King Mohammed VI, who supported this solution Ibid. . German specialist argued that such strategy would be the most beneficial one, as it has preferable cost-benefit radio and creates new jobs Ibid. . In addition to that, as the study argues, Germans also influenced the usage of concentrated solar energy amongst the other solar technologies, as they stated, that Germans would willingly invest in this technology Ibid. P. 44.. Other interviewed also noticed strong influence of German experts in support of small residential photovoltaics projects, which were first denied by Moroccan side, but approved later Ibid. . The impressive power of German side was noted in overall agenda-setting process. However, despite such successes in policy transit, German side failed to promote feed-in tariffs to Morocco, as its official argued, that such policy did not suit Morocco. The Moroccan side insisted that there were no prospects for feed-in system. The renewable industry did not exist in this country, thus it could not be benefited by such policy; the electricity prices were subsequently increase, which was not suitable for local electricity companies; finally, the opposition of World Bank towards feed-in scheme was also important - its rejection of feed-in policy should be outlined especially, as World Bank also had massive investments in the Moroccan energy industry Steinbacher K. Drawing…. The last reason is the most interesting - it proves, that German renewable energy promotion scheme was refused by many significant actors, including European Commission and World Bank, which puts leading ambitions of Germany in uncertain position. Interestingly, feed-in policy was also rejected by South African and California in their partnerships with Germany. This proves that despite the serious influence that Germany has in the renewable energy field it cannot fulfil all its targets and exercise undisputed leadership.

Summarizing our findings from this chapter, we can notice, that overall Germany has a consistent and diversified renewable energy foreign policy, which is realized through a network of governmental institutions. The financing of international renewable energy projects is also considerably high. Germany currently spends around 3.5 billion Euro to promote energy transit around the world in the form of loans and investment on various projects and the increase of environmentalist budget by 500 Million Euro in 2020 also widens German possibilities. Most of the German projects are aimed at developing countries (Africa, for instance) and consist of both technological and institutional cooperation. By showing its commitment to limitation of CO2 emissions in international conferences and the Paris Agreement Germany claims its leading position in energy transit and actively shapes international rules on this subject: by promotion of setting long-term goals for CO2 emissions mitigation, Germany changes the rules of the game worldwide. Other countries face the need to increase their renewable energy share, a process in which Germany consistently wants to assist by providing institutional and technical expertise and economic aid. Thus, it creates a network of partner countries, which relies on German reputation as pioneer of energy transit. However, despite the fact, that German possibilities are indeed impressive, they are not endless: Germany often faces opposition at the European and international levels. When in 2007 Germany managed to influence the adaption of 20-20-20 goal, the 2013-2014 negotiations about further EU 2030 energy framework proved, that most European Member States showed skepticism about further increase in renewables share, as it takes more investment in green energy capacity and makes the country's electricity grid more unstable. However, the initial goal of 27% share was finally increased to 32%, which was still seen as insufficient by German institutions. We also need to mention Germany willingness to boost the EU regional energy partnership, especially in case of the Nord Sea Cooperation, of which Germany takes presidency this year. Many researchers expect, that while Germany also obtains the presidency over EU Council this year, it will try to increase the Nord Sea cooperation. Anyway, German energy transit, because of overall German electricity capacity and allocation in geographical center of Europe and thus - high interconnectedness of German electricity grid with other Members ones. Thus, while Germany increases its renewable capacity, which makes electricity production more unstable, it also shapes the EU electricity market by selling cheap electricity excesses to its neighbors or buying electricity from them, when production is low. Considering this, one could say, that German energy transit has spill-over effect on the overall EU energy situation. In addition to that, Germany still manages to remain energy transit champion of the world: despite opposition of European Commission towards feed-in tariff and rejection of this scheme on the supranational European level, all EU Member States still adopted some forms of feed-in tariffs; Germany manages to influence decision-making process during COP conferences, including 2015 Paris Conference, relatively unsuccessful concerning its own international organizations, while bilateral partnerships have been quite efficient in expanding German influence in renewable energy promotion. Interestingly, most of these accomplishments rely on the success of domestic energy transit - that is what made Germany renewable energy pioneer and increased its international capacities. Thus, Germany can be observed as agenda-setter and influential leader of international energy, which fits well to soft power paradigm. Moreover, the economical part is also necessary: green investment and promotion of German energy technology exporters also adds some economic leverages in German foreign policy. With addition of the fact, that Germany manages to influence EU legislation and decisions of UN institutions, which are obligatory for its members, one could also claim, that Germany obtains some hard power possibilities too. However, they are mostly limited in contrast to possibility of influencing and setting the agenda, which play the dominant role in Germany's strategy.

Conclusion

Examining the domestic and foreign German energy transit process with theoretical framework of smart power, the following conclusions can be made.

First, the green energy policies of Germany on the international levels are heavily influenced by domestic politics. The initial process of energy transit in Germany was launched by German domestic climate protection organizations, parties and social unrest towards CO2 emissions and dangers of nuclear power. Thus, climate issues and energy transit soon became a mainstream in Germany's political agenda and no political force could avoid addressing it, which made the work on renewable energy legislation more intense and led to success of domestic renewable energy policies and increase in the renewable energy share. Because of that, Germany was also perceived as one of the most successful European countries in the field of renewable energy. In addition to that, strong domestic lobby made it impossible not to show its green energy commitment at the European and international levels.

At the European level, due to this strong influential leadership position, German feed-in tariff policy was adopted by most of the European member states despite the European Commission's opposition to this scheme at the supranational level. Germany's leadership was later confirmed by the success of German sharpening of the EU 2020 energy Framework and then - the EU 2030 energy Framework, as well as through influence over decision-making process during international conferences, such as Kyoto Protocol or Paris agreement and increasing number of bilateral partnerships, in which Germany often manages to initiate agenda setting and policy transit to the recipient partner country. However, sometimes Germany fails to attest to its influential leader position, as it was in the case of failure in promoting feed-in tariff scheme to the EU institutions. Germany came across opposition of the European Commission, which did not let Germany to transit its energy promotion policies on supranational level. Moreover, Germany also could not resist European Commission lobbying of EU ETS, as most of the EU member states were in favor of such mechanism. Nonetheless, Germany was able to put veto on adoption of the competing TGC system at the supranational level. In contrast, Germany's reputation in renewable energy area was crucial for adoption of the national feed-in schemes by other EU member states, without supranational interference. Moreover, the German veto on TGC made it possible for European countries to make their own choices, which in fact was positive for Germany. In addition to that, despite the growing skepticism towards increase in the share of renewables in the new EU 2030 energy framework, Germany still can profit from that situation. Disruption of supranational institution such as the European Commission on decision-making process (meaning that the European Commission loses its influence over this process with the consequent transfer of influence to the European Council and on the level of bilateral relations between states) consequently increases intergovernmental relations. Considering this it is possible to assume, that Germany will take a more advantageous position in bilateral negotiations between countries because of the scale of its economy, electricity grid interconnectedness, the first place among EU states in electricity production and successful RES promotion. Apparently, it increases German influence on decision-making process

At the international level Germany also has some successes and flaws. Examining its position in UN institutions it is noticeable that Germany was able to influence the decisions of such institutions and set the international agenda. Both the Kyoto Protocols and the Paris Agreement were aimed to mitigate CO2 emissions and thus to increase the share of renewable energy sources. This outcome plays into Germany's hands, as other countries are obliged to implement decisions, which leads to the rise of RES share. Consequently, it also increases Germany's possibility for cooperation in renewable area with 3^rd countries. However, Germany's own attempts to create its own international organizations or promote the feed-in scheme worldwide have failed. Considering this, it possible to notice, that German capacities for trend- and agenda-setting, despite being very ambitious, are not endless.

Bilateral cooperation and energy partnerships proved to be quite remarkable in terms of policy transfer from Germany to 3^rd countries, as the case of Morocco-German energy partnership shows. German experts managed to induce Moroccan authorities to increase renewable energy share and were also successful in promotion of concrete technologies, policies and offered a large amount of economic aid, which convinced Morocco to continue this partnership. However, it is necessary to notice, that Moroccan energy strategy has had its domestic premises, and the decision to increase RES share cannot be attributed to Germany's influence alone. Moreover, Germany failed again to introduce feed-in tariffs, which were seen as incompatible by the Moroccan side. In addition to that, Germany once again faced opposition from supranational institutions. The World Bank was not in favor of feed-in scheme and as it also financed some of Moroccan energy projects, Morocco choose not to go against it. Overall, Germany can be called a strong soft-power environmentalist actor, as it is able to influence policies of single states and international organizations despite some of its failures. The collaborative mechanism (bilateral cooperation and energy partnerships) itself is typical for Germany's partnerships in the green policy field. Moreover, Germany failed to introduce feed-in tariffs not only in Morocco but also, for instance, in South Africa.