Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: Internal aspects (1953-1986)

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Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: Internal aspects (1953-1986)

S. Merl, Stephan Merl, Dsc (History), Professor, Bielefeld University

Abstract

The author focuses on internal aspects to answer the question why the complex mechanization of agriculture under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed. The author argues that the command economy did not solve the basic task of ensuring animal production by large farms, because the high-quality equipment to reduce labor input and costs was not provided. Behind the facade of impressing reforms - from the virgin-land program and liquidation of the machine-tractor stations (MTS) to Brezhnev's 1966 promise to speed up mechanization and the Non-Black-Earth program of 1974 - nothing really changed. The basic deficiencies named in 1955 still existed in 1969 and after the establishment of the Gosagroprom in 1986: nearly all Soviet machinery was not reliable and was badly done.

Thus, the increase in the production of such machinery under Brezhnev was only a waste of resources. Less than 10% of Soviet machines met the world standards. Instead of increasing labor productivity, this machinery caused the farms (and the state) enormous losses. Due to the gaps in mechanization (primarily in transportation and collecting feed) the majority of the agricultural workforce (70% in 1982) was still engaged in manual work. In the late 1960s, the Ministry of Agriculture made alarming reports on the state of the USSR's agriculture to the CC and CM and demanded - again in vain - urgent action and investment to modernize the agricultural machinery industry in order to ensure the world-standard inputs by 1975. The article considers challenges of developing animal husbandry, consequences of such campaigns as the virgin-land program, conversion of collective farms into state farms and liquidation of the MTS, successes and failures of the mass production of highly efficient machinery, proposed alternatives of organizing agricultural work and payment, and the state of agriculture in 1955, 1969 and 1986.

Key words: agricultural modernization, complex mechanization, agricultural machinery industry, efficiency of agrarian production, agricultural labor productivity, socialist competition, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Khudenko.

Аннотация

Штефан Мерль, доктор исторических наук, профессор Билефельдского университета. В статье представлены результаты поисков ответа на вопрос, почему при Хрущеве и Брежневе Советский Союз не смог провести комплексную механизацию сельского хозяйства, но, в отличие предыдущей публикации, акцент сделан на внутренних проблемах страны. Автор полагает, что командно-административная система не смогла решить основную для сельского хозяйства задачу - обеспечить развитие животноводства на базе крупных сельскохозяйственных предприятий, и главной причиной было отсутствие высококачественного оборудования, которое бы позволило снизить трудовые затраты и издержки производства.

За впечатляющим фасадом якобы великих реформ (освоение целинных земель, ликвидация машинно-тракторных станций, обещание Брежнева в 1966 году ускорить механизацию и программа 1974 года по развитию Нечерноземья), по сути, ничего не менялось. Ключевые недостатки сельскохозяйственного машиностроения, озвученные еще в 1955 году, не были устранены ни в 1969 году, ни после создания Госагропрома в 1986 году: практически вся сельскохозяйственная техника была плохо сделана и ненадежна, а потому наращивание масштабов ее производства при Брежнева было бессмысленной тратой ресурсов (уже тогда менее 10% техники соответствовали мировым стандартам последнего десятилетия). Вместо того, чтобы увеличивать производительность труда, сельскохозяйственная техника приносила хозяйствам (и государству) огромные убытки.

Провалы механизации (в первую очередь, отсутствие транспорта и техники для сбора кормов) приводили к тому, что большинство работников сельского хозяйства (70% в 1982 году) все еще занимались ручным трудом. В конце 1960-х годов министерство сельского хозяйства направляло в Центральный комитет и Совет министров панические отчеты о состоянии сельского хозяйства, безрезультатно требуя срочных мер и инвестиций в модернизацию сельскохозяйственного машиностроения, чтобы обеспечить соответствие техники мировым стандартам к 1975 году. В статье описаны проблемы в развитии животноводства, последствия таких государственных кампаний, как освоение целинных земель, превращение колхозов в совхозы и ликвидация МТС, предлагаемые варианты организации труда и его оплаты в сельском хозяйстве, а также состояние сельского хозяйства в 1955, 1969 и 1986 годы.

Ключевые слова: сельскохозяйственная модернизация, комплексная механизация, сельскохозяйственное машиностроение, эффективность сельскохозяйственного производства, производительность сельскохозяйственного труда, социалистическое соревнование, Хрущев, Брежнев, Худенко

virgin-land machinery state farm

The article provides archival evidence to the argument that the Soviet complex mechanization after 1953 was a failure (Merl, 2020a) focusing on its internal aspects rather than external factors (Merl, 2020b). To understand this failure, it is necessary to consider the key

challenges of agriculture after Stalin: the need to improve the quality of industrial inputs in agriculture and to develop animal production (underdeveloped and concentrated in private plots) at the large farms. Thus, the article questions the consequences of the political campaigns to `reform' and `modernize' agriculture started by Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

The article presents and discusses the data of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture on the state of the Soviet agriculture, often in comparison to Western countries, and on its shortcomings and malfunctions. Some of such reports were prepared on request `from above'. Many documents contain proposals on what should urgently be done to overcome the known shortcomings and complains about the governing bodies not executing the CC and CM orders. The Ministry was not allowed to blame the economic system and decision making for the defects. The striking finding is that the basic deficiencies named by the Ministry in 1955 and in the late 1960s were the same the Gosagroprom mentioned in 1986. Thus, the governing bodies either did not care or could not overcome the known bottlenecks, which caused severe damages to farms and in the end to the state: unreliable, badly done and often defective machinery, lack of high-quality machinery for producing and collecting feed, lack of transport at the farms, lack of materials for constructing barns, stores and stables, excessive fuel consumption by the outdated tractors, excessive need for repair and spare parts, and the extreme turnover of drivers and other specialists for the mechanized agriculture.

The aim to develop animal production at large farms required to significantly increase and mechanize feed production and to provide a lot of agricultural machinery and equipment not produced in the USSR. The first part of the article considers the corresponding issues to understand whether the state provided the necessary support to farms with the required investment. The second part analyzes the meaning of the virgin-land program for agriculture in the short and long run: reduction of the available machinery in the previously main agricultural regions in the mid-1950s, and the start of the permanent redistribution of agricultural machinery, transport and drivers between regions during harvest campaigns. Considering the corn-campaign failure as the necessary new machinery was not provided, the third part focuses on the production of efficient machinery and reasons why its mass production never started or was delayed.

The fourth part examines reasons for the failure of the planned relocation of the agricultural research, training and ministries from the `asphalt' to the state farms in the countryside. The fifth part considers the consequences of the fact that the farms had only defective, not reliable working machines and lacked special machinery and transport. This part mentions harvest losses and fatal accidents, and asks why the industry was not to compensate the farms for the losses caused by the defective machinery. The sixth part considers the reasons for blaming farms for the deficiencies of mechanization and for widening the `socialist competition' awarding increasingly more agricultural workers with honorary titles and money prizes. The seventh part focuses on the alternatives of work organization and payment discussed in the 1960s to increase the efficiency of labor and machinery. The eighth part presents the alarming reports of the Ministry of Agriculture to the CC and the SM from 1969 to 1971, and the measures the Ministry required to improve the quality of industrial inputs in agriculture by 1975 up to the world standard. The concluding part presents the defects of the complex mechanization as stated by the Gosagroprom in 1986.

The mid 1950s: animal husbandry at large farms and the lack of state support

Mechanization under Stalin focused on crop production and the use of harvest. Agricultural machinery factories produced mainly tractors, combine harvesters and machinery for field work. The most labor-intensive parts of farming, especially animal husbandry, root cropping and vegetable production were widely provided not by collective or state farms but rather by private plots (Merl, 2020a). Therefore, in 1953, the introduction of animal husbandry at large farms had to start from nothing and became a great challenge: most farms lacked the necessary buildings - stables and feed storage barns, machinery to produce feed and transport to collect it from fields, technology for the labor-intensive animal production - milking implements, technology for feeding, dung collection and watering. Many farms still waited to be electrified, which is a precondition for the large-scale animal production.

Let us consider first the machinery that in the 1950s the Ministry of Agriculture demanded to produce for animal husbandry and whether farms had the investments the governing bodies expected. The desired result - reduction of labor input and costs of animal production - depended primarily on the complex mechanization which did not get the necessary state support. I will discuss reasons for the failure in transforming weak collective farms into state farms, the consequences of the state purchasing prices being lower animal production costs, and the development of the collective farms' financial situation after the elimination of the MTS.

The CC Plenum in September 1953 stated that there were no machinery systems for complex mechanization. At the beginning of 1955, Matskevich complained to the CM that only 5,600 of the ordered 20,000 silage harvesters were delivered to the farms. Trucks needed to collect the silage - a precondition for harvesting mechanization - were not provided RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7757. L. 75-78.. In the summer of 1955, he reported to Khrushchev (and also Saburov and Bulganin) that many Soviet agricultural machines had construction or production defects. The MTS lacked nearly all types of machinery: for feed - including corn production, transportation, lifting implements, for working between the lines, and efficient corn harvesters RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7709. L. 171-172..

Keeping the collective and state farms' livestock in winter was a permanent challenge due to the lack and low quality of fodder. Every winter animals died due to poor feeding. Many collective farms did not harvest enough fodder, often the straw was not collected from the fields RGAE. F. 7486. D. 6864. L. 53-56, 74-92; D. 7970. L. 203-216, 225-228; D. 8169. L. 20-21.. On January 25, 1955, the board discussed the lack of machinery to produce hay and to mechanize the labor-intensive animal production RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7377. L. 1-15.. Mechanization of watering for the cattle suffered from the lack of pipes RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8704. L. 110-111..

On May 6, 1955, Matskevich reported to Khrushchev and Bulganin that the collective farms in their (ordered from above) planning to increase livestock production often forgot about fodder. There were no cultivators or corn harvesters to develop corn production, while the manual harvesting reduced yields significantly. The new combine harvester constructed by Emelyanov would harvest 80% of corn which could be made silage instantly. Matskevich requested optimistically that the Rostov factory would start its production in June 1955. As the farms were in great need for transport during the corn harvest, the Gosplan should be instructed to provide in the summer of 1955 50,000 trucks to the MTS per month, and the building industry was to construct storages for silage RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7708. L. 252-268.. None of these requests was executed. On October 21, 1955, Matskevich complained that the Gosekonomkomissiya's (GEK) plan for 1956 did not include the Ministry's requests. There were no grain, corn and silage combine harvesters. Providing only 16,000 corn harvesters would bring the level of the corn harvest mechanization only to 11% RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7710. L. 100-110, 119-133.. Instead of ordering to construct a special factory for feed-production machinery, the GEK instructed the aviation industry to produce silage harvesters RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8003. L. 68-75.. On September 6, 1956, Volchenko reported that due to the lack of metal the industry reduced the production of deficit agricultural machines (such as corn silage harvesters) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8003. L. 292-332..

The clearest consequences of the state's lack of support for introducing animal production at large farms were the severe problems the new state farms faced, when they were created from several small `economically weak' collective farms. This conversion started in 1954 30 and was based on the ideological expectation that state farms as the `higher form of property' would radically change the economic production. However, on February 7, 1958, Volchenko reported to the Gosplan about the alarming results: while the average milk yield per cow at collective farms grew from 1956 to 1957 by 15% (1858 liters), it fell at state farms (from 2413 to 2358 liters) due to the conversion. The state farms failed to implement their plan of harvesting and delivering agricultural products to the state - they produced only 58% of the required hay and silage, and taking a lot of livestock and poultry from collective farms became a great challenge for the new state farms. The losses of livestock during winter due to poor feeding and costs of animal husbandry increased RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8314. L. 125-168..

In the late 1960s, most state farms made of weak collective farms were in a desperate situation. They urgently needed investments in the construction of such buildings as stables and barns, but the Gosplan refused to provide the necessary means. On August 12, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky informed the CC that the planned reduction of the budget for construction would primarily affect the 5,600 state farms poorly equipped with the means of production. Most of them lacked housing and farm buildings. Their economic results did not provide the necessary investment RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9127. L. 107-115.. On September 6, 1968, the board reviewed the situation of these state farms again. To help them work efficiently, it demanded to provide them with energetic, mineral-fertilizer and material-technical implements in priority order. The Gosplan should be instructed to provide additional investments RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9116. L. 300-306..

Chekmenev, the deputy Minister of Agriculture, informed the price commission of the CM Presidium that after the conversion of small collective farms into state farms the share of state farms working with losses increased in 1959. The state prices for meat, milk and wool did not cover production costs for the production was extremely labor-intensive and hardly mechanized. The yields were still low. The state farms' losses from the sales of meat and milk to the state increased from about 1 billion rubles in 1954 to more than 4 billion rubles in 1959 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8539. L. 181a-209.. An important reason for such losses was that state farms kept livestock as collective farms. Thus, they strongly suffered from the state-set purchase prices for animal products, which caused losses as the prices did not cover production costs. The slightly higher prices paid to collective farms did not cover their production costs either. On November 29, 1960, Matskevich demanded from the CM to increase the producer prices for animal products. As animal production was extremely labor intensive, the only way to cut costs was to use efficient machinery for collecting fodder and mechanizing animal production RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8540. L. 123-150.. Some of the needed machines were not produced by the Soviet industry.

Moreover, financially collective farms suffered from arbitrary actions of the local authorities. They wanted `illegal' deductions from the collective farms' money, as was the situation under Stalin, to finance local needs without the vote of the collective farm members' general assembly. This caused delays and debts in work payments of the collective farm members. On April 17, 1967, Matskevich informed the CC that collective farms had to pay the postmen, the construction of the rayon hospitals, sanatoriums, schools and local clubs, in the Odessa Region - an inter-farm cement factory, and in the Kherson Region - a medical institute RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 55-59.. On August 8, 1969, the CC forbade such `illegal deductions' from the collective and state farms' funds. On January 18, 1971, Matskevich reported (on the request) to the CC on fulfilling this order, but in some cases such `deductions' continued. The Gosbank did not control the use of the collective farms' finances, which opened the way for illegal deductions RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9274. L. 10-12; D. 9356. L. 18-27..

The financial mess with the collective farms under Khrushchev was aggravated by the state's strange fear that `collective farms would become rich'. Collective farms under Khrushchev were to ensure all their investments by `profits' from the sales of their production to the state. While the state purchase prices for crop production were quite sufficient after 1953, prices for animal products did not cover the production costs.

When expecting a good harvest in 1958, the governing bodies worried that collective farms would get too high profits due to the 1953-1955 increased producer prices. On August 25-26, 1958, the Ministry's board discussed the lowering of the purchase prices and ordered the republic ministries of agriculture to lower prices for grain, sun flowers, sugar beets and corn in the expected regional harvest, taking into account (sic!) the developing mechanization, improved farm machinery and increased labor productivity RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8297. L. 107-116..

When expecting a good harvest in 1960, the governing bodies again forcibly lowered the agricultural purchase prices. Some regions reacted reluctantly, but nobody dared to oppose Khrushchev openly. On May 21, 1960, Tasenev (the Kazakh CM) informed the USSR CM that although the money income of collective farms in 1959 exceeded that of the previous year, the payment to the farms' members decreased on the average by 17%. The indebtedness of collective farms was also determined by the purchase of the MTS machinery: they owed 0.8 billion rubles to their members for work RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8539. L. 131-131a.. Only Ukraine protested 32 and demanded to increase the state prices for grain by 10%: collective farms showed an increase in their indebtedness - only to their members they owed for work 6.8 billion rubles RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8539. L. 262-266, 270..

The governing bodies were much more concerned about the artificial losses of diary plants due to the state fixed prices than about the losses of collective and state dairy farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8185. L. 50-62.. In 1958, the enforced purchase of the partly defective MTS machinery at the prices of the new one dramatically worsened the financial situation of collective farms and their ability to pay their members for work and to purchase new equipment to raise the work efficiency. The Khrushchev's order demanded to provide money for the MTS machinery as soon as possible, which reflected his need to raise money for his space program and his belief that collective farms got `high' incomes from selling the 1958 harvest RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8297. L. 107-116..

On September 23, 1960, Chekmenev (the Gosplan) informed the CC Presidium Commission for prices that the liquidation of the MTS under the pressure to purchase their agricultural machinery, changes in the procurement system, and the new state purchase prices for agricultural products significantly worsened the collective farms' economic and financial situation. The producer prices for crop production in 1959 on the average covered 159% of the collective farms' costs, but the prices for animal products - only 80% (beef - 65%, pork - 70%, poultry - 66%, milk - 84%). Regional differences were drastic: the average prices for animal products in Ukraine covered 70% of the production costs, in Middle Asia and Estonia - from 125% to 141%. Costs of many collective farms were very high due to poor mechanization. Therefore, even production of potatoes and vegetables brought many collective farms losses. The permanent pressure on collective farms to sell more animal products to the state was increasing their losses. Due to poor mechanization, the labor inputs required for animal production was higher than at state farms. Collective farms were forced to sell animal products below their costs; thus, they lacked money to buy machinery to increase their production efficiency. The dramatic financial situation of collective farms, which deprived them of necessary investments, becomes evident from the state standard that 45% profitability was needed for accumulation of the state prescribed funds RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8540. L. 1-32.. Thus, the state paid for the collective farms' animal products hardly half of the price necessary for reproduction!

Chekmenev provided detailed information on the collective farms' financial situation in the late 1950s. In 1959, their incomes increased only by 5.4%, while expenditures for capital investment jumped from 23.9 billion rubles in 1958 to 48.5 billion rubles in 1959 due to the enforced purchase of the MTS machinery. These used machines became an additional burden for collective farms which had to cover the extremely high costs for maintaining this equipment. Many collective farms were forced to take long-term state credits, and in the early 1960, more than 10 billion rubles of credits were already overspent. The credit indebtedness of collective farms increased from 32.4 to 50.5 billion rubles in 1959. The average payment per a labor-day decreased in 1959. Under the uniform purchase prices for agricultural products introduced in 1958, the state paid on the average 10% to 15% less to farms, which determined their losses of 4 billion rubles in 1958 and of 9.1 billion rubles in 1959. In 1959, the award of 15% to 25% for selling milk to the state was eliminated. Farms had to spent more money on industrial inputs: tractors, trucks, cars and agricultural machinery's spare parts. Thus, the state increased its income by 4.1 billion rubles in 1959, and with the higher income tax got another 2 billion rubles from collective farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8540. L. 1-32.. The state's savings and additional incomes meant losses for collective farms - 4.2. billion rubles in 1958, 9.6 billion in 1959 and 10.5 billion in 1960. The total losses of collective farms in three years were 24.3 billion rubles - due to the increase in prices on spare parts - 4.1 billion rubles in 1959 and 1960, increase in the income tax - 2 billion rubles in 1959 and 1960, and the reduced producer prices - 4.2 billion rubles in 1958, 3.5 billion in 1959, and 4.4 billion in 1960 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8541. L. 214-307..

Collective farms' profitability varied by republic. Farms specializing in sun flowers, cotton, flax and, in some regions, grain were highly profitable, while animal husbandry and some other crops were unprofitable. On the average, collective farms reached profitability of only 9% (instead of 45% set as a standard), which meant that the average collective farm in the early 1960s could not accumulate resources. Chekmenev asked the CM to instruct the Gosplan and the Ministry of Finances to pay special attention to the significant differences in profitability of plant and animal production. Collective farms urgently needed incentives to produce more animal products. Due to the desperate financial situation of many collective farms, the Ministry of Agriculture demanded to reduce the input prices for tractors, cars/ trucks and agricultural machines' spare parts, because the set prices endangered the necessary repair work and prevented the farms' accumulation. Collective farms' incomes from animal products were to be exempt from the income tax RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8540. L. 1-32..

In their report to Khrushchev from December 24, 1960, `On urgent measures to increase the USSR agricultural production', Matskevich and others hinted at the desperate financial situation of collective farms. They demanded to increase the state purchase prices 34 for agricultural products and to reduce the prices of industrial inputs for farms. Collective farms were to be reimbursed for transport costs to deliver their products to the distant state procurement points. Matskevich and others required to increase the state capital investments in agriculture significantly compared to the draft plan, and a third of investments was to be used for constructions RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8541. L. 214-307.. In 1962, the Economic Commission of the Nationalities Council demanded to strengthen collective and state farms by lowering the prices for tractors, machinery and spare parts, and by reducing the income tax for collective farms selling animal products to the state RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8704. L. 20-34. .

In 1968, the `price scissors' - artificially low prices for animal products and comparably high prices for industrial inputs - attracted attention again. On July 4, 1969, Matskevich informed the CC that since 1962 the costs of animal products had increased significantly instead of falling (due to the failure of mechanization). The average profitability of animal production reached only 6% at collective and 4% at state farms. Therefore, the Ministry proposed to reorient the system for stimulating crop production to animal products and to introduce 25% surcharges for sales above the plan. The surcharge for milk and regionally for meat was to be increased RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9209. L. 130-187..

Thus, what the state demanded for developing the large-scale animal husbandry was a vicious circle. To reduce production costs, farms had to invest in the highly productive technology; however, farms lacked the means to afford investment due to the state prices on animal products; and even if farms would have earned the necessary money, they would not have bought the necessary effective equipment for the Soviet industry did not start to produce such. The Gosplan provided neither the necessary investment to construct new agricultural machinery factories for the large-scale animal husbandry nor the necessary building materials for farms. The governing bodies did not admit that to ensure animal production at large farms, they needed state support. The distrust to peasants and collective farms spread under Stalin persisted: the governing bodies feared that collective farms would become `rich' and were more concerned with hindering `individual profits' than with raising the farms efficiency.

Virgin-land campaign: the start of the permanent emergency mobilization

The transfer of machinery and drivers from the central regions to the virgin lands was first declared to be a temporary emergency measure. However, it became the most stable element of the USSR `socialist' agrarian policy after Stalin: machinery, especially combines, were moved to the east (sometimes to the south) within the annual `harvest help' campaigns. Trucks were moved between regions and ministries, and under Brezhnev in most regions - from cities to the countryside. Drivers (including soldiers) were moved between regions. Each September/October, students, mechanics and drivers from other economic branches were sent for `harvest help' in their region.

On December 28, 1953, the Ministry's board criticized Fedoseev for he delayed the sending of tractors from the 1953 fund to the virgin lands. He was made personally responsible for that all produced caterpillar tractors had been sent to Kazakhstan and Siberia since January 1, 1954. All other available material-technical supply had to be distributed in such a way that the virgin lands' needs were `fully' satisfied RGAE. F. 7486. D. 6864. L. 225-227.. Thus, the start of the virgin land campaign meant that other agricultural regions, especially the main black-earth areas, were deprived of new agricultural technology, although there was a shortage of tractors, combines and other machinery, and many machines were broken or outdated. In many regions, the number of tractors ready for work declined RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7710. L. 217-292; D. 7707. L. 298-229..

Ukraine particularly suffered from the primary delivery of new machinery to the virgin lands. On November 10, 1955, the Ukrainian CM informed the USSR CM that the required increase of sown area for industrial crops could not be achieved: MTSs and state farms lacked the necessary machinery. In 1954 and 1955, they got only 1,229 new tractors, while 1,440 existing tractors were broken. Many MTS did not have enough tractors to harvest the grain. No other agricultural work could be done during the harvest. The situation with combine harvesters in 1955 was catastrophic, but Ukraine still had to send combines as `harvest help' to the virgin lands. With the existing combines the 1955 harvest could not be collected in time. Many existing combines were produced from 1932 to 1935 and were totally outdated. The GEK did not take into account that each year about a half of the grain was harvested from the ground. In 1956, to harvest the grain as was ordered - in 10 days, 50,000 additional combines and trucks were needed RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8001. L. 10-21..

On November 29, 1955, Kuchumov, the deputy Minister of Agriculture, informed Saburov (the deputy CM) that in Ukraine and the North Caucasus the MTS suffered from a lack of combine harvesters. In 1956, the existing combines could harvest only 35% of the grain. The industry fell far behind the plan for producing combines. Therefore, Kuchumov asked the CM to provide Ukraine and the North Caucasus with 10,000 combines from the Ministry's fund for state farms. Benediktov agreed to waive of the allocation of combines in the first 36 half of 1956 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7710. L. 173-182.. On May 5, 1956, the Uzbek CM informed Matskevich of the lack of combine harvesters. The MTS could ensure harvesting of only 600,000 hectares, while the other 230,000 hectares of collective farms would be harvested by hand. In 1955, the harvesting of 285,000 hectares by hand delayed the harvest until November and caused huge losses RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8002. L. 237-240..

The Ukrainian situation with combine harvesters was still extremely tense in 1959. Kalchenko (the chairman of the Ukraine CM) addressed the USSR CM to inform that there were only 40,000 pulltype combine harvesters for the grain harvest, and they could be used only with DT-54 tractors. Collective and state farms asked for 12,600 tractors, but the Gosplan provided only 4,000, i.e., in South Ukraine, about 5,000 combine harvesters would not have traction power. In July 1958, Ukraine had to send 2,500 pull-type combine harvesters to Kazakhstan; however, instead of providing the requested 5,370 grain combine harvesters, the Gosplan provided only 390. For the 1959 harvest, there was an urgent need for 2,500 pull-type combine harvesters; for collecting silage - of 168,000 3-ton trucks but only 82,000 existed. In total, in 1959, agriculture needed at least 666,000 trucks - 497,000 of the Gigant type, while the Gosplan provided only 40% of the needed numbe RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8435. L. 277-310..

The regional `lending' of machinery and drivers started in the mid- 1950s. On August 6, 1956, Matskevich ordered (as the deputy chairman of the USSR CM) that right after harvesting in the south, all harvest machinery was to be transferred to Kazakhstan and Siberia, including swaths reapers and pick-up balers. Qualified accountants were to be send to the virgin lands too RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8003. L. 155-189. . 28,000 combine harvesters were transferred from the south to the virgin lands. 325,000 trucks (211,000 in the RSFSR, 77,300 in Kazakhstan, 24,600 in Ukraine) were sent to harvest from other branches of the economy RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8226. L. 103-111.. On March 8, 1957, Gureev, the deputy chairman of the Ukraine CM, protested against the order to send 8.400 drivers trained at the Ukrainian agricultural schools to Kazakhstan. Even if all these drivers would have stayed in Ukraine, their number would still fell far behind the needed RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8185. L. 44-46..

It became a permanent problem to get the transport and machinery lent to other regions back, and an even greater problem was to get them back in a working condition. On January 4, 1956, Benediktov, the Minister of State Farms, complained to the CM, that the Ministry of Agriculture did not return 2,269 of 9,000 combine harvesters provided by his Ministry to the southern agricultural regions on the order of the CC and CM from December 25, 1954 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8001. L. 3-4..

To ensure the 1958 spring sowing, the Kazakh CC and CM requested 50,000 tractor drivers from other republics. The RSFSR and Ukraine again protested in vain against the CM's order to send drivers to Kazakhstan RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8188. L. 167-169; D. 8314. L. 9-13.. It became quite usual to request additional machinery and drivers from other regions to harvest. Thus, in December 1959, Kunaev, the chairman of the Kazakh CM, asked Kosygin for additional combine harvesters and tractors together with additional drivers to speed up the i960 grain harvest RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8438. L. 190-194..

The need to move tractors, combine harvesters and drivers to the virgin lands did not disappear under Brezhnev. Agricultural regions never had enough agricultural machinery in working condition. On May 14, 1966, the Ministry's board decided to establish an operative team responsible for transferring trucks and combine harvesters during the harvest to the places where they were needed the most RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8947. L. 136-139.. For instance, on June 2, 1966, the Belgorod western region asked Polyansky for `harvest help'. On June 8, 1966, Matskevich ordered the Kazakh and RSFSR ministers of agriculture to send combine harvesters to Belgorod RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 1-3..

On June 14, 1966, Matskevich and Ezhevsky presented on the request the draft decree `Measures to secure the harvest and procurement of agricultural products in 1966' to the CC. Due to that year weather conditions, the time for harvesting was extremely short. However, the repair of tractors and machines was delayed as there were no needed spare parts. Grain combine harvesters should be delivered earlier than planned to the RSFSR and Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense was to provide 60,000 and the Ministry of Construction 20,000 trucks; 151,700 tires should be provided additionally RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 11-18.. On July 8, 1966, Matskevich and Ezhevsky proposed to the CC and CM a plan to provide agriculture with the necessary transport. In the east, they expected a good but late harvest, so the army was to send trucks to Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the south. Spare parts (tires) and fuel were to be supplied separately RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 33-41.. On July 9, 1966, the RSFSR CM informed the USSR CM that 50,000 army trucks with drivers and officers were additionally needed in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 109-118..

On September 19, 1968, Matskevich informed the CC that due to the problems with the 1968 harvest 32,500 trucks of the Ministry 38 of Defense were sent from Kazakhstan to other regions, especially Ukraine RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9127. L. 158-161.. On October 8, 1969, the CC and CM ordered to send 17,500 trucks from other branches of the economy to Ukraine. Even the local machinery taken into account, Ukraine still lacked the necessary 54,000-64,000 trucks RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9253. L. 352-369..

In the draft decree to the CM `On securing harvesting and procurement in 1970' from April 24, 1970, Matskevich, Ezhevsky and others again demanded to provide the machinery ahead of time, to provide additional funds and transportation for agricultural products, and to give credits to farms to pay for fuel and repair. If necessary, self-propelled combine harvesters would be sent from the south to the east4 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9332. L. 233-283..

On October 6, 1971, Matskevich informed the CC that the situation with trucks at collective and state farms was getting worse, because each year from 25% to 30% trucks were taken by the army to transport the harvest. The army returned these trucks without repair, and 22,000 of 30,000 trucks in 1970 were not returned. The loss of these new trucks became a special problem for farms - they were replaced by old trucks, which caused additional harvest losses. Mat- skevich asked the CC to order the Ministry of Defense to return the farms' trucks or to provide the same number of the army new trucks RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9357. L. 142-143.. As the situation was not resolved, on October 18, 1971, Matskevich addressed Brezhnev personally: the trucks not returned by the army caused extreme problems with transporting the harvested sugar beets - about 12.5 million tons of sugar beets could spoil on the fields. The CC and CM ordered to take 9,000 new trucks sent by the Kazakh army to Ukraine to harvest sugar beets until December 1. However, Grechko, the Minister of Defense, ordered to replace all 30,000 new trucks by the old ones. More than a half of these old trucks had technical defects and could not be used. Matskevich asked Brezhnev to instruct Grechko to send all army trucks to agriculture until December 1 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9357. L. 161-165.. On June 29, 1971, Matskevich, Ezhevsky and Florentiev, the RSFSR Minister of Agriculture, sent the CC on the request a draft decree regulating the increased supply of grain combine harvesters, trucks and drivers to the Urals, Siberia and the Kazakh virgin land - additional 4,000 combine harvesters were to be sent from the south to the Urals and Siberia. To overcome the lack of tractor and combine drivers at the Kazakh virgin land, 30,000 (instead of 5,000 set by the Gosplan) drivers were to be sent to Kazakhstan from other regions RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9357. L. 60-75..

While in the short political run it strengthened the Khrushchev's rule, the virgin land campaign become a nail in the coffin of the Soviet agriculture: this campaign started the permanent redistribution of scarce machinery, drivers and workforce between regions during the harvest - it was economically harmful for the central production areas which urgently needed the agricultural machinery that was sent to the virgin land. Thus, the virgin land campaign significantly reduced harvests in Ukraine in the mid-1950s. In the long run, such emergency measures as the redistribution of scarce machinery (combines and trucks), drivers and mechanics during the harvest became a permanent means of the state interference in the farms' economy and a factor of uncertainty (with the available resources) for the farms' leaders. Obezlicka spread as nobody really felt responsible for the machinery, and costs were never calculated.

Improved technology and the failure to start its mass production

The machinery produced until 1953 was outdated in the international perspective. Many agricultural machines were defective and poorly done. Most equipment needed for animal production and harvesting special crops was not produced in the USSR. There was a great need for the new, more effective and high-quality machinery, and in its mass production.

The Benediktov's draft decree (on the request of the CM) from December 28, 1954, `On the production of new tractors, agricultural machines and implements in 1955', demanded the production of 53 new types of such. Instead of assessing the need for the requested machinery, the Gosplan criticized the draft in its comment to Malyshev (the deputy chairman of the CM) for contradicting the CM's decree from June 11, 1948, because the draft was developed without consultations with the production ministries and with the technical council on mechanization and electrification. The ministries did not agree with the draft. The Gosplan asked the CM to order the Ministry of Agriculture to make a new draft based on the agreement with the industry RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7757. L. 70-72.. Thus, not the needs of agriculture guided the Soviet industry, but what the industry wanted or proposed to supply and what the Gosplan was ready to finance. Nobody really cared about the needs of agriculture and complaints about the poor quality and defects of the machinery.

The testing of new and improved tractors and agricultural machinery began before 1955. On January 6, 1955, Benediktov, the Minister of Agriculture, together with Akonov, the Minister of Car, Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction reported on the request to the CM that in October 1954 the sample copies of the potato harvester 40 constructed by the All-Union Research Institute of Agricultural Machinery were tested. Many construction defects were found: the machine collected only 73% to 87% of potatoes and often broke down RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7757. L. 12-13.. The second testing of the flax harvester LK-7M was not successful: the required improvements were not made, and the machine was poorly produced RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7757. L. 36-41.. On January 8, 1955, Benediktov reported that the testing of the hay baler revealed severe construction defects which led to the loss of 10% to 15% of hay RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7757. L. 18-20. .

On November 28-29, 1956, the Ministry's board discussed with the Ministry of State Farms' board the testing of Soviet and imported machines in order to introduce a new agricultural technology. The 20th Party Congress demanded to increase the production of tractors by 1960 by 2.7 times. The boards criticized the slow progress of their production: from 416 new machines presented in 1956 only 29 passed the testing successfully and could be put into mass production. Often it took 10 and more years to design new machines, but when mass production started, the construction offices no longer cared about making further improvements. The boards required the production of the modernized tractors. The DT-24 still had serious defects and needed essential construction changes. The boards demanded to launch in 1957 the production of tractors with electric ignition. They made a list of the machinery needed the most: effective combine harvesters, harvesting machinery for corn, sugar beets, potatoes, cotton and hay RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7970. L. 263-302..

When planning the needed number of agricultural machinery in the mid-1950, the boards faced the question whether the USSR should focus on the Western standards. On July 17, 1956, Chekmenev (the Gosplan) addressed Volchenko (the deputy Minister of Agriculture) on the issue of the Soviet agricultural technological standards. The 20th Party Congress demanded to produce a great number of tractors, combine harvesters and agricultural machinery: in 1960, in the MTS one (15hp) tractor was to work on 85 hectares, at state farms - on 68 hectares. Concerning combine harvesters, the recommendations of the British ministry were used. As the USSR fields were larger, foreign standards were not accepted for calculating the need for agricultural machinery for the Five-Year-Plan RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8003. L. 14-17..

On October 20, 1956, Volchenko informed the CM Presidium that the GEK's `draft plan for 1957' did not follow the production goals set by the September CC Plenum in 1953 and did not meet the agriculture's urgent demands. Thus, the production of only 44% of the requested tractors would not speed up field works as was planned. Despite the set standard of 60 to 80 hectares, the work load per tractor in Ukraine was 125 hectares. The production of the urgently needed tractors with high engine power was reduced from the requested 20,500 to only 450. The production of other agricultural machinery was also drastically reduced. Moreover, the orders of the CC Plenum on providing the MTSs with repair stations were not executed RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8003. L. 228-249..

A serious step to develop new machinery was made in 1957, before the Khrushchev's `decentralization' and the decision to liquidate the MTS hindered further actions. On October 8, 1957, when discussing the 1958 plan and budget, Volchenko (the deputy Ministry of Agriculture) named the following urgent tasks for the farm mechanization: production of agricultural machinery, construction of buildings and repair stations, and training drivers. 85 machines to be designed and manufactured in 1958 were listed, including a small manual caterpillar tractor for horticulture and wine growing with 16-20 hp, and a new tractor with 30 hp. The wheeled tractor MZZ-7 was to be developed on the basis of the Belorus model. A tractor with a uniform hydraulic system was to replace the DT-54, and a two self-propelled chassis with 45 and 70 hp motors was to be constructed for harvesting machinery and other agricultural machines (mass production was to start in 1960). The list also included machinery for soil cultivation and spreading fertilizers, a pull-type grain combine harvester (mass production of the self-propelled grain combine harvester Type SK-3 with 70hp was to start in 1960), harvesting machinery for corn and oil seeds, industrial crops, potatoes and vegetables, machinery for horticulture, wine growing, tee, timber and subtropical crops, machinery for pest control and fodder harvesting, a new hay baler and a silage harvester for the mechanization of animal production (mass production was to start in 1959, of the silage harvester with 70 hp - in 1960) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8188. L. 13-18..

Hardly any of the machines requested by Volchenko were provided or put into mass production in the following decade. However, attempts to achieve the set goals started in 1957. On May 27, 1957, at the consultations with the Gostechnik the requested improvements were discussed: experiments with new wheeled tractors with better off-road performance, self-propelled harvesters, and so on. The limited availability of tires was mentioned, but the Yaroslavl Tire Company promised to produce tractor tires RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8221. L. 11-16.. The stronger control of the set deadlines was required: the industry provided samples for testing with delays: from 88 tractors scheduled to be tested in 1957 only 6 were provided in time, and 32 never provided RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8221. L. 101-108..

On January 19, 1959, Kuchumov, the deputy Minister of Agriculture, informed Ezhevsky (the Gosplan) about the agriculture's need 42 for 2.1325 million tractors (73% - wheeled tractors) in the 7-Year-Plan (1959-1965). The Gosplan provided significantly less - only 1.2506 million tractors. Kuchumov accepted the reduced number provided that those tractors would ensure a decisive increase in the agriculture's efficiency. Therefore, he asked to change the types of the provided tractors: a share of them was to have 4 driving wheels. The types proposed by the Gosplan did not satisfy the needs of the grain, cotton and sugar-beet regions. The number of small tractors (DT 20, 28, 30) was to be significantly reduced - by 237,000, and instead the DT 40 - 40,000 - was to be provided, the DT 54 and DT 70 - a total of 432,700 (90,000 more), and 426,300 of the Belarus (68,500 additional) were to be produced RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8434. L. 16-22..

On October 23, 1961, Olshansky, the Minister of Agriculture, complained that the Gosplan's draft plan for 1962 increased the supply of agricultural machines as compared to 1961, but would not ensure the set scale of mechanization of sowing and harvesting grain crops and straw. Without the mechanization of these works, the autumn plowing would be also delayed. Straw harvesting was mechanized only to 29%; the harvesting of corn, cotton, sugar beet and potatoes still lacked combine harvesters, which also hindered the introduction of progressive production methods. The draft did not ensure the mechanization of labor-intensive works in animal husbandry RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8626. L. 193-204..