Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: Internal aspects (1953-1986)

However, Khudenko, got a second chance when he became the head of the Iliysk state farm in the Alma-Ata Region in March 1963. The report from October 15, 1965, mentioned that the farm's production increased significantly in 1963 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 254-258.. The economic results of this testing in 1963-1965 were impressive, but it again caused workers and officials' dissatisfaction. The officials' goals were contrary to the core of the experiment's success - the reduction of the labor input and of the number of machines. However, there were also protests against stopping the experiment. On April 29, 1965, in the Komsomolskaya Pravda, Elemanov (the deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan and the corresponding member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences) denied all accusations (of the sharp reduction of workers and of Khudenko not providing enough machinery to the teams) and stressed that such an organization of labor was widespread in the US and Australia RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 245-248.. On February 5, 1966, Elemanov informed Kosygin that changes in the old system of work organization and remuneration were necessary, that standardization should be applied not to separate work operations but to the final product, and that workers rather than `external specialists' should organize their work. Elemanov described the work of the Iliysk state farm: from 3 complex and 9 plant brigades 17 teams were formed; each team got 4 tractors, 5 combine harvesters and other machinery; instead of the average 830 workers, the new labor organization needed only 67 drivers, and instead of the large management - only two leading specialists (a chief agronomist and a chief accountant); each team worked on 3,000 hectares of arable land with the task to produce 500 tons of grain per worker; due to the high labor productivity, the salary of the driver increased to 330-350 rubles. Elemanov asked Kosygin's permission to continue the experimen RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 116-126..

Kaminsky, the engineer and the Party member since 1926, addressed the CC Agricultural Department after reading the article in the Komsomolskaya Pravda. He stressed that Khudenko's approach was close to the Russian national character as successfully breaking bureaucratic structures. He mentioned that under the given work organization peasants lacked freedom to decide on production, and regretted that the CC Agricultural Department had not followed such healthy ideas. As the agricultural situation worsened, the 1965 CC Plenum had to take action by choosing between two paths: to reduce the costs of agricultural production by using Khudenko's experience or to increase wages according to the farm labor and resources expended. The 1965 CC Plenum chose the second path and put the CC Agricultural Department in charge, i.e., bureaucrats, dogmatists and reinsurers were to make decisions in order not to let the `producers of material goods' get rich RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 264-265, 282-283..

Nevertheless, there were hidden heated debates on Khudenko's reform until 1969. Most of its harsh critics held leading position in the apparatus, but it was supported by some Politburo members (Voronov), representatives of the Novosibirsk branch of the Academy of Sciences (Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya) and journalists (Yanov, 1984: 33-34). In 1967, despite Kosygin's refusal to resume testing RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9275. L. 64-66., Khudenko (with the support of the deputy Minister of Agriculture of Kazakhstan) got the chance to establish a new testing state farm to produce lucerne with the needed number of workers and machinery on the uncultivated land in Akchi of the Alma-Ata Region. The farm did not have any administration - only 60 workers who formed 11 teams on the commercial basis of payment: 6 teams for farming, 1 - for repair and spare parts, 1 - for the purchase of seeds and fertilizers and for the sales to the state, 1 - for construction, 1 - for public catering, and 1 - for coordination (agronomist Li and accountant Khudenko) (Yanov, 1984: 34-39). The aim was to test the work remuneration that would increase labor productivity and reduce inputs to the necessary level. The project was stopped from above, if Yanov (1984: 120) is correct - by Brezhnev's order. According to Volovchenko, the aim to increase labor productivity implied the `increase in labor intensity', which was not allowed in the `socialist production'. He also commented on the teams' payment as based on the final results of production that such workers did not get plans and did not know the level of production above which they would get additional rewards RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8857. L. 96-109..

Thus, Khudenko showed that when people worked on their own, the commanding officials were unnecessary and the number of machines and workers could be reduced significantly. Responsibility for production costs made the teams take only the needed machinery and maintain it carefully, which eliminated the widespread feeling of obezlichka (irresponsibility). In 1970, after testing his ideas three times with the convincing economic results, Khudenko was finally stopped, then arrested for `corruption', and died in prison in 1974. However, in the 1980s, his ideas were revived in the form of `contract teams and brigades'.

Investments and actions requested by the Ministry of Agriculture for the FYP 1971-1975

On November 6, 1964, just after Khrushchev's displacement, Volovchenko sent to Polyansky (the CM) a report on the state of agriculture, in which he stressed that its labor productivity was several times lower than in the US. The capital stock of the USSR agriculture was increasing too slowly, with only a 20% share of energy resources and machinery. In terms of energy supplies, the Soviet agriculture lagged far behind capitalist countries: in the US, the use of electricity was 14 times higher, and 4 times more tractors and combines were used for every 100 hectares of arable land. Volovchenko demanded to expand the industrial production of tractors, combine harvesters, trucks and agricultural machinery. After the liquidation of the MTS, the technical maintenance of tractors worsened, and farms did not have enough tractors and machinery to finish field works on time RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9207. L. 213-216; D. 9281. L. 55-66; D. 9357. L. 289-234.. Matskevich repeatedly reported on the poor development of the complex mechanization: on December 17, 1969 - to the CC, on March 19, 1970 - to the CM, and on December 8, 1971 - to the CC RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9207. L. 213-216..

In December 1969, Matskevich and Ezhevsky complained about long delays in the start of the mass production of new agricultural machinery, which hindered the development of the complex mechanization and kept the high labor input in agriculture. The orders of the CC 1968 Plenum to speed up the introduction of complex technologies were not executed. The Gosplan kept delaying the start of the mass production of the successfully tested machines; therefore, farms were forced to use outdated machinery or to do manual labor. Among the machines recommended for production some years ago were the caterpillar tractor T-130, the cotton tractor MTZ-50X, the sugar beet combine harvester AMK-2, and the portable irrigation apparatus CDA-I. Matskevich and Ezhevsky underlined that the highest labor input in grain production was in collecting straw: the grain harvesting per hectare took 2.5 hours, while collecting straw - 11.8 hours. Every year huge amounts of straw needed for animal husbandry was not collected from the fields due to the lack of the necessary machinery and transport. Other great losses were determined by the lack of equipment for cleaning and cooling milk. In total, about 100 highly effective and successfully tested machines were not put into mass production by the Gosplan RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9281. L. 55-66..

In his report from March 1970 `On the technical level of the USSR agricultural production in the international perspective', Matskevich stressed the low labor productivity due to the insufficient energy resources and funding: in 1968, the USSR had only 8.2 (the US - 36.5) tractors per 1,000 hectares of agricultural land, 4.4 (13.5) combine harvesters, and 0.6 hay bales (31.4). The supply tasks set by the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 were not solved. Thus, the grain harvesting took 18-20 days, silage harvesting - 15-18, potato and sugar-beet harvesting - 25-35, which determined high harvest losses - about 35-40 million tons of grain per year. The outdated tractors consumed too much fuel and rarely managed to work without major repairs during the warranty time (4,000 working hours). Due to technical defects, the average tractor downtime was about 14% of the shift, which was several times longer than in capitalist countries. There was a huge shortage of machinery for animal husbandry, and the available equipment for manure cleaning usually worked for only three years. Just some fully mechanized branches of the Soviet agriculture showed a significant increase in the labor productivity, for instance, poultry husbandry in the Baltic countries. Matskevich named the lack of agricultural machinery for fodder harvesting as the key reason for the low productivity in animal husbandry. Due to the lack of transport 20-25% of hay and 30-45% of silage were lost. Moreover, the fodder did not contain enough protein, and the production of concentrated feed did not grow RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9357. L. 189-234..

In December 1971, in his report `On the scientific-technical progress in agriculture' Matskevich argued that manual work and work with horses still accounted for 70-75% of the total work input in the Soviet agriculture. The lack of agricultural machinery hindered the development of horticulture and wine production, and mechanization of animal husbandry affected just a limited number of operations. Only the complex mechanization could significantly reduce the work input in agriculture, but the quality of most Soviet machines was far behind the developed countries, for instance, in terms of the tractors' engine power (hp), productivity, and fuel consumption. Only the Vladimir and Chelyabinsk tractor factories and the Yaroslavl motor factory produced motors which met the fuel-consumption standards of that time, while most Soviet tractors and combine harvesters had outdated motors consuming too much fuel, which were produced by the Kharkov, Minsk, Altai and Rybinsk factories. Most produced agricultural machines were outdated and did not meet the world technical standards. From 700 Soviet tractor types, only 5 received the quality certificate. Matskevich underlined that farms also suffered 64 from high prices for new machinery, which limited the use of wheeled tractors. Nevertheless, he stressed that the supplies of poor-quality machinery were no longer acceptable, because it needed too much effort to operate RGAE. F. 650. D. 331. L. 1-104..

By August 1, 1982, the level of mechanization had hardly changed since 1971: still 68.6% of agricultural workers used only manual labor, only 26% were engaged in the mechanized work (including supply and side production). While in crop production 27% of workers at state farms and 23.6% at collective farms were engaged in mechanized work, the situation in animal husbandry was worse: 19.4% of workers at state farms and 8.4% at collective farms were engaged in mechanized work RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9208-9209..

On July 4, 1969, Matskevich presented (on the request of the 1968 CC Plenum) draft plans for the development of animal husbandry during the Five-Year Plan (1971-1975) with special sections (detailed information on measures, needed investment and imports) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9356. L. 162-164.: development of milk production; industrial cattle fattening; livestock breeding; improvement of feed production technology, fodder storage and concentrated feed; rational use of hay and meadows; development of veterinary services; livestock diseases control, and so on. Matskevich stressed that costs of animal husbandry had increased significantly since 1962, mainly due to the high fodder losses and poor quality of feed which were determined by the lack of machines for feed production, lack of spare parts for available machines, lack of special storages for fodder, lack of bales and hay-drying equipment. Thus, feed costs made up 40-60% of total animal husbandry costs. On May 4, 1971, Matskevich and Ezhevsky again informed the CC on the urgent need to mechanize the feed production in order to reduce the fodder harvesting time and, thus, to increase the quality of hay. Due to the lack of necessary machinery, hay harvesting often took 50 to 60 days, which caused the loss of nutritional value: about 1 million tons of hay protein was lost annually. Due to the lack of machinery, storage and packing material, many farms stopped to use silage RGAE. F. 650. D. 16. L. 1-57..

Striking continuity: the shortcomings of agricultural production named by the Gosagroprom in 1986

On June 25, 1986, the Gosagroprom Committee discussed `The design and production of a new machinery system for the complex mechanization of crop production and animal husbandry' during the Five-Year Plan (1986-1990). The complex mechanization was to be carried out `in a short time' - by 2000 - with the complex program to raise the quality of agricultural machinery RGAE. F. 650. D. 16. L. 1-4., which was not a new task. Three decades earlier, the complex mechanization had become a standard for the developed Western countries. Already in the mid-1950, the Ministry of Agriculture demanded to copy the Western experience and started to import the high-quality Western models of agricultural machinery (Merl, 2020b). In 1969, the Ministry of Agriculture made a second attempt with the detailed draft decrees on the complex mechanization of animal husbandry during the FYP of 1971-1975. In 1986, 1960 and 1975 were changed for a new deadline - 2000 - for the complex mechanization, which was an obvious declaration of failure: the political system could not solve the task.

The third attempt followed the same path: like in the 1950s and in the second half of the 1960s, the `effective cooperation' of the research and production of new machinery was to check all types of agricultural machinery for its compliance with the scientific-technical progress, for the reduction of time between designing and the start of mass production, for the technological ability to perform several operations at the same time, and for higher quality requirements. The production of more advanced and high-quality machinery was to be `speed up', which was a banal obvious task not even worth mentioning by the Gosagroprom for Soviet monopolist factories did not produce reliable, efficient agricultural machines. In 1986, only one task was partly new: to increase `the economic influence of clients on the production of high-quality agricultural machinery RGAE. F. 650. D. 16. L. 5-11..

Despite the resolution's common phrases, the speeches ruthlessly stressed the crucial shortcomings of the system that made the farms work with unreliable and poor-quality machinery. Ermin, the head of the RSFSR Gosagroprom, said that after the start of the non-blackearth program in 1974 nothing really changed: after 12 years, still no machinery suitable for the region was produced, although only wheeled tractors could increase yields on such soils. At that time, the key problem was the low quality rather than the lack of agricultural machines: there was no reliable machinery for animal husbandry, and even `new' technologies were already outdated. Prices for inputs were too high, and often prices for the `improved' machinery exceeded the real gain in productivity: for instance, the tractor K-700 was 50% more expensive but increased labor productivity only by 20%. Moreover, the industry still ignored the safety issues: neither the driver's cabin nor his seat was safe.

Ermin demanded from the industry to produce complex and high-quality machinery of all necessary types. Until then, mechanization had hardly reduced labor input, and the farms' costs were 66 growing instead of falling. There was hardly any mechanization of feeding in animal husbandry, about which farms were complaining in vain for years. Some of the needed machines, especially for silage production, were never produced, while others were out of production. The time for producing silage was still three times longer than necessary, and every year a half of green harvest was classified as fodder of low quality.

It was impossible to produce high-quality silage without the necessary machinery, but the replacement of outdated machines in feed production was slower than in any other branches of animal husbandry. There was also a shortage of machinery for harvesting, sorting and processing of vegetables and fruits. 12 years after the CC and CM promised new machinery for the nonblack-earth region, still no combine harvesters and machines suitable for the region were provided.

The available machinery could not work in rainy seasons and on the soil that needed low tillage. Ermin mentioned that the trade image of the Soviet agricultural machinery was its low quality and unreliability. Nearly all machinery produced for animal husbandry was defective, as also were many brands of plows, cultivators, and potato harvesting machinery. Moreover, the defects of the combine harvester KSK-100 were known for a long time, but no new combine harvesters were to be designed and produced before 2000 RGAE. F. 650. D. 16. L. 18-21..

Motorny, the chairman of the collective farm with good results in Kherson, complained bitterly about the lack of high-quality machinery: “We do not need more tractors, we need tractors of a better quality”. The farms lacked sowing machines and tractors with the necessary machinery (for instance, the T-150 was provided with just one cultivator). Motorny stressed that people were tired of the situation and lost trust in the state. He demanded the production of reliable combine harvesters (like produced in the GDR) and wondered why the industry provided so many poor-quality tractors and pipes instead of few reliable and high-quality ones. The Altai tractors permanently lost oil, but good metal was wasted for such junk; spare parts were suitable only for a special type of tractors or machines; many tractors were `modernized' without any impact on productivity, and so on.

Cherdintsev, the team leader from Orenburg with a 43-year harvesting experience, stressed the dissatisfaction of workers who were forced to use manual labor due to the poor-quality machinery in animal husbandry. For instance, manure transporters were so poorly constructed that could not collect manure when fattening 6,000 head of cattle; farms had round bales, but no transport to collect them; the combine harvester KSK-100 was of such poor quality that nobody wanted to work on it. Only for three years the Soviet industry was producing new combines Don-1200 and Don-1500 which worked great and provided comfort for the driver.

The director of the model state farm with the comparatively high labor productivity in Krasnoyarsk complained about the poor quality of machinery: thus, the plows damaged the soil, and many herbicides were needed, which meant `wasting millions of rubles'. He bitterly complained that often the relatively reliable machines were replaced by more defective or unsuitable. At his farm, for feed production they used the KPS-5I and the KSK-100, but his best drivers “were used to improving the defective machines produced by the industry: in the end, nothing was left from the original version”. High-quality feed production machinery was only delivered from abroad: for instance, the GDR mower had a cutting width of 4 meters, so the hay dried up after a few days, while the Soviet mower had a cutting width of 5 meters, so the hay did not dry but rotted in swaths. Animal husbandry urgently needed transport for silage, machines for spreading manure and workers.

The academic of the VASKhNiL Kryazkov, the director of VIM, made a crushing verdict on the Soviet agricultural machinery: about 80% did not meet the requirements. However, Soviet constructors should not be blamed - the problem was that the mass production of new machines had never started. Soviet agricultural machines were poorly made, unreliable and unstandardized, they caused the farms high costs for maintaining and repair. The industry was not responsible for its machinery, the farms did not participate in its testing, and the officials making decisions about production did not take into account the issues of repair. Kelpis, the head of the Riga GSKB, accused the Gosplan of that new machinery often showed good results when tested, but, when put into mass production, only the lowest possible costs were taken into account. He described the situation with the complex mechanization of diary production: some farms were close to the world standards, but the high-quality milking equipment was used just for 3% of cows, while 79% of cows were still milked with buckets.

virgin-land machinery state farm

Conclusion

Thus, there are several decisive factors of the failure of the complex mechanization:

The lack of state support for solving basic tasks after Stalin, especially for the development of animal husbandry at large farms. The governing bodies never provided the investment necessary for a fundamental reconstruction of the agricultural machinery industry, which determined the lack of high-quality feed harvesting machinery and transport in agriculture, and the waste of scarce resources in industry. The poor-quality machinery caused the farms high costs of maintenance, high consumption of spare parts and fuel, high harvest losses, and the need for a quick replacement of machinery. Thus, `mechanization' hardly affected the agricultural labor productivity, and the official data on mechanization was `fake' due to counting available rather than working machinery.

No changes in the agricultural policy: following Stalin's precepts, the governing bodies, especially under Khrushchev, did not trust collective farms and feared their `enrichment'. Although the basic conditions for working by themselves were not provided and the state purchase prices for animal products did not cover the production costs, the farms were to make investments. Without the complex mechanization, the desired reduction of labor input and increase in efficiency were not possible.

The governing bodies' refusal to abandon the state command system in agriculture. Although in 1931 the responsibility for production in industry was transferred to the factories' directors, this never happened in agriculture. Most heads of collective and state farms were well qualified, but the state continued to interfere into their production. They could not buy the machinery they needed; therefore, farms never had enough high-quality transport and machinery in working condition to complete all steps of production on time. This contributed to the lack of personal responsibility for the means of production (obezlichka). Khudenko's reform based on the independent contract brigades was blocked under Brezhnev.

Following Stalin's percepts, the governing bodies blamed farms and local authorities for shortcomings of mechanization which were actually determined by defective machinery. The Party leadership announced the `socialist competition' to motivate the agricultural workers and introduced special honorary titles and orders. There were many awards and cash bonuses for production results and yields that were extremely poor in the international perspective. Without providing the high-quality means of production, Brezhnev's policy to raise wages and to improve living conditions in the countryside could not compensate for dissatisfaction with work. The well qualified younger generations needed for the complex mechanization left the countryside for cities, which determined a high turnover of workers in agriculture.

The basic shortcomings named by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1955 and in the late 1960s were the same the Gosagroprom named in 1986. The governing bodies either did not care or did not manage to eliminate the well-known shortcomings. They allowed the agricultural machinery factories to act as monopolists and blocked all direct contacts between the machinery producers and farms. Khrushchev's campaigns caused long-term harm to agriculture, while Brezhnev's campaigns never provided the promised high-quality inputs but contributed to the ever-increasing waste of scare resources.

References

1. Merl S. (2020a) Agricultural reforms in Russia from 1856 to the present: Successes and failures in the international comparative perspective. Russian Peasant Studies, vol. 5, № 2, pp. 56-87.

2. Merl S. (2020b) Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: International aspects (1953-1986). Russian Peasant Studies, vol. 5, № 4, pp. 78-117.

3. RGAE (Rossiisky Gosudarstvenny Archiv Ekonomiki) [Russian State Economic Archive], Fond 7486 (Narodny kommissariat zemledeliya SSSR), Opis 1.

4. RGAE (Rossiisky Gosudarstvenny Archiv Ekonomiki) [Russian State Economic Archive], Fond 610 (Gosagroprom), Opis 1.

5. Yanov A. (1984) The Drama of the Soviet 1960s. A Lost Reform, Berkeley: University of California.

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