Why the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and Brezhnev failed with the complex mechanization of agriculture: Internal aspects (1953-1986)

In September 1968, Samarin, the chairman of VSNTO, sent a list of models ready for mass production to the CM. He criticized the still not regulated cessation of the outdated machinery production and the start of mass production of new models. The mass production of 55 new machines still did not start, while 17 other new machines were ready to replace the outdated ones. From 545 produced agricultural machines at least 140 had serious defects. Often the repair was complicated: sometimes it took up to 7 hours only to prepare the repair. Construction defects caused fatal accidents. He demanded the standardization of agricultural machines RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9242. L. 177-198..

On January 19, 1968, Matskevich und Ezhevsky commented on the Gosplan's proposal to speed up the supply of agricultural machinery and spare parts. The main controversy was with investments in animal husbandry which lacked milking equipment, transportation for dung, distribution of fodder, battery cages for poultry. The Gosplan's proposed cut of investment in the FYP until 1975 would mean the impossibility of the planned reduction of labor input in animal husbandry. At that time, the labor input per a kilo weight increase in cattle fattening was more than 10 times higher than in the US. The Gosplan's plan of plant mechanization did not correspond to the agriculture's minimal needs: it would allow to mechanize only 28% of production. Matskevich und Ezhevsky made a list of new machinery factories to be constructed to provide the high-quality equipment needed to reduce the labor input (such as wide harvesting machines which the Gosplan did not even intend to design).

On March 22, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky with the CM protested against the Gosplan's draft decree `On measures to improve the technical level of tractors and agricultural machinery' for it did not execute the CM's order to reduce the labor input by the use of the highly efficient machinery. Instead of starting the mass production of the new, successfully tested agricultural machines, the Gosplan insisted on producing the outdated machinery, while there were highly productive tested machines (for instance, in 1965, the potato combine harvester). Moreover, the Gosplan stopped the production of 150 standard agricultural machines without replacements RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9165. L. 142-143..

On March 3, 1969, the Ministry of Car, Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Production reported problems with speeding up the tractor production: in 1968, up to 20% less tractors were produced due to the problems with getting motors from the motor factories and to the lack of workforce. Efforts were made to improve the quality and reliability of tractors and to improve their cabin, but the factories suffered from the insufficient supply and poor quality of inputs RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9241. L. 96-113..

More than a decade after the first request, in the late 1960s, new, more efficient combine harvesters (Niva and Kolos) were presented, and their mass production was to start in the FYP 1971-1975. Already on December 13, 1968, Matskevich with Lebedev (the Gosplan) protested against the reduction of the number of these combines to be produced by 1975 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9167. L. 233-255., but later there was a further reduction. The production of the combines Niva and Kolos was to start at the Taganrog factory in 1971 - 83,000 Nivas and 7,000 Koloses were to be produced by 1973. In many respects, they were closer to the Western standards, however, of those of the 1950s RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9314. L. 76-85.. On March 19, 1970, Matskevich informed the CM that even the best Soviet grain combines fell far behind foreign models (including the GDR E-512): their energy supply, productivity and output capacity were too low, the amount of metal used for production - too high, and the operating comfort for drivers - minimal. Even Niva and Kolos did not meet the world standards as they did not cope with higher yields per hectare. They needed too much time for technical maintenance, lacked speedometers, means to assess the energy load and grain losses when threshing, and their energy supply was too low: instead 120 hp for Niva and 170hp for Kolos would be necessary RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9281. L. 55-66; D. 9314. L. 76-85..

In the discussions on the quality of agricultural machinery, the question was whether caterpillar or wheeled tractors were preferable for the Soviet agriculture. Wheeled tractors were considered universal - for cutting hay, cultivating root crops, and especially transportation; they were less expensive for the farms as they needed repair less often and the prices for their spare parts were lower. Due to the high repair need, working with the Soviet tractor was more expensive than buying it, while in the West repair costs constituted only 20% of the purchase price in 7 years of work. For the Soviet agriculture wheeled tractors were also preferable, but the Gosplan and tractor industry chose caterpillar tractors. Unlike western countries, the purchase price for wheeled tractors were twice higher than for caterpillar tractors, although in the West they were 1.5 times less expensive. This difference was not economically determined, but was partly explained by the price for tires: in the USSR, tires made 20% to 28% of the tractor's price, while in the West - only 2% to 7%. In the USSR, until 1955, in general wheeled tractors were not used for transportation due to their speed of just 5-9 km per hour (in 1970, - 9-15). Caterpillar tractors contributed to the high turnover of drivers: as they could not be used for transportation, drivers were often employed only for the field season RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9314. L. 241-289; D. 9281. L. 55-66; D. 8187. L. 68-73..

The designing of new and highly productive machinery slowly developed from 1955 to 1958, but was stopped by the Khrushchev's administrative reorganization which transferred the agricultural machinery production to local SovNarKoms and liquidated the MTS, thus, reducing the farms abilities to invest. In the 1960s, the designing of highly efficient machinery continued, but the governing bodies showed little interest in providing the necessary investment for its mass production.

The failure of Khrushchev's `relocation from the asphalt to the countryside'

In 1961, Khrushchev started the relocation of agricultural training facilities and research institutions including the Academy of Agricultural Sciences (VASKhNiL) and ministries of agriculture `from the asphalt to the countryside'. The decree required the transfer of millions of people - staff and students - to the countryside with no facilities for accommodation, training, research, and everyday services. To implement the relocation, huge finances and building materials were needed, but the governing bodies did not provide them in 1961-1964, although there were successful examples of establishing new research centers in the countryside (Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk and `closed research towns' near Moscow).

In the spring of 1961, the Ministry's board prepared the relocation of the VASKhNiL and the Timiryazev Academy. Laboratories and testing stations at the farms were to be provided with the necessary equipment RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8616. L. 8-68.. On January 11, 1962, the board discussed in detail the location of the agricultural research and production complexes in the Podolsk District of the Moscow Region. A small `science town' for researchers was to be built in the village Novo-Mikhailovskoe to host the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, VASKhNiL, and some research institutions (fertilizers, agricultural economics and microbiology) with their testing fields RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8691. L. 14-24..

On January 11, 1963, the Minister Pyshin addressed Polyansky (the CM) to inform him that after two years none of the problems was solved: the housing for the Ministry's staff, their provision with everyday goods, good telephone connection to Moscow and the heating system RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8807. L. 3-9.. The staff therefore would be forced to travel daily by bus from Moscow to their new working place. The Gosplan even announced to provide for this only 10 unheated buses RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8807. L. 16.. Kosygin at least made a concession: the research staff would pay only 5 kopecks per trip, and the Ministry's costs for buses would be covered RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8807. L. 59, 92..

In 1963, the Khrushchev's relocation was at risk of failure, because the governing bodies provided neither the necessary finances nor the building material. On June 3, 1964, Volovchenko, the new USSR Minister of Agriculture, informed Lomako (the Gosplan) that the total relocation costs would be about 798 million rubles. The relocation of only 80 agricultural universities would cost 404 million rubles. If just 31 million rubles were provided annually, the relocation would have continued until 1970 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8832. L. 143-146.. On July 21, 1964, Krasot, the head of the main administration of the higher education, reported that only 3 of 14 institutions planned for relocation in 1962-1963 started to move to the state farms despite the lack of dormitories for students and apartments for teachers RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8832. L. 229-247.. On August 15, 1964, Volovchenko reported to the CC and CM on the relocation of the Ministry's agricultural universities. 17 universities were located on their testing fields and 31 - in the suburban places near their testing fields, and only 50 other universities were to be relocated. According to the plan, 32 of them were to be relocated by 1965, but the construction of the necessary new buildings started only for 8 of them due to the lack of funding RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8832. L. 273-304..

After the Khrushchev's removal, on November 10, 1964, Volovchenko informed the CC and CM that by the end of 1964 the relocation of 8 universities would be completed, which required the urgent construction of working and classroom buildings, accommodation, services and culture facilities (about 57 million rubles were needed). He suggested to provide the necessary means to finish such constructions for other 16 universities, while 17 universities located in suburban areas should not be relocated, i.e., the 1961 decree was changed in this respect RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8833. L. 44-88.. At the beginning of 1965, Brezhnev and Kosygin repealed the decree from August 28, 1961, on the relocation of the higher education, research and testing institutions, but the relocation of 18 universities were to be finished by 1968 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8852. L. 29-30.. The inability to provide building materials for agriculture hindered not only the Khrushchev's relocation program but also most projects of the complex mechanization of animal husbandry as depending on the high-quality constructions (Merl, 2020b).

Consequences of providing farms with defective and non-effective machinery

The Gosplan never managed to ensure the standardization of agricultural machinery, i.e., scarce spare parts, pulled and lifted machinery could be used only with one specific type of about 100 different tractors produced. Machinery and equipment for animal husbandry were of extremely low quality due to being produced by 150 small and poorly equipped factories subordinate to different industry ministries RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9166. L. 206-265; D. 9281. L. 55-66.. Thus, most agricultural machines and tractors at farms were defective and outdated.

Soviet factories sent their unreliable, often defective machinery also abroad - to the socialist and `less developed' countries. The reports of Soviet engineers from these countries highlight the problems that the Soviet farms and drivers faced every day. As some of the `less developed' countries benefited also from the Western help, their drivers were familiar with the Western machinery, and the comparison with the `socialist' agricultural technology shocked them. Some drivers complained about the poor quality of the Soviet machinery, often completely unable to work. However, the Soviet officials named such complaints from Ceylon (1959), Syria, Iraq (1961) and other countries `anti-Soviet propaganda'.

Ivanov, the representative of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations in Ceylon, forwarded a report of two Soviet engineers from July 16, 1959, who informed that the Soviet tractors and pulled implements were unsuitable for the local conditions (high temperatures and precipitation) and could not work in the jungle with heavy and stony soil. The tractors had construction defects; moreover, Soviet factories often provided broken tractors, and some implements could not be used with the supplied types of tractors. The Stalingrad factory provided the DT-54 tractors without heat resistant components and coolers, and the tractors could not work on the jungle's soil. The report listed 11 major defects RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8477. L. 1-13.. On February 4, 1961, the complaint of the vice consultant for economic issues of the Soviet embassy in Damascus arrived. The USSR had signed a development aid contract with Syria to provide and install water pumping systems, but the provided equipment, especially pumps from the Azerbaijan SovNarKom, was outdated, unsuitable, and could not work with the provided defective diesel motors RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8652. L. 294-301..

Gushchin, the consultant on economic issues in the Soviet embassy in Iraq, complained about the bad quality of the agricultural machinery provided by the SovNarKoms of Belorussia, Rostov, Stalingrad and Odessa. The reports of the Iraqi media were interpreted by Soviet officials as the start of an `anti-Soviet campaign'. The engineer-mechanics Gorbachev and Melnik confirmed that the Soviet tractors had defects: motors could not work at 45-50 degrees Celsius - they overheated, broke, their valves burnt. The poor construction of tractors (DT-54 and MTZ 5) determined that they needed repair after a few days of work, while American and British tractors worked without serious repair until amortization. The Iraqi drivers, who had used foreign tractors before, did not understood why Soviet tractors needed repair before work and why their parts did not fit together. The main problem with the DT-54 was their hydraulic systems for the lifted machinery, which broke very often and were responsible for 95% of the downtime (American tractors did not have such problems). The chassis of the Belarus' tractors broke very quickly, and the Minsk factory did not agree to make improvements. The pulled implements had the same problems: they were poorly manufactured and broke quickly. From 114 sowing machines not even one arrived complete and in working condition. While American tractors had a nice color for years in the hot climate, Soviet tractors lost color quickly. The engineer-mechanics stated that the situation would have been less dramatic if the Soviet factories had provided spare parts quickly. Due to the lack of spare parts tractors often worked 2,000 to 3,000 hours without repairs, and then needed a general overhaul; while the widespread American service stations changed tractor parts quickly RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8659. L. 399-405; D. 8654. L. 303-309..

These reports describe the problems the Soviet drivers faced. They did not react with an `anti-Soviet propaganda' but `voted with their 48 feet': being deeply dissatisfied with the defective machinery, uncomfortable and dangerous, after a few months of work they left the countryside for cities. Farms often complained about defective machinery and lack of parts or them not fitting together, reported that a significant number of the existing machinery could not be used due to the lack of necessary spare parts and tires. On January 4, 1957, the Ministry's board demanded to change the rules of complaints: the defective spare parts were to be changed immediately for good ones in stock. The Glavavtotraktorosbyt was to check samples of spare parts and send complains to the factories, i.e., defective machinery (according to the technical requirements) would not be delivered to farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8169. L. 12-15.. This proposal had little effect for many spare parts were not in stock and the industry still produced defective machinery.

In 1965, the Soyuzselkhoztechnik received 6,221 complaints only about tractors RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 5-19.. In the first nine months of 1968, due to the defects caused by the low quality of machinery, it sent 17,300 tractors and 63,900 agricultural machines back to factories, especially the Ryazan combine harvesters (40%) and Kharkov tractors (38%). However, the quality of most agricultural machines was low for factories did not care about the technological discipline RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9167. L. 183-187; D. 9242. L. 177-198..

The rules of complaints had no effect for the industry. The 15-day deadline set by the CM to react to a complaint was useless for farms for it consisted of checking rather than repair, and many factories forwarded complaints to other places RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9166. L. 53-55.. On May 28, 1968, Matskevich and Ezhevsky stated that the rules for complaints did not contribute to the improvements of production. As the factories did not react, farms addressed the Soyuzselkhoztechnik RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9166. L. 60-82.. On March 1, 1968, Lebedev, the deputy of the Gosplan, informed the CM that factories often readdressed the complaints and suggested that heads of district divisions of the Soyuztselkhozekhnik should claim compensation from factories RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9166. L. 83-84.. On March 22, 1968, the Commission of the People's Control proposed the CM to prolong the warranty time: farms suffered enormous losses of time on technical inspections and high expenditures on the maintenance of defective machines. Only 10% of tractors could start working without changes, 6.5% were sorted out. The low quality of the DT-75 caused a lot of complaints: in 1967, the GDR informed that 157 of 300 DT-75 provided were unreliable. 35% to 40% of the Minsk combine harvesters and most of the Ryazan potato harvesting machines K-3 were unreliably RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9166. L. 260-265.. On July 21, 1969, Kardapoltsev again informed Kulakov that the rules of complaints did not work and demanded to oblige factories to eliminate their production defects immediately and to pay compensation to farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9207. L. 104-107.. However, there was no effective pressure on the industry to stop producing defective machinery: the governing bodies did not care about the farms' problems, and the industry never paid compensations for the production defects and damages despite the widespread fatal accidents (defective agricultural machinery, unpacked toxic substances, etc.) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8370. L. 71-72, 122-126; D. 8867. L. 135-152; D. 9019. L. ^8-19; D. 9²⁶6. ^L. 329-353.. On January 28, 1955, the board stated that the work safety at MTSs was insufficient: work safety rules and systematic examination of fatal accidents were often ignored RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7678. L. 129-132..

On December 11, 1965, the Komsomol CC Secretary Pavlov informed the CM about the catastrophic work-safety conditions in agriculture, which endangered drivers, serving staff and the environment. The number of fatal accidents increased by 24% from 1961 to 1963; in 1964, in the RSFSR 1,536 fatal accidents were registered. Many drivers and animal breeders suffered from occupational illnesses, but nobody cared RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9019. L. 28-32.. Matskevich confirmed Pavlov's description: the working conditions in agriculture, especially for drivers, did not meet the requirements of the Socialist production; many tractors and self-propelling machinery had construction defects: extreme noise, vibrations, penetration of dust and gas into the cabin RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9019. L. 21-22..

Despite fatal accidents, the industry continued to produce machinery that did not meet the safety requirements. On May 12, 1969, the Lugansk Kraikom complained about the unsafety of the Belarus: in 1967, 8 tractor drivers died, in 1968 - 14. The Party Committee required to change the tractor construction according to the safety requirements: coordination of the tractor's braking with that of the pulled machines, the cabin's construction as preventing it from rolling over, etc. On August 29, 1969, Volovchenko and Ezhevsky informed the CM that in 1970 the Belarus was to get a better cabin, in future - with a compressed air system to brake the pulled machines RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9242. L. 44-49.. On March 19, 1970, Matskevich reported to the CM that due to the violations of standards by the industry more than a half of tractor drivers suffered from occupational illnesses. The number of fatal accidents was very high: 30% were caused by the tractors' rolling over, the rest - by the low dynamic reliability and insecure braking systems RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9281. L. 55-66. D. 9274. L. 110-114..

In 1955, serious problems were caused by the lack of tractors and cultivators for root crops, machines for the quadrant sowing and grain combine harvesters". Often the industry delivered new tractors without the necessary machinery: in 1956, 4,600 tractors were provided without plows; in 1958, caterpillar tractors were provided without some necessary parts RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7709. L. 171-172. RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8370. L. 80. D. 7710. L. 232-235. D. 8371. L. 28-30.. On January 31, 1967, Matskevich reported to the CC that often tractors were delivered to farms without the necessary implements RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 5-19. and could not be used with the farms' implements. There were all pulled implements only for less than a half of the tractors К-700 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9266. L. 196-212..

The permanent lack of spare parts did not allow farms to use the available machinery. For instance, in 1955, many combine harvesters could not work technically. About 30% to 40% of the combines' working time was downtime RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7709. L. 156-157.. On July 9, 1958, Matskevich reported to the CC and CM that due to the lack of spare parts in the Stalingrad and Saratov Regions at the start of harvesting about 20% of combines and 26% of hay cutters had not been repaired RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8316. L. 1-12.. The lack of spare parts delayed the preparation of 100,000 tractors DT-75 for the 1968 sowing. The spare parts for cars and trucks made up only 12.3 to 65.9% of the needed RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9164. L. 253-258.. On June 13, 1962, the Ministry of Agriculture informed the CM that collective and state farms had only 35% to 40% of the needed truck and car tires. Although already a third of the farms' machines could not be used without tires, the planned figures for tires for 1963 to 1965 were reduced to 27.5 million, while agriculture alone would need 25 million RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8704. L. 99-127..

The lack of fuel for tractors was another permanent problem during harvesting: many tractors had some downtimes due to the lack of fuel. The problem was partly determined by the outdated and unrepaired tractors with an excess need for fuel. Like every year, on August 15, 1966, the chairman of the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply complained to the CM that in the first half of 1966 agriculture received 40% of the required diesel, and 30% - of fuel. He insisted that agriculture had to use fuel more economically, but many farms could not store and use it properly. In addition to unrepaired tractors and machines, transportation, storage and refueling caused huge losses RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 124-161..

All data on mechanization showed `existing' rather than working machinery. For instance, the number of wheeled tractors in working condition was significantly below the statistical reports: from 367,000 wheeled tractors registered on January 1, 1956, 61% were broken especially those working on kerosene RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8187. L. 68-73..

Let us consider the typical local situation with the lack of machinery, transport, spare parts and fuel for harvesting on the example of Ukraine's reports to the CM in 1966. On April 27, 1966, Shelest and Shcherbitsky (the Ukraine CC and CM) informed the USSR CC and CM about Ukraine's need for `harvest help'. In the previous year, high harvest losses were caused by the lack of harvesting machines and transport. Collective and state farms with high grain yields suffered primarily from the combine harvesters not constructed for yields above 15-20 decitonne per hectare. Also, they lacked suitable machinery for fodder harvesting and transport to collect the harvest from the fields, which did not allow to harvest fodder in time to ensure the high-quality winter fodder for the livestock. In 1966, the expected good harvest would increase the work load of the harvesting machinery and transport compared to 1965. There were only 59,600 grain combines (much less than needed), and 12,900 of them were too outdated. Only 1,600 of 6,000 requested modernized combine harvesters (like straw shredders) were provided, but none of 1,200 requested transporters for sugar beets. Shelest and Shcherbitsky urgently requested additional 3,300 grain harvesters SK-4 (with straw shredders), 800 sugar-beet and 15 flax harvesting machines, etc., but only 1,500 or 9.5% of the requested modernized machines were provided. The situation with transport was especially dramatic: many trucks and tractors could not be used due to the lack of spare parts and especially tires. The permanent lack of transport determined the temporary removal of trucks from the industry, but there still was not enough fuel. Moreover, there was a shortage of storage facilities (for about 2 million tons of the expected harvest), and the available barns and asphalt places needed repair. Shelest and Shcherbitsky stressed the need to mechanize storage to reduce the high labor input RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9022. L. 150-184.. In the following decades, there was still a shortage of the urgently needed combine harvesters with straw choppers as special trailer constructions for choppers were not provided. Cleaning and delivering the grain to the state in time became a problem as the grain cleaners (OPP-5) were no longer produced RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9184. L. 5-7..

The key problem was the shortage of machinery for large fields RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9209. L. 130-187.. On May 5, 1967, Matskevich and others complained to the CC that the Gosplan did not increase the production of tractors T-100, while the number of tractors of this hp-type at the farms decreased by 52 half from 1959 to 1967 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 87-105; 5-19.. The industry produced only combine harvesters of a small cutting width, not suitable for large fields or even grain yields above 15-20 decitonne per hectare. Therefore, with higher yields, grain losses increased dramatically, also due to the lack of trucks to collect the harvest RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9242. L. 14-16..

In addition to the lack of suitable machines, another key problem was the widespread delivery of defective machinery. On October 22, 1955, the head of the Zaoksk MTS described in detail how farms suffered from such defective machines: the potato harvester KKP-2 often broke on heavy soil and damaged a half of the harvested potatoes; the grain combine harvester S-4 was suitable only for small fields, needed serious technical changes and often broke during the grain harvest; the tractor KD-35 had defective chassis and motor, and so on. “I wish the factory improved its technology” RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7710. L. 152-154..

On April 16, 1966, Matskevich informed the CC that the main problem was the poor quality of the machinery produced by the Soviet industry; moreover, its productivity was declining, while the need for repair and maintenance was growing together with the losses of fuel. 73% of the DT-75 and 53% of the MTZ needed the first general overhaul already during the warranty time RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8961. L. 66-80..

In the fall of 1969, Kardapoltsev, the deputy Minister of Agriculture, informed the CC about serious defects of tractors and plows. At the All-Union Competition of Tractor Drivers in Tartu, Estonia, 6 of 23 tractors T-74, 5 of 20 MZZ-50L and all 23 plows PKS-4-35 showed serious defects. Thus, the agricultural technical requirements of the high-quality plowing were not met. Kardapoltsev demanded to pay serious attention to these defects as causing the farms great losses RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9127. L. 184-191..

In 1969-1970, the new tractor DT-75M was delivered to farms, although the defects revealed during testing were not eliminated and the motor produced by the Altai factory was not reliable. On February 18, 1969, Volovchenko and Ezhevsky protested to the CM against the sales by the Ministry of Car, Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Construction of the DT-75M at a price higher than agreed and despite its defects and insufficient reliability revealed during testing RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9241. L. 60-62.. On July 7, 1969, Ezhevsky reported on the defective Altai motors of the tractors DT-75M and T-4 and the combine harvester SK-4. 158 of 219 tractors DT-75M' motors tested by the Krasnodarsk farms broke after 100 to 700 hours of work due to the violations of the production technology. From January to May 1969, there were complaints about 1,123 of 1,156 delivered motors, but the factory did not care. Ezhevsky asked to stop the delivery of defective motors and to order the factory to repair motors at own expense RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9314. L. 5-13.. On July 21, 1969, Kardapoltsev addressed the CC Secretary Kulakov: from 617 tractors DT 75M delivered from the Volgograd Factory to farms in 1968, 534 had serious problems with motors (many engine failures and replacements of parts) which caused high losses RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9207. L. 104-107.. On September 2, 1969, Ezhevsky and Kardapoltsev protested to the CM against the mass production of the Volgograd DT 75M with the Altai motors, because their major defects were not eliminated. They asked to order the urgent elimination of defects, the new testing, and the repair of tractors by the factory RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9242. L. 174-176..

In 1970, at the July CC Plenum, some regional party secretaries criticized the defective agricultural machinery as responsible for huge harvest losses. Some combine harvesters were served by 6-7 people. Not the additional but the high-quality machinery was needed to increase labor productivity. However, the level of mechanization of many livestock farms was decreasing: for instance, only 12 Kazakh livestock farms were fully mechanized; in the Voronezh Region the sugar-beet harvesting was not mechanized RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9266. L. 196-212..

When introducing animal husbandry at large farms, the lack of transport for harvesting, especially of fodder, became a permanent problem. On August 2, 1966, Matskevich and Ezhevsky informed the Gosplan about the shortage of transport for the Gosplan included only 150,000 trucks in the Five-Year-Plan (1966-1970). For several years, the farms were receiving only a fourth of the requested transport: in 1965 - 95,000 of 382,000 trucks. The lack of transport hindered the use of fertilizers, harvesting of green fodder, constructions and the in-time delivery of agricultural products to the state; it caused standstills during the grain, fodder and sugar beet harvesting, i.e., high harvest losses: for sugar beets and corn not collected in time, 5 days of delay meant a loss of 10% of the harvest, and even higher losses for grain. In Eastern Kazakhstan, the grain harvesting usually lasted 36 to 40 days with the corresponding decline in yields from 21.5 to 4.1 decitonne per hectare. Thus, the harvest losses due to lack of trucks were huge, and by 1970 the need for trucks would double RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9023. L. 74-77.. In 1962, the US agriculture had about 3 million trucks (and additional wheeled tractors), while the USSR farms - less than 1 million RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8857. L. 96-109. and hardly any special transport (Merl, 2020b). On October 6, 1971, Matskevich informed the CC that collective and state farms needed 1.5 million trucks, had only 0.85 million trucks, and 183,000 of them 1.6 urgently needed repair. 33% of trucks at collective farms and 18% at state farms were in use for more than 10 years, i.e., were outdated. Nearly all available trucks had a small tonnage. The situation became even worse, when 25% to 30% of the farms' trucks were taken by the army to transport the harvest RGAE. F. 7486. D..

The lack of transport at farms caused serious problems with bringing mineral fertilizers and other inputs from distant railway stations. When the Ministry wanted to increase the supply of mineral fertilizers in the mid-1950, it mentioned all problems with sending fertilizers to remote collective and state farms: construction of storages at the railway stations and at the farms, transport to bring fertilizers to the farms, machinery for applying fertilizers. The lack of transport at farms affected the railways: some freight cars waited for years to be unloaded. Moreover, the industry often provided fertilizers unpacked or poorly packed. On February 1, 1966, Volovchenko complained to the CC about the low quality of mineral fertilizers for their concentration did not meet the international standards. Only 30% of fertilizers were granulated. Fertilizers often arrived in torn bags due to not being previously cooled as abroad, which caused high losses RGAE. F. 7486. D.. When transported unpacked and unloaded at the stations, about 10% of fertilizers spoiled in the open at the railway stations.

On January 31, 1955, Benediktov raised the transport question for the first time when addressing the CM: freight cars with machinery, tractors and building material for the Kazakh MTSs were not unloaded immediately, stood at stations for a long time, and the railway claimed penalty payments RGAE. F. 7486. D.. On February 3, 1955, Beshchev (the Ministry of Transport) informed Kaganovich of the unloaded freight cars at several railway stations RGAE. F. 7802. D.. Finally, on December 10, 1956, the CM ordered the railway to transport all deliveries to the MTSs itself at the beginning of 1957 RGAE. F. 7486. D.. On December 17, 1957, Gundobin, the Minister of Transport, informed the CM that the unloading of 28,162 freight cars with agricultural goods was delayed for receivers did not take them RGAE. F. 7486. D.. On April 18, 1958, Kozlov (the Commission of Soviet Control) reported that 13,670 freight cars with mineral fertilizers stood unloaded at the railway stations: 180 cars - since 19521954, 860 - since 1955-1956, 6,390 arrived in 1958 RGAE. F. 7486. D.. In 1956 9%, in 1957 7.2%, and in the first quarter of 1958 15% of fertilizers were not collected by farms RGAE. F. 7486. D.. On January 12, 1961, the Gosplan insisted that, according to the 1956 CM decree, the railway was responsible for the fertilizers' transportation to the farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8659. L. 21-28.. On March 15, 1967, the Soyusselkhoztecknik informed the CC and CM on the still unresolved situation with the storage of fertilizers in the open at the railway stations, which caused the loss of 6 from 30.5 million tons of fertilizers (i.e., about 20 million tons of grain) in 19661 RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9103. L. 118-127..

Defective machinery and the lack of special machinery and transport determined the farms' excessive spending on repair and fuel, huge harvest losses, and long stillstands when waiting for spare parts or tires. Therefore, farms could not reduce the labor input and costs of production. The governing bodies did not pay farms any compensations for such hardships and blamed them for all the problems.

The Party's choice: local officials' fault and `socialist competition'

The party leaders (Khrushchev and Brezhnev) followed the traditional path of blaming the lower officials for the regime's mistakes and of appealing to the workers for raising productivity without providing them with the efficient machinery. As with perfect machinery everyone can achieve good results, the defective machinery was a precondition for declaring workers `heroes' of the `socialist competition'.

In 1955, there was a rumor that the MTS machinery would not allow to harvest the planned amount of hay in 7-8 days (which was unrealistic) in order to put pressure on drivers RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7678. L. 58-68.. For fulfilling the MTSs' plan for corn harvesting only by 9.5% and for not providing fodder for collective farms the lower MTS officials were blamed - for not using the machinery efficiently RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8183. L. 192-193.. The MTSs were blamed for the excessive spending on repair for its costs exceeded the planned ones RGAE. F. 7486. D. 7678. L. 48-57.. On October 26, 1967, Kardapoltsev, the deputy minister, informed the CC that collective farms often wrote machinery off too early: in 1966 - 16% to 24% of tractor plows, 11% to 32% of corn combine harvesters in different regions. However, he admitted that much of the agricultural machinery of farms was technically and morally outdated RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 158-161.. On June 27, 1968, Kobanov (the Committee of the People's Control) reported to Kosygin that the farms' shortcomings were close to the criminal negligence: agricultural machines, including the imported equipment, stood in the mud or snow RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9167. L. 46-49.. On January 7, 1969, Matskevich informed the CM, according to its request `to protect agricultural equipment', that not only the outdated machinery was written off RGAE. F. 7486. D.. On February 14, 1969, Matskevich, Ezhevsky and others informed the CM that, despite the increased supplies, the number of machines in collective and state farms was less than planned. Sometimes tractors, combines and melioration equipment were written off for no good reason. They demanded a better use of the available machinery and an increase in the drivers' motivation to maintain it RGAE. F. 7486. D.. Matskevich was aware of the agricultural machinery defects but continued to blame local officials: on April 2, 1968, he accused Rashidov (the CC of Uzbekistan) and Kurbanov (the CM of Uzbekistan) of the shortcomings in the use and maintenance of the machinery in Uzbekistan. Although they received new machines, the labor productivity remained low, while the costs of the machinery repair and technical maintenance kept growing RGAE. F. 7486. D..

Goroshkin, the deputy chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Remuneration, suggested to award tractor drivers for the low fuel consumptions and to punish them for the excessive fuel consumption `due to the driver's fault' with 60% of the costs. On October 11, 1966, Sidak (the deputy Minister of Agriculture) warned about the consequences: the threat of punishment for more than 30% `excessive fuel consumption' was not economically reasonable for the tractor drivers would refuse to take tasks with a high risk of the excessive fuel consumption RGAE. F. 7486. D..

The complex mechanization depended on the qualified workforce. While the lack of tractors and combines was the main problem in the 1950s, from the 1960s onwards it was the lack of well-trained people to drive and repair tractors and combines. Defective tractors, the high risk of occupational illnesses and fatal accidents determined an increasing turnover of trained drivers, i.e., the human resources were wasted: when the trained people left for cities, new drivers were trained, which is why the majority of drivers had little experience and knowledge.

On April 16, 1966, Matskevich informed the CC that a better use of tractors depended on the availability of drivers. From 1962 to 1964, 953,000 drivers were trained, while 800,000 - 89% of drivers - left the countryside. Such a high turnover (most tractor and combine drivers left after 15 months on collective farms or 14 months on state farms) was determined by the negative work experience and seasonal employment. Often there were no engineers, mechanics RGAE. F. 7486. D. and agricultural specialists: graduates were to move to special regions and farms, but refused to do so RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9020. L. 24-27.. Thus, in 1965, 7.5% of 20,000 university graduates did not come to the prescribed collective and state farms. The situation with graduates of agricultural schools was even worse: for instance, in Ukraine, 24.3% of graduates did not come to the prescribed farms. However, even if the graduate arrived, he was of little help for farms - many were soon drafted into the military and never returned RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9020. L. 47-59.. On September 21, 1966, Matskevich informed the CM on many complaints about the increase in the turnover of specialists. As one reason was the low salary, he required a significant increase in wages RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9019. L. 33-37.. However, instead of raising wages, from the mid-1960s onwards, the Party tried to prevent the high turnover by the honorary titles for agricultural workers and celebration of the `agricultural worker's day'. On October 6, 1966, the board discussed the draft decree `On celebrating the agricultural worker's day' RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8947. L. 210; D. 8961. L. 100. as the All-Union public holiday RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9127. L. 162-166..

In 1966, such honorary titles as the `honored agronomist of the RSFSR' were granted on the personal application RGAE. F. 7486. D. 8961. L. 178-188.. On June 10, 1966, Matskevich suggested to the CM to introduce such titles as the `honored livestock technician of the republic' with the salary increment of 10 rublesi RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 228-234.. On February 3, 1967, the board discussed the Order of Labor Glory for agricultural workers and members of collective farms RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9036. L. 19-38.. On September 1, 1967, Matskevich and Ezhevsky suggested to the CC to introduce honorary titles for tractor and combine drivers: `honored representative of the Soviet agricultural mechanization', `honored tractor/combine driver of Soviet agriculture' RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 147-154.. On July 25, 1968, other new titles were discussed - `collective of communist work' (with some special regional requirements), and `master of animal husbandry' (first-class master, second-class master, etc.) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9116. L. 278-299; D. 9195. L. 277-283..

The idea to raise labor productivity by awarding honorary titles reached its peak in 1971. In spring, Matskevich with colleagues sent the CC a draft decree `On measures to strengthen the moral reward for good production results', which suggested awarding farms with orders and the best workers - with the title `hero of socialist work', orders and medals. At that time, every year 65 to 75 best farms and 20,000 to 30,000 best workers were awarded, and the number of best workers was to be increased by 10-15,000. New honorary titles were introduced: for instance, for female tractor drivers - a medal named 58 after Pasha Angelina. To award research and training institutions and administrative bodies, the honorary certificates of the CC, CM and Unions were to be introduced. 1,455 honorary diplomas of the Ministry of Agriculture, the CC of the Union of Agricultural Workers could be awarded together with 1.5 million rubles of cash rewards. The republics were to follow the same path. To attract public attention to the work results, the All-Union consultations of best workers were to be organized RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9356. L. 77-108..

Although the state would have profited from the reduction of production costs and labor input, it used the poor quality of agricultural machines to strengthen the political stability. Not the industry but the local officials were accused of the `irresponsible' maintenance of the farms' agricultural machinery. From the mid-1960s onwards the state strived to enlist the workers' support by awarding them with honorary titles and orders and wasted huge resources on increasing workers' motivation. Awards were granted mainly for physical efforts and revealing stopgaps. However, the impact of such measures on labor productivity or production came to naught.

Alternatives: the transfer of the production responsibility to farms

How did the heads of state and collective farms together with workers assess the state agrarian policy? There is very little `uncensored' data on this issue, which shows that some qualified farm leaders were fed up with the permanent interference from above. They could manage production and increase its efficiency themselves. As the mood of Czech agricultural workers and farm directors was quite similar to that of their Soviet colleagues, let us consider their demands that were openly expressed during the Prague Spring of 1968.

On February 20, 1968, Matskevich reported to the CC on the most important events at the second CSSR Cooperative Congress in Prague. The Czech economic reforms in agriculture, processing industry and agricultural machinery production suggested that the system of industrial associations needed special services for supplying agriculture in order to improve cooperation between cooperatives and processing plants. Cooperatives' responsibility for production should be strengthened and the unnecessary parts of the state administration eliminated. The Party Secretary Dubchek praised the work of peasants and admitted that they did not need any extra instructions on when to start sowing or harvesting. The task of the central administration was reduced to providing favorable conditions for the development of agricultural productive forces. Dubchek mentioned the large number of complaints about the lack of fertilizers and high prices for the poor-quality agricultural machinery produced in the CSSR, GDR and USSR. Some delegates required that the farms were given money to purchase any agricultural machines they wanted. Other delegates opposed specialization and planning. They wanted to decide themselves which production branches would be most profitable for development. Many delegates opposed the state interference in the construction of poultry farms for cooperatives could handle it themselves. Matskevich stressed that `demagogic statements against ministries' found broad support, when Frantisek Kunc demanded to free the cooperative system `from top to bottom' without new slogans and obligations as cooperatives knew better what to produce RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9130. L. 4-12..

Khudenko's reform would require the transfer of responsibility to the farm workers - teams and brigades working without the rules set from above (beznaryado-zvenievaya sistema). He considered the centralized standards for labor organization and remuneration unnecessary and even harmful. After testing the proposed reform at the Iliysk state farm in Kazakhstan for the second time, Khudenko developed the `general principles' RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9018. L. 241-244. for organizing the work and remuneration at farms: the state farm was to get its production tasks for 3-5 years in advance, including the planned costs, wage funds and capital investments; the production unit (team) in the mechanized crop production was to consist of 4-5 drivers working together during the whole contract period; the team was to be formed on a voluntary basis from `broad specialists' (combine/tractor/truck driver); 750 to 1000 hectares of agricultural land, tractors, combine harvesters and trucks were to be provided for the team; the driver's workload was to be 2000 standard hours a year; the monthly payment was to be calculated on the basis of standard hours, while the final payment - on the basis of production results (harvest) RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 60-66.. This Khudenko's proposal resembled the working principle of the shabashniki - temporary contract teams engaged, for instance, in construction projects and paid for the built house.

Khudenko had support from above when tested his reform for the first time. There were more opportunities for experiments under Khrushchev, and he did not ask for any additional help from the state. Khudenko wanted to prove that the work could be done with less machinery and labor input provided the high motivated drivers due to their self-organization and own responsibility. On November 12, 1960, the Commission on Ongoing Affairs of the CM approved the testing in the virgin-land region in Kazakhstan RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 62-66.. The testing was a great success in the economic perspective: the whole farm work was done by only 60 (of 863) workers and with only 60 (of 150) tractors. The participants were organized into 6 teams with 10 drivers and 10 tractors each. However, the workers no longer needed for production expressed dissatisfaction, and Khudenko was made responsible for the unrest (Yanov, 1984: 31-33). Thus, on August 31, 1962, the CM Presidium received a recommendation to withdraw the testing permission RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 62-66.. According to Matskevich, the `specialists' came to the conclusion that the proposed reform would reduce the material incentives for drivers, and that the reduction in the number of workers would lead mainly to savings RGAE. F. 7486. D. 9046. L. 60-66.. As raising the USSR's poor labor productivity was at the top of the political agenda this sounds rather strange, but ideology triumphed over economics, and Matskevich protested against further testings.