Security in Turkey

3.5 Regional Complex Security Theory (RCST)

The field of International Security is without a doubt is of a great concern in the world affairs. Regional Security Complex Theory influences IR according to the security and power politics discourses of its units. Buzan argues that security is a relational phenomenon therefore, it is not possible to understand the national security of a country without understanding the international setting of security interdependence in which it exists (Buzan, 1998: 187) Buzan's main emphasis in security discourse is on the regional level and believes that `regional security' should take a special place in a country's foreign policy and security should be analyzed from different dimensions; in another word, his main distinction points were; during and post-Cold War security studies, scope of security studies and inclusion of topics such as immigration, national and global criminal and terroristic organizations, environmental issues and economic well-being which were ignored in the traditional security studies. While analysing regional security and its effects, Buzan have introduced many important concepts. First and most important in our case is the concept of amity and enmity which according to Buzan leads to the formation of a “security complex” (ibid., 189). “A regional security complex is a set of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1991: 190) It recommends an analytical framework to investigate how security concerns tie together in a regional pattern in which geographical and historical dimensions. In addition, other factors like historical past, territory, ethnic lines and ideology can affect the amity/enmity concept.

Turkey is situated at margins of at least two important Regional Security Complexes; Middle East (including the sub-complexes of the Levant, Gulf and the Maghreb) and the European Union (including the Balkans sub-complex) and maybe the ex-Soviet complex (including the Baltics; Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; the Caucasus; and Central Asia) (Barrinha, 2013: 165-182). In our case, the security complex must include the most important factor of our research which is the Kurdish population. As a result, we consider Turkey and its constituent units; Iran, Iraq (including the Iraqi Kurdistan) and Syria as a security complex. The reason for bringing the mentioned countries in a single complex are; that they are all geographically situated in the Middle East, the territory and integrity of these countries will be in danger if the Kurdish population residing in these countries seriously develop a separatist ideology and the members of this complex historically or in terms of ethnic lines intersect in some points; in another words, they have language, culture or ideological similarities which can bring them together. It is worth to note that the Kurdish population residing in these countries could also make their own security complex to peruse their own goals. Turkey as a country which has embedded almost half of the Kurdish population in it, and have been suffering more than any other member of this set, in terms of security, economics and socially from the Kurdish side specially the PKK, should have a greater role in forming the security complex. The two foreign policy doctrines drafted by Ahmet Davutoglu, features that Turkey was in search of forming such complexes. Turkey's economic developments and prosperity and its precise foreign policy during the AKP rule have proved that a great majority seems to think that Turkey may serve as a model for the Middle East (Seufert, 2011: 3).

3.6 Kemalism: the expanding machine of the Kurdish question

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the Turkish Republic, a framework for the minority rights of the country were drawn by Ataturk and his colleagues which is still in use and that is the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty was a replacement for the 1920 Sevres Treaty and formed the borders of Republic of Turkey (Yildiz 2005: 7) This framework introduced the notion “Turkishness” as a unison non-ethnic identity for the whole citizens of Turkey (Yildiz 2005: 11), in order to get rid of ethno-cultural differences and promoting non-discrimination in the country. Their goal was to promote global citizenship aspect and avoid the dual standard of the Ottoman Empire's “first class” and second class citizens (Icduygu & Soner 2006: 453) while ignoring the minority group's basic rights (Kymlicka 1995: 4).

The Lausanne Treaty distinguishes the minority groups into two categories; first, the Muslim large minority groups like Kurds, Laz and Alevites which were not even recognized as minorities (Kisacik 2010: 12) and still large proportion of the Turkish community have the same belief. The Turkish constitution also do not recognize large Muslim minority groups with distinctive ethno-cultural and language features as minorities (OSCE Report 2007: 20). However, the Lausanne Treaty recognizes a handful of non-Muslim minority groups- such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews (Kaya, 2011: 202). These groups were allowed to practice their own language and tradition and build their social, religious institutions to the extent that their activities do no contradict with the principles of the new Republic of Turkey, specifically the unity of the country.

Ataturk at the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence promised a bi-national Republic of Turks and Kurds; thus, received large support from the Kurdish side. However, after the war he suppressed the Kurds by all means instead and denied their national and cultural rights to create a single Turkish nation from distinctive Muslim ethnic groups (Yavuz, 2009; 190) Therefore, the Kemalist ideology seems to be the expanding machine of the Kurdish question. As the Kurdish communities; for instance, Shaikh Said in 1925 tried to rebel against the Turkish Republic authorities, which resulted in a harsh response from the officials and a stricter policies and emphasize on the “Turkishness” identity (Aytar & Cavdar 2010: 7) Orhan Pamuk (Pamuk, 2005: 225) best describes the Kemalist approach toward minority groups as following:

“They (the Turkish nationalists) had a political agenda: they were picking their way through the ruins looking for signs of a new Turkish state, a new Turkish nationalism: the Ottoman Empire might have fallen, but the Turkish people who had made it great (like the state, the two were happy to forget the Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, the Kurds and many other minorities) and they wanted to show that, though suffused in melancholy they were still standing tall”.

For the last four decades and the rise of Kurdistan's Worker's Party (PKK), which tries to reach their goals through military approach, the Kemalists always have seem to the Kurdish question as an equivalent to the PKK and terrorism. Thus, Kemalism have traditionally approached toward the issue by military means. In addition, to the Kurdish question, Kemalists are not tolerant to political Islam as well.

3.7 Neo-Ottomanism and AKP

Apparently, the Kurdish question was not considered a question under the Ottoman Empire, at least the Ottomans recognized the Kurds as a linguistically and culturally distinctive ethnic group than Turks. The Ottoman Empire because of its vast geography is featured with multiculturalism; including peoples of different religious, language and ethnic groups living in peace. However, the main and dominant power was recognized as the Sunni-Muslim embracing Turkish tradition (Yegen, 1999: 557; Kirisci 1997: 114) According to the Ottoman cast system; peoples were classified based on their religion to Muslims and non-Muslims categories not based on ethnicity; nonetheless, the Muslims hierarchy occupied the top “first-class” (Kisacik, 2010: 13; Icduygu & Sonver 2006: 448) More interestingly, despite the widely discrimination against the non-Muslims communities, they were allowed to have their own self-governing communities (Kisacik, 2010: 14; Icduygu & Soner 2006: 452)

Thus, the Kurds were free to practice their tradition and speak their own language, Kurdish. However, evidences show that in early 19^th century (1880s) there were some Kurdish tribal and religious figures who claimed self-determination from the Ottoman and Safavid Empire. For instance, Shaykh Ubayd Allah of Nihri is known as first great Kurdish nationalist who invaded Persia in 1880 claiming acting in the name of Kurdish and the formation of the `Kurdish League' purportedly a nationalist movement by the Shaykh (McDowall, 2007: 53). The Ottoman policies toward the Kurds were unpredictable and seem strange that the Sultan, having once suppressed the Kurdish emirates during the years of Ottoman tanzimat (1826-76) should have vested Shaykh Ubayd Allah with so much power (ibid., 57) However, Shaykh Ubayd Allah did not see a high chance of the survival of a truly independent Kurdistan in such troubled region in 1880s (McDowall, 2007: 58).

Turkish politics witnessed a major change in November 2002 elections when Islamist technocrats, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, came to power. Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP), emerged from the ashes of the “Welfare Party” (Islamist Party, banned in 1998 by the constitutional court for confronting the secularistic values) (Unver, 2011: 152) of Necmettin Erbakan formed a government which is regarded as a milestone in the history of socio-political transformations of Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism best represented by the AKP, and Kemalism are the two major ideologies dominant in Turkey which is constantly in confrontation with each other on the issues of being an Islamist, secular, nationalist and their approach toward the Kurdish question.

AKP's stance on the Kurdish issue is constantly shifting from recognition to complete denial. The reason for the constantly changing position toward the Kurdish question is assumed to be the preservation of power (Yavuz, 2009: 187). For instance, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, Erdogan as leader of the party and the government on August, 2005 though with reluctant, acknowledged the existence of the Kurdish Question in Diyarbakir which is the unofficial capital of the Kurds (ibid.: 188; Vatan, 2007). While several months before his acknowledgement on April 13, 2005 he denied the existence of a Kurdish problem in Turkey; it is a fictitious problem he argued in Oslo (ibid.) He added that his party address the issue within the framework of citizenship and they are at equal distance to all around thirty distinct ethnic groups living in Turkey. Furthermore, in January 2007 Erdogan denied the Kurdish question and argued that “there is no Kurdish question, there is terrorism question.” (Unver, 2011: 156, Vatan, 2007).

To analyse Turkey from a RSCT perspective in the Middle East, we could see that the most probably the Kurdish question, the Palestinian issue and AKP's ethical and sympathetic approach toward the Arab uprising (except Bahrain) are within the framework of neo-Ottoman agenda. The Palestinian question is a vital cause which not only unifies the Middle East but the whole Islamic world. Therefore, Erdogan's seriously criticism of the Israeli President at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009 and “Mavi Marmara” events in a way, securitized the Palestinian issue and relations with Israel and was act of bringing Turkey to a changing security environment. However, the Kurdish question in the contrary to the Palestinian issue, in an unprecedented effort, was desecuritized domestically and abroad under the “zero-problems with neighbours policy”. In addition, the AKP officials in 2009 mentioned in a public assembly that “no political problem in the region can be resolved without [utilising] Ottoman archives” aiming that the Ottoman history should be a part of the peace processes in the Middle East (Aras, 2009: 7).

The neo-Ottomans stress on Islamic identity and believes that a single Islamic identity is the key to the Kurdish issue. AKP believes that “the components of the population in Turkey are unified by shared Islamic bond” and Erdogan referred to the “Turkish origin and Kurdish origin “separately and added that the Kurds do not have any problem in Turkey (Yavuz, 2009: 191). In short, we can conclude from AKP's stance on Kurdish issue that (a) AKP does not regard “Turkish identity” or the “Turkish” nation as the national identity of the population of Turkey; and (b) The party stresses on Islamic identity, along with legal citizenship, as the national identity of Turkey. (ibid.) However, from the Kurdish perspective specially from PKK's point of view the Islamic identity and the legal citizenship cannot solve the Kurdish issue. Because the Kurdish population do not only want to be recognized as Turkish citizens or as Muslims but they want to be recognized as distinguished ethnic identity with specific rights which makes them co-equal to Turkish identity.

3.8 Kurdistan's Workers Party (PKK)

During the difficult period of the late 1970s, several Kurdish groups seeking independence in Turkey were created. Kurdistan Workers' Party (P.K.K: Partiya Karkarena Kurdistan) that the action plan was a fusion of Marxism and Kurdish nationalism, was the most powerful of these groups. Although it was believed that PKK after the coup by the Turkish military on September 12, 1980, has been completely destroyed. However, “in August 1984 PKK renovated itself as a revolutionary organization in the quest of Kurdish independence” (Barkey & Fuller 1998; 21) under its founding leader, Abdullah Ocalan, and started a growing guerrilla war in South-eastern Anatolia. Until August 1993 P.K.K had such a rapid growth so that Ocalan could claim: “the Kurdish problem has deadlocked Turkey's foreign policy”. PKK set its top priority to undermine the economic foundations and enterprise of Turkey (Aysegul, Emrence 2015; 61) and Ocalan declared that without our approval, no oil pipeline will cross here (Kurdish regions) and if it does, it will not be possible to utilize it. For instance, PKK made it clear that they would delay the construction of Baku-Tiblisi-Cyhan pipleline, a investment from Russia to South Caucasus and finally into Turkey (Aydin & Cem, 2015; 44)

It is difficult to understand the Turkish history in the course of the last quarter-century without considering the role played by the Kurdish nationalism and specifically the role of PKK which is without a doubt the most extreme version of the Kurdish nationalism manifestation in contemporary history (Yavuz, 2009: 171). “The rise of the PKK and its fear strategies in the 1980s have accomplished more to characterize the “Turkishness” identity than seventy years of republican approaches went for the homogenization of the people” (Turkone 1995: 31). The PKK which was established in 1974, carried out its first great attack in 1984 and reached its peak by 1990s; however, since the early 2000s after the arrest of Ocalan the conflict cooled down, and under the AKP government as a “desecuritization” process of the Kurdish question there has been a peace process and negotiations between the government and the PKK (Berkey & Fuller, 1998: 21). Abdullah Цcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 by Turkish intelligence and the help of CIA (Marcus, 2007: 277-279) and he was sentenced to death; however, after his trail, he dramatically changed his view on Kurdish issue from separatist or federal solution to a great advocate of democratization and pluralism in Turkey as a solution for the Kurdish question (Pirim & Ortulu, 1999: 293-361). It is worth to note that the Syrian government has a vital role in the rising of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey; specifically, the PKK and its uncontested leader. With the help of the Syria, Ocalan has achieved, at least among a considerable part of Turkey's even non-Kurdish population a status that no other Turkish Kurd personality has ever reached, definitely not since Shaykh Said days. (Barkey & Fuller, 1998: 42)

3.9 PKK's Security Threats on Turkey based on the Copenhagen School

Current major and important security threat against Turkey is the PKK, and flow of Kurdish fighters. Following the collapse of the ceasefire and peace talks in July 2015 between the Turkish government and the PKK, the chaotic situation prevailing in Turkey, and the impact the Syrian crisis and rise of Kurdish YPD has increase security concerns in Turkey. The new situation in Iraq and Syria, has created a new security issues for Turkey. Meanwhile, looking both Iraq and Syria, two neighboring countries, which are involved in various anti-security issues, IS, PKK and its affiliates represents a serious presence in these countries which makes the situation increasingly complex. Thus, PKK has increased its presence in both Southeastern Turkey, Northern region of neighboring Syria and some parts of Iraq. According to the Copenhagen School, insecurity in the region around Turkey, threatens its security of military, political, economic, social and environmental well-being. For further transparency of the five aspects of security, I have tried to introduce them in the following. And anti-security activities of the PKK against the Turkish government in each of these categories and dimensions are measured and examined separately and key issues affecting these aspects will be discussed.

3.9.1 Military Aspect

The military dimension is the most classical perception of the concept of security which was important during the Cold War's bipolar structure and competition of the two blocks. After the Cold War, the importance of this dimension was not reduced, but somehow, military section's performance in regional crises in the Balkans, Afghanistan and many other regions, represents acceptance of other aspects of security such as social security by its side (Adler, 2008: 13). In the general case of military threats, traditionally the national security has been at the center of concerns. Usually, military action could threaten all parts of government. There is no doubt, in order to show its deterrence capability and military power, Turkey would have to invest a lot in border areas and abroad in Syria and Iraq. Basically entering the military war is influencing the country as a whole directly or indirectly; including from social and economic perspective. Turkey has always been one of the main security issue concerns, comparing to its neighboring country Iran, which have maintained the relative safety of the bustle of chaos and insecurity is adjacent territories. The Turkish-Kurdish relations in the past few decades has been full of incidents; as a result, according to statistics, more than 40,000 people have lost their lives in this un-ending conflict. International Crises group (2016) described the recent conflicts between Turkey and the PKK insurgents as “the worse since 1990s” and added that 600 people have been killed within only six months which 200 of them were civilians. Regardless of the government's weak or strong position in this dispute, always human and economic costs of military action remain high (Buzan, 2011: 141-az farsi) The Turkish government has decided to expand its operations against PKK expand. Accordingly, the government extended its armed struggle to the borders of Syria and Iraq under the “Euphrates Shield Operations”. On the other hand, the PKK does not seem to be lodged against these attacks and urged to bring its forces to cities and continue to combat in the cities rather than in the mountains.

The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons known as TAK is considered as PKK's military wing emerged recently which follows an Al-Qaeda model of suicide attacks and assassinations in the public sphere. TAK targets Western cities, and tourism resorts more frequently and professionally comparing to the early years of PKK (Marcus, 2007: 2). So if the government fails to find an innovative solutions and break the deadlock, then most likely the problem will continue in to take more life specially civilians. However, from an opportunity-driven view, Turkey's military engagement in Iraq and Syria could be interpreted as either a military showcase for its opponents or an operational training and gaining knowledge of a variety of strategies and tactics of urban and guerilla warfare, which can boast the capabilities of Turkey's security forces, while at the same time fighting the terrorists. In addition to the military maneuvers with the aim of promoting deterrence in Syria and Iraq, Turkey could follow its neo-Ottoman policy in the Middle East.

3.9.2 Political Aspect

In the field of security perhaps the most prominent aspect of political security, is the sovereignty discourse and the rule of institutions that emerged from it. Political threats always shadow over government agencies. Threat may differ from; pressure over the government on adopting a specific policy, overthrowing the government, separatism and to disrupt the political context of the government to weaken it before the military conflict. The idea of the state, especially national identity and ideology, its promoters and state institutions, are common targets of political threats. Because the government is essentially a political entity, political threats may be as harsh as military threat.

Political threats emerge as a result of ideas and customs that also justifies the international anarchy. Because of assertive nature of these ideologies and customs, a state that favors one side is conceived as a threat by others. The rivalry between ideologies are very complex which makes it difficult to define political threat. In the meantime, national identity threat is transparent. These types of threats, including attempts to expand separation of cultural and ethnic identity between the groups in a country is the main goal. It is required to distinguish between the political threat, both deliberate ideological or national and those that are merely caused the legitimacy of the governments by alternative external means (Buzan people, state and fear: 144).

As of PKK, looking to its political ideas that has grown around it, representing a Kurdish nationalist movement which is seeking to establish an independence country of their own. Kurdish separatism has always been a threat to Turkey's national security and integrity and its neighbouring countries; Iran, Iraq and Syria also have been effected by this phenomenon. Compared to the countries mentioned above, the Kurds in Iraq, has a more complex role to play in national security, which also affects the security of its neighbours. About 15 to 20 percent of Iraq's population are Kurds. They are among the early groups to put the Iraqi government under pressure to create an independent state. On the other hand, according to available documents, most likely in recently years PKK and PJAK in critical junctures will appear as a unified threat for the states concerned with this issue (Aghazadeh Khoei, 2015: 3).

In the meanwhile, increasing bilateral and multilateral regional alliances between Turkey and its regional allies i.e. with the Kurdistan Regional Government and also highlighting the recent role and cooperation between Iran and Russia as strategic allies for Turkey in the Syrian civil war showed that Turkey will do everything to resist and deter such threats. On the other hand, the involved countries Iraq, Iran and Syrian governments also are clearly aware of such threats; however, there is no doubt that PKK pose a more serious threat to Turkey comparing to Iran. Moreover, a mobile strong armed group such as PKK can turn into an apparatus for any opponent nation such as Iran, which tries to increase its influence in the region.s

3.9.3 Social Aspect

The social aspect of security includes defining security in terms of quality of social life, identity and norms (Chena, 2008: 32). Today, national security is not limited only to the military sector and perhaps the lack of social security and threats to citizens, such as reduced hope for life or life expectancy, is more important than military security to national security. As social threat is not easily distinguishable from political threats. The main problem of social threat in terms of national security, is that most them rises from within the country. Since social security is basically the traditional patterns of language, culture, religious, ethnic identity and customs are concerned, these values are threatened most of the time from within the country. Certainly in terms of Kurdish questions influencing the public opinion in the community, we have witnessed a huge difference. Passing the ten present parliamentary election threshold by a pro-Kurdish party in Turkish general election is a major example of the Kurds. Many young Turks voted for the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP). PKK on the other hand, in order to attract the Alawites of Turkey to its manifesto which makes 15 percent of the total population, they recently appointed three Alevi Kurds and one Alevi Turk (Cagaptay, 2014: 1) were appointed to the six-member Executive Council. In addition, three of the six members of the council is women which is something unprecedented in the history of the PKK (ibid.,). PKK's all these ethnic and gender equality promotions are a part of special recruitment policies to promote thinking, recruitment and dissemination of news and opinions. Furthermore, PKK added two names in its top military ranks who are from Syrian Kurds; this may strengthen PKK's social basis among the Syrian Kurds although the PYD has close ties with the PKK. When it comes to combating the PKK, because of not having a particular permanent base, and the guerrilla tactics and spread to civil populated areas so that in this way make any measure difficult for the Turkish armed forces to take against them. It is very difficult to distinguish a PKK-member from other part of the society which is actually a weakness for the Turkish side.

4. Turkey's Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is shaped by combination of several factors including “the international system, regional dynamics, national dynamics (such as public opinion, economic structure and lobbies), sociological drivers (such as history, culture and ethnicity) and ideological characteristics of policy makers” (Efegil, 2012). It can be argued that in the case of each country, the role and intensity played by these aforementioned factors differ. In case of Turkey, from the early days of the Turkish republic until the end of the Cold War, sociological factors and national dynamics were the main drivers of Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's pro-Western approach in its foreign policy and not interfering in the Middle East affairs was preferred instead, according to the Kemalist ideologies. On the other hand, when the moderate Islamist or the neo-Ottomans took power in 2000s, Turkey's foreign policy shifted dramatically which will be discussed in details as follows.

4.1 Evolution of the Turkish Foreign Policy

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk the first president of the new Turkish Republic radically changed the society, as a result of mass reforms, the relation of the state with some portion of the society including the Kurds and previous Islamic Caliphate was broken (Aydin, 2003). In addition to domestic mass reforms, Ataturk completely altered the expansionist and assertive foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire to a defensive, neutral and balancing foreign policy in the International Relations with exception of some cases (Martin, 2004). Different approaches presented bout Turkey's foreign policy balance orientation. Graham Fuller can be considered the first theorist of the modern era that explains the role of Turkey in regional security system. Other theorists like Daniel Lerner also have worked to show Turkey's strategic role in the new geopolitical and security structures.

With regard to the philosophy of the founders of the Turkish Republic, the approach toward the pro-Western policy was considered as the first principle of Kemalism in its foreign policy in the region so that after the Second World War, the Middle East was of secondary importance for the country's foreign policy (Fuller, 1999: 115-116). However, Turkish political system faced with new domestic and international variables were as a result of that process, new trends in the area of foreign policy emerged. The Kemalists followed Ataturk's neutral foreign policy until 1980s when Turkey gave permission to the coalition forces to use their airbase for the operation against Iraq (Martin, 2004).

During the AKP rule the activist foreign policy of Turkey developed to a “proactive” foreign policy when Ahmet Davutoglu was Turkey's Foreign Minister (Davutoglu 2013). The one-dimensional Pro-Western foreign policy shifted to a multi-faceted policy and became oriented and multi-dimensional. Especially, Turkey's role in the Middle East increased dramatically but of course, too much focus on the Middle East does not mean that Turkey's relation with the West disrupted. Turkey has an important place in the Western organizations, particularly NATO. Yet with the rise of Islamists in recent years, the Western world have acknowledged that after the end of the Cold War, structural changes have occurred in the security environment in the country. Certainly, Turkey is facing security challenges and threats that most of them rises from the Southern part of the country and perhaps this issue has had an impact in forcing Ankara to intervene in the events of the Middle East.

4.2 Foundations of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

Given the key role and influence that Ahmet Davutoglu, the former Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister had in the shaping and implementation of Turkish foreign policy during the AKP rule, and to understand Turkey's foreign policy and its objectives in the Middle East, we have to begin the analysis from his thoughts. Davutoglu, the main theoretician of modern Turkey's foreign policy has presented his views and insights within two frameworks: “Strategic Depth” and “Zero-problems with Neighbors” policy. The Strategic depth doctrine which is discussed in Davutoglu's book of the same title, argues that a country's status in International Relations is determined by its geostrategic position and historical depth. Accordingly, geopolitics constitute the core of the doctrine penetrating into the indicated dynamics of the relation between domestic, regional and global factors while historical depth provides an assessment of the link between the past, present and future (Ustun, 2014: 93; Davutoрlu, 2008: 80).

And other liberal components such as an emphasis on soft power, trying to mediate and solve regional and international crises and adopting win - win strategy over other countries, completes this Doctrine (Dautoрlu & Deniz: 2002).

In this doctrine, Davutoglu argues that “Turkey due to its special geographical location and history, has strategic depth” and therefore must be unique among the regional countries. And as the central power, to take a leadership role of the peripheral regions and gain strategic importance of the world for itself.

According to Davutoglu, Turkey can be present simultaneously in all regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea and gain a global strategic position. In order to achieve this goal, Turkey needs to do a particular on its soft power. Turkey can use its historic and cultural ties in these regions and promote its democratic institutions and liberal economy in these areas. Turkey, in addition to reduce its military's influence in politics, it should also make efforts to solve regional conflicts and promote economic cooperation in the region not to require the intervention of the Great Powers. Davutoglu believes that Turkey bears multiple regional identities. As a result, Turkey has the ability and the responsibility to adopt an integrated but multi-dimensional foreign policy (Bern, 2015: 17). Active participation in solving regional conflicts, is Turkey's task due to its historical multi-dimensional depth.

Davutoglu argued that Turkey needs to resolve all bilateral disputes that obstruct Turkey's relations with neighbors, and in this context they have offered the "zero problems with neighbors policy" or doctrine. According to this doctrine, Turkey to be able to become a regional power and gain strategic importance internationally, it must establish friendly relations with its neighbors, and resolve the problems and differences between the states (Reynolds, 2012: 11).

The main goal of Turkey in this framework is to achieve maximum convergence and cooperation with neighbours. The RST also suggest that in order for Turkey to become a global player, first it needs to become a regional superpower and for that it needs to belong to a security complex. “Eliminating all disputes and tensions, improving stability in the region through economic interdependency, searching for innovative mechanism and channels to resolve disputes by encouraging positive actions and initiatives, creating cultural bridges or dialogue and mutual understanding are engines and goals of this policy” (Davutoрlu, 2010: 13).

To operationalize these doctrines and theories, the first prerequisite is to have a proactive diplomacy that covers a wide range of priorities of Turkish foreign policy.

The framework in which this policy operates in are as follows:

o Security is not a zero-sum game according to Turkey; in another word, security cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of other countries.

o Supporting the discourse that all problems can and should be resolved through diplomatic and political cooperation.

o Economic interdependence is necessary in that given the importance of peace and stability in the new approach is necessary.

o Cultural harmony and mutual respect.

4.3 Principles and objectives of the AKP foreign policy

The AKP government has not yet attempt to bring an Islamic government; however, under the AKP rule Islamic values have been nurtured and expanded. We can even say that the government is secular rather than Islamist; because they have restricted religion to individual and personal level and have denied to implement Islamic Law in Turkish society. Erdogan announced in several stages that Justice and Development Party's tendency to Islam, is just as the tendency of the Christian Democratic Party of Germany to the teachings of Christ (Ustun, 2014: 9). Abdullah Gul another prominent member of the AKP has insisted repeatedly that there are no plans to establish an Islamic state in Turkey, they adhere to the country's secular constitution. Nevertheless, it has been contended that Islamic character and the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire may acquire more advantages in relations with the west and that 'the acknowledgment of Turkey's position in the West will be more probable through the reinforcing of Turkey's connections toward the East (ibid, 72).

The European standards and criteria and Turkey's bet for the EU membership has widely influenced its foreign policy formation. During the AKP rule, Turkey received notifications regarding normalization of its relationships with its neighbours including, Greece, Syria and Armenia (ibid.). Therefore, the new foreign policy of Turkey is designed to ensure its own security and stability though taking a more active role in bringing security, stability and order to its environment. Overall, elements and indicators that the ruling AKP have designed for operating its foreign policy can be summarized in a few cases:

· Balance between democracy and security

· Zero problem policy towards neighbours (however, this policy is no more the priority after 2010)

· Closely following the Turkey-EU accession process (this process also have faced some serious challenges)

· Developing relations not only with neighbours but beyond (economic interdependency, cultural relationship)

· Multi-dimensional foreign policy (an active role in the Middle East, and become a model in this area in the context of the integration of religion with democracy)

· Rhythmic diplomacy

The general aim of these principles are to alter Turkey's passive foreign policy as a military power to a regional and global power. Turkey strategy for the year 2023 was to become the central figure in the region and sub-regions and a major player in the international system; according to Turkey, the sub-regions or the sub-systems are referred to the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia and North Africa.

However, after the uprisings in the Middle East which is referred as the “Arab Spring” the balance of power changed also changed in the region. Thus, Turkey seems to give more weight to the ideals and ethics and setting democratization a criteria in their policy-making rather than its strategy before the Arab Spring,

of interacting with states regardless of their regime types and ideologies (Isiksal, Huseyin, 2015: 59) This is well documented in Erdogan's dual-policy adaptation toward Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia while Erdogan was among the earliest group of leaders to call for; for instance, Mubarak to resign. However, in the case of Bahrain, “he never endorsed the uprising in order to not antagonize Saudi Arabia” (ibid.) Different groups view Turkish foreign policy from their own ethnic or sectarian perspective. Sunnis in the Middle East (except the Kurds) have a positive view of the Turkish foreign policy after the Arab Spring. On the other hand, the Shias in Iran and Iraq and Shia Turkmens believe on the contrary. Indeed, factors like the Islamic State or ISIS, the Kurdish question and more may have influenced Ankara's new security and foreign policies. In short, the failure of Turkey foreign policy, specially the `zero-problems with neighbors' policy was evident when its relationship with Syria, Iraq and Iran deteriorated over the crisis in Syria and Iraq (Bern, 2015).

4.4 A shift in Turkish Foreign Policy

Changes in behaviour and attitudes of Turkish foreign policy makers after the Islamic awakening and revolutionary upheavals in the Middle East (2011) rises the questions in the minds of researchers in the field of international relations, policy-makers and public opinion, that what are the causes of rotation of successful domestic, economic and foreign policy of the AKP administration from a pragmatic approach, mediator, and economic-oriented policy from 2002 to 2011 to an interventionist, security-oriented, and aggressive policy in the aftermath of the 2011's? The revolutionary developments taking place in the Arabic countries in the Middle East as a milestone, not only altered the internal interactions of the AKP, but the Turkish foreign policy strategies and approaches has entered a new phase. AKP government in a decade, had become one of the most successful governments in the history of Turkey in terms of governance, economic indicators, welfare and human rights, at the beginning of this development Turkey became a successful model for the countries at the edge of transformation and change. However, the zero-problem with neighbours' policy and the economic diplomacy in Turkish foreign policy, was facing strict and dramatic test in how to respond to the revolutionary developments in the neighbouring countries. Changing geopolitical realities in the Middle East, and panic in Turkish foreign policy-making levels on how to deal with these developments, along with other factors, led to a change in the interaction-oriented approaches, economic and soft power-driven and pragmatic foreign policy of the AKP; so that the elites of the party, entered the big game in the Middle East with rivalry, security-oriented, ideological and aggressive in dealing with regional developments and bilateral relations with neighbouring states and beyond.

4.5 Authoritarian and Ideological Approach

In internal policy field, at the same time with an increase in the strength of the party in Turkey and unprecedented transitions in the Arab wold, the Turkish authorities to disregard the discourse of the politics of the country, was seeking to redefine the identity and politics toward the upheaval in the Middle East. The result of this change in the semantic structure of the ruling party, was a decline in characteristics and foundations of Western democracy in Turkey. In parallel to the rise in AKP's popularity and election wins (2007,2011), Turkish citizens and public opinion in the region, have witnessed the imposition of authoritarian and undemocratic policies of the AKP administrative elites. Reports of different international organizations shows a general decline in democracy in Turkey that involves the deterioration of freedom of the press, degradation of freedom of speech, human rights and so on. Specifically, the Kurdish activists are the main victims of such policy. For example, Freedom House's 2014 Freedom of the Press report, downgraded the country's freedom of press from “relatively free” to “not free” (Freedom House, 2014; Al Monitor, 2014). According to the report, 40 journalists were imprisoned as of December 2013, which majority of them were Kurds and charged under antiterrorism laws in KCK-related issues (Freedom House, 2014). Thus, Turkey in the ranking was allocated to be 134^th among 197 countries. After countries such as Nigeria, Lebanon, Tunisia, Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Algeria and Kuwait. Reporters Without Borders in their 2012 report also called Turkey as “world's biggest prison for journalist” and added that “most of the imprisoned journalists are representatives of the Kurdish media” (Reporters Without Borders, 2012). The report insists that Turkish judicial system often conducts a political analysis of the case rather than judicial or legal analysis, when journalists or authors are critical of the AKP government while they are covering the Kurdish question. On the other hand, indicators of democracy of Economist Intelligence Unit in 2013, has defined Turkey as an authoritarian regime, ranked 88 among 167 countries after countries such as Bangladesh, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2014). EIU's democracy index today shows that turkey has become more authoritarian since 2013; Turkey took 97^th place in 2015 which remained untouched until this day (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). There are many more reports and information indicating a decline in Turkey's democratic values and standards and introduces the AKP government as authoritarian. However, it is worth to note that during the second term of government of the ruling party, democracy index (2007) and the third period (2011) had an upward trend. When the state was during the negotiation process to join the EU, Turkey was trying to consolidate the legitimacy of the foundations of his party, and to introduce Turkey as a model Muslim democracy to the Islamic world. But in recent years, especially after the Arab Spring, Turkey has witnessed profound changes in the discourse of the AKP government which ultimately provided the grounds for the decline of democracy in the country.

The Kurdish question which is considered as one of the main political-security challenge in Turkey, has been affected by policies at home and aggressive approaches toward Syria to overthrow the Assad regime, again has created an atmosphere of insecurity and instability in Turkey and southern borders of the country. It happens at the time while Turkey had considerable advances regarding the Kurdish question in the history of the Turkish Republic by granting the Kurds a relief package of cultural, educational and linguistic rights. Gaining power and advancing of the Syrian Kurds (PYD) in Northern borders of Turkey and the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party's (HDP) entry to the structure of power in Turkey, have created anxiety amongst the AKP leadership.

4.6 Securitization of Foreign Policy

Ankara's offensive policies toward Syria including trying to overthrow the Syrian government, through allowing 1) the volunteer Muslims to go to Syria through Turkey and fight against the Assad forces; 2) the Syrian rebels; Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army to use the Turkish soil as a base to organize their resistance against the Assad regime (Weitz, 2014: 34, Bulent, 2012) In addition, it is claimed that “the rebels have received weapons and other military support transported through Turkey and funded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia”(ibid.). However, Turkish officials have rejected the claim multiple times. At the same time, Turkish authorities saw the situation in Syria as an opportunity that can be used for the succeeding a puppet government: “to install a Sunni regime--one that might even be influenced by its own Muslim Brotherhood doctrine.” (Schanzer & Tahiroglu, 2014: 7) The AKP Deputy chair in this regard stated that Turkey's goal of supporting the Syrian opposition is “the establishment of a Turkey-friendly government in Damascus and an intensification of economic ties.” (Katrin, Hasnainan, 2014).

Erdogan tried to influence the ideas and elements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Arabic countries undergoing transformation to consolidate the political future of the country, in line with the Turkish model, and be influenced by Ankara. In line with the new Middle East to be born, Ahmet Davutoglu in the Turkish Parliament in July 2012 stated that "we will be the owner, pioneer and the servant of this new Middle East." (Karaveli, 2012). Since February 2012, Turkey to overthrow the Assad regime, have supported the opposition groups holistically and there were several reasons behind this policy. First, like most of the experts and world leaders, Turkey assumed that the Assad regime is at the verge of collapse (Katrin, Hasnain, 2014) given the fall of similar regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. “According to more than 4,600 IS documents reviewed by the U.S. army, more than 90 percent of all foreign fighters - including Turkish militants - between 2013 and 2014 entered Syria through the Turkish border.” (Schanzer, Tahiroglu, 2017: 15) In majority of the interviews from the former fighters in Syria, they described the border security guards as “unconcerned” about fighter's crossing in or out of Turkey even some of them described the Turkish-Syrian border as “openly complicit” (ibid., Katrin, Hasnain, 2013).

4.7 Aggressive Approach Toward Neighbours

The Arab uprising not only deteriorated the Syrian-Turkish relations, but securitizing and aggressive approaches by Ankara, toward the transformations in Syria, Iraq and Egypt have deteriorated the relations with Iraq, Iran, Egypt and Russia as well. Tensions between Russia and Turkey escalated in the shadow of the Syrian crisis. The incident caused a diplomatic crisis between Moscow and Ankara that resulted in the fall of the Russian Su-24 by the Turkish F16, on 24 November 2015 and the crisis reached its peak. The commercial and political relations between the two countries despite the strategic ties, especially in the field of energy, was at the lowest since 2002. In this regard, repeated requests from the leaders of Turkey to create a buffer zone and a no-fly zone in northern Syria in order to support the so-called moderate opposition and accelerate the overthrow of the Assad regime, exacerbated the conflicts in the security interests of Russia and Turkey. However, Russia, due to the possible presence of NATO in the security sphere of influence, always blocked this issue in the Security Council (Onis, Yilmaz, 2015: 63-67).

Overall transformations in domestic politics and foreign policy from 2011 onwards under the AKP, have shown a securitized Turkey, in the local, regional and international relations. Now this country, especially with an interventional and aggressive approach toward developments in Syria, and Mosul, Iraq and other regional equations, not only is levelled as an aggressive actor in bilateral relations with Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Armenia, Israel, Cyprus and Russia; but also, it is considered as an adventurer and unreliable actor from the US and EU side as well (Zalewski, 2013). Comparing and describing the performance and behaviour of foreign and domestic policy of the AKP government from 2002 to 2011 and from 2011 (after the Arab uprisings) until today shows a complete reversal of the party's domestic politics and foreign policy approaches. Davutoglu's successful `zero-problems with neighbours' policy' ended up with `zero friendship with its neighbours' or zero-friends' (Zalewski, 2013) and the harmonious politics, multilateralism and balancing between security and freedom within Turkey has been discredited.

Consequently, Turkey has featured many characteristics in its foreign policy; from when Davutoglu was the foreign policy designer of Turkey, and Turkish foreign policy was characterized as expansionist, adventures and ideologically-driven to the post-resignation of Davutoglu which Turkey choose to adopt friendly and reconciliatory approach when Erdogan stated at the 13^th Islamic Summit in April 2016 that “we should increase our friends and decrease enemies” (Pesidency of Republic of Turkey, 2016).?As a result, Turkey's attempt to improve its relations with Russia and Israel, depicted a less ideological, cautious and pragmatic Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkish foreign policy slightly changed following the failed military coup attempt on July of the same year. “Erdogan condemned the Western countries for failing to show solidarity with the failed coup attempt” (Reuters, 2016) and rejected Western countries criticism of mass detainment, removal and suspension of around 60,000 people over suspicion. (ibid.) In 2016 Turkey shifted its axis from West toward Russia and Iran, an anti-Western alliance despite the fact that Russia wants the Syrian Kurds to gain more autonomy in Syria and even “Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov suggested that Syria become a federal state” (Tabrizi & Pantucci, 2016 :22, The Guardian, 2016)