Security in Turkey

Russia which eight times have vetoed the proposed UN Security Council resolution against the Syrian regime (CNN, 2017) and Iran, who is present on the ground in Syria to protect the Assad regime.In addition, Turkey's insistence on carrying out military operations in Mosul, Iraq “even the Turkish involvement means risking additional problems with Iraq”, (Daily Sabah, 2016) and the Euphrates Shield Operations in northern Syria, shows that Turkey after the Syrian crises, is not adherent to a single focused long term policy when its national interest and security is threatened in the region where everything could happen rapidly. Therefore, elements like the regional geopolitical transformations, and Turkey's internal political and security concerns seems to be the main foreign policy drivers of the AKP government. The geopolitical transformations as mentioned before that Ankara is ready to risk additional problems with neighboring countries can not be any other element but the Kurdish factor. In the few years IS is considered as a major threat not only to the Middle East but to the EU as well. However, for Turkey the Kurdish factor seems to be a much greater threat to its national security and thus in the last couple of years Turkey is struggling to adopt policies which in the first degree, guarantees its national security and secondly, peruse its ideological and economic goals in the region.

4.8 The Kurdish Factor

Syria crisis could cause many challenge against the national interests of Turkey in terms of economic, political and security. Just to note, that one of the main objectives of the Turkish foreign policy in the context of the doctrine of neo-Ottomanis, was to minimize problems in the relationship with neighboring countries to develop relations, and especially in the economic sphere and assume the role of an influential actor in the development of region. Hence the unrest in Syria is not only at odds with Turkey's foreign policy based on minimizing the problems with neighboring countries in order to provide a background to the expansion of trade and economy, but the chaos from another dimension was threatening the Turkish national security. Syria's complex nature of ethnic and religious composition, uncertainty about the future political life of Syria and the possibility of dissolution of Syria, have made Turkish leaders worry regarding the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria similar to regional Kurdistan government in Iraq. Something that after a decade of peaceful relations could stimulate the Turkish Kurds, intensify the Kurdish question and convert to a serious security concern to Turkey (Walker, 2012: 2)

During the crises in Syria, the Syrian Kurds acquired a new status, which is regarded as more serious threat to Turkey than the fundamentalists Jihadist in such as IS. In practice, between the Kurds and IS; if Turkey had to choose fighting the Kurds or the IS; I would argue that Turkey would choose the Kurds to fight because Turkey considers the Kurdish question as their first security concern. IS do not have a strong root in Turkey and do not have any territorial claims on Turkey, but the Kurds have territorial claim and have a Kurdish manifestation since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The making of an independent regional government of Kurdistan in northern Syria while having close ties with the PKK and great support from the US would definitely be a threat to Turkey's territorial integrity because millions of Kurds live on the other side of the border in southern Turkey who are waiting for such an opportunity.

Today the major regional security concern of Turkey is emerging in its southern borders and northern Syria. The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD have declared an autonomous regional government in Rojava in Syria in November 2013 (Schanzer &Tahiroglu, 2014: 11, Cagaptay, 2014: 4)

Turkey believes that the PYD and its armed wing, People's Protection Unit (YPG) have links with the terrorist group PKK: Erdogan stated that its impossible for Turkey to tolerate PKK cooperation with the PYD (Richard Weitz 2014: 40). Unlike the PKK, PYD which “has emerged as Turkey's top enemy in Syria” (Schanzer, Tahiroglu, 2017: 16) is not considered as a terroristic group in the U.S or EU; on the contrary, the Syrian Kurds have enjoyed receiving support from U.S. while historically, in the fight against the Kurdish terroristic group, PKK Turkey have received very limited supported from its neighbours and allies. (Isiksal, Huseyin 2015: 12) Although the U.S authorities have announced their concerns regarding the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds stating that (Weitz, 2014: 40, Gordon, 2012):

We are equally clear that we don't see for the future of Syria an autonomous Kurdish area or territory; we want to see a Syria that remains united . . . any movement toward autonym or separatism . . would be a slippery slope.

But the U.S government continues to support the Syrian Kurds specifically the PYD fighters. The relations between Turkey and the U.S administration was showing a rift on the unfolding human crisis in Kurdish populated Kobane (Arin, 2015: 6) Considering all these complex relations between global and regional players and the failed coup attempt which Turkey blames the self-exiled cleric, Fethullah Gulen, Turkey have just re-configured its foreign policy in lines with the new national security concepts- to combat terrorist groups such as IS, PKK and its affiliates and the Gulenist Movement. (Daily Sabah, 26 Oct 2016) Erdogan introduced a new security doctrine on October 2016 asserting that “Turkey has abandoned the misguided security approach”; meaning that Turkey will no longer sit tight for security dangers to reach its borders. Rather, the nation will handle and conciliate these security dangers wherever they develop. (ibid.) As a result of this new policy, Turkey have brought wide range reform in its military and National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to improve its operation capabilities abroad and support for the defense sector. Almost a month later after this reconfiguration, a Turkish court issued the arrest warrant of Saleh Muslim Mohammed, the chair of Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in relation to a bomb attack on military busses in Ankara (Reuters, 22 November 2016).

It is worth to mention that Turkey before reconfiguring its foreign policy to more a security-oriented policy, also used such techniques by allowing the Turkish nationals to join groups like the IS and the Nusra Fron (Jabhat al Nusra) for another reason: to fight the PKK and its affiliates (PYD/YPG) (Schanzer, Tahiroglu, 2017: 15). In 2014 Erdogan for the first time flagged a move in Ankara's position by saying that Turkish troops could be utilized to help set up a protected zone in Syria, if there was a universal consent to establish a secure area for those fleeing the conflict (Arin, 2015). In addition, Turkish air forces have targeted the PKK positions in northern Iraq, and the YPG in Syria (Schanzer, Tahiroglu, 2017: 15). Furthermore, in August 2016, Turkish troops entered Jarabulus, an area held by IS, to clear IS from its outskirt, and also to build up a secure zone between two Kurdish enclaves to keep the Kurds from connecting their territories into single entity. (ibid.)

4.9 Current Situation of the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq

Recent challenges of the Regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan with the Iraqi government, a new round of violent tensions between the PKK and the Turkish state and above all the role of Syrian Kurds in Syrian crises and its relationship with other actors, have created a special feature for the Kurdish community in Turkey, Syria and Iraq and in the region in general. It is helpful to know that in this complex and rapidly changing environment of the Middle East, what roles the Kurds have been able to play in these three countries, and is the current situation in the region in their benefit or not?

If we want to study the status of the Kurds as regional players over time, we can conclude that the capability of the Kurds has changed dramatically comparing to the past, after the parliamentary elections in Turkey in June 7 2015, the People's Democratic Party (HDP) managed to pass the 10% threshold and become the first ever Kurdish party to enter the Turkish parliament. While mostly supported by the Kurds, HDP won critical support and praise from all over the Turkish society (Loizides, 2015: 25). Since the Kurdish-state relations turned back to the early years of AKP in power, the exercise of power by the Kurds will decrease if AKP adopt strict policies against the Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds which have gained a semi autonomy in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussain in 2003, have maintained well. The semi-autonomous government, with its army, the Kurdish Peshmerga have proved to be a major player in the fight against the so called “Daesh” terrorist group or ISIS and able to attract regional and international support.

But if we look at the situation of the Syrian Kurds, they have somewhat taken advantage of the current situation in Syria and the Middle East but now the they do not have the necessary concentration and centralization to become an independent power. So generally speaking, major developments has been created in the situation of the Kurds. However, they still do not have their own state and depends on good intentions of regional and global players- sometimes for survival. Of course, according to the rapidly changing equations and the transformations in the Middle East, predicting the future of the Kurds and the balance of power in the turbulent region looks difficult.

4.9.1 Turkey

The pro-Kurdish HDP for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic managed to pass the highest threshold (10%) in the world and enter the Turkish parliament in 2015 general election. Ethnic Kurds entered the Turkish parliament either independently or under the umbrella of other political parties but not to the extent that they could play an important role against the opposition. Currently, AKP and Erdogan have a dominant position in Turkish politics. Erdogan has already won the majority votes in previous elections as well as the referendum this year which grants more authority to him and does not need much to work with other parties. Now all the issues depend on Erdogan's policies because if Erdogan seeks to suspend talks with the PKK and adopt repressive policies against the Kurds, then the Kurds or their representatives in parliament can not play a great role in the country.

4.9.2 Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq

The status of the Iraqi Kurds is better comparing to the Kurdish minority in other countries of the region. Kurds in Iraq established a semi-autonomous regional government called as Kurdistan; which have its own parliament, army(Peshmerga) and administrative units. This area has signed contracts with other countries in various fields, including oil. Although this area is not officially independent but in practice the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) independently enters in trade and exchanges with other countries. Iraqi Kurdistan as a centerpiece in the future may become attractive to other Kurds and by increasing its power can turn into a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, a dream which they have been looking for a long time. It should also be noted that the regional and global perspective toward the Iraqi Kurds, in the first degree the Turks, have different position. However, without political and financial aid of Turkey to the government of Iraqi Kurdistan in previous years, would not have its present form. So the role of Turkey towards Kurds is much greater than other countries. However, Turkey is in opposition to Syrian Kurdish movements because of majority being members of parties such as the Kurdish Democratic Union Party and the People's Protection Units which have close ties and good cooperation with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) of Turkey.

4.9.3 Syria

Some believe that the continuing crisis in Syria during the past six years and the vital role of the Syrian Kurds in fighting against ISIS in Syria and the support, although weak, provided by the US to them, has provided the space for Kurdish independence in Syria. However, in this regard it should be emphasized that Saudi Arabia and Turkey has been at the core of United State's policy in the Middle East, especially in Syria. Although the U.S sometimes helps the Syrian Kurds to destroy the ISIS positions and there is collaboration between the U.S and the Syrian Kurds specifically the YPD; however, in practice the policy of U.S is not much different from the policy of Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. It is not the policy of both countries to empower the Syrian Kurds and to look them as an independent player in the region. Their goal is clear, and they want the Bashar al-Assad regime to fall and bring a government that advocates policies of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. As long as the US does not adopt an independent policy towards the Kurds, a major change in the status of Syrian Kurds is hardly possible. And it can not be expected that the US support to the Syrian Kurds having a decisive role.

On the other hand, the Syrian Kurds, specifically the YPD have created an autonomous region since 2013 and their representatives are freely traveling to the West and advocating for their cause. However, they are under heavy military pressure from the Turkish side. We can conclude that the current situation of the Syrian Kurds are relatively better after the Iraqi Kurds.

4.9.4 Iran

Turkish Kurds now have their own political party representing them in Turkish parliament and PKK's insurgency have become a non-state regional player which overall the status of the Turkish Kurds can not be described as weak or silent. The Syrian Kurds now have their autonomous Kurdish administration and enjoy support from the U.S. Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq in some cases like fighting the IS have depicted better performance than the central government and signing economic and trade deals directly with other countries. Which means that Iraqi Kurdistan is almost operating independently. The Iranian Kurds seems to be the most passive or unlucky or least powerful of all Kurdish communities in the Middle East. Putting political rights a sight, ill treatment of the minorities including the Kurds in Iran face series challenges in receiving equal citizenship rights; for instance, religious, legal and social challenges.

The Iranian Kurds under the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK), have been in confrontation with Iranian security forces occasionally but it has not seriously influenced the Iranian policy direction yet. PJAK is considered to be PKK's Iranian-Kurdish affiliate which have been observing a ceasefire since 2011; however, PKK commanders clarified that they will resume war with Iran in the future.(Jenkins, 2012)

5. Foreign Policy Analysis

5.1 Relations with Syria

Turkey has the longest border with Syria and both countries had tense relations because of the Kurdish question, and dispute over water and territory (Berkey, & Fuller, 1998: 31). Syria disagrees that Hatay, a city in the border now belongs to Turkey according to the agreement between Turkey and France, Syria claims that Turkey has violated the 1921 agreement between France and Turkey (Martin, 2000: 83-105; Fýrat & Kürkçüogˆlu, 2010: 165-175) which was solved in 2004 after more than five decades during the AKP era (Elgur, 2006: 2-3). Until AKP came to power, the relations between Turkey and Syria are characterized by rivalry, suspicion and resentment. Before the AKP era, Syria has always used PKK to stabilize the balance of power and regional competition against the Turkish government. In early 1980s Syria allowed the PKK to have their training camps in the Syrian soil as well as in the Bekaa Valley which was under Syrian government control (Marcus, 2007: 56). Syria has provided strategic support in terms of allowing PKK training camps on Syrian territory, letting PKK terrorists enter Turkey from Syria and granting sanctuary to the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Damascus for about two decades (Olson, 2000, 2001)

Perhaps the Syrians for their actions had their own reasons, historical enmity arising from the accession states "Alexandrette" (Hatay) to Turkey during the French mandate over Syria and problems related to water Euphrates River (which flows through Turkey into Syrian territory) and long relations between the two countries was characterized by enmity (Isiksal & Omerci, 2015: 23). The Turkish government was strictly controlling the flow of Euphrates River into Syria which has critical economic importance, to restrain PKK and visa-versa the Syrian government was using its "Kurdish card" to gain concessions from Turkey on the contentious issue of Euphrates River water (Entessar, 2009:104). Finally, during the AKP ruling through the “Zero-problem with neighbours” policy, Syria agreed to stop accommodating PKK terrorist within the Syrian territory in return Turkey waived the visas for Syrians and both countries signed many trade agreements (Isiksal & Omerci, 2015: 23). which latter Turkey became Syria's largest economic partner; $2.2 billion in 2010 (ibid. 60) “Syria became a showcase symbol of Turkey's foreign policy strategy of zero problems with neighbours”; however, Erdogan was misjudged when Bashar al Assad rejected his advice to bring reforms during the Arab Spring (Weitz, 2014: 35).

However, things have changed dramatically for Turkey to a zero-sum war in Syria after the Arab uprisings and have pitted Turkey against some state and non-state actors like Iran and Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Turkey no longer had a clear vision in Syria in terms of foreign policy. Turkey focused on Assad's removal through its financial, logistical and weaponry support for the opposition armed forces known as the Free Syrian Army and others (Wall Street Journal, 2013) AKP's opposition parties within Turkey also criticized Turkey's military and logistic convoy's to Syrian anti-regime fighters including the Nusra Fron (Jabhat al Nusra) which is Al Qaida affiliate in Syria; Turkey, except ex-deputy prime minister and AKP member, always denied support for the extremist Jihadists (Hurriyet, 2014, Radika, 2013, Fars News, 2013)

However, Assad didn't fall, instead day by day the Syrian Kurds became powerful and finally declared northern Syria as autonomous region in 2013. The U.S government played a major role in supporting the Syrian Kurds in fighting against the IS and making them a non-state regional player. Turkey has explicitly express its opposition regarding PYD's declaration of an autonomous region in Syria because of PYD's links with the terrorist group, PKK. Iran and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq also exposed their opposition to this move. In the last two years it seems that Turkey has emphasized more on its national security rather than political or ideological ambitions and started to see it's regional foreign policy from internal security perspective and security challenges at home. Erdogan announced that `Turkey will no longer wait for security threats to reach its borders'. Saying so, Turkey's “Euphrates Shield” operation was launched in Syria, including support for the opposition Free Syrian Army plus Turkish tanks, artillery and aircraft aiming to destroy security threats for Turkey outside its borders where they emerged, aiming IS, PKK and its Syrian affiliates PYD/YPG. (Anadolu Agency, 2016)

It is assumed that Syrian government on the other hand, willingly left northern Syria for the Kurds to counter Turkey's influence. In addition, Iran has ties with the PKK leaders such as Cemil Bayik, who is stongly against the peace talks with Turkey and `has pledged to defend Iran and Syria against Turkish plots' (Weitz: 2015: 70). In addition, media reports claimed in 2015 that Iranian authorities detained the PKK leader, Murat Karayilan and then released him rather than handing him over to Turkey (ibid.,). Therefore, it is viable to see Iran and the Syrian regime resuming its late 1990s policy of providing massive support for the PKK to confront Turkey if Turkey continues to support the opposition armed groups in Syria. Nevertheless, it looks like the harsh tone of Turkish officials has been changed regarding the Syrian regime comparing to the early days of the Syrian crisis. In March 2017, Binali Yildirim, the Turkish Prime Minister supported the decision which handed over the western part of Manbij to the Syrian Army and he emphasized in the presence of the Assad regime in northern Syria instead of the PYD/YPG terrorists (Daily Sabah, 2017).

In addition, unexpected approaches of Turkey's traditional western allies specifically U.S's approach toward the Syrian Kurds undermined the trust between them and make Turkey to seek ad hoc and issue-oriented cooperation and a shift of axis toward such as Russian-Iranian alliance.

Ankara has already set aside peace talks with the PKK and now is in the war with them. But if Turkey to opens negotiations with the PKK and there is development in the Kurdish-Turkish relations in Turkey, in this case the Turkey may authorize a semi-independence for the Syrian Kurds so that the Syrian Kurdistan functions under the economic and trade banner of Turkey such as Iraqi Kurdistan. The logic behind such decision of Turkey is if Syrian Kurdistan is economically completely dependent on Turkey, then the policies of Syrian Kurdistan will merge and completely overlap, and there will be no need to feel threatened by its affiliates. This scenario is not without a major risk based on recent history of the Turkish-PKK peace talks; which PKK is sitting around the table with an AK 47 in hand; anything could happen anytime. In short, it looks to be a very weak probably that the Turks, Syrian government or Iran accept such a major development for the Syrian Kurds in the region.

5.2 Relations with Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan

Relations between Turkey and Iraq was influenced by factors that include the oil-rich provinces northern Iraq, the dispute over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers; which Turkey use them as political instruments (Martin, 2000: 90) and the Kurdish question is the most important. Turkey on the issues of new Iraq, in addition to the principles of political, security, economic and cultural rights also relies on the legal principles. The AKP's policy relating to Iraq based on peace, security, democracy and stability, and believes that Turkey should play an active role in these areas. AKP, on issues of northern Iraq, while emphasizing the need to pay particular attention to the legitimacy and rights of Turkmens, considers all three ethnic Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs living in the region is as Turkey's relatives and to expand trade relations with places are of great importance for Turkey. Deteriorating situation in Iraq and the external pressure are the two main factors in the revival of Kurdish identity that urged Turkey to avoid its nationalist interests and harmonization. AKP's policy against Iraq has always been influenced by the pattern in which the maximum participation of Turkey in terms of the stability and security of Iraq is considered.

The Turkish-Iraqi relations have two different dimensions. First, Turkey's relations with Baghdad which deteriorated in recent years because of Turkey's intervention in Iraqi soil specifically in Mosul. Second, Turkey's relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. Comparing to Turkey, Iran has more influence and closer political ties with Baghdad and ideologically-oriented powerful Shia militias in Iraq. Turkey's relationship with the KRG is based on economic interest mainly energy trade, occasionally cooperation against the PKK and recently, KRG has become Turkey's ally in limiting Iran's influence in Iraq. During AKP's first term in power, KRG was chosen by Turkey as alternative source of its energy demand, which increases by six to eight percent every year (Foreign Policy, 2013) which today KRG export approximately 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey (Hurriyet, 20 Nov 2015). KRG's increasing unilateral oil deals with Turkey have become an issue of contention between the KRG and the central government.

The AKP government introduced a set of relief package for the Kurds in Turkey in mid 2000s which improvement in Turkey's relations with the KRG is partly due to this initiative to resolve Turkey's Kurdish question through peaceful means (Pusane, 2016: 23). In addition, “Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the PKK have been historical rivals in the Kurdish nationalist movement” (ibid.,) and thus Turkey's alliance with RGK aims to reduce role of PKK. Specially after PKK and its affiliates forces moved from Qandil Mountains and Syria to Sanjar area in 2014 (Manis, 2017). Erdogan made it clear that Turkey will not allow transformation of a “new Qandil” in Sanjar (Anadolu Agency, 2016) while Erdogan was giving his speech Turkey's military under the name of `Operation Euphrates Shield' was fighting in northern Iraq's Karkuk, Musel, Tal Afar and Sanjar to clear IS and PKK. In Syria, both regional players have announced their concerns regarding the rise of a Kurdish entity in country's north. Turkey was the firsT to oppose PYD's declaration of an autonomous region in Rojava followed by Iran and also `Barzani's Iraqi KRG stirred anger from this move' (Cagaptay, 2014: 4) since Barzani's KDP has historical contention with Ocalan's PKK as “both had leadership claims among the Kurdish nationalists” (Pusane, 2016: 24) ; and thus KRG is not happy with its affiliates, PYD dominating the Syrian Kurdish politics.

In 2011, Barzani tried to counter PYD empowerment in Syria by unification of different Syrian Kurdish groups except the PYD, under the umbrella of Kurdish National Congress (KNC) as well as he played a major role in establishing the Supreme Kurdish Council in 2012 aimed to promote power distribution between the PYD and the KNC (ibid.,). The Supreme Kurdish Council in Syria was established through singing the Erbil Agreement which according to International Crisis Group, it was never implemented (2016: 2). It's worth to mention that the Kurdish National Council (KNC) was also supported by Turkey against the PYD and more interestingly, the KNC complained to the U.S ambassador in Syria, about “Turkey backing the Jihadists” (Schanzer & Tahiroglu, 2014: 12). KRG accused PYD of violating the agreement and this led to another occasion in 2012, when PYD didn't let the Peshmerge forces to enter into Syria and the KRG retaliated by blocking the Iraqi-Syrian border to prevent humanitarian aid delivery to PYD controlled region. The leader of the KRG blamed the PYD of making “secret deals” with the Assad regime and committing violence against other Kurdish groups in Syria (Hurriyet, 2013 & Zaman, 2013).

As a result, it seems that Turkey, Iran and KRG have built an alliance or a security complex to confront the PYD autonomous region's advancement in Syria, while Turkey is working with its Iraqi Kurdish ally to contain Iran's role in Iraq. On the other hand, Iran is using its Kurdish card, specifically, the PKK as political instrument toward Turkey which is close to Syria's current policy. Syria's silence regarding the Syrian Kurds getting increasing power could be interpreted as Syria's strategy to prevent Turkey's intervention in northern Syria although relations between them are less than optimal (Tabrizi & Pantucci: 2016: 12). Qandil Mountain has served as a headquarters for the PKK in northern Iraq.

5.3 Relations with Iran

Relations between Iran and Turkey is based on the historical past and shared cultures. “One-third of Iranians are Azeri Turks, and Tehran is the second-largest Turkish-speaking city in the world” (Richard Weitz: 2014: 67) In fact, political relationship has always been known as natural enemies and essential friends. Iran and the AKP both religious parties although with Shia-Sunni theological differences, have developed their relations over the past decade based on dialogue, cooperation and good neighborly relations. Turkey considered Iran as a natural ally in the war against the PKK, and Ankara and Tehran had been consulting on some political and security concerns. Economic relations between Turkey and Iran have been developed in line with the political rapprochement. The volume of trade between the two neighbors in 2008 reached $10 billion (Ulgen, 2010: 3). In general, Iran's position in Turkish foreign policy under the AKP rule have dramatically increased. Iran is the third-largest supplier of energy to Turkey. Turkey's role in developments in Iran's foreign policy, such as hosting several rounds of nuclear talks between Iran and the West and mediation in this area, and opposing the fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran (Richard Weitz, 2014: 65-66) saying that `countries that oppose Iran's nuclear weapons, should themselves not have nuclear weapons' (Washington Post, 2009), have helped to increase Turkey's regional and international position. On the other hand, aiming Iran, Turkey has repeatedly stated that they are strongly against development and spread of Nuclear weapons in the Middle East and this concern and opposition of Turkey is because of the possibility of changing military balance in the region that can start a nuclear race (Uygur, 2008: 6)

In fact, relations between Iran and Turkey in recent years is based on the fundamental principles of non-interference in internal affairs, good neighborliness and economic and military cooperation. As a result, the Turkish government and public opinion in this country do not consider Iran as a direct foreign threat for them (Ulgen, 2010: 4). On the other hand, the Kemalists and Turkish military elites in Turkey which dominated Turkish politics before AKP, perceived Iran and Syria as potential threats and thus tried to cooperate in terms of security area with Israel (Weitz, 2014: 63). The relations between the Islamic Republican and the “Turkish Model” deteriorated as a result of intense contention amid the Arab uprisings, as both have held themselves as paradigm of Islamic democracy (ibid.). Iran like Syria can use its Kurdish card against the Turkish government as political pressure if necessary. In another word, one of the co-founders of the PKK, Cemil Bayik who is now one of the two Executive Council co-chairs of PKK, built strong ties with the Iranian intelligence service since 1990s (Cagaptay, 2014: 1) and it seems that recently some Iranian support for the PKK has resumed (Richard Weitz, 2014: 70) which could be in response to AKP's support for Syrian opposition that irritated Iran. Syria under the Alawite leadership was the only Arab state that stood with Iran in the war against Iraq (1980-1988), enmity with Israel and amity with Hezbollah in Lebanon and holly shrines of Shia figures in Syria are other reasons why Iran wanted to protect the Syrian regime. Iran's interest in Syria looks to be strategic geopolitics in order to ensure its influence over Lebanon and Iraq rather than ideological. On the other hand, AKP is supporting the opposition groups in Syria as Abdullatif ªener, a former AKP deputy prime minister acknowledged to Iranian media that Turkey “sent a large volume of heavy weapons to the terrorist group, the Nusra Front.” (Schanzer, Tahiroglu, 2014: 14, Fars News, 8 Sep 2013).

Turkey have morally justified its involvement in Syrian to protect civilians at the beginning of the crises; however, with the rise of the PYD in northern Syria, the priority for Turkey was to prevent growth of separatist Kurds. Iranians have complained about Turkey's regional support to opposition armed groups seeking to overthrow the Assad regime (Richard Weitz: 2014: 69) while the Turks believe that Iran is supporting PKK (Tremblay, 2016). Therefore, now an indirect confrontation and rivalry is going on in Syria among both countries. While a few years ago, Turkish-Iranian intelligence were working together and coordinating military strikes against the Kurdish terrorist groups in northern Iraq (Weitz, 2014: 69, Reuters, 2011). Turkey and Iran both agree on protecting the territorial integrity and unity of Syria and Iraq and the destiny of these countries should be determined by their own people; however, Turkey and Iran failed to come to mutual understanding and shared solution. After the Syrian Kurds announced an autonomous region in northern Syria, Iran joined Turkey in condemning the PYD's declaration of independent Kurdish administration asserting “they want to divide Syria” (Tabrizi & Pantucci, 2016 :8) The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif also warned that changing borders in Syria will make the situation worse and it will be “the beginning of Armageddon” (Wall Street Journal, 2016). It seems that Iran is also worried about the making of autonomous Kurdistan regions in Syria, Turkey and consequently in Iran which is the only disagreement between its pro-Kurdish Russian counterpart in Syria. In conclusion, Iran seems to play a dual-policy role toward Turkey; meaning that using Turkey's sworn enemies, PKK and its affiliates for their political interest while trying to improve its relations with Turkey which can function as a mediator between Iran and the West.

5.4 Relations with the EU

Turkey's relations with Europe after nearly four decades of basic steps still is around demarcations of Turkey's eligibility to enter European Union. This relationship has seen many developments in recent decades but there is still uncertainty about the outcome of this relationship. With the arrival Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP), the process of EU's considered reforms were followed dramatically and seriously which also influenced the political and economic developments within Turkey as well as Turkish foreign policy. Improving human rights condition in the country, specifically minority rights were an essential part of these reforms.

The AKP government had a new approach to the Kurdish question and `the resolution of the Kurdish question would go hand in hand with Turkey's EU accession process' (Unver, 157). In October 2, 2005 the negotiations officially started for Turkey's EU accession. The democratization was a precondition to Turkey's EU accession; therefore, a profound solution was needed to resolve the Kurdish question. As a result, at the same year, Erdogan unlike Kemalist leaders, acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish question and promised to solve it. AKP used its EU card; institutions and standards to reduce military's role in politics and thus desecuritize the Kurdish question to some extent plus granting some cultural rights to the Kurds. (Yavuz, 2007: 249)

However, could a relief package including cultural rights, political participation and distinctive ethnic recognition of the Kurds means end of the conflict? For some yes, but for separatist groups like PKK who is seeking independence from Turkey (Weitz, 2015: 129, Marcus, 2012) or the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party (HDP) which favours democratic federalism (Kubilay, 2015: 2), these rights are not a solid solution. Indeed, AKP's Kurdish policy in its early days in power generally been “equalist -meaning that Erdogan viewed Kurds as a distinct but equal group within Turkey, whose problems should be resolved through democratizing approaches” (Unver, 158). In the process of its massive reform as part of the EU preconditions; such as, reducing ten percent threshold requirement that would open the possibility of Kurdish representation in the parliament (Yavuz, 2009: 185), Turkey insisted that they have made significant progress in improving democratic quality in the country (Kirisci, 2011: 335). It is worth to mention, that EU also asked for a general amnesty for the PKK guerrilla members (Yavuz, 2009: 185) which together with the election threshold issue, never took place.

The democratic opening in 2009 which included open and secret talks between Kurdish nationalists (including Ocalan, PKK leader) and Turkey's Intelligence service (MIT), helped the enforcement of a more flexible and embracing policy toward the ethnic Kurds and the KRG (Weitz, 2014: 129). Abdullah Ocalan the imprisoned PKK leader in that year presented a 156-page peace plan to Ankara which Erdogan rejected and presented his own (Unver, 159). In 2009 for the first time Turkey's intelligence service (MIT) officially started peace talks with the PKK leaders in Europe well known as `Oslo Process'.

5.5 Failure of the Democratic Opening

The Kurdish opening was steadily improving until in September 13, 2011 the recordings of the secret talks in the “Oslo Process” between MIT and the PKK were leaked (Unver 163), Erdogan accused the PKK of leaking the tapes (Philips, 2015). In 2012 first, promotion in legal and foundation status of the intelligence service (MIT) in order to define its operations and authority within a legal framework to chase and constrain PKK's urban networks and second, arrival of the Arab uprising to the borders of Turkey influenced the Kurdish question in Turkey. In the spirit of the Arab uprisings, Cemil Bayik, one of PKK's top authorities, announced a new stage of intense military operation in Turkey and called for a `people's uprising' in 2012 (Unver, 164). AKP followed the peace talks. After the revelation of the secret talks in Oslo, the next peace talks became an open process called as the “Imrali Process”. This process of peace talks had some astonishing results. In March 2013, PKK announced a unilateral ceasefire which was followed by withdrawing its troops from Qandil Mountains into northern Iraq (Lindenstrauss, 2016: 98).

However, the withdrawal process stopped in September 9, 2013 because of what PKK called lack of Turkish government's compatibility with the requisites of the reform adding “from now on Turkish government is responsible for anything that may happen” (Unver, 2015: 97). In addition, the Kurdish opening lacked a comprehensive plan about which steps should the government take to resolve the issue (Pusane, 22, Yavuz, 2009: 112). Furthermore, “Erdog?an does not appear to have a clear understanding of the power of nationalism and ethnic identity because he has constantly shifted his position from denial to the acceptance of the Kurdish issue” (Yavuz, 2009: 188) Lack of a strong desire and trust from both sides, to solve the Kurdish question was not the only reason of the oldest question in the Middle East to remain unsolved. The Arab uprisings, the increasing criticism about AKP's Kurdish opening and fear of losing its nationalist support (Pusane: 2016: 23) and Erdogan's preference of preservation of power rather than solving the problem (Yavuz, 2009: 189) are another reasons. For instance, Erdogan in March 2015 Erdogan said that there is no Kurdish question in Turkey (Lindenstrauss, 2016: 99) which was in contrast to his famous Diyarbakir speech in 2005.

The parties against the AKP claims that Erdogan is always using the security card to solve internal challenges facing his party and believes that using this card can prolong his domination of power. The rift with the Gulen movement and mass arrest of the leaders of the Kurdish parties are proof of this claim. In the meanwhile, you can argue that he is using the same card against journalists, Kurdish rights activist and his political opponents. AKP in several stages tried to compromise with the PKK what now they call the terrorist group. Interlocution of Turkish government with PKK has increased PKK's legitimacy both in the public opinion and internationally.

Given that the positive result of the April 2017 referendum elections for the AKP in order to change the Turkish regime from parliamentary to a presidential regime, it is possible for the AKP to resume the peace processes again. Just to mention that ethnic Kurds also demand an extensive amendment in the current Turkish constitution. The rise of another autonomous Kurdish region in northern Syria; however, forced Turkey to adopt more a security-oriented policy toward the Kurdish question. In addition, most of the developments toward the Kurdish question were achieved as a result of EU accession preconditions but now the EU accession is no more a priority for Turkey; therefore, consequently, the ruling party does not have to grant more rights and lose support from nationalist side, especially when they just held a referendum and the next general election will be held in late 2019.

5.6 Current Security Challenges

Erdogan is now facing three major problems despite the old Kurdish question within the country: the first and biggest problem in this country that Erdogan face is the Gülen Movement and their way of thinking that the one-sided and quick clearing by Erdogan is becoming a huge problem not only in Turkey but it can also effect its relationship with other countries. For instance, either closing the Gülen Schools or not in different countries like Afghanistan has created a huge controversy in many countries these days. Erdogan disproportionately reacted and complete extermination of the supporters of Fethullah Gülen, the self-exiled cleric an old friend and ally and staunch current opponent, because of which AKP count him responsible for the failed military coup attempt and unrest. As a result, enormous numbers of political opposition figures, lawyers, human rights activists, teachers, journalists and many more were arrested due to their link and sympathy for the Gulen movement or PKK.

The second challenge to Turkey should be listed as Islamic State or ISIS. Undoubtedly, Turkey's involvement in the Middle East specially in the Syrian crises is not beyond danger. While Turkey's major focus is on the Kurdish insurgent groups like the PKK and PYD, IS could use this opportunity and challenge Turkey in the future. The third issue also comprise Syrian refugees and immigrants. An estimated 2.2 million Syrian refugees are currently residing in Turkish soil. While Turkey is directly involved in the war against the PKK in Syria and Iraq and also supporting the `moderate opposition' in Syria, the refugees in Turkey could become a burden in terms of finance and security.

Conclusion

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) changed the extremely security conscious approach of the Kemalists toward the Kurdish question. y. Erdogan for the first time in the history of the Republic acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish question in Turkey and promised to solve it by democratic means as a result in order to desecuritize the Kurdish question. reforms and relief packages for the oppressed Kurds was introduced in Turkey in AKP's second term in power. After granting many cultural and linguistic rights, AKP started to negotiate with the ultra-nationalist Kurdish movement, the PKK who is seeking autonomy from Turkey. While encouraged by the EU, Turkey first started peace talks with the PKK in Oslo and then in Imrali which finally resulted in a ceasefire between the two parties, and PKK insurgents started to withdraw from Qandil Mountains. However, because of what PKK called to be “violation of terms of the agreement”, the peace didn't last long. AKP while negotiating with the PKK seems to be strengthening its intelligence service capabilities. As a result, a phobia and fear exists from both sides that prevents any fundamental solution for the question in Turkey. In addition, resolving the Kurdish question seems to be difficult because of the following circumstances; first, lack of a single definition of the Kurdish question, within Turks, Kurds and political elites. The definition of Kurdish question ranges from more cultural rights to federalism and separatism. Although there are plenty of nationalist Turks who completely deny the existence of such an issue and if the ruling-AKP take a more flexible approach toward the Kurds, the party would lose the support of nationalist Turks. Thus, recently, the Turkish officials also limited the Kurdish question to a “bunch of terrorist” in the mountains and separated the Kurdish question from the larger conundrum and vowed to fight terrorists. Second, continuously changing positions of the AKP regarding the Kurdish question; from being first in the history to acknowledge to complete denial of the issue. Scholars have concluded that “Erdogan does not appear to have a clear understanding of the power of nationalism and ethnic identity” (Yavuz, 2009: 188).

The Arab uprising also has an enormous impact on Turkey's regional security policies within the Kurdish question framework. The regional anarchy created by the IS opened the space for the Kurds to practice their military power in a wider region. PKK and the Syrian PYD and most probably the Syrian government made a regional security complex based on enmity with Turkey and announced an autonomous region in northern Syria. On the other hand, Iran and Turkey who are ideological rivals in the region seems to be forming another security complex to counter further empowerment and penetration of similar Kurdish entity in their borders. By changing equations in the region and PKK's expanding operations in northern Syria and Iraq, PKK also reshuffled its structure in 2014 by letting most experienced unconventional fighters to take role. At the same time, Turkish foreign policy also shifted from neo-Ottoman approach to a security-oriented assertive security-foreign policy. In another words, with the rise of PYD in northern Syrian, Ahmet Davutoglu's `zero-problem with neighbours' policy was expired with the emergence of larger imperatives in the region mainly the consolidation of Kurdish military and political power. Turkey shaped its foreign policy around the domestic and foreign security challenges in a reactive pattern. Turkey's long term and inclusive military operation in Syria and Iraq, known as the “Euphrates Shield” in order to manage the external security threats of regional transformations is a clear evidence of Turkey's new self-centric, cautious and ad hoc policy. As a result, Kurdish security concerns is the main driver of Turkish foreign policy while countering Iran's expansionist policy is also in Ankara's agenda. In addition, to some extend IS also is considered in Turkey's new policy; however, IS comes into same category of terrorism together with the PKK and its affiliates.

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