Reflection on queer issues during the Sochi Olympics

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Abstract

Russia hosted the Winter Olympics in 2014 and the FIFA World Cup in 2018, increasing international attention on Russia, and its stance on queer rights. This study contributes to the field of queer international relations and existing literature on Russia-West tensions centred on queer issues. There is significant literature on Russia's political homophobia and this paper builds on that, focusing on how Western countries other Russia based on this issue. Coverage by the UK's Daily Mail from 2008 to 2018 is analysed using Emotion Discourse Analysis and headline analysis. The results show a negative portrayal of Russia based on queer rights, even though acceptance of queer rights within the UK is uneven. Evidence homonationalism is found, with the UK presented as `sexually exceptional' based on acceptance of queer rights, while Russia is demonised and constructed as inferior and Other. This work has important implications for UK-Russia relations and wider political tensions.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my thesis supervisor Professor Goncharov of School of Social Sciences and Area Studies in the Department of Political Science at Higher School of Economics, St Petersburg. I would also like to thank András Gál for his assistance in formulating my topic and methodology.

I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues David Horst and Katie Cox for their invaluable feedback on the draft of my thesis.

Finally, I also must express my gratitude to my parents and friends for their support. A special thank you to Emma Sanderson for her help and constant encouragement throughout the process of researching and writing this thesis, and valuable comments and edits to my draft.

Amber Franich

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. Literature Review

1.1 Queer Theory and International Relations

1.2 Queer Politics and the “West”

1.3 Queer Politics and the UK

1.4 Queer Politics and Russia

1.5 Queer Politics and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics

2. Research Design and Methodology

2.1 Emotion Discourse Analysis

2.2 Headline Analysis

2.3 Data Selection and Collection

3. UK and Russia Coverage 2008-2012

3.1 UK

3.2 Russia

4. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics

5. The 2018 FIFA World Cup

6. UK and Russia Coverage 2013-2018

6.1 UK

6.2 Russia

7. Discussion of Findings

Conclusion

Bibliography

Appendices

Appendix One UK and Russia Coverage 2008-2012

Appendix Two 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics

Appendix Three 2018 FIFA World Cup

Appendix Four UK and Russia Coverage 2013-2018

Introduction

Tensions between Russia and the west are on the rise, and one issue that repeatedly arises as an issue of contention is that of queer rights. Russia has never been a particularly queer-friendly country, and liberalisation since the collapse of the USSR has not led to acceptance of queer rights. The Russian government's treatment of the queer population has come to greater international attention since 2013, when the law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values”, also commonly referred to as the `homo-propaganda law' or the gay propaganda law, was implemented across the federation. There is substantial literature on queer politics within Russia and the Putin administration's use of political homophobia both domestically and internationally. The literature shows a trend of othering the West at least partly based on acceptance of queer rights. The purpose of this research is to contribute to the less extensive studies on how Western nations also utilise queer politics in the othering of Russia. Othering is a concept in identity, where the identity is based not only on the presence of traits or values (what one is), but also on what one is not.

Queer issues have been used in the process of othering and demonising other countries and groups. In the preface of her book Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir Puar calls attention to an incident in July 2005 where two Iranian male youths were publicly hanged in Mashad, sparking widespread outrage and calls for protests worldwide. Demonstrations were held in cities around the globe with the support of many organisations, activists, scholars, celebrities and politicians. However, there was controversy regarding the facts of what occurred. It was “unclear whether the two had had consensual sex...and were the victims of antigay persecution, or if the teenagers were convicted of gang raping a 13-year-old boy”. Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (London: Duke University Press, 2007) x. She notes that the sentencing of three homosexual Nigerian men to stoning to death did not elicit the same response, nor did exposure of torture (and homophobia) that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Looking at the incident as an issue of juvenile execution it is worth mentioning that in the US execution of minors was only outlawed in March 2005, revealing that a consensus on the inhumanity of capital punishment there was not a foregone conclusion. Ibid., xi.

With all these details in mind, Puar repeats a question posed by Paula Ettelbrick, the director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC): “Why now? Why just Iran?”. Ibid. Puar points to the wider political context, in particular the Bush administration labelling Iran as an “axis of evil” by the Bush administration, escalating pressure to take military action against Iran for supporting Hezbollah, and evidence of other planned military action. She claims that the “frenzied fixation on the homophobia of Iran's state regime” is part of “the racism of the global gay left and the wholesale acceptance of the Islamophobic rhetoric that fuels the war on terror and the political forces pushing for an Iranian invasion”. Ibid. The focus on Iran as a homophobic state is both a reflection of and feeds into the wider context of political tension and othering of Iran.

If we look at the political situation between Russia and the West (and the UK) in 2014 and in 2018 we can similarly see a great deal of tension. Sources of this tension include: the Ukraine Crisis, the Syrian Civil War, the offering of asylum to whistle-blower Edward Snowden, and the Skripal Poisoning to name a few, and are accompanied by measures such as sanctions. In Terrorist Assemblages Puar argues that there is a link between the homophobic portrayal of Iran and the US perceiving Muslim groups and their culture as inferior and perverse, and thus in need of control (in the case of Iran, through military action). Ibid., ix-xii. Queer theorist, Cynthia Weber, also argues that queer rights discourse can be used in the constructing of less `progressive' countries as inferior, which then feeds in to wider relations. Cynthia Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 113. Likewise, this research seeks to establish whether western media portrays Russia as a homophobic state as part of a process of demonisation of Russia, where the issue of queer rights is used to construct Russia as inferior, perverse and Other.

Since the enactment of the homo-propaganda law, Russia has been host to two major international sporting events: the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup. These events have put Russia, and Russia's queer politics, under the spotlight, thus drawing the scrutiny of the international community. During both events the subject of queer rights and the treatment of queer individuals in Russia was covered by international (and more specifically, western) media. This research will focus on an analysis of the portrayal of queer issues in Russia in this coverage, specifically that of the UK's Daily Mail. In doing so, the author intends to establish whether or not there is a pattern of demonisation of Russia, based on the issue of queer rights and politics.

The central question of this research is: How were queer issues in Russia portrayed in the Daily Mail during the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 FIFA World Cup? Additionally, the following research questions will be addressed: queer daily mail olympics

1: How were queer issues in Russia portrayed in the Daily Mail prior to, and outside the context of, the Sochi Olympics and the World Cup?

2: How have queer issues outside of Russia been portrayed in the Daily Mail?

3: How does the portrayal of queer issues in Russia during the Sochi Olympics and World Cup compare to other portrayals of queer issues in the Daily Mail?

It is expected that a pattern of queer politics being used in Othering Russia will be found, where queer rights issues in Russia are used to demonise Russia in comparison to the UK, but the same criticism is not as prevalent in the coverage of domestic issues.

This research is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the under-researched field of queer international relations. Furthermore, it uses the recent example of the 2018 FIFA World Cup - at the time of writing there is no published academic work on queer issues and this event. This research also takes a different approach by looking at a conservative Western media source, whereas previous studies have focused on queer or left-leaning sources, or Russian media sources. Looking at a conservative source is expected to be interesting, as they are less likely to accept queer rights, thus making their stance more nuanced and contradictory, which is interesting when examined through the lens of queer international relations theory.

The first chapter of this paper will outline the current literature, looking at queer politics and international relations as a field, and outlining queer politics in the UK and Russia. It will discuss the literature on how queer issues have been used in the Othering of Muslim groups, and how these theories are applicable to Russia-West relations. The second chapter will outline the research design and methodology, which involves Emotion Discourse Analysis of sample articles and headline analysis. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters outline the analysis of the Daily Mail's coverage of queer issues over four categories: UK and Russia coverage 2008-2012, Sochi Olympics, FIFA World Cup, and UK and Russia coverage 2013-2018. The seventh chapter provides a discussion of the findings of the analysis. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the research and suggest directions for further research.

1. Literature Review

1.1 Queer Theory and International Relations

Increasingly, International Relations (IR) scholars are recognising the importance of gender and sexuality in the study of IR and as a “fundamental organising aspect of international politics”. Cynthia Weber, “Queer International Relations: A Symposium”, The Disorder of Things <https://thedisorderofthings.com/2016/11/21/queer-international-relations-a-symposium/> (21 November 2013) accessed 22 February 2019. It is difficult to offer a precise definition of Queer theory as it can encompass not only LGBT themes such as sexuality or sexual rights, but also the challenging of social, economic and power relations, as well as the “dualistic binaries” that exist in mainstream IR theory - for instance West/Rest or liberalism/premodern homophobia. Markus Thiel, “Queer Theory”, in International Relations Theory, eds, Stephen McGlinchey, Rosie Walters and Christian Scheinpflug (Bristol, England: E-International Relations Publishing, 2017) 97, 100. Leading Queer IR scholar, Cynthia Weber argues that sexuality is key to understanding sovereignty, power, security and nationalism - key concerns for IR scholars - and that “IR theories and policies around modernization and development, immigration, terrorism, human rights and regional and international integration rely upon as well as construct complex relationships of sovereignty and sexuality”. Weber, “Queer International Relations”. This highlights the fact that the study of queer issues in IR is a key part of understanding a variety of issues in international politics.

This paper will focus on the area of Queer IR theory that “analyses and critiques societal and political norms in particular as they relate to the experience of sexuality and gender”. Thiel, “Queer Theory”, 97. Queer theory is a useful tool to assist in understanding the variety of complexities in the area of LGBT politics and rights. For instance, LGBT rights promotion stems mainly from the West, leading to conflict based on this promotion and its often “culturally intrusive manner”. Ibid., 100. Further complicating the issue is that in many of the states resisting the promotion of LGBT rights, homophobia "was institutionally embedded" by colonising powers - the very same states now leading the push for universal LGBT rights. Markus Thiel, “LGBT Politics, Queer Theory, and International Relations,” E-International Relations <https://www.e-ir.info/2014/10/31/lgbt-politics-queer-theory-and-international-relations/> (31 October 2014) accessed 15 March 2018. Thus, LGBT rights have become a point of “political contention”, both domestically and internationally. Thiel, “Queer Theory”, 98.

This chapter will provide an overview of the situation of queer politics in the West, the UK and Russia. It will elaborate pertinent queer political theories from scholars Jasbir Puar, Momin Rahman, Cynthia Weber, and others, and explain concepts, in particular homonationalism and sexual exceptionalism that illustrate the mechanisms by which the West can be seen to use the issue of queer rights as a tool in the othering of Russia. The othering of Muslim groups will be used as an example of this process, and the applicability of this to Russia-West and Russia-UK relations will be shown. Finally, existing literature on the issue of queer politics at Sochi Olympics will be discussed, as well as two previous studies with similar research focuses, one by Catherine Baker, the other by Ann Travers and Mary Shearman, further illustrating the research contribution of this paper.

1.2 Queer Politics and the “West”

As already indicated above, the fact that progress concerning, and promotion of LGBT rights is largely defined by and stems from the West is significant in international relations. It impacts the way in which states perceive and interact with each other. The progress towards decriminalisation of same-sex relationships in `Western' countries has created a context where “the underlying assumption around sexual issues is understandably one of global progress towards the social acceptance of sexual diversity”. Momin Rahman, “Queer Rights and the Triangualation of Western Exceptionalism”, Journal of Human Rights 13:3 (2014) 275. This consequently leads to tension between countries that are seen as contributing towards this global progress (from a Western perspective), and countries that are seen as inhibiting it. For many Western states this acceptance or progress towards acceptance has become an important feature of their identity and politics.

Queer theorist Jasbir Puar describes the emergence of a type of national “homonormativity” or homonationalism that has arisen alongside this move towards acceptance. Homonationalism is a “collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated by both national rhetoric of patriotic inclusion and by gay lesbian and queer subjects themselves”. Jasbir K. Puar, “Mapping US Homonormativities”, Gender, Place and Culture 13:1 (2006) 67. It refers to a sort of “sexual exceptionalism”, where she argues that based on progressive attitudes towards LGBT/Queer issues, a nation can believe itself to be both distinct and superior (exceptional) from states that do not share these attitudes. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 3-4. Puar argues that today's US, a “heteronormative nation”, “actually relies on and benefits from the proliferation of queerness”. Ibid., xxv. By espousing certain homonormative ideologies (usually pertaining to white, middle or upper class LGBT people who wish to have families) the US is able to incorporate these into nationalism (homonationalism) and distinguish themselves as sexually exceptional from those who do not support the same ideals. Ibid. An important aspect of writings on homonationalism is the acknowledgement of the fact that this occurs even when these “exceptional” states do not necessarily provide full equal rights to their own LGBT citizens, and/or perhaps ignore other human rights issues and abuses such as racism. Fred Joseph LeBlanc, “Sporting Homonationalism: Russian Homophobia, Imaginative Geographies and the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games”, Sociology Association of Aotearoa New Zealand Annual Conference (2013) 2.

In Terrorist Assemblages Puar illustrates how a “queer platform” can be used “to propagate anti-Muslim rhetoric”. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages”, 18. She uses the example of British LGBT rights group OutRage! whose prominent activist, Peter Tatchell, warned of a “New Dark Ages” of “religious obscurantism and intolerance” stemming from Islamic fundamentalism, which could have serious political consequences for the LGBT community. Ibid. They also claimed to have received death threats from various Muslim organisations following the London Bombings. According to Puar, they codified for Europeans “that Muslims are especial threat to homosexuals, that Muslim fundamentalists have deliberately and specifically targeted homosexuals, and that the parameters of this opposition correlate with those of the war on terror: civilization versus barbarianism”. Ibid. In general, her work highlights a trend of “Islamophobia in the global north”, where homonationalism contributes to “a collective vilification of Muslims”. Ibid., 21.

Puar also claims that the Western focus on gay marriage rights in particular is actually “less about gay rights and more about codifying an ideal of European values”. Roy in Puar, Terrorist Assemblages”, 18. Gay marriage rights have become a signifier of that which is civilised and that which is not, and “progressive sexuality” has been “championed as a hallmark of…modernity”. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages”, 41. This distinction can be used in discourse against immigrant groups who refuse to assimilate, or to other states. Lack of same-sex marriage rights or other LGBT rights in some states provides an empirically “locatable” space that can be designated as homophobic, thereby producing “geopolitical mapping of neoliberal power relations in the guise of cultures of sexual expression and repression”. Ibid., 29. This argument illustrates how Russia, a state without same-sex marriage rights, can be constructed as culturally less civilised or inferior, while also signifying its inferior status in West-Russia power relations.

Cynthia Weber supports many of these arguments in her book Queer International Relations. She states that “Imagined in the image of the white, modern, Western neoliberal citizen”, a LGBT person is not “alien” or “perverse” but rather a “normal minority human being”. Weber, Queer International Relations, 20. To discriminate against LGBT people is unjust, and same-sex love is normalised through “gay marriage, gay consumerism, and gay patriotism”. Ibid. Similarly to Puar, she writes how a state's progress towards acceptance of gay rights as human rights has become a measure of development or being `on the right side of history'. Ibid., 30. This type of thinking can lead to what Weber calls “homointernationalism”, where gay rights as human rights “are promoted as global rights for all `LGBT' people”. Ibid., 113. However, the “obligation to defend the `LGBT'” is targeted towards the “global South”, not towards Western states that “themselves fail to measure up to the standards they impose”. Ibid. In this way gay rights can be used “to exert pressure on countries where the US [or the West] has some ulterior motive”. Dean Spade, “Under the Cover of Gay Rights”, NYU Review of Law and Social Change 37:79 (2006) 87. The issue of LGBT rights can be used to help construct a country as “backward” or “cruel”, thereby demonising said country and justifying interventionist measures. It is noted that this has occurred in “anti-Arab and anti-Muslim framings” during the War on Terror. Ibid.

In fact, Sociologist Momin Rahman, refers to this type of “homointernationalism” as “homocolonialism” in his article “Queer Rights and the Triangualation of Western Exceptionalism”. He argues that this “sexual exceptionalism” as explained by Puar, becomes a tool for Western nations that can be described as “`homocolonialist' because the deployment of LGBTIQ rights serves to stigmatise non-Western cultures and conversely reassert the supremacy of Western nations and civilisation. Rahman, “Queer Rights and the Triangualation of Western Exceptionalism”, 284. His article also focuses on demonisation of Muslim groups. The evidence that Muslims and Muslim states are intolerant towards homosexuality, based on religion is highlighted. Ibid., 276. Rahman claims that this feeds into a Western discourse of modernity versus tradition, with sexuality offering a “prism” through which to perceive this cultural contrast. Ibid., 277. When discussing the uneven application and acceptance of LGBT rights within the West itself, Rahman argues that this in fact adds to the exceptionalism of this acceptance. He argues that “this exceptionalism that permits the use of homosexuality to challenge Muslim cultures, not simply as being guilty of “traditionalism” but more specifically as resistant to the exceptionalism of Western modernity that queer rights exemplify”. Ibid., 279. This allows “Eastern cultures” to be defined as “against modernity”, and thus “others”, creating potential for them to be constructed as problematic, and stigmatised. Rahman, “Queer Rights and the Triangualation of Western Exceptionalism”, 279-281. These arguments further show how LGBT rights/homophobia discourse can be used in the process of othering.

In their works, both Rahman and Puar largely focus on homonationalism/homocolonialism in the context of the US and how it impacts relations with Muslim nations and groups. However, this paper argues that their arguments can be applied to Russia-West relations, and the case of UK-Russia relations. This broader applicability is noted by both authors. Puar states the UK is a good example of a European state with a counterpart to US sexual exceptionalism, indicating that her arguments are transferable. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 11. Rahman also that their arguments can also be applied to others (apart from Muslim groups) who are “more broadly in favour of the traditional social organisation of genders and families”. Rahman, “Queer Rights and the Triangualation of Western Exceptionalism”, 275. Below it will be explained how Russia falls into this category. The following sections will further elaborate how these concepts can be applied to UK-Russia relations.

Naturally, this exceptionalism influences interactions with states or groups who are not seen to meet this same level of progress, and this process of othering can have practical implications. An example is the UK and the US making (or threatening to make) aid to certain African nations, notably Uganda, contingent upon the decriminalisation of homosexuality. In 2011, then UK Prime Minister David Cameron, in relation to anti-homosexual legislation in nations including Malawi, Uganda, and Ghana, said that “Britain is one of the premier aid givers in the world. We want to see countries that receive our aid adhering to proper human rights” and that “This is an issue where we are pushing for movement, we are prepared to put some money behind what we believe”. BBC News, “Cameron threat to doc some UK aid to anti-gay nations”, BBC NEWS <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-15511081> (30 October 2011) accessed 05 March 2019. In 2014 the US cut aid to and cancelled a military exercise with Uganda in response to an anti-gay law that was implemented, with harsh penalties on homosexuality - a move that was designed to “reinforce [US] support for human rights of all Ugandans regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity”. Reuters, “U.S. cuts aid to Uganda, cancels military exercise of anti-gay law”, Reuters <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-uganda-gay-announcement/u-s-cuts-aid-to-uganda-cancels-military-exercise-over-anti-gay-law-idUSKBN0EU26N20140619> (19 June 2014) accessed 05 March 2019. Furthermore, such actions are often met with a negative response. African scholar Endong writes that for many Africans western “gay-prosletyism” is seen “as a form of cultural imperialism or (attempted neo-colonialism)”. Floribert Patrick Calvain Endong, “LGBT Rights Movement in Africa and the Myth of the Whiteman's Superiority”, 7:1 Journal of Globalisation Studies (May 2016) 149. This is just one illustration of how this topic carries very real importance for how international politics is carried out.

1.3 Queer Politics and the UK

In LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? scholars Ayoub and Paternotte write that LGBT rights are now a “powerful symbol of Europe” and an element in debates on a wide range of topics, including international relations. Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte, “Introduction”, in LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? Eds, Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 3. They seek to understand the “`special relationship' that unites issues of sexuality and Europe” and to explore “how this relationship has been constructed and how it has become, especially in rhetoric and imagination, a reality.” Ibid. They argue that LGBT issues are “linked to Europe's normative structures from above”, which leads to activists using this idea of Europe when fighting for rights, which further cements the idea of a Europe that is united around LGBT rights and acceptance. Ibid. For many, Europe “enshrines fundamental values crucial to LGBT rights”. Ibid., 12. This perspective has not only been “imagined by LGBT activists…but has also been increasingly endorsed by national and European institutions”. Ibid. Europe has the most “advanced” LGBT rights in the world, with high levels of tolerance, and high standards of legal protection across most of the region. Ibid.

The normalisation of LGBT rights in Europe can be seen in official discourse, for example the 2013 statement by the French, Belgian and Italian ministers of equal opportunities: Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, Joëlle Milquet, and Elsa Fornero. They stated that “EU member states put the respect of fundamental rights at the top of their values… We want to see these values in the external policy of the European Union… We want to live in a European space in which individual freedoms are effectively protected, regardless of one's sexual orientation or gender identity”. Ibid., 6.

This shows how important LGBT rights are both within the EU and as part of what they wish to project internationally. There have also been various legal changes at the national level, and LGBT rights claims have been taken up by European institutions. The Council of Europe, which has a human rights mandate, was the “first international institution to consider LGBT issues”. Ibid.,12.

This official defence of LGBT rights has contributed to forming the idea of what it means to be European or what qualifies as European. Through these values “the notion of Europeanness intersects with an idea of civilisation, positing some individuals and some peoples as less civilised than others”, creating internal and external boundaries. Ibid., 15. These “less civilised” individuals or groups emerge as “sexual others” to LGBT Europe. Russia is one of these “sexual others”, and thus an “other” for European identity to be constructed against. Ibid., 16.

In 2013 The Council of the European Union adopted Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons. The guidelines claim that:

“These guidelines aim to provide officials of EU institutions and EU Member States, with guidance to be used in contacts with third countries and with international and civil society organisations, using a case-by-case approach, in order to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTI persons within its external action”. Council of the European Union, “Guidelines to promote and protect the enjoyment of all human rights by lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) persons”, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (24 June 2013) para 6.

It is clear that LGBT rights and Europe are closely linked, and that this linked is reinforced at a national and institutional level within Europe. As these guidelines reveal, LGBT rights have also become an important aspect of the EU's international affairs. In recent years the visibility of LGBT issues has increased “across the region and beyond”. Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte, “Conclusion”, in LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? Eds, Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 233, 239.

It is important to note that while, at the current time of writing Britain has yet to exit the EU, and the Sochi Olympics took place prior to the referendum on the decision to leave the EU, Britain should be considered as heavily influenced by, but still distinct from the rest of Europe. The history of LGBT rights in the UK is naturally tied with the region. In 1978 the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) was “formed in the UK, and became the first “enduring transnational LGBT organisation. Ayoub and Paternotte, “Introduction”, 9. This group was “inspired by a specific idea of Europe” and believed that European values and institutions would be useful in progressing LGBT rights internationally. Ibid., 9-10. Today, the UK is considered one of the world leaders on LGBT issues, with gay activist Peter Tatchell describing it as now being “one of the best countries in the world for gay equality”. BBC News, “Decriminalisation of homosexuality: History of gay rights in the UK”, BBC News <https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/40459213> (25 August 2017) accessed 17 March 2019. A Foreign Affairs Committee report on human rights in the UK also cited LGBT rights as one of the thematic issues the UK has taken a lead on within the UN Human Rights Council. House of Commons, “Global Britain: Human rights and the rule of law”, House of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee: Thirteenth Report of Session 2017-19 (London: House of Commons, 2018) 5.

However, The UK “has not fostered a reputation for being either a good European or a regional LGBT rights pioneer”. Kelly Kollman, “Deploying Europe: The Creation of Discursive Imperatives for Same-Sex Unions”, in in LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? Eds, Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 110. In fact, they had some of the most restrictive laws in the region. Union-wide, consensual sex between two men was not decriminalised until 1982, lesbians and gay men were unable to openly serve in the military until 2000, and there were unequal ages of consent until 2001. Ibid. Partly due to this, in the 70s and 80s British LGBT rights activists often coordinated closely with their European counterparts. European institutions, such as the ECHR, were also utilised in the UK in changing the above laws. Ibid., 111. In 1981 they made a ruling that required the UK to decriminalise same-sex intercourse in Northern Ireland. Ayoub and Paternotte, “Introduction”, 12.

Furthermore, the high level of Euroscepticism that exists within the UK (leading to a decision to leave the EU), has meant that since the 80s the idea of “Europe” has rarely been used to further the cause of LGBT rights. Kollman, “Deploying Europe”, 111. During the push for, and passing of, more progressive legislation for LGBT rights, similar laws and trends in Europe were only rarely referred to. Ibid., 112. In fact, opponents of same-sex marriage actually used the image of Europe as a negative thing, attempting to link LGBT rights to an “unwanted `European' presence in domestic politics”. Ibid., 113. The argument was that the recognition of same-sex marriages could lead to European courts could use European human rights treaties to “force” religious organisations into performing same-sex marriages (and therefore infringing on religious freedoms). Ibid. While the UK did legalise same-sex marriages, Europe was invoked not as a benchmark to be reached by supporters, but as a threat to British values and sovereignty by opponents. Ibid. This serves to highlight that while LGBT rights are part of the UK's human rights norms, civil acceptance of these rights is not complete. This mirrors the situation in the US described by Puar, and it can be seen that despite the complexities, LGBT rights are an important part of the UK's international politics and identity - it is `sexually exceptional' per the theories outlined previously.

1.4 Queer Politics and Russia

There is substantial literature concerning explanations for the Putin regime's continued use of political homophobia. One of those explanations is that it is part of the Putin regime's efforts to differentiate Russia from the `West'. Defining Russia and Russian identity in contrast to the “West”, has been the case since before the revolution. Vera Tolz, “Tolz, Vera. “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies 50:6 (1998) 995. Official discourse under the Putin administration has continued this, focusing on Russia's greatness and the uniqueness of its culture. Petr Panov, “Nation-building in post-Soviet Russia: What kind of nationalism is produced by the Kremlin?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 92. Some scholars even argue that Russia has a “negative identity”, with its identity being constituted in relation to a “negative”, in this case the West, which becomes necessary for solidarity, and that Russian identity is based on not belonging to the West. Boris Dubin in Panov, “Nation-building in post-Soviet Russia”, 92; Led Gudkov in Panov, “Nation-building in post-Soviet Russia”, 92. Ayoub and Paternotte write that, “Connecting LGBT rights to the idea of Europe has become a recurring theme in international politics…and a rhetorical vehicle used by those offering an alternative cultural paradigm”. Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte, “Introduction”, in LGBT Activism and the Making of Europe: A Rainbow Europe? Eds, Phillip M. Ayoub and David Paternotte (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 1. Queerness and queer rights are a “rainbow-tinged”, external threat. Ibid. Homosexuality is tied to the West and Western values, becoming something that Russia does not belong to - or something that does not belong in Russia. Any foreign criticism of this stance “is dismissed as an example of political correctness gone mad or as politically motivated, once more reinforcing the symbolic and moral distance between `European' sexual democracy and Russian national traditions and values”. Nartova and Stella, “Sexual citizenship, nationalism and biopolitics in Putin's Russia”, 47.

The Russian government's treatment of the queer population has come to greater international attention since 2013, when the law “for the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional Family Values”, also commonly referred to as the `homo-propaganda law' or the gay propaganda law, was implemented across the federation. Many argue that this law has “fuelled anti-gay abuse, discrimination and violence”. Al Jazeera, “Russia's LBGT victimised by `gay propaganda law”, Al Jazeera <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/09/russia-lgbt-victimised-gay-propaganda-law-150914082614488.html> (14/09/15) accessed 10 December 2017. The vagueness of the law, combined with the fact that it legitimises anti-queer sentiments, creates fear among queer Russians. This law was implemented alongside a series of previous laws targeting NGOs, which place restrictions on the operation of LGBT organisations. In 2006, the Putin administration passed controversial laws on the regulation of NGOs requiring the re-registration of all organisations, which could be denied if their “goals and objectives… create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation.”, Sarah L. Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltsin Era”, Problems of Post-Communism 58:3 (May/June 2011) 20. These changes also constitute an attempt to curtail the influence of foreign NGOs, outlawing “affiliates of foreign NGOs” and requiring “existing organisations to re-register as exclusively Russian, which may prove legally impossible”. Liliana N. Proskuryakova, “Russian Civil Society Will Find It Harder to Breathe”, Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/russian-civil-society-will-find-it-harder-breathe> (08/12/05) accessed 27 October 2017.

This attack on foreign influence poses a significant problem, as international support including “moral support, technical assistance, and financial funding” can be crucial where domestic support is weak, or lacking, or the situation in which the NGO is operating hostile. Henderson, “Civil Society in Russia”, 14. This is true for LGBT organisations. These changes illustrate Putin's vision of civil society that includes “maintaining a commitment to Russian cultural values”. Ibid., 18. In 2012 a “foreign agent” law was passed, requiring non-profit organisations receiving foreign funding and engaging in “political activity” to register and declare themselves to be “foreign agents” - a term that has a very negative connotation in Russian. Ellen Barry, “Foreign-Funded Non-profits in Russia Face New Hurdle”, The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/world/europe/russia-introduces-law-limiting-aid-for-nonprofits.html> (02/07/12) accessed 10 December 2017.

Furthermore, in 2015 a law was implemented which targets “undesirable NGOs”. ABC News, “US leads criticism of Russia's new law targeting `undesirable' NGOs”, ABC News <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-24/russia-new-ngo-law-draws-western-ire/6493520> (24/05/15) accessed 10 December 2017. This law allows the government to impede the operation of foreign groups whose activities could be construed as a threat to Russian security or the “basic values of the Russian state.” Ibid.

As stated previously, and argued by Mole, in Russia homosexuality is at odds with national discourse on identity, and often seen as one of the corrupting forces of the “decadent” West. Richard C. M. Mole, “Nationalism and Homophobia in Central and Eastern Europe”, in K Slootmaeckers, H. Touquet and P. Vermeersch (eds) The EU Enlargement and Gay Politics: Gender and Politics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 99. This is supported by Essig who argues that in Russia, homosexuality is constructed as an external threat, that needs to be eliminated to protect ordinary Russians. Laurie Essig, “`Bury Their Hearts': Some Thoughts on the Spectre of Homosexuality Haunting Russia”, QED; A Journal in GLBTQ Worldmaking 1:3 (2014) 39. Stella also supports this, claiming that the rhetoric of the Putin administration positions homosexuality as a threat to “traditional” values, marriage, and the family - which are important morally, ideologically and pragmatically (to counter Russia's declining birth rates). N. Nartova and F. Stella, “Sexual citizenship, nationalism and biopolitics in Putin's Russia”, in F. Stella, Y. Taylor, T. Reynolds, and A. Rogers (eds.) Sexuality, Citizenship and Belonging: Trans-National and Intersectional Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2015) 47-48. These laws highlight how the Putin administration envisions Russia's values as separate from and under threat from the West. They are also a strong indicator that Russia is “in favour of the traditional social organisation of genders and families” - meaning that, as argued by Rahman, theories of sexual exceptionalism are applicable to Russia-West relations.

An analysis of Putin's 2013 Valdai Address can also serve to highlight how queer politics has become a divisive issue between Russia and the west. The central question of the Valdai Address is that of Russia's national identity. Putin describes how “many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute the basis of Western civilisation” and denying traditional sexual identities and moral principles. President of Russia, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, President of Russia <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243> (19/09/13) accessed 20 November 2018. The first example of this provided is the implantation of “policies that equate large families with same-sex partnerships” - a clear indication that acceptance or support of such partnerships is a negative, and western, occurrence. The next two phrases mention “belief in Satan” and promotion of paedophilia.Ibid. While no direct connection is made between these things and same-sex partnerships other than that they are of the west, their positioning within the speech effectively equates homosexuality with Satanism and paedophilia. This link has been made by other officials, for example Yelena Mizulina, who spearheaded promotion of the homo-propaganda law who frequently made this connection in interviews. Dan Healey, Russian Homophobia from Stalin to Sochi (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) 12. Putin notes that this western moral model is being “aggressively” exported, which “opens a direct path to degradation and primitivism”. President of Russia, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”. The phrase “moral crisis” is used multiple times. Such emotive language emphasises the threatening nature of these issues.

For Putin, the peak of this crisis is supposedly the “loss of the ability to self-reproduce” and he argues that the “values embedded in Christianity and other world religions” are necessary to prevent such demographic crisis, “degradation and primitivism” and to maintain “human dignity”. Therefore, he argues it is “natural and right to defend these values”. Ibid. In the question and answer section of his address, Putin claims that Russia is “not limiting our sexual minorities' rights in any way”. Ibid. However, the opinions on same-sex marriage expressed in this Valdai Address clearly illustrate justification for state-sponsored homophobia through laws such as the homo-propaganda law. The potential that this discourse has for minority discrimination is in fact highlighted by the statement “one must respect every minority's right to be different, but the rights of the majority must not be put into question”. Ibid. Assuming that one considers disallowing same-sex marriage as an infringement of minority rights, this can be seen as a contradiction of Putin's later statement. It is clear from the address that minority rights, in this case the potential right for same-sex couples to be married, will be infringed in Russia, as same-sex marriage has been conceptualised as a threat to Russia's ability to survive through reproduction, and thus to the majority of Russians.

In this speech these “moral” concerns are also clearly positioned not only as a threat to Russia's identity and survival, but as a specifically western threat. These issues are being exported to Russia - they are not Russian, but “traditional values”, the bulwark against impending moral and demographic crisis, are. In the following segment of the speech, Putin then goes on to state that there are attempts to “revive a standardised model of a unipolar world and to blur the institutions of international law and national sovereignty”, and that in such a world sovereign states are not required, only “vassals”. Ibid. This positions perceived export of certain western morals as not only a threat to Russia's identity and demography, but also as a threat to Russia's vision of the international system and the sovereignty of the Russian nation. This corroborates the argument made by scholar Alexandra Novitskaya that alternative sexualities have become a “symbol of [the] confrontation” between Russia and the West. Alexandra Novitskaya, “Patriotism, sentiment, and male hysteria: Putin's masculinity politics and the persecution of non-heterosexual Russians”, Norma: International Journal for Masculinity Studies (2017) 9. This speech clearly reinforces the argument that the Putin administration utilises the issue of queer rights to other the West. It also further illustrates Russia's support for “traditional” organisation of family and gender roles - it does not share progressive Western attitudes. This makes Russia likely to be a state which, based on Puar's sexual exceptionalism, Western states can believe themselves to be distinct from and superior to, and thus also a target of demonisation.

This anti-West based cultural identity that the Putin administration has cultivated in Russia is considered as crucial to the regime. According to Sharafutdinova, Putin has become a guardian of “traditional values, morals, and spirituality” - what she labels “morality politics”.Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, “The Pussy Riot affair and Putin's demarche from sovereign democracy to sovereign morality”, Nationalities Papers 42:4 (2014) 616. This morality politics is very important internationally. Many commentators have suggested that Putin (and Russia) is becoming - or at least is viewed as by some - as the world's new moral or conservative leader. Putin has consistently defended support of traditional and family values internationally. Some argue that he intends to be the global leader of those who disagree with liberal Western values that are becoming less traditional and patriarchal, with his actions seen as “the creation of [a] new hegemony”. Damien McElroy, “Vladimir Putin Claims Russia is moral compass of the World”, The Telegraph <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10513330/Vladimir-Putin-claims-Russia-is-moral-compass-of-the-world.html> (12/12/13) accessed 26 April 2018; Brian Whitmore, “Vladimir Putin, Conservative Icon”, The Atlantic <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/12/vladimir-putin-conservative-icon/282572/> (20/12/13) accessed 26 April 2018.