An argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith

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An argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith

Rob Lovering

ANNOTATION

W.K. Clifford famously argued that it is «wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence». Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not. To wit, I am inclined to think that it is not morally wrong for, say, an elderly woman on her death bed to believe privately that she is going to heaven even if she does so on insufficient evidence -- indeed, and lest there be any confusion, even if the woman herself deems the evidence for her so believing to be insufficient. After all, her believing so does not appear to endanger, harm, or violate the rights of anyone, nor does it make the world a worse place in a significant, if any, way. That Clifford might have put too fine a point on the matter, however, does not entail that there are no conditions under which it is wrong to believe something upon insufficient evidence. In this paper, I argue that in cases where believing a proposition (read: believing a proposition to be true) will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith-- for present purposes, to believe the proposition despite deeming the evidence for one's believing to be insufficient -- before one has attempted to believe the proposition by proportioning one's belief to the evidence.

Keywords: Belief, Faith, Evidence, Doxastic Practice, W.K. Clifford.

АННОТАЦИЯ

Роб Ловеринг PhD, доцент, Городской университет Нью-Йорка; Колледж Стейтен-Айленд

Довод в пользу ошибочности

PRIMA FACIE ПРОПОЗИЦИОНАЛЬНОЙ ВЕРЫ

Аннотация: У.К. Клиффорд убедительно утверждал, что: «всегда, везде и для каждого-- неправильно иметь какие-либо убеждения, основанные на недостаточных свидетельствах». Однако, если дух этого заявления находит отклик у меня, то буква--нет. А именно, я не склонен считать, что морально ошибочно, например, для престарелой женщины при смерти иметь убеждение о том, что она отправится в рай, даже если у нее нет для этой уверенности достаточных оснований. То есть, разумеется, даже если она сама полагает, что у нее нет для этого убеждения достаточных оснований. В конце концов--ее убеждение не несет опасности, вреда или нарушения чьих-либо прав, не делает мир хуже. Строгий подход Клиффорда к разрешению этого вопроса не означает, что не существует условий, при которых нельзя верить чему-либо без достаточных на то оснований. В данной статье я утверждаю, что в тех случаях, когда убеждение относительно некоторой пропозиции (т.е. вера в то, что пропозиция истинна) влияет на других, морально ошибочно prtma facte придерживаться пропозициональной веры (в данном случае--иметь убеждение относительно некоторой пропозиции, несмотря на убеждение в том, что свидетельства в ее пользу недостаточны), не попытавшись убедиться в пропозиции, соотнеся собственную веру с фактом.

Ключевые слова: У.К. Клиффорд, убеждение, вера, свидетельство, доксастическая практика.

INTRODUCTION

W.K. Clifford famously argued that it is “wrong always, everywhere and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (Clifford, 2014: 107). Though the spirit of this claim resonates with me, the letter does not. To wit, I am inclined to think that it is not morally wrong for, say, an elderly woman on her death bed to believe privately that she is going to heaven even if she does so on insufficient evidence -- indeed, and lest there be any confusion, even if the woman herself deems the evidence for her so believing to be insufficient. After all, her believing so does not appear to endanger, harm, or violate the rights of anyone, nor does it make the world a worse place in a significant, if any, way. That Clifford might have put too fine a point on the matter, however, does not entail that there are no conditions under which it is wrong to believe something upon insufficient evidence. In this paper, I argue that, in cases where believing a proposition (read: believing a proposition to be true) will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith--for present purposes, to believe the proposition despite deeming the evidence for one's believing to be insufficient -- before one has attempted to believe the proposition by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. To be clear, I do not argue that it is always wrong to have propositional faith or even that it often is. I simply argue that, under certain conditions, it can be--hence the prima facie language. (To say that an act is prima facie wrong is to say that it is wrong all else being equal. I will have more to say about this as the paper ensues.) With these preliminary remarks out of the way, let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of having propositional faith (as it is understood here) as well as my reasons for employing this understanding.

ON HAVING PROPOSITIONAL FAITH

Again, for present purposes, to have propositional faith--formally, to have faith that p -- is to believe a proposition (believe that p) despite deeming the evidence for one's believing to be insufficient. If this is to be understood properly, an analysis of some of key terms is required. Beginning with “evidence”, by it I mean epistemic reasons, those that indicate the truth of a proposition. (“Indicate” is to be understood conservatively, meaning that such reasons do not always or even often necessitate the truth of a proposition -- though, of course, at times they do.) Said reasons may be inferential or noninferential in nature, public or private, and more¹. The presence of tire marks on a street, for example, serves as a public, inferential epistemic reason for believing the proposition “Someone's driven here”. Epistemic reasons are to be contrasted with practical reasons, those that indicate, not the truth of a proposition, but the benefits of believing a proposition. For instance, a benefit of believing that I will do well on the exam--namely, that I increase the likelihood of my doing well on the exam by doing so--is a practical reason for believing the proposition “I will do well on the exam”.

By “sufficient” evidence, I mean evidence the strength of which is roughly proportional to the strength of the belief derived from it. Simply put, the stronger one believes something, the stronger the evidence must be if it is to be sufficient. To illustrate this, consider two spectra. For the first spectrum, 10 will represent the extreme of maximally strong belief, while і will represent the other extreme of maximally weak belief. For the second spectrum, 10 will represent the extreme of maximally strong evidence, while і will represent the other extreme of maximally weak evidence. If the strength of my belief that I am typing right now is approximately 7, then the strength of the evidence for my belief must be approximately 7 as well if it is to be sufficient.

But what counts as evidence? And in what does evidential strength consist? As interesting and important these questions are, they need not be addressed here to proceed with my argument for the prima facie wrongness of having faith that p. This is because regardless of what counts as evidence and what makes for evidential strength, the individual who has faith that p deems the evidence, whatever it might be, for her believing that p to be insufficient. That is, she deems her belief that p to be stronger than the evidence--again, whatever it might be--warrants. Perhaps her deeming it so is since she has not consulted any evidence whatsoever and, thus, does not know what the evidence warrants. Perhaps it is due to the fact that she has consulted (some) evidence and considers it too weak to warrant her strength of belief. In any case, to proceed with the question of whether it is prima facie wrong to have such faith, we need not answer the questions above. It is enough to know that the individual who has such faith deems the evidence for her believing that p to be insufficientSome philosophers, such as Jonathan Adler and Georges Rey, argue that believing something while deeming the evidence for one's so believing to be insufficient is incoherent. As Rey writes, “try thinking something of the form: p, however, I don't have adequate evidence or reasons for believing it [...] where you substitute for p, some non-religious claim, for example, 2 + 2 = 37, `the number of stars is even', or `Columbus sailed in 1962'. Imagine how baffling it would be if someone claimed merely to `have faith' about these things” (Rey, 2007: 260). Though I grant this is a possibility, as Adler himself suggests, said incoherence can be avoided by adding that the belief in question is not attended to in full awareness. See Adler, 2002: i2ff..

It behooves me to address why I have chosen to employ an understanding of having propositional faith that involves this subjective, negative assessment of the strength of the evidence for one's belief that p, that of deeming the evidence for one's believing that p to be insufficient for one's so believing. I have three reasons for doing so--two empirical, one philosophical. Beginning with the empirical reasons, first, and perhaps most importantly, cases involving this understanding of having propositional faith are pervasive, particularly among believers in God's existence. As Hilary Kornblith writes:

I've heard many people say quite sincerely, “I believe that God exists, but by my own lights, I am not justified in believing that God exists”. [...] [S]uch a person believes that God exists, regards this belief as unjustified and finds that so regarding the belief does not make it go out of existence (Kornblith, 1987: 119).

Similarly, T. J. Mawson writes:

There are some who believe in God even though they do not take themselves to have any positive reasons for doing so and who do not consider themselves in any way intellectually irresponsible in so believing. Deciding whether or not there's a God, such people say, is a “leap of faith”, rather than a conclusion of reason (Mawson, 2010: 93).

Like Kornblith and Mawson, I too have encountered many individuals, both personally and through various media, who had or have such faith that God exists. Indeed, the majority of theists with whom I have discussed God's existence have professed to have such faith that God exists, either straight away or after a bit of philosophizing (I ask the theist on what grounds she believes that God exists, she lays out an argument for God's existence, I raise objections, she submits replies, and this is repeated until she declares, “None of this really matters since, at the bottom, I have faith that God exists”). And various philosophers--Soren Kierkegaard, most notably -- have had this kind of faith that God exists. This is not meant to suggest that, objectively speaking, sufficient evidence of God's existence is lacking. It is only to say that the understanding of having propositional faith at work here is pervasive, and especially so among believers in God's existence.

The second empirical reason that I employ this understanding of having propositional faith is that people do not usually claim to have propositional faith when it comes to beliefs for which they think they possess sufficient evidence. As Matthew McCormick puts it:.we don't invoke [faith] or feel like it is necessary in situations where there is sufficient evidence in support of the desired outcome [...]. [F]aith is invoked and it is only necessary when there is some shortcoming in the evidence. If there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion, then faith isn't needed (McCormick, 2012: 217).

The third and the philosophical reason that I employ this understanding of having propositional faith may be motivated by way of the following illustration. Suppose someone (let's call him “Joe”) believes a proposition-- say, that intelligent extraterrestrials exist--and does so on the basis of what he deems to be sufficient evidence, namely, a gut feeling. Suppose also that he is mistaken about having sufficient evidence for his belief: the strength of Joe's belief that intelligent extraterrestrials exist is 8, but the strength of his evidence for his belief (the gut feeling) is 1. In this case, Joe believes that intelligent extraterrestrials exist but he erroneously fails to deem the evidence for his believing so to be insufficient.

Now, some scholars appear to understand having propositional faith in such a way that, in this case, Joe has such faith that intelligent extraterrestrials exist. That is, they seem to understand having propositional faith in such a way that Joe's believing that intelligent extraterrestrials exist without sufficient evidence is one and the same as his having faith that they exist, regardless of whether Joe himself also deems the evidence for his so believing to be insufficient. Richard Dawkins, for example, understands propositional faith to be “belief that isn't based on evidence” (Dawkins, 2008: 426). And Richard Creel writes of “those who have faith that God exists, that is, those who have nonevidential confidence that God exists” (Creel, 2003: 69). In neither of these understandings of having propositional faith is it stated explicitly that deeming the evidence for one's believing that p to be insufficient is a condition of having such faithIt may be that this condition is stated implicitly, of course, hence my claim that they seem to understand propositional faith in this way..

But not including this condition--at least, not including it explicitly-- strikes me as a problematic omission. To see this, consider Joe again. To be sure, Joe lacks sufficient evidence (ex hypothesi) for his belief that intelligent extraterrestrials exist. But it seems premature to say that he thereby has faith that intelligent extraterrestrials exist. Indeed, Joe himself would not profess to have faith that intelligent extraterrestrials exist. Rather, he would profess to believe it on the basis of what he deems to be sufficient evidence: the gut feeling. It seems, then, that in addition to the pervasiveness of cases involving the understanding of having propositional faith to be employed here as well as the fact that people do not usually claim to have propositional faith when it comes to beliefs for which they think they possess sufficient evidence, there is a third, philosophical reason to employ this understanding.

Much more could be said about this understanding of having propositional faith, to be sure. And it should be noted that other understandings of having faith--propositional or other--are available for one to consider and, if desirable, employ elsewhereSee, for example, Howard-Snyder, nodate; Buchak, 2012. ^sSee also Schellenberg, 200s, Chapters s and 6. For others who argue that having faith does not involve having belief, see Audi, 2008; Zamulinski, 2008; Howard-Snyder, 2016; Matheson, 2018.. What's more, and perhaps more to the point, some understandings of having faith are fundamentally at odds with the understanding at work here. For example, as J.L. Schellenberg's understands it, having faith does not involve having a belief; having faith is, as he puts it, “beliefless”. Instead, to have faith involves having an attitude, specifically a “purely voluntary attitude of mental assent toward [a] proposition, undertaken in circumstances where one views the state of affairs to which it refers as good and desirable but in which one lacks evidence causally sufficient for belief of the proposition” (Schellenberg, 2007: 7)^s. And though arguments similar to mine may be formulated and raised against some of these other understandings of having faith (even Schellenberg's -- see the following footnote), this is not true across the boardGiven Schellenberg's understanding of having faith, one could argue for the prima facie, wrongness of voluntarily adopting an attitude of mental assent toward p under the circumstances he describes.. Suffice it to say, then, the argument presented below is applicable only to the understanding of having faith at work here. And, for the sake of space, I will have to leave the matter at that and move on to my argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith.

ON THE PRIMA FACIE WRONGNESS OF HAVING PROPOSITIONAL FAITH

The specific claim that I defend below is as follows: In cases where believing that p will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. My argument for this claim is as follows:

Pi: In cases where one's doing something will affect others, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt not to wrong those who will be affected by one's doing it.

Ci: In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt not to wrong those who will be affected by one's believing that p.

P2: Attempting not to wrong those who will be affected by one's believing that p involves attempting to believe that p by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable.

C2: In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt to believe that p by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable.

P3: The practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence is the only doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable.

C3: In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence.

P4: One way not to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence is to have faith that p before one has attempted to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence.

C4: In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence.

Each of the preceding premises will be defended in turn.

DEFENSE OF Pi

My defense of Pi begins with an assumption, albeit a safe one by my lights: that, morally speaking, and other things being equal, one should not wrong others. I will not defend this assumption here, not only because I trust most readers will grant it, but because doing so would involve a major digression into matters of meta- and normative ethics (If the reader does not share this assumption, she is free to commit this paper to the flames, as it were). Given this assumption, it seems to follow that, all else being equal, one should attempt not to wrong others. That is to say, if it is true that one should not wrong others, then it appears that it is also true that one should attempt not to wrong others. To say otherwise--to say that one should not wrong others but that one should make no attempt not to wrong others -- is hardly plausible or even intelligible. Among other implausibilities, such a view on what one should do would render the first “should” (that of “one should not wrong others”) so weak--to wit, weak enough as to require not even the attempt to fulfill it -- that the claim in which it is found would, for all practical purposes, be meaningless. Given this, I am inclined to think that if it is true that one should not wrong others, then it is also true that one should attempt not to wrong others.

DEFENSE OF P2

My defense of P2 is made in two steps. The first step involves establishing how one might come to wrong another. The second step involves establishing how one attempts not to wrong another. Beginning with the first step, there are, of course, numerous ways in which one might come to wrong another. But the two ways most pertinent to this discussion are as follows: by committing errors of moral fact and by committing errors of nonmoral fact. By “committing errors of moral fact”, I mean believing that an act or state of affairs has a moral status that it does not actually have (e. g., believing that murder is morally permissible or that the starvation of innocent children is morally good). By “committing errors of nonmoral fact”, I mean believing that an act or state of affairs has a nonmoral status that it does not actually have (e. g., believing that cats can breathe under water or that the chemical composition of water is SiO₂). That coming to wrong another can and, indeed, occasionally does involve committing one or both of these errors may be seen as follows.

Take murder. When one murders another and thereby wrongs him, this can be and sometimes is the result of committing one or both of the preceding errors. Beginning with errors of moral fact, wronging another by murdering him can be the result of erroneously believing that the victim deserves to be killed (as some Nazis believed of the Jews), that murder is morally estimable (as some gang members seem to think given their approval of initiation murders), and so on. In such cases, an error of moral fact is committed. Second, wronging another by murdering him can be the result of erroneously believing that one's victim is not genetically human (as some Ku Klux Klan members have suggested of African-Americans), that one's victim desires to be killed (as some patient-killing nurses have believed), and so forth. In such cases, an error of nonmoral fact is committed.

This brings us to the second step, that of establishing how one attempts not to wrong another. Given that how one might come to wrong another can and, at times, does involve committing errors of moral and nonmoral fact, attempting not to wrong others in these ways involves attempting not to commit such errors. And attempting not to commit such errors involves attempting to believe purported statements of moral and nonmoral fact by way of a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, or so I will argue. Perhaps the clearest way to convey what I mean by a “fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable” is to break this clause into its constitutive parts and analyze them in a piecemeal fashion. So, to begin with, by a “doxastic practice”, I mean simply a belief-acquiring practice, whatever its nature. Proportioning one's belief to the evidence, having propositional faith, believing by way of sense perception, memory, reasoning, flipping coins, reading tea leaves--each of these is an example of a doxastic practice.

By a “fact-determining” doxastic practice, I mean a doxastic practice that regards facts as opposed to mere opinions or tastes. The reason for this should be obvious: the issue at hand is what attempting not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact involves. Thus, whatever doxastic practice is proposed as a solution, it should be one that pertains to facts, not mere opinions or tastes.

Finally, by a doxastic practice that has “demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable”, I mean a doxastic practice that can generally be counted on for the acquisition of true or probably true beliefs and is plausibly causally connected to said beliefs. It is important that the doxastic practice be reliable since one is attempting to acquire true or probably true beliefs about purported statements of moral and nonmoral fact -- one is not attempting to acquire, say, merely rationally held beliefs about such facts, beliefs that need not be true or even probably true in order to be rationally held. And it is important that the doxastic practice be nonarbitrarily reliable so as to avoid doxastic practices that might be reliable but nevertheless should be rejected on the grounds that they are not plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs one acquires through them. Consider, again, the doxastic practice of believing by way of flipping coinsThe possibility of such a doxastic practice is discussed in Mavrodes, 1983: 209.. Such a practice might turn out to be reliable in that it might (however bizarrely) be counted on for the acquisition of true or probably true beliefs. But even if it did, it seems one ought to reject it and do so on the grounds that it is not plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs one acquires through it. Simply put, there appears to be no connection at all, let alone a plausible causal connection, between sides of coins and truths such as “Three is greater than two” and “The capital of New York is Albany”.

Given the preceding description of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, one might think that such a practice presupposes an externalist--specifically, reliabilist -- approach to epistemologyBriefly, an externalist approach to epistemology deems the justifiability of a belief to be partly a function of considerations external to one's internal states -- i.e., one's mental states, such as what one believes--whereas an internalist approach to epistemology deems the justifiability of a belief to be wholly a function of one's internal states. For more on this distinction, see Pollock, 1986: 21-24.. As understandable as this thought might be, the preceding description does not presuppose this. In short, “reliable” is meant to convey merely that the doxastic practice can generally be counted on the acquisition of true or probably true beliefs. And a doxastic practice that can generally be counted on the acquisition of true or probably true beliefs is consistent with both externalist (e. g., reliablism) and internalist (e.g., foundationalism) approaches to epistemology.

That attempting not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact involves-- at least, should involve--attempting to believe purported statements of moral and nonmoral fact by way of a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable may be seen as follows.

Take cases of punishment. Whether or not to punish someone for something he allegedly did -- say, stealing a gold watch--is a moral matter, at least in part. How, in good faith, should one attempt to refrain from wrongly punishing such an individual? One should attempt not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact, among other things. And one should do this by believing the relevant moral facts (that stealing is or is not wrong, that stealing is or is not deserving of punishment -- whatever the moral facts may be) and nonmoral facts (that the accused did or did not steal the gold watch, that the alleged gold watch is an actual gold watch -- whatever the nonmoral facts may be) by way of a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. To do otherwise would be morally irresponsible--a judgment, it is worth noting, that is reflected in many countries' due process laws and procedures. In other words, and from another angle, one should not attempt not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact by way of doxastic practices (flipping coins, reading tea leaves) that cannot generally be counted on for the acquisition of true or probably true beliefs or that are not plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs one might acquire through them. To do so would be morally irresponsible.

Or, to consider a case not involving punishment, suppose a new, seemingly sentient and sapient life form were discovered to be on Earth and one was genuinely concerned about not wronging it. How, in good faith, should one attempt to refrain from doing so? Again, one should attempt not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact. And one should do this by believing the relevant moral facts (that killing this life form is wrong, or morally acceptable, or morally required -- whatever the moral facts may be) and nonmoral facts (that this new life form is indeed sentient and sapient, or not sentient, or not sapient -- whatever the nonmoral facts may be) by way of a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. One should not attempt not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact by flipping coins or reading tea leaves. As above, to do so would be morally irresponsible.

Attempting not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact, then, involves attempting to believe purported statements of moral and nonmoral fact by way of a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable.

DEFENSE OF P3

This brings us to P3. One fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable--indeed, the only fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be so, ostensibly (more on this in a moment) -- is that of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. By “proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence”, I mean consulting as much of the evidence (whatever it might be) both for and against a proposition (p) that one can reasonably obtain and believing that p or that not-p as strongly as the evidence warrants. That proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence is a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable may be argued for as follows.

Beginning with this doxastic practice's reliability, consider the history of intellectual progress, specifically that of the sciences (formal, natural, social). Progress in the sciences is at once undeniable and impressive. And the doxastic practice through which we have come this far, particularly in more recent history, is principally that of proportioning our beliefs to the evidence. As a result, we have come to deem this doxastic practice to be one that has demonstrated itself to be reliable in these domains (there is no better place to witness that we deem this doxastic practice to be one that has demonstrated itself to be reliable in these domains than the place wherein intellectual development is expected to occur: the classroom).

A thorough presentation of this fact would involve describing in greater detail the history of the sciencesThis is evidenced in a wide variety of works, including Bauer, 2015; Gibbon, 2019; The Oxford Illustrated History of Science, 2017; The Cambridge History of Science, 2002-2020 and more.. For the sake of space, I will have to trust that the reader is sufficiently familiar with their histories to grant the point.

This is not to say that we have always proportioned our beliefs to the evidence or that all intellectual progress is rooted in doing so. Indeed, the history of intellectual progress is filled with anecdotes of intellectual advancement occurring as a result of chance eventsFor example, two Nobel Prize winners: Francis Crick and Kary Mullis attributed some of their prize-winning work to their use of acid. In Mullis' own words: “Would I have invented PCR [polymerase chain reaction] if I hadn't taken LSD? I seriously doubt it [...] [having taken LSD] I could sit on a DNA molecule and watch the polymers go by. I learned that partly on psychedelic drugs” (quoted in Nutt, 2012: 258).. It is simply to say that, when we reflect upon the history of intellectual progress -- especially that of the sciences--we see a stronger and stronger correlation between proportioning beliefs to the evidence and intellectual progress. It is also not to say that no other doxastic practices have had a role in intellectual progress. Clearly, others have (e. g., believing by way of sense perception, memory, reasoning, etc.). Though I will have more to say about these practices and their relation to that of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence in a moment, let it suffice for now to say that acknowledging that they have had a role in intellectual progress is not inconsistent with my claim above that the doxastic practice through which we have come so far intellectually is principally that of proportioning our beliefs to the evidence.

Consider, also, the history of moral progress. There is no doubt that moral progress has occurred throughout history. What was once considered morally acceptable in many societies--slavery, torture, the eye-for-an-eye principle of justice (at least, the literal implementation of it), the unequal regard for and treatment of women and racial minorities, etc. -- is now largely condemned as immoral, and plausibly so. And the doxastic practice through which we have so progressed, especially in more recent history, is principally that of proportioning our beliefs to the evidence (the turn to equal regard for and treatment of women and racial minorities is a clear case in point, as is the turn to moral concern, and treatment reflective thereof, for nonhuman animals). As a result, we have come to deem this doxastic practice to be one that has demonstrated itself to be reliable in this domain (there is no better place to witness that we deem this doxastic practice as one that has demonstrated itself to be reliable in this domain then in a course on moral philosophy). As with the history of intellectual progress, a thorough presentation of the history of moral progress would involve describing in greater detail the history of moral progress¹¹. But, as above, for the sake of space, I will trust that the reader is sufficiently familiar with its history to grant the point.

Similar to before, this is not to say that we have always proportioned our beliefs to the evidence, that all moral progress is rooted in doing so, or that no other doxastic practices have had a role in moral progress. Acknowledging these things, however, is not inconsistent with my claim that the doxastic practice through which we have come so far morally is principally that of proportioning our beliefs to the evidence.

But is the doxastic practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence nonarbitrarily reliable? That is, is it plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs one acquires through it? Though a full defense of the claim that it requires more space than is available here, the following will do for now.

One way to see that the doxastic practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence is nonarbitrarily reliable is to consider the various roles that evidence plays in a theoretical inquiry. As Thomas Kelly observes, evidence has played and continues to play a number of roles in theoretical inquiry, including but not limited to those of belief justifier and neutral arbiter (Kelly, 2018). But the role most pertinent to this discussion is that of truth indicator (hence my construing “evidence” in terms of epistemic reasons above). As Kelly puts it:

As a general matter, evidence seems to play a mediating role vis-а-vis our efforts to arrive at an accurate picture of the world: we seek to believe what is true by means of holding beliefs that are well-supported by the evidence, and we seek to avoid believing what is false by means of not holding beliefs that are not well-supported by the evidence. The picture is well summarized by Blanshard: “`Surely the only possible rule', one may say, `is to believe what is true and disbelieve what is false'. And of course, that would be the rule if we were in a position to know what was true and what false. But the whole difficulty arises from the fact that we do not and often cannot. What is to guide us then? [...] The ideal is believed no more, but also no less than what the evidence warrants” (Kelly, 2014).

Indeed, Kelly suggests that the role of truth indicator is evidence's most fundamental role in a theoretical inquiry. “Perhaps the root notion of evidence”, he writes, “is that of something which serves as a reliable sign, symptom, or mark of that of which it is evidence of” (Kelly, 2014).

That evidence has played and continues to play the role of truth indicator supports the view that proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence is a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. To begin with, and as Kelly explains:

When evidence is understood in this way, it is no mystery why attending to evidence is a good strategy for one who is concerned to arrive at an accurate picture of the world: given that Koplik spots are in fact a reliable indicator of measles, it obviously behooves those who are concerned to have true beliefs about which individuals are suffering from measles to pay attention to facts about which individuals have Koplik spots. Similarly, given that smoke is, in fact, a reliable indicator of fire, those who are concerned to have true beliefs about the presence or absence of fire do well to pay attention to the presence or absence of smoke. Thus, when we understand “E is evidence for H” as more or less synonymous with “E is a reliable indicator of H”, the connection between evidence and truth seems easily secured and relatively straightforward (ibid.).

Exactly how evidence indicates the truth of some proposition need not be established in order to agree with Kelly, and reasonably believe, that it reliably does. We need not, for example, know exactly how the presence of Koplik spots reliably indicates the truth of the proposition “This individual has measels” in order to reasonably believe that it does, or exactly how the presence of smoke reliably indicates the truth of the proposition “Something is on fire” in order to reasonably believe that it reliably does. We often do have an idea of how the evidence so indicates, of course. For example, the presence of smoke is (to use Hume's locution) “constantly conjoined” with the presence of fire, the specific chemical composition of smoke is constantly conjoined with the temperature of the fire, and so on. But precise knowledge of the way(s) in which evidence indicates the truth of some proposition is not necessary for reasonably believing that it reliably does. All this to say, however exactly evidence indicates the truth of some proposition, one may reasonably believe not only that it does but does so reliably.

With the preceding in mind, one can see how proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence has demonstrated itself to be not only reliable (as the histories of intellectual and moral progress suggest), but nonarbitrarily so. For when one proportions one's beliefs to the evidence, one believes that p or that not-p and does so only as strong as the evidence permits. In other words, one allows the evidence to determine not only what one believes but how strongly one believes it. And given that evidence plays the role of truth indicator -- that of reliably pointing to the truth of the proposition for which it serves as evidence--it is, in that way and to that extent, plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs one acquires through it. A good faith attempt not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact and, in turn, wrong others, then, involves attempting to proportion one's beliefs to the evidence. That is, it involves attempting to consult as much of the evidence for and against p that one can reasonably obtain and attempting to believe that p or that not-p as strongly as the evidence warrants.

But might it involve something else? After all, even if one grants that proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence is a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, one need not grant that it is the only fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. And some might contend that, in addition to proportioning one's belief to the evidence, there are other fact-determining doxastic practices that have demonstrated themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable.

Now, I am happy to grant that there might be a fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable and that is significantly distinct from the doxastic practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. If there is, however, I have no idea what it is. This is due to the fact when it comes to other possible fact-determining doxastic practices, either they have not demonstrated themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable, or they have but are not significantly distinct from the doxastic practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. Beginning with the latter, there are, to be sure, other doxastic practices that have demonstrated themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable. Nicholas Everitt summarizes this well when he writes:

All of us are equipped with a range of cognitive faculties which allow us to acquire, store and manipulate information about a huge variety of subjects. Our sensory equipment enables us to know about our perceptual environment; our memory enables us to store information both about specific events in the past and about general truths; and our reasoning capacity enables us to see the implications of the information which we have and to draw sometimes long and complicated inferences. We all assume that these cognitive faculties are substantially reliable. When they are operating properly, they reveal to us truths, probable truths, or near truths. They are, we might say, truth-directed. Of course, on occasions, we arrive at falsehoods. We are careless in our inferences, our observations, or the viewing conditions are not ideal, or there is some malfunction in the relevant organs. But, in general, we take it that our cognitive faculties succeed in giving us truths (or probable or approximate truths [...]) (Everitt, 2004: 178-179).

But to the extent that these other doxastic practices have demonstrated themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable, they have so only when regulated by the practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. Take sense perception. Were someone to believe strongly that it's raining outside, do so by way of sense perception, but not proportion her belief to the evidence (e.g., the strength of her belief that it is raining outside is 9, but the strength of her evidence for that belief-- acquired through sense perception--is 1), then the doxastic practice by which she believes that is raining outside, that of sense perception, would not, in that instance, demonstrate itself to be reliable. More broadly, were people to believe by way of sense perception, memory, or reasoning but not proportion the beliefs they arrive at through these things to the evidence, then these doxastic practices would not demonstrate themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable (it's worth noting that Everitt seems to acknowledge this implicitly in the last few lines of the quotation above. So, again, to the extent that believing by way of other doxastic practices has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, it has so only when regulated by the practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. In this way, believing by way of sense perception, memory, and reasoning qua doxastic practices that have demonstrated themselves to be nonarbitrarily reliable are not significantly distinct from the doxastic practice of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence.

As for the former, some might think that having propositional faith is a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. This, however, does not appear to be the case. To wit, when we reflect upon the histories of intellectual and moral progress, we do not see (as we do with proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence) a stronger and stronger correlation between such progress and having propositional faith. In that way and to that extent, having propositional faith has not demonstrated itself to be reliable in these domains. But even if it had, it would still be an open question as to whether it demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. And believing by way of having propositional faith does not seem to be plausibly causally connected to the true or probably true beliefs that one might acquire through it. For there appears to be no connection at all, let alone a plausible causal connection, between believing that p despite deeming the evidence for one's so believing to be insufficient, on the one hand, and p being true or probably true, on the other. After all, if evidence does not connect this doxastic practice to the true or probably true beliefs that one might acquire through it, what does? Hope? Will? Fear? Social inclusion? None of these plausibly connects having propositional faith with the true or probably true beliefs that one might acquire through it -- or so it seems to me--and no other plausible candidate comes to mind.

DEFENSE OF P4

My defense of P4 is rather straightforward. This is due to the fact that P4 simply identifies one way in which one could fail to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. To have faith that p -- to believe that p despite deeming the evidence for one's believing that p to be insufficient -- before one has attempted to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence is one way not to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. This could occur in a number of different ways, naturally, including but not limited to:

о one could fail to consult any evidence for and against p whatsoever and just immediately have faith that p; о one could consult some but not all of the evidence for and against p that one could have reasonably obtained and then, desiring a strength of belief not warranted by said evidence, move on to having faith that p;

о one could consult all the evidence for and against p that one could have reasonably obtained, fail to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence, and then move on to having faith that p.

But the last of these is of particular import to the present argument and, thus, worthy of analysis.

So, what does the last of these--failing to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence after one has consulted all the evidence for and against p that one could have reasonably obtained -- involve? Though it likely involves a number of things which, in turn, may vary in presence and degree from case to case, one that I would like to focus on here is that of neither honestly nor sincerely attempting to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. Simply put, a dishonest and insincere attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence is, for all practical purposes, no attempt at all. Given this, if one consults all the evidence for and against p that one could have reasonably obtained but does not honestly and sincerely attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence, then one fails to attempt to believe that p by proportioning one's belief to the evidence. So, for instance, if an Islamic apologist consults all the evidence for and against the proposition that Allah exists that she could have reasonably obtained but does not honestly and sincerely attempt to believe that Allah exists by proportioning her belief to the evidence, she fails to attempt to believe that Allah exists by proportioning her belief to the evidence.

Exactly why someone would not honestly and sincerely attempt to believe that p by proportioning her belief to the evidence will vary from person to person, with some reasons (lack of mental energy) being more innocuous than others (willful bias). But there is little doubt that some people some of the time do not honestly and sincerely attempt to believe this or that proposition by proportioning their belief to the evidence. To motivate this, consider that, according to Christian theistic philosopher Brian Leftow, Christian theists are particularly vulnerable to cognitive biases when it comes to the issue of God's existence. As he puts it:

Christian commitment [...] is not just abstractly intellectual. It is passionate. It involves hopes, ideals, self-discipline, and personal sacrifice. Passions can tempt one to intellectual dishonesty. Further, the more hope and effort one invests in a religious belief, the more it would hurt to find that belief false, and the more foolish one would feel. So depth of Christian commitment can also tempt one to intellectual dishonesty -- for example, weighing anti-Christian arguments unfairly (Leftow, 1994: 199).

Given this, it stands to reason that at least some Christian theists do not honestly and sincerely attempt to believe that God exists by proportioning their belief to the evidence. In any case, there is little doubt that people do not always honestly and sincerely attempt to believe propositions by proportioning their beliefs to the evidence.

SUMMARY

epistemic moral evidence belief

My argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith may be summarized as follows. In cases where one's doing something will affect others, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt not to wrong those who will be affected by one's doing it. In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt not to wrong those who will be affected by one's so believing. Attempting not to wrong those who will be affected by one's believing that p involves attempting not to commit errors of moral and nonmoral fact. And this involves attempting to believe purported statements of moral and nonmoral fact by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable. One and seemingly the only fact-determining doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable is that of proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. Thus, attempting not to wrong those who will be affected by one's believing that p involves attempting to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence. In cases where believing that p will affect others, then, it is prima facie wrong not to attempt to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence. Thus, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence.