An argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith

A QUALIFICATION

At this point, an important qualification is in order. The extent to which believing a proposition will affect others is partly a function of the content of the belief itself. For, content-wise, some beliefs are more other-regarding than others (by “more other-regarding”, I have in mind both quantitative considerations--how many “others” are affected -- as well as qualitative considerations--the ways in which they are affected). The belief that human beings are never to be trusted, for example, is more other-regarding than the belief that elves have pointy ears since the former makes a claim about how one is to behave with respect to beings with whom one (in all likelihood) regularly interacts while the latter does not. Given this, one might maintain that the extent to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the belief is other-regarding: the more other-regarding the belief, the more wrong it is (all else being equal) not to attempt to proportion one's beliefs to the evidence. Though Clifford might reject this, I will proceed as if this is the caseClifford held that even believing statements that are not other-regarding has deleterious effects, such as making the individual who does so (repeatedly) more gullible and, in turn, more susceptible to believing on the basis of insufficient evidence statements that are other-regarding..

If, then, the belief that p is not other-regarding, then the degree to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence is zero. In other words, it is not prima facie wrong to have faith that p (the aforementioned case involving the elderly, dying woman is an example of this). Even when this is the case, however, it does not follow that having propositional faith is never prima facie wrong. This would be true only if those who have propositional faith do so completely independently of other beliefs. But such is generally not the case. People who have propositional faith usually possess many beliefs about many matters, including many beliefs that are other-regarding.

With the preceding in mind, even if, in and of itself, the belief that p is not directly other-regarding, it may be conjoined with other-regarding beliefs in such a way that it becomes indirectly other-regarding. When this does, in fact, occur, then the degree to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the conjunction of these beliefs is other-regarding. Take, for example, the beliefs that God exists (which I will stipulate to be a belief that is not other-regarding) and that God wants wives to submit to their husbands (which is an other-regarding belief). The degree to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that God exists before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that God exists to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the conjunction of these beliefs -- that God exists and that God wants wives to submit to their husbands--is other-regarding.

Finally, and most obviously, if the belief that p, in and of itself, is other-regarding, then the extent to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the belief that p is other-regarding.

APPLYING THE ARGUMENT

Before raising objections to my argument, I would like to further motivate the latter by applying it to sundry beliefs, religious and nonreligious alike. Beginning with the latter, imagine a physician who believes that her patient needs a liver transplant. The belief “My patient needs a liver transplant” is other-regarding, of course, as it regards her patient (among others). Given this, as well as my argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith, it would be prima facie wrong for the physician to have faith that this is so before she has attempted to proportion her belief that it is to the evidence. And this seems to be the correct verdict.

And so it is with myriad other cases of nonreligious belief: imagine a car mechanic who believes his customer's car needs a new engine, a dentist who believes her patient needs a root canal, a criminal defense lawyer who believes his client should plead guilty, a stockbroker who believes her client should purchase as much stock in Microsoft as possible, and so on. Each of these beliefs is clearly other-regarding. Given this, as well as my argument, it would be prima facie wrong for these individuals to have faith that these things are so before they attempted to proportion their beliefs that they are to the evidence. And, as before, this seems to be the correct verdict.

As for religious beliefs, take Raëlism, the religion that teaches that life on Earth was scientifically created by a species of intelligent extraterrestrials. Among other things, Raëlians believe that to usher in the “Great Return”-- the return of our alleged extraterrestrial creators--an embassy must be built, preferably in Jerusalem (Why an Embassy for an ET Civilization?, 2019). Accordingly, they believe that such an embassy ought to be built. Now, the belief “An embassy for our extraterrestrial creators ought to be built, preferably in Jerusalem” is other-regarding--it regards, among many others, people who reside in Jerusalem. Given this and my argument, it would prima facie wrong for Raëlians to have faith that this is so before they have attempted to proportion their belief that it is to the evidence. And this appears to be the correct verdict.

Or, take Satanism (LaVeyan), a religion that emphasizes the use of reason, among other things (but not, despite their name, the worship of Satan). The Church of Satan embraces what are referred to as “Eleven Satanic Rules of the Earth”, one of which is: “When walking in open territory, bother no one. If someone bothers you, ask them to stop. If they don't stop, destroy them” (LaVey, 1967). The belief “I ought to destroy he who does not stop bothering me after I've asked him to” is clearly other-regarding. Given this and my argument, it would prima facie wrong for members of the Church of Satan to have faith that this is so before they have attempted to proportion their belief that it is to the evidence. And, as with the cases above, this seems to be the correct verdict.

Before moving on, it is worth considering a religious belief that is not obviously other-regarding but is often assented to by way of having propositional faith, and that is the belief that God exists. What does my argument have to say about the belief that God exists? As alluded to above, the extent to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that God exists before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that God exists to the evidence depends on the extent to which the belief that God exists is other-regarding. The question, then, is: To what extent is the belief that God exists other-regarding? Some might think that it is not other-regarding at all, while others might think that it is other-regarding to one extent or another. Rather than settling this dispute, I will simply repeat (briefly) what was discussed above. If the belief that God exists is not other-regarding, then it is not at all prima facie wrong to have faith that God exists. If the belief that God exists, in and of itself, is not directly other-regarding but becomes indirectly other-regarding as a result of being combined with other-regarding beliefs, then the degree to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that God exists before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that God exists to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the conjunction of these beliefs is other-regarding. And if the belief that God exists, in and of itself, is other-regarding, then the extent to which it is prima facie wrong to have faith that God exists before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that God exists to the evidence is proportional to the extent to which the belief that God exists is other-regarding.

OBJECTIONS

There are numerous objections that may be raised against my argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith; indeed, too many to be addressed here. That said, the four to be discussed below are what I take to be among the most pressing.

PRIMA FACIE WRONGNESS DOES NOT ENTAIL ULTIMA FACIE WRONGNESS

I have argued that it is prima facie wrong--again, wrong all else being equal--to have faith that p before one has attempted to proportion one's other-regarding belief that p to the evidence. But this does not entail that having faith that p is ultima facie wrong -- that is, wrong all things considered. Given this, one might object to my argument on both theoretical and practical grounds as follows. With respect to the theoretical grounds, one could argue that my argument leaves the theoretical door open for the ultima facie moral permissibility of having faith that p. As for the practical grounds, one could argue that, when applied to actual cases of individuals having faith that p, the argument's conclusion will be inapplicable to the vast majority of them. I will respond to each of these objections in turn.

Regarding the former, that my argument leaves the theoretical door open for the ultima facie moral permissibility of having faith that p is, as I see it, no problem at all. Indeed, I have already conceded that there are cases wherein having faith that p is ultima facie morally permissible, such as the aforementioned case of the elderly woman on her death bed privately believing that she is going to heaven on evidence that she deems insufficient for so believing. To be clear (and frank), I offer my argument for the prima facie wrongness of having propositional faith, not to have an excuse for morally condemning people who have propositional faith. Rather, I am merely attempting to determine the conditions (if any) under which is it prima facie wrong to have such faith.

Having said that, though my argument leaves the theoretical door open for the ultima facie moral permissibility of having propositional faith, it also leaves the theoretical door open for the ultima facie wrongness of having propositional faith. And sometimes the prima facie wrongness of an act can become ultima facie moral wrongness. This occurs when, after all things are in fact considered, no wrongness-defeating factors arise (exactly when no wrongness-defeating factors arise will depend on the particulars of one's having propositional faith).

As for the latter--that, when applied to actual cases of individuals having faith that p, the argument's conclusion will be inapplicable to the vast majority of them -- the idea here is that, were one to empirically investigate the matter, one would find that most people attempt to proportion their belief that p to the evidence before having faith that p and, thus, their having faith that p is, or at least can be, ultima facie morally permissible.

The first thing to note about this objection is that it amounts to speculation about the results of some future empirical investigation of the matter. But speculation is just that, speculation. And I, for one, am agnostic about what the conclusion of such an investigation would be.

The second thing to note is that the soundness of my argument does not turn on empirical predictions. Whether my argument is sound is a function of the truth values of its premises and the logical relation between the premises and the conclusion. Empirical predictions, as interesting as they may be, do not bear upon the soundness of the argument.

The last thing to note is that this objection rests upon an implicit and dubious assumption, namely: if one has attempted to proportion one's other-regarding belief that p to the evidence just once before having faith that p, then one's having faith that p is, or at least can be, ultima facie morally permissible. To be sure, my argument does not explicitly address the number of times one must attempt to proportion one's other-regarding beliefs to the evidence in order to avoid prima or ultima facie wrongdoing. But it implicitly suggests that the number is not one. To see this, suppose Joe attempts to proportion his other-regarding belief that p to the evidence, deems the evidence for p to be insufficient for the strength of belief that he desires to have and, thus, has faith that p. According to my argument, Joe has avoided prima and perhaps even ultima facie wrongdoing, other things being equal. So far, so good. But what if Joe later confronts new evidence for or against p? Given that this evidence is new, Joe's previous attempt at proportioning his belief that p to the evidence is rendered obsolete, since it does not include all the evidence -- which includes this new evidence-- that Joe can reasonably obtain. In order to avoid prima or ultima facie wrongdoing with respect to his believing that p, then, Joe must attempt anew to proportion his belief that p to the evidence which, in this case, includes the new evidence.

With the preceding in mind, even if most people attempt to proportion their other-regarding beliefs that p to the evidence before having faith that p, it does not immediately follow that their having faith that p is ultima facie morally permissible, let alone indefinitely so. For attempting to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence can be an ongoing process, depending on whether and how often one is confronted with new evidence for or against p. And for those who are confronted with new evidence for or against p, they must attempt anew to proportion their belief that p to the evidence (which includes the new evidence) if they are to avoid prima and ultima facie wrongdoing (whether one might be morally obligated to seek new evidence for or against one's other-regarding beliefs that p is a related but separate matter, one best explored elsewhere).

MORAL FACTS DO NOT EXIST

Some might object to my argument on the grounds that moral facts do not exist and, thus, attempting not to wrong others does not involve attempting not to commit errors of such facts. A thorough reply to this objection would involve a lengthy digression into metaethics, something that is beyond the scope of this paper. But a thorough reply is not one and the same as an adequate reply, and an adequate reply to this objection is available.

To begin with, there are at least two senses of “moral fact”, what I will refer to as a “stronger sense” and a “weaker sense.” According to the stronger sense of “moral fact”, a moral fact is an objective (read: mind-independent) fact. On this understanding of “moral fact”, the moral rightness and wrongness of acts as well as the moral goodness or badness of persons or states of affairs are properties of reality (whatever reality's other properties might be). According to the weaker sense of “moral fact”, on the other hand, a moral fact is a subjective (read: mind-dependent) fact. On this understanding of “moral fact”, the moral rightness and wrongness of acts as well as the moral goodness or badness of persons or states of affairs are properties imputed to but not of reality.

With the preceding distinction in mind, if “moral fact” is meant in the stronger sense (as it is here) and it is true that such moral facts do not exist, then my argument is, to that extent, undermined. I write “to that extent” deliberately, however, as it would remain the case that one ought to attempt not to commit errors of nonmoral fact, and this would still involve attempting to believe purported statements of nonmoral fact by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, as is proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. As for whether it is true that such moral facts do not exist, in order to avoid wading into deep metaethical waters, I will not defend here the view that they do. Instead, I will simply make the following observation: denying the existence of such moral facts is going to be a hard pill for many people to swallow, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. Regarding philosophers, according to one survey, fifty-six percent of philosophy professors accept or lean toward moral realism, a view according to which there are such moral facts (The PhilPapers Surveys: Results, Analysis and Discussion, 2018). As for nonphilosophers' take on such moral facts, one philosopher who has studied the matter, Michael Smith, writes that they “seem to think moral questions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts; that moral facts are wholly determined by circumstances and that, by engaging in moral conversation and argument, we can discover what these objective moral facts determined by the circumstances are” (Smith, 1994: 6). Perhaps the denial of the existence of such moral facts is a pill we all should swallow nonetheless. But that's a discussion for another time.

But even if “moral fact” is meant in the weaker sense, my argument would be largely unaffected. To begin with, and as above, it would remain the case that one ought to attempt not to commit errors of nonmoral fact, and this would still involve attempting to believe purported statements of nonmoral fact by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, as is proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence. It would even remain the case that one ought to attempt not to commit errors of moral fact, the difference would be simply that “moral fact” would now refer to a fact about moral properties that are imputed to reality. And this, too, would still involve attempting to believe purported statements of moral fact--statements about moral properties that are imputed to reality--by way of a doxastic practice that has demonstrated itself to be nonarbitrarily reliable, as is (once again) proportioning one's beliefs to the evidence.

THE ARGUMENT PROVES TOO MUCH

Some might contend that my argument faith proves too much. Consider, for example, the following statements:

« Dogs exist independently of our minds.

« Other people are not actually automata.

« One's memories are usually reliable.

Surely, some might maintain, it is not prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence.

But of course, if my argument is sound, then it is prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence. And more than mere declaration is needed here. After all, each of these statements either is or can be other-regarding, either in and of itself or when combined with other beliefs. For example, if the context in which one believes that one's memories are usually reliable is such that another will be harmed depending on what one believes, then what one believes could turn out to involve wrongdoing. If one is to attempt to refrain from wronging those who will be affected by one's belief, then, one ought to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence. And so it is, mutatis mutandis, with the other statements.

That said, and perhaps more to the point, to be prima facie wrong is to be wrong all else being equal. This is consistent with the claim that it is not wrong all things considered to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence. In this case, one can consistently hold that, though it is wrong, all else being equal, to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence, it might not be wrong, all things considered, to do so. And this strikes me as the correct verdict.

Consider, next, the following statements:

« My son will overcome his illness.

« My daughter will live a long, fulfilling life.

« My future will be as good as or better than my past.

Once again, some might insist that it is not prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence. But there are at least two reasons to think this objection is misguided.

First, in some cases, statements such as these are properly understood to be statements of hope or desire rather than statements of belief. Accordingly, they are not instances of failing to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence.

Second, even in cases where statements such as these are not statements of hope or desire but, instead, belief, they nevertheless fail to serve as counterexamples to my argument's conclusion. To see this, consider the case of Madeline Neumann, an 11-year-old girl who died after her parents prayed for healing rather than seek medical help for a treatable form of diabetes. According to the local police chief, the girl's parents attributed the death to not having “enough faith” (Police: Girl Dies After Parents Pray for Healing Instead of Seeking Medical Help, 2008). Now, whether the Neumanns understand having “faith” as it is understood here is unclear, but it need not be clear to make my point, which is as follows: If the Neumann's believed that their daughter would survive without medical treatment and made no attempt to proportion that belief to the evidence, then, according to my argument, their having such faith was prima facie wrong. And this seems to be the correct verdictIncidentally, this seems to be reflected in the legal outcome of this case. Though there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the moral and legal statuses of acts, it is worth noting that the mother was subsequently convicted of second-degree reckless homicide..

Consider, third, the following statements:

« God desires that I love others.

« God desires that I help those in need.

« God desires that I be good to others.

Yet again, some might argue that it is not prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence. After all, loving others, helping those who are in need, and being good to others are morally commendable acts.

But, as above, if my argument is sound, then it is prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence, and more than mere declaration is needed here. Moreover, this objection appears to take too much for granted, as it seems to assume that doing what God desires--even loving others, helping those in need, being good to others--cannot be morally problematic. But doing what God desires can be morally problematic, of course, depending on one's understanding of God and, specifically, what he thinks loving, helping, and being good others permits. During the various inquisitions, for example, “helping” others turn from their heretical ways involved torturing and even killing them, among other things. And torturing and killing others in the name of “helping” them strike me as paradigmatic cases of wrongful behavior. More recently, “loving”, “helping”, and “being good to” others has involved picketing the funerals of dead soldiers, informing those mourning that “God hates fags” (à la the Westboro Baptist Church), relying solely on prayer for healing rather than seeking medical help for treatable life-threatening illnesses (à la the Neumanns), crucifying and ultimately killing a nun during a would-be exorcism (à la a Romanian priest and four other nuns), and so onFor the Westboro Baptist Church, see Westboro Baptist Church, 2019; for the crucifixion of the nun, see Crucified Nun Dies in “Exorcism”, 2005. Each of these cases constitute wrongful behavior, or so it seems to me.

Furthermore, and as with a previous reply, to be prima facie wrong is to be all-else-being-equal wrong. In this case, one can consistently hold that, though it is wrong, all else being equal, to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence, it might not be wrong, all things considered, to do so. And this strikes me as the correct verdict.

Or, finally, consider the following statements:

« This food ought to be thrown away since it has gone bad.

« This forest ought to be avoided since it is ridden with poison ivy.

« This building ought to be evacuated since a bomb threat has been issued.

As with the preceding statements, some might argue that it is not prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence. After all, what could be wrong with erring on the side of caution? What's more, with some of these statements, there may not be enough time to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence.

I will begin with the latter point as my reply to it is rather straightforward. If one doesn't have enough time to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence in a given case, then it is not wrong when one fails to do so in said case. “Ought”, after all, implies “can”. However, this in no way detracts from my argument's conclusion; it merely sets a reasonable limitation on its applicability.

As for the former, for final time, if my argument is sound, then it is prima facie wrong to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence, and mere declaration to the contrary is not enough. Additionally, erring on the side of caution can indeed be wrong, depending, of course, on the circumstances in which one does so. If, for example, the aforementioned food is the only food left to feed one's desperately starving child, then it might be wrong--and arguably is--to have faith that the food ought to be thrown away since it has gone bad before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that this (the entire statement, which includes both of its constitutive claims) is so to the evidence. Similarly, if crossing through the forest it the quickest way to get help for an injured (nonlethally) friend, then it might be wrong -- and arguably is -- to have faith that the forest ought to be avoided since it is ridden with poison ivy before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that this (again, the entire statement) is so to the evidence. This is not to say that erring on the side of caution is always wrong, naturally; only that, in certain circumstances, it can be.

But what about the third statement, namely, “This building ought to be evacuated since a bomb threat has been issued”? Would it be, could it be, prima facie wrong for one to believe it before one before one has attempted to proportion one's belief to the evidence? As with the first two statements, I can think of circumstances in which it could--and arguably would -- be (e.g., when evacuating the building will result in even more harm to those in the building than would result if a bomb were detonated). But what about the typical bomb threat, wherein the harm of evacuating the building is relatively innocuous? Would it be prima facie wrong for one to believe that the building ought to be evacuated since a bomb threat has been issued before one has attempted to proportion one's belief to the evidence? It seems to me that it would not. But this is consistent with my argument's conclusion. For, again, “ought” implies “can” and, with typical bomb threats, there is not enough time to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence. That said, if one did have enough time to attempt to proportion one's belief to the evidence, then, according to my argument, it would be prima facie wrong for one not to do so given the other-regarding nature of the belief and, more specifically, the harm (physical, psychological, financial, social) that may come with evacuating a building. And, once again, this strikes me as the correct verdict.

Finally, and to say it one more, to be prima facie wrong is to be all-else- being-equal wrong. In this case, one can consistently hold that, though it is wrong, all else being equal, to have faith that these things are so before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that they are to the evidence, it might not be wrong, all things considered, to do so. And this strikes me as the correct verdict.

ONE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT ONE BELIEVES

Another objection to my argument may be elicited by asking the following questions. First, doesn't my argument entail that one can control what one believes and, thus, that one is responsible for what one believes? If so, doesn't this undermine my argument, since one is not in control of what one believes?

Regarding the first question--whether my argument entails that one can control and is responsible for what one believes--simply put, it does not entail this. Nor, however, does it entail that one cannot control and is not responsible for what one believes. Strictly speaking, my argument entails the following: to the extent that one can control and is responsible for what one believes, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith before one has attempted to proportion one's belief to the evidence. This is consistent both with the view that one can control and is responsible for what one believes as well as the view that one cannot control and is not responsible for what one believes. My argument does not entail, then, that one can control and is responsible for what one believes (and if one can control and is responsible for what one believes, so much the better for my argument).

But even if it did, and in answer to the second question, this would not undermine my argument. For though one may not have direct control over what one believes -- though one may not be able to will oneself to adopt any given belief, for example--one nevertheless appears to have indirect control over what one believes. As Jonathan Adler puts it:

...for many of our beliefs we do have the ability to influence and shape the dispositions underlying their acceptance. If you are quick to ascribe ill motives to others, you have probably had many occasions to discern and evaluate this pattern of your attributions and you can undertake to control them accordingly. The modification does not require direct control over your believing (Adler, 2002: 66).

And if the Adlers of the world are correct about this (as it seems to me they are), then one can control what one believes, at least indirectly. In the spirit of this paper, one would want to know what evidence they have for this. For the sake of space, however, I will have to forgo this discussion and refer the reader to the relevant literatureSee Adler, 2002: 66ff. It should be noted here that some philosophers have argued for the stronger view that we have direct control over some of our beliefs. See Mourad, 2008; Helm, 2004, Chapter 2 and Peels, 2016: 6iff..

Of course, even if this is correct, it does not follow that one has the ability to influence and shape the dispositions underlying the acceptance of all of one's beliefs. To use examples from above, it might be that one does not have the ability to influence and shape the dispositions underlying the acceptance of the beliefs that dogs exist independently of our minds, that other people are not actually automata, or that one's memories are usually reliable. Try as one may, one might not be able to reject these beliefs; at least, one might not be able to reject these beliefs while remaining sane (similar to before, if one is able to reject these beliefs while remaining sane, so much the better for my argument).

But even if one does not have the ability to influence and shape the dispositions underlying the acceptance of all of one's beliefs, it does not follow that one does not have the ability to influence and shape the disposition underlying the acceptance of other beliefs, especially beliefs commonly assented to by way of having propositional faith, such as the belief that God exists. Indeed, the belief that God exists is significantly different from the beliefs that dogs exist independently of our minds, that other people are not actually automata, and that one's memories are usually reliable. One might not be able to reject the latter beliefs, but one is able to reject the former belief. To wit, assuming religious affiliation is some indication, more than half the world's population does just this: according to Oxford University Press's World Christian Encyclopedia, in 2009, roughly 3 billion out of the world's 6.8 billion were adherents of religions that include belief in God (World Christian Encyclopedia, 2001). Moreover, since being an adherent of a religion does not entail that one really believes that God exists, the number of believers in God's existence is likely to be (much) smallerDaniel Dennett's “belief in belief” is pertinent here. See Dennett, 2006, Chapter 8.. So, even if one does not have the ability to influence and shape the dispositions underlying the acceptance of all of one's beliefs, it does not follow that one does not have the ability to influence and shape the disposition underlying the acceptance of other beliefs.

CONCLUSION

I have argued here that, in cases where believing that p will affect others, it is prima facie wrong to have propositional faith--to have faith that p-- before one has attempted to proportion one's belief that p to the evidence, where having faith that p is believing a proposition despite deeming the evidence for one's believing to be insufficientThough my argument has focused on the possibility of wronging others, Allen Wood has argued that having propositional faith can be wrong on self-regarding grounds. See Wood, 2008.. As I addressed above, there other understandings of having propositional faith, and much more could be said both for and against my argument. But enough has been said here to stimulate further discussion on the matter--or so, dare I say, I have faith1 would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on an

earlier draft of this paper..

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