On the purity of European consciousness and the limits of being-time in the existential anthropology of the late M. Heidegger

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Oles Honchar Dnipro national university

On the purity of European consciousness and the limits of being-time in the existential anthropology of the late M. Heidegger

Victor Okorokov,

doctor of sciences in philosophy, professor

Dnipro

Abstract

The issue of the European thinkers' purity of consciousness is studied from the standpoint of the later M. Heidegger (in polemic with F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan). The article shows that Heidegger, having embarked upon the searching for new thinking, chooses the European thinking origins and, starting from the «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)», he already refuses to distinguish between being and time, that is, he is looking for a third principle (thinking) for their joint grip. We believe it is no longer the being that follows from the understanding of time, but being and time from the understanding of thinking (and even thinking of being). In this new dimension of consciousness, thinking falls into the time-like phenomenology dimension, commuting with being and time. Based on the analysis of the subsequent working of Heidegger, we can conclude that thinking must go through the metaphysics path to return to its wholeness (at the origins), but already to the existential-temporal unity. Thinking, commuting with being and time, starts to bend like the light in the black hole (according to the general theory of relativity of Einstein) and split (Heidegger uses the term «the Clearing of Being»). Existential thinking is a special case of this gap. It was that new dimension of thinking that the mystics and the Eastern sages aspired to. The topos, where being is joined to time, is the ultimate (pure) thinking that has overcome ignorance or attachment to the material world. It is through this dimension we begin to understand not only what being is, but also what time is, as thinking begins to distinguish its time, it temporalizes and starts to listen to its own «breathing» or temporalization of time (Heidegger wrote about). In such dimension, thinking turns into that original topos, when all connected with being flows inherently, be it Gods, humans, or the things grasping (everyone goes the way of being). The ideas of later Heidegger suggest that thinking can appear only where the being clearly exists (and Tao in its non-manifestation). Thinking arises only in conjunction with being and a new topos (thinking of being). Thinking is the gift of the being through the clearing (interspace), the one that allows you to grasp both the being and Tao. Nevertheless, based on the later M. Heidegger, it can therefore be concluded that almost fifty years after the writing of «Being and Time», European thinkers still have not learned to think, since what awakens true thought, what should encourage us to think, and what is associated with pure thinking, has not yet awakened. It does look as if the later Heidegger was close to the idea that time reveals not only the being but also consciousness. In the classical dimension of thinking of being beyond the boundaries, both time and the being disappear, thereby closing the path to pure thinking (to avoid the «true»).

Keywords: consciousness, pure thinking, European thinking, logical and rational thinking, pure being, being and time, existential anthropology, M. Heidegger.

Main part

heidegger metaphysics thinker

The European culture route to the purity of consciousness proved to be very thorny and contradictory. But in fact, the depth of culture can be measured precisely by the purity allowing you to discover in consciousness. We know about the existence of ancient high cultures (Egyptian, Iranian, Sumerian, Aramaic, etc.); however, we still have not figured out whether these cultures' pure thinking patterns were the same as those in Ancient Greece and in our time. Cultures and civilizations disappear, but thinking remains. Moreover, we constantly talk about the fact that the ancient high civilizations were destroyed since thinking of their representatives became more and more polluted, as they did in Egypt and the Sumerians, and at the origins of the Old Testament thought. For instance, did the Aryans who came to India bring the light of thinking or the pollution of war? Does the tribal war, described in the Bhagavad Gita, bring us to the inner tension of the hero's (Aijuna) thought; or is it an inevitable fact of thought pollution (although even Krishna interprets it as something that should not prevent a warrior from doing his duty)? (Edgerton, 1972) In a word, we still (even in the 21st century) face the problem of interpreting the purity of thinking or the fact that our consciousness is filled with the dirt of war. The most prominent thinkers of the 20th century sought to decipher the essence of pure thinking (for example, E. Husserl, 1983; S. Freud, 2015; M. Scheler, 1962; Sri Aurobindo, 1998; A. Badiou, 2003, 2005; etc.), but, ultimately, they failed to convince the mass society of the need to purify consciousness. As in the days of the ancient Greeks and the time of the Bhagavad Gita writing, we are standing in front of a wall of war and evil in misunderstanding, although A. Badiou leads us to the idea that a mask (correlating with an event), betrayal (correlating with loyalty), coercion of the unnameable (correlating with the power of the true) are the evil figures, and that any attempt to name the unnameable, to call the «community of people» capitalism, socialism, democracy or communism leads to catastrophic evil (Badiou, 2001). For evil (as well as good) is born at the origins of thought, where a person attempts to name something (a form of being of sociality in particular). And the named one, transferred to the masses, becomes evil, and we call it the «Idea» and the «Ideal State» (Plato), the beginning of the world (Aristotle) or communism (Marx). The events of the 20^th century showed how fascism, under the guise of socialism, burst into the European consciousness, and the dirty events were committed under the name of communism. This is the nature of human consciousness, which, striving for purity, does evil; this requires considering at what stage of the way purity consciousness can be transformed into its opposite (evil).

This article is aimed at exploring Heidegger's understanding of the European consciousness purity, and to show in this context that starting from the very first works («Being and Time» (Heidegger, 1962) through the works after the turn (see Heidegger, 1979, 1979, 1983, 1992) and ending with the last work «What is called thinking?» (Heidegger, 1968) that Heidegger's work is undergoing a profound internal transformation from fundamental ontology to fundamental anthropology. Such a study is based on our earlier works on Heidegger (Okorokov, 2018, 2020), as well as the article on the pure consciousness of early Heidegger (primarily, «Being and Time» (Okorokov, 2022). Similar issues in Heidegger's work were studied by both Ukrainian: A. Bogachov (Bogachov, 2021), I. Karivets (Karivets, 2020), R. Kobets (Kobets, 2020), E. Boliaki (Boliaki, 2012), L. Gordon, and A. Wohlman (Gordon & Wohlman, 2019), M. Peters (Peters, 2019), R. Huttunen, and L. Kakkori (Huttunen & Kakkori, 2021), M. Lambert (Lambert, 2020), G. Petropoulos (Petropoulos, 2020), R. Uljee, G. Tsagdis, and F.W. Zantvoort (Uljee et al., 2020), F. Westerlund (Westerlund, 2020),

E. Husserl (Husserl, 1983), M. Scheler (Scheler, 1962), S. Freud (Freud, 2015), A. Badiou (Badiou, 2005), Sri Aurobindo (Sri Aurobindo, 1998), and others.

A. Bogachov, on the one hand, points out the difficulties of the Ukrainian translation of «Being and Time»; on the other hand, he seeks support for such a translation in the work of F. Westerlund (Bogachov, 2021). I. Karivets writes that in the fundamental ontology, thinking is understood as being in tradition without tradition, and that thinking is arbitrary and spontaneous (Karivets, 2020). R. Kobets focuses on the fundamental ontological projection of thinking as a kind of science of cognition and the Dasein project (Kobets, 2020).

F. Westerlund reveals the contradiction between Heidegger's attempt to establish Husserl's phenomenological experience and apply a radically historicist approach to understanding thinking; that is, the boundaries of phenomenological thinking are explored through Heidegger's existential experience (Westerlund, 2020). G. Petropoulos analyzes the complex relationship of Heidegger to Plato, where the latter is revealed as a thinker of the transitional period in the affirmation of the truth of being (Petropoulos, 2020). R. Huttunen, L. Kakkori believe that, given the fact that there are two types of thinking (calculating and meditative), Heidegger can be considered a technological essentialist, and overcoming technological thinking is very difficult (Huttunen & Kakkori, 2021); and we can agree with it, taking into account that for more than two thousand years technological thinking has been dominant in the European consciousness.

M. Lambert focused on the positions of Chad Engelland concerning the relationship between Heidegger and Kant, suggests that, despite significant transformations and changes in the work of early and later Heidegger, Kant remains a crucial interlocutor throughout his career and brings him to the border of his later thinking, that is, at different periods, Kant becomes even more important for him than his teacher Husserl, and in an attempt to surpass Kant, Heidegger tries to «jump over his own shadow,» which, according to Heidegger, is the task of any philosopher. That is why early and later Heidegger tries to distance himself from Kantian transcendental thinking (Lambert, 2020). In our opinion, the later Heidegger departed from Kantian transcendental philosophy quite seriously, as he did not find any transcendental support for European thinking, especially since the German thinker diverged from the Kantian transcendental idea of time as a form of inner feeling.

Hegel, Heidegger and Derrida, according to R. Uljee, G. Tsagdis, and F.W. Zantvoort, are the three founding figures of modern European philosophy, and three thinkers whose intertwined heritage continues to enliven fierce philosophical disputes. But it was their debates that initially shaped the philosophy of the 20th century. Heidegger criticized Hegel as the archetype and culmination of the entire Western philosophical tradition, but Derrida would also criticize Heidegger for logocentric and ontotheological motives in his thought, that is, for his hidden Hegelianism. According to Hegel, thinking itself has a history, and the central premise of the Heideggerian project is that thinking can exist only in the continuous deconstruction of its history; it means that there is a relationship between history and time, the consciousness of time and the presence of time modalities in his writing. In other words, Heidegger suggests that thought development moves around the relationship of temporality (Dasein), the history of being and the meaning of the Event (Ereignis), among which, according to Derrida, a crucial role is played by the priority of temporality over the event (Uljee et al., 2020).

The relationship between Heidegger and Plato (and with Greek thought as a whole), essentially, the relationship between the first and last thinkers of the metaphysical era is crucial given modern critics. Many modern researchers of Heidegger's work have written on these relations, but we would like to single out the works of two remarkable critics, F.J. Gonzales (Gonzales, 2009) and T Sheehan (Sheehan, 2015).

F.J. Gonzales and T. Sheehan have revealed that Heidegger, largely based on Plato, misinterpreted him, and it may question the entire teaching of Heidegger as the finalizer of modern European culture. As the role of Plato is significant for Heidegger as well.

However, we want to show that Heidegger's transcription of Plato is only a certain reconstruction of the Greek philosopher, an attempt to modernize him, to show that from the point of view of modern culture, he is, firstly, relevant, and, secondly, the path of his thinking anyway leads to contradictions, that is, according to Heidegger, Plato did not solve the global problems of culture and failed to smooth out the contradictions between thinking and being. In our language, Plato was only on the outskirts of understanding pure consciousness but closed its light by the world of ideas for himself (and for us).

In other words, on this matter, we are on Heidegger's side, since he tried to show inconsistent thinking not only of Plato, but of all subsequent European (metaphysical) culture, and not only in the field of fundamental ontology, but the later Heidegger in the field of fundamental (existential) anthropology (given the phenomenological influence of Husserl).

Gonzales is trying to reveal the phenomenological motives of Plato but is not such a phenomenological image of Plato just another new (not existential, as in Heidegger, but phenomenological) reconstruction of Plato. The problem remains open.

Moreover, one can say that Gonzales, regarding Socrates and Plato, falls into the same trap as Heidegger. Things he reproaches Heidegger for (inaccurate reading and speculation), he applies to them himself (see, for example, Gonzales, 2009: 289-290, 295). Gonzales has many statements, such as, «It is clear that Plato would not accept this move» (Gonzales, 2009: 295), etc.). To who is it clear, and how? Has Plato incarnated in Gonzales?

Neither Gonzales nor Sheehan, despite the fundamental analysis of Plato's ideas, have brought us closer to understanding the true essence of modern European thinking; even European classical thinking also froze on Plato's ideas, as no one could clearly express those passages that have come down to us from the pre-Socrates. So, what's happening next, are we forever stuck in the shadow of the outstanding thinker of antiquity, enchanted by his thinking?

But it is not just about how talented Plato was, but whether there are alternative ways for European culture. In our opinion, there are, because there is a path of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese cultures, but there is a path of ancient civilizations, the study of which (say, following the example of M. Eliade or Prabhupada) could shed light on the origin of our thinking. In the East, this kind of illumination sometimes was called the appearance of God (Brahman or Krishna) on Earth. Even in European culture, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, appeared in human form (and this is an element of the alternative Platonic spiritual culture). In the East, when culture comes to a standstill, new spiritual avatars appear (Buddha, Shankara, Ramanuja, Chaitanya, etc.). There has been no renewal in Europe since Plato and Christ.

So perhaps Spengler is right, and this is the decline of (old) Europe, and it needs renewal (it would be better not the way R. Girard prophesied, not a sacrificial renewal). Maybe enough bloody sacrifices that lead only to consciousness simulations (for a certain historical period), we would like psychoanalysis not to be omnipotent and the repressed consciousness to be replaced by a spiritual one. So that neither Oedipus nor the Sphinx would lead us along the path of pure consciousness, but Mo Tzu or Christ (with their universal love and humanity).

European culture desperately needs new spiritual (ancient) sources to discover a new spiritual tradition (such as Zoroastrianism for Pythagoras). Thinking, divorced from spiritual roots, produces only success (money, computers, networks, robots, etc.) or (in the classical sense) logos and metaphysics.

When it comes to the opposition of dialectics and being in Heidegger's concept, according to F.J. Gonzales, one can only say that neither Plato nor Heidegger succeeded in expressing the temporal properties of dialectics, based on the fact that dialectical thinking is still not absolute (ideal), but is always unfolded in time. In this context, it would be nice to apply the diachronic approach to language, proposed by F. de Saussure, to statements about being. In other words, all classical (modern included) European thinking considers logos (and any natural language then) as static. But such logos (and such a language) does not apply to being, according to Heidegger. However, neither Heidegger nor his critics (in particular, Gonzales and Sheehan) could see language as an event unfolding in time. And just as Heidegger was looking for an event-based approach to being in «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)», it was necessary to find such an approach to language. Who knows, perhaps, in this case, there would be a language capable of expressing being. Neither F.J. Gonzales nor Heidegger did not explore this possibility. Maybe in such a linguistic topos, the harshly negative language of Gonzales would be less critical of Heidegger.

Thus, many researchers of Heidegger's work are trying to understand the existential - anthropological motives of the later M. Heidegger, that is, to comprehend the transition from the fundamental ontology of the early to the existential anthropology of the later Heidegger. We strive to comprehend this transition in the context of research into the essence of the purity of modern European thinking. This idea can be expressed in another way: modern European culture is clearly on the way to a new way of thinking formation.

M. Heidegger, completing «Being and Time», faced the need for thinking through what time is, and concluded that time, in turn, must be revealed from the horizon of being. Since the fundamental way of being existence is understanding, the German philosopher was forced to consider the very possibility of such an understanding and decided to look for the purity of European consciousness, which must now (just like time) unfold from the historical horizon of the being of European culture. Thus, Heidegger made a significant turn from fundamental ontology, first to the history of being, and, ultimately, to the history of the essence and purity of European consciousness study.

However, Heidegger is one of the few European thinkers who tried to understand the complexity of this path of purification of consciousness in European culture and came to the disappointing conclusion that we, unlike the East, are still at the origins of this path. Perhaps that is why the last work of Heidegger is named symbolically - «What is called thinking?» (Heidegger, 1968).

One can reduce the study of F.J. Gonzales on Heidegger to the justification of Plato (as opposed to Nietzsche and Heidegger's misreading, who interpreted Platonian truth as unconcealed, but sometimes critically (inaccurately) assessed it as correctness). You can justify T. Sheehan's new reading of Heidegger's work, considering purely English accuracy in comparing the terminology of Aristotle and Heidegger. T Sheehan stated, «as regards philology and historical science (Historie), his (Heidegger) hyper-valorization of the pre-Socratics based on a heavily theorized construal of a handful of fragments is highly questionable. He himself even called into doubt the historical (historisch) correctness of his own interpretations of archaic Greek thought» (Sheehan, 2015: 254). «Professor Tezuka was quite right: when it comes to the needless confusion that dogs Heidegger's philosophy (not only among analytical philosophers but among Heideggerians as well), much of the blame must be laid at Heidegger's own doorstep» (Sheehan, 2015: 12).

All this is correct and true, and there are modern critics well versed in ancient texts and the etymological intricacies of Heidegger's complex work. Although, where T. Sheehan doubts (of the vagueness of the pure origins of European thought, as if there were only fragments before Plato, and only he and Aristotle brought European thought into the system), one can object that, after all, Indian thought starts from the obscure Vedas, and the Chinese from the obscure Book of Changes, and thereunder, what should we consider the clarity of Buddha and Lao Tzu to be the origins of Indian and Chinese thought. Any understanding (system) implies tradition. Wasn't there Bharata in India and Homer in Europe, who already implied polishing of thought?

This is not the task. No teaching can escape criticism. The task is to figure out whose idea of thinking is more correct, Plato's or Heidegger's. Could not Plato be mistaken in truth, goodness, thinking, and education interpretation? He could. And just as Heidegger could be wrong in interpreting Plato? But this is not the reason to judge both. Who has not erred in understanding the essence of thought? The task is rather to find an approach to thinking that would straighten out all the problems of modern European thinking (it does not matter whether we follow the path of Plato following Gonzales and Badiou or follow the path of Heidegger). Or perhaps there is a third way, and not just a way to the second dimension (as in Heidegger). This article is aimed at considering alternatives to different ways of thinking, that is, to introduce a conditional «purity of thinking,» according to the following type: the purer the thinking, the more accurately it reflects being, fundamentally avoiding the category of truth, that confused everything in European thinking, and which Plato, Heidegger, Badiou, F.J. Gonzales, and T. Sheehan tried to correct. The purity of thinking is about the divine dimension, and the truth of thinking is about the human dimension.

The purpose of the research

Our goal is to show that Heidegger, who has always sought a way to understand pure being, was increasingly striving to understand the purity of thought and explore ways to a new dimension of thinking associated with being-time in his later work, that is, to show that Heidegger's work is a consistent transition from understanding the purity of being to understanding the purity of thinking, the turn of the outstanding German thinker from fundamental ontology to the history of being, the formation of ideas on the continuum (topos) of being and time, and further to the history of research (or understanding) of the purity of European thinking (as T. Sheehan said, his clearing (enlightenment) or understanding of the continuum (topos) being-thinking).

M. Heidegger turned out to be the thinker who initially at the fundamental-ontological level, while Sheehan considers it to be meta-metaphysical (in his opinion, «Heidegger's meta-metaphysical inquiry, on the other hand, takes up where metaphysics leaves off») (Sheehan, 2015: 15)), revealed the internal conflict of European consciousness and, in search of a way to resolve it, began to consider anthropology at the level of human existence, a different level of fundamental reading of human being (called Dasein (Heidegger, 1962) in «Being and Time»). At this level, the problems that arose were hidden behind the boundary of the existence of things (and the world), and, thus, European thinkers were forced to study the inner realm of being (consciousness), which turned out to be completely different from that which all classical culture pointed to. Being in its anthropological underside turned out to be that non-being, or that incomprehensible link in thinking, which in the language of Parmenides opened the way to metaphysics, and in the language of J.-P. Sartre turned out to be a fundamental (deep property) of consciousness itself.

In T. Sheehan's language, this means the following, «In its briefest formulation, Heidegger argues that the pre-Socratics (we will limit the discussion to Parmenides and Heraclitus) discovered the hidden clearing, al^ffeia-1, but failed to see that the appropriation of ex-sistence is the reason why there is a clearing at all» (Sheehan, 2015: 252). That is, Parmenides discovered the complexity of understanding being by thinking, and discovered the enlightenment of human thought (clearing) for grasping things, but did not understand the essence of this complexity, which was revealed only by Heidegger.

The German thinker tried to understand the essence of this enlightenment («clearing») and to find a direct path for a human to being (initially through facticity and Dasein). But some researchers believe that Heidegger was wrong on this path. Thus, F. Gonzales considers it his main objective to show that Plato is «right» and Heidegger is «wrong» (Gonzales, 2009: 299). Is it possible, in principle, to designate the topos in which we clearly understand how thinking grasps being? The Greeks discovered this and erected there a building of philosophy. But they did not understand why, when we try to grasp being, we lose the understanding of thinking itself, and were forced to embark on the path of metaphysics, through the introduction (understanding and naming) of such concepts as al^ffeia, ei5o<; and ohoia things (see, for example, (Sheehan, 2015: 70). This is why, according to Sheehan, «Greek philosophy and in fact could be raised only by going beyond metaphysical thinking - or, as he (Heidegger) put it, «stepping back» from metaphysics into a region that is before and the basis for it» (Sheehan, 2015: 85).

Together with the Greeks and Heidegger, we found ourselves in that wonderful place where thinking, having thought about why things appear to us at all, should we rely on Xoyo<; (word, language) in this place, as Heraclitus understands the way of thinking, or being, in the interpretation of Parmenides, or we must find in this place clearing (enlightenment), according to Heidegger, can become permeable to itself. Heidegger seeks to show us that as long as we strive to understand things as something external to thinking, that is, we are in subject-object relations with them, thinking seems obvious to us (in the light of loyo^ al^ffeia, ei5o<;, ohoia, etc.), but as soon as we strive to carry out this operation, proceeding from thinking itself, we instantly take the path of being - and everything becomes foggy and confused. Perhaps, in this place (topos), we are already invading the realm of being-thinking. As Sheehan writes, «It is with us human beings that Sein comes into play (…). Or again: When Heidegger claims that in the modern world «things, to besure, are still given (…) but Sein has deserted them,» this «desertion» does not mean the disappearance of the «out-there-ness» of things (their existentia or Vorhandensein) but refers, rather, to the loss of the understanding of how things become meaningfully present at all: «Where struggle [nolepo^] ceases, things certainly do not disappear, but world [i.e., the meaning-giving clearing] disappears.» On both accounts, therefore - (1) that Sein was not his focal topic, and (2) that what he did mean by Sein was the intelligibility of things (Sheehan, 2015: 11). Here is another answer for our study. Sein was not the basic theme of Heidegger. What was the main focus then? Clearing as that thinking that approaches the understanding of Sein (in our interpretation, this is pure thinking).

Thus, the Greeks discovered that it was not possible to break through to thinking that grasps oi^a (being, the constant presence of things). Heidegger is surprised that there, where philosophy and metaphysics flourished and where thinking begins (at the origins), we are still in ignorance and misunderstanding. And that means modern culture is opposed to ancient Greek (at its origins). Gonzales states, «The opposition between Plato and Heidegger is not an opposition between the nihilistic forgetting of being, on the one hand, and the attempt finally to think being in a new beginning - though this of course, is how Heidegger wants us to understand it - but rather an opposition between two different approaches to thinking being» (Gonzales, 2009: 292-293). Two thousand years after the Greeks, we are again (thanks to Heidegger) at the origins (horizon) of thinking and in a twofold sense: on the one hand, like the Greeks, we do not see thinking that grasps things in their being, on the other - we are looking for the origins of thinking as such (in the historical-temporal aspect), and we are trying to think like the Greeks to understand the originality of the thinking of European culture. In both cases, the main initiator of both approaches was Heidegger (actually, early and later).

For example, J-P. Sartre was looking for a detour (through Nothingness - from the depths (horizon) of consciousness). Both Heidegger and Sartre were confronted by Parmenides' fundamental insights that the path to being lies on both sides of the understanding of human thinking (from the truth of being and from the truth of non-being).

But Parmenides closed the second way for Europeans, pointing out that it was the goddess (Dike) who opened the first one to him. The gods, through the consciousness of a human (Heraclitus and Parmenides), endowed a human with the gift of thinking, but in human performance, this gift, as Nietzsche and Heidegger would say, turned into «fetters» of all European thinking (metaphysics and logic), and, as we saw after Nietzsche and Heidegger, the path to a new misunderstanding (Nothingness), because the metaphysical multiplication of thoughts is the path of consciousness into the void of illusory ideas (about the world), as the Hindus would say the path to ignorance or consciousness obscured by Maya - the Indian interpretation of the obscuration of clearing (enlightenment, mental glades). Thinking becomes opaque on the way to grasping being (first of all, one's being, which early Heidegger tried to formulate through ex-sistence). However, after turn, later Heidegger seeks to solve this problem by searching for the European thinking origins as such (that is, through an analysis of the thinking of the ancient Greeks, primarily the understanding of Plato and Aristotle). Our task is to figure out how close later Heidegger was to what we call pure being.

Heidegger clearly shows that metaphysics is just a limit of thinking, which draws a circle of visibility of ideas about beings (or about things) from the positions of koyo^ and al^heta. Both the world and the cosmos in such a system of knowledge are reduced to a system of things, and the beginning is only the horizon of this system, conjectured from knowledge about things (according to Heidegger, the most profound foundations). In such a metaphysical system of knowledge, the more «thinking turns to the existent…, the more resolutely philosophy moves away from the truth of being.» (In the existential dimension, on the contrary, «Dasein… the foundation of the truth of being» (Heidegger, 2020: 223). Only a person who can listen to a being can understand its meaning (penetrate its dimension) and find himself on the other side of existence (the world of things). Consequently, Heidegger concludes that the original appropriation of the first beginning (and hence its history) means the acquisition of soil in another beginning (Heidegger, 2020: 224). Only through the source (the first appropriation of the history of being (destruction) is a person able to break the circle of being and enter the dimension of truth (as openness) of being, that is, enter the horizon of understanding of being, which Heidegger associates with time. But this, according to Sheehan, is a particular time, «In any case, in his later writings Heidegger was finally clear: these so-called «time» words were only preliminary attempts to name the thrown-open or disclosed clearing, aX^heta-1. «Time» is a preliminary name for the openness of the clearing» (Sheehan, 2015: 97).

On the approaches to understanding non-logos (beyond logic), thinking problems begin everywhere. European culture has only succeeded in understanding the thinking, that is, known as logos (logical and rational). As Gonzales writes, «It is with this conception of Xoyo^, as it comes to characterize modern logic, that, according to Heidegger, «The way is cleared for the development of thinking as reckoning, grounding, and deducing…» (144-45). Thinking ceases to be a matter of receiving the gift of a being's self-showing and becomes instead a matter of reliably connecting a predicate to a subject by means of proof, inference, or calculation. Thinking becomes mastery» (Gonzales, 2009: 235). This is the thinking that, according to Heidegger, must be overcome, otherwise, the path to understanding thinking itself becomes closed. Thinking turns into computer calculus, as Sheehan states, «recognizing the «danger» (Gefahr) of the epoche of technik for what it is: the obliteration of the hidden source of meaningful presence» (Sheehan, 2015: 265).

Is it possible to find another way in understanding European thinking, the pinnacle of which is modern computer thinking? This is the main task of the later Heidegger. But the German thinker begins with a careful analysis of how the Greeks thought of the basic concepts, first of all, Plato and Aristotle, and transforms the idea of truth: «time» as the naming the «truth» of being, and this is all as a task, as «on the way,» not as doctrine and dogmatics (Heidegger, 2020: 237). Human is such a creature that thinks and understands being on the way, that is, in time; therefore, time is the basic truth of being (in fact, as in Heraclitus and Parmenides).

Heidegger is influenced by Parmenides, for he says that one must not think of being, but speak of the time of being (Heidegger, 2020: 237). Everything follows from time; it is the basis for understanding being, its main essence. As long as we think about being (about things), both time and being disappear beyond the horizon of ideas about things. «Now the guiding principle of Western thinking is the essence and thinking, «thinking» - ratio - reason as a guiding question and anticipatory grasp of the interpretation of essence, is called into question, but in no case is it that thinking is replaced by «time and everything is relied only on more «temporarily» and more existentially» (Heidegger, 2020: 237-238). Here Heidegger clearly shows the path of new thinking, which is no longer focused on reason, but rather on time (as an understanding of being) and, accordingly, existence. Existential thinking is strictly related to time. The German thinker strives to choose for himself: (and this is not a choice between Plato or Aristotle, but a choice between Heraclitus or Parmenides (time and Xoyo^ or being and ohoia, or maybe a choice of dimension, where they are one).

If Einstein tried to unite space and time and mathematics into a single continuum (topos), then Heidegger carries out the same operation for being and time, as the path of logos research leads to a dead end. At least, he is already trying to get away from their delimitation in «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)», that is, he is looking for a third beginning (thinking) for their joint grasp. This dimension of thinking, in which the connection between being and time is revealed, is existential. Along the way, Heidegger embarks on the path of creating existential anthropology (in that he surpasses the narrowness of the phenomenology of E. Husserl and the anthropology of M. Scheler). Heidegger is trying to discover a new dimension of consciousness, in which thinking, time and being, commuting with each other, overcome the classical (rational and empirical) variations associated with an attempt to grasp them as separate structures. The turning point to a new understanding is not «Being and Time», in which the role of thinking is still very vague and confused because the German thinker is only trying to overcome the fascination with the Greeks. In this regard, Gonzales asserts the following, «This weakness of Xoyoi is precisely the weakness with which we see Heidegger continually struggling in «Zeit und Sein.» It is what leads Heidegger to reject the assertion, and therefore logic, as the paradigm for thinking being» (Gonzales, 2009: 293). Aoyoi (logos or logics) are closed. How, then, to start thinking about being? In that context, the later work «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)» is important. Dasein personifies only approaches to the problem of understanding thinking, something like viscous mythological thinking, in which everything is still intertwined and the selection of clearing (enlightenment) is still extremely difficult.

However, if the transition has been made, then metaphysics becomes impossible in the new dimension of consciousness (Heidegger, 2020: 238). We fall into the «other beginning» as «a jump that transforms being… into its more original truth» (Heidegger, 2020: 238). Only here Heidegger, through understanding the event of being, begins to understand the true meaning of the new thinking, in which the initial truth is the connection between being and time (one might say, being-time). Moreover, according to Sheehan, here he understands time «from thinking.» «In the first beginning, truth (as unconcealedness) is a character of beings as such… In the other beginning, truth is recognized and grounded precisely as the truth of being and being itself precisely as the being of truth, i.e., as the intrinsically turning event (…). The leap into the other beginning is the return to the first, and vice versa. (…) is not a transposition into something past, as if this could be made «actual» again in the usual sense» (Heidegger, 2020: 240, 241). Heidegger only emphasizes that both beginnings of thinking - essential and existential - are complementary, and to achieve the second, it is necessary to go through the first as a certain stage of the path. But in the first beginning, «time is experienced here in a concealed way as temporalizing, as transporting, and thus as an opening up;… Motion as the presencing of the changeable as such» (Heidegger, 2020:249). This is an interpretation of the ideas of Heraclitus (the mysterious transition from non-existence to existence) and Plato (our thinking is synchronous with walking). We only see movement because we think (we go in thinking) synchronously with it. Therefore, in Heidegger's concept, «every apprehension and determination (concept) of beingness and being is a matter of thinking» (Heidegger, 2020: 256). Thinking is rigidly connected with the comprehension and definition of being. To grasp a thing, one needs thinking (and then the understanding of how thinking itself does this is closed); to grasp being, gross logos thinking is not enough already (Heraclitus and Parmenides showed this); in this place, Heidegger uses the term clearing (enlightenment), allowing to «sharpen vision» (perception of thinking itself). But what is there on the horizon (over the border) of such existential thinking? Heidegger is on this side of thinking (in this dimension). And then, a natural question arises: does thinking distinguish between being and what is beyond its borders (non-being)? According to Parmenides, it does not (thinking is on this side, in conjunction with things), and this is the fate of classical European culture. Heidegger, relying on Nietzsche, argues that culture is unfolded. Comparable with Nietzsche, the old gods have left our Earth (our classically tuned consciousness), and now we want new gods (of being) to come into our thinking, and we have discovered another dimension (another beginning associated with being).

This is the situation of our time, our thinking slightly opens the entrance to a new dimension, according to Heidegger, and begins to understand the essence of its closeness to the classical understanding of being. Gonzales describes this reversal of Heidegger as follows, «Heidegger's belief in the possibility of a direct naming of being, in contrast, assumes that being is somehow present or manifest in the name itself; the name is not a conventional sign for being, but naturally belongs to, or is appropriated by, being as its own presenting» (Gonzales, 2009: 296).

Sheehan takes this Heidegger twist even deeper, «However, Heidegger's own work takes two major steps away from metaphysics and its traditional concern with «being.» In the first place, Heidegger's philosophy was not in pursuit of Sein at all. Rather, he was after das Woher des Seins, the «whence» of being, «that from which and through which… being occurs.» (We note the frustrating ambiguity in the meaning of «Sein» in this case. It could refer either to the clearing or to the being of things. Here, I take it in the second sense.). Originally Heidegger called this «whence» the intelligibility of being (= der Sinn von Sein).

Over the years he reformulated that as the «disclosedness» or «place» or «clearing» or «openness» or «thrown-open realm» for the being of things, all ex aequo (Sheehan, 2015: 9). And even further, Sheehan directly points to the essence of how Heidegger resolves the problem of the eclipse of being (understanding thinking), «In his later work, especially from 1960 until his death in 1976, Heidegger expressed himself a bit more clearly. He declared that the merely formal indication «das Sein selbst» finally turns out to be die Lichtung, the thrownopen clearing, which he designated as the Urphanomen of all his work. The clearing is the always-already opened-up «space» that makes the being of things (phenomenologically: the intelligibility of things) possible and necessary. Heidegger calls it «the open region of understanding» and «the realm of disclosedness or clearing (understandability)» (Sheehan, 2015: 20). Sheehan did a great job and managed to unite the seemingly divergent realm of being in Heidegger into a system. But it is easier to systematize an event that has already taken place (even if it is a rather complex and divergent event) in Heidegger's work. Therefore, Sheehan, like many other commentators on his work, is only trying to create a logical-etymological system, whereas Heidegger himself argued the impossibility of a single reading of being. Something like how Einstein tried to put the genie (the divergent energy-momentum of the Universe) into a bottle through corrections. However, Einstein's theory still held out. Heidegger's genius is that he saw the Greeks' mistake in understanding being, which led them and all European culture to elevate metaphysics to the highest place in thinking and considered the question of being closed to thinking. And here Heidegger, according to Sheehan, actually made a discovery, «.Heidegger's question turns out to be 1. not «Whence beings?» - the answer to that is: being; 2. nor even «Whence being at all?» - the answer to that is: the open clearing; 3. but rather «Whence and how is there `the open'?» or equally «Whence and how is there the clearing?»

And the answer to that question will be Ereignis - the appropriation of existence to its proper state of thrown-openness» (Sheehan, 2015: 69). But our thought is not about where in the teachings of Heidegger and his magnificent commentator Sheehan the thread of comprehension of being breaks, but about what is beyond this «appropriation of being» border and whether it can be overcome. At this point, Heidegger's teaching breaks off. We are trying to continue it by referring to the Eastern tradition. And if Sheehan can be understood in such a way that thinking breathes time (filled with time), then we, following the example of Gonzales and Sheehan, are trying to grasp this dimension of thinking, in which it begins to understand its fullness of time and being (from the horizon of spirituality).

One of the variants of such grasping of being is the abyss. In «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event),» Heidegger ties the beginnings of thinking and being to it. In particular, «timespace as abyss (…) Space-time as arising out of the essence of truth… Space and time… themselves arise out of time-space, which is more original» (Heidegger, 2020: 371, 460). Heidegger looks at approaches to a new understanding of being and considers time-space (almost like Einstein's) to be part of being (the basis that is bottomless).

«Abyss as absence, as grounding in self-concealment, self-concealment in the way of thinking of grounding» (Heidegger, 2020: 469). For that which is bottomless can only be connected with thinking as a way of transitioning to another dimension, which in our dimension is seen as groundless (it is in this sense that such thinking can be associated with being). And at the same time, «the abyss is. in itself a receptacle-space-counter-moving - in-a-sweep place-of-instant «interspace» as which Dasein must be founded» (Heidegger, 2020: 479). That is, existential thinking must begin with the feeling of the abyss, and in the same place, it collides with interspace as a receptacle for thinking on a different level. There is a feeling that Heidegger, apparently not knowing the physics of his day so thoroughly, was nevertheless somehow involved in Einstein's work (or at least got to know him remotely) and tried to transfer Einstein's physical approaches to the field of fundamental ontology, and later fundamental (deep) epistemology (although the word epistemology is inappropriate here, and there is no other suitable word for the science of deep thinking, and for now I call it existential (deep) anthropology (not at all in the sense of Scheler).

In such a context, thinking becomes that clearing, within which a connection with being is necessarily traced, whether it be the existence of Gods, people, or things (everyone goes through the path of being and thinking involved in it). However, in ancient Indian philosophy, in this place, they spoke of the unmanifested state (deep divine sleep of thinking without dreams). On the other hand, it is similar to atheistic Buddhism (and maybe also Jainism). Apparently, according to Heidegger, thinking can only appear where being already exists. For people, where the thought comes into contact with being, there is an effect of clearing, called by Heidegger the interspace, which, therefore, is a kind of transitional event associated with being, with human, and with divine thinking. It is only in the field of being that thinking as such (from-thinking) is manifested, and only then does the conception of being, the gods, and the good arise. A person thinks, finds himself in society and is connected with the Gods only through the presence of being-thinking. Thinking, according to Heidegger of the period «Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)», is the gift of being through enlightenment (and interspace).

To get into this clearing, thinking must first (following the example of the Greeks) go through the logical and metaphysical path (XoyoQ al^&eta, ^hm<;, ei5o<; and onma) and only later make a jump into a new dimension, since «transitional thinking cannot. rid itself of the metaphysical tradition» (Heidegger, 2020: 527). «Only the transition to the other beginning, the first overcoming of metaphysics (under the transitional necessity of retaining its name), raises this distinction to the level of knowledge and thereby places it into question for the first time-not casually, but as what is most question-worthy» (Heidegger, 2020: 520). Only when it comes into contact with another dimension the thinking faces the need to overcome metaphysics. The question is also whether it is possible to stay in this other dimension for a long time, or it is possible to stay in an existential state for a long time. Heidegger leaves this question unanswered. However, his student Binswanger developed existential therapy, therapy for prolonged immersion in a new dimension of being. Maybe this is the question of whether it is possible to tame a thermonuclear reaction. And the new (spiritual) thinking, striving for an understanding of being and divinity, resembles this process. Classical thinking, formed at the level of low (logos) energies, says «no». Spiritual thinking can get into these new (high-energy) states.

A more thorough answer to the question of whether European thinking has matured to deep purity, Heidegger provides in his last work, «What is called thinking?» (Heidegger, 1968). And he begins his research with the assertion that it is necessary to learn to think. And the very mind that dominated European thinking for thousands of years and closed the understanding of clearing only deploys its logos in thinking itself (how can one not recall the Sankhya teaching, in which this idea was realized back in the 6th century BC, then there is in that historical time about which Jaspers wrote and in which, according to Heidegger, we should learn wisdom from the ancient Greeks). Returning us to this past, Heidegger writes that the main thing in thinking is the ability to keep this source, as, «What keeps us in our essential nature holds us only so long, however, as we for our part keep holding on to what holds us. And we keep holding on to it by not letting it out of our memory. Memory is the gathering of thought» (Heidegger, 1968: 3). What did the Greeks leave us that keeps us? Most of Heidegger's writings for almost fifty years after «Being and Time» (see, for example, works Heidegger, 1979, 1979, 1983, 1992) relate to the search and analysis of the origins of European being and thinking, the search for what initially keeps us. In this beginning, he analyzes the thought of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, on whom he writes in this period as the original European thinkers (and their conceptions of Xoyo^, ohoia, ohoia, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle about al^heta are what, fortunately, or unfortunately, preserves European thought right up to the present). This keeps almost unchanged, although outwardly, retains European thinking to this day. Heidegger, followed by A. Badiou, showed that Christian thought deconstructed (replaced) ancient thought and modern thinkers deconstructed medieval thought. And it turned out that we kept hidden (replaced) knowledge, which resulted in modern technical thinking in its entirety. In these matters, Heidegger has a lot of uncertainty. For example, Sheehan writes, «Is Heidegger arguing that the forgottenness of appropriation is the driving force of Western history or only a reflection of such forces in philosophical terms? Or is it something in between? Heidegger is notoriously vague about all of this. He seems to agree with Hegel that philosophy, his own included, arrives too late to direct the course of history» (Sheehan, 2015:292). In «The Question of Technik,» the severe limitations of Heidegger's thought are on full display.