The Russian disinformation threat and the EU response: the debate

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NATIONAL RESEASRCH UNIVERSITY - HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON

Master Dissertation

The Russian disinformation threat and the EU response: the debate

Master Programme `International Relations in Eurasia'

Field of Study 41.04.05 International Relations

by Student Ville Majamaa

Supervisor: Prof. Maxim V. Bratersky

Moscow, Russia 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter 1.Literature review

1.1 Importance of ideas in international politics

1.2 Changes in diplomatic and information space

1.3 Soft power

1.4 Information warfare

1.5 Strategic communications

Conclusions for 1 chapter

Chapter 2. Theoretical and methodological framework

2.1 Strategic narratives

2.2 Methodology

2.3 Sources

Chapter 3. Discussion and analysis

3.1 Developments in 2015

3.2 Developments in 2016

3.3 Developments in 2017

Conclusion

Bibliography

INTRODUCTION

2014 was a turning point for relations between Russia and the European Union. Amongst the many events deserving scholarly attention, this study is dedicated to the European debate on the so-called Russian disinformation threat and its rapid ascendance to the centre of European political discourse.

Referring to the events in Ukraine, in September 2014, the Finnish Minister of Defence states that `Russia is waging an information war, with false news approved by the state leadership'. Hдglund, Carl (2014) Over the year, similar claims are made by several other European state representatives as well as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Vershbow, Alexander (2014) Some two years later, in November 2016, the European Parliament depicts the threat of Russia's `anti-EU propaganda' as parallel to that posed by Daesh. European Parliament (2016a) Less than a year later, in October 2017, the European Commission commits to presenting `an initiative on countering fake news' in its work programme for 2018. European Commission (2017f), p. 4 At the same time, France and Germany, amongst others, either consider or have already introduced national regulatory measures.

As this brief timeline shows, what begins as a relatively niche discussion, in the context of the post-Maidan political and economic shockways dominating the headlines, transforms quickly from a concern of a few national governments and specialised expert community into a major policy issue on the European Union agenda. While the debate is initially prompted by the conflict in Ukraine, since then its proponents have been heard in connection to most major European elections and referenda, to the extent that even past events are re-interpreted from this new perspective. Yet, this is not a mere scholarly debate. Should the EU response target Russia or Russian operators specifically, it will impact the bilateral relationship. Moreover, the new regulation, whether national or European, will not only impact millions of people but could affect the norms regarding state behaviour in the information space well beyond the European continent. Such as the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is currently doing, Forbes (2018) Before any of this can come to fruition, however, a sufficient consensus on the threat perception and the required response is needed amongst the relevant European institutions.

This study argues that the European Union's response does not represent such consensus. On the one hand, the topic has entered the mainstream European security and foreign policy discourse and it is generally accepted that some Russian narratives differ from those promoted by the European Union institutions. On the other hand, whether this phenomenon is understood negatively as hostile Russian `disinformation', neutrally as Russian `soft power' or without any attribution as `fake news' depends on the actor in question. The popularity, or legitimacy, of the negative framing of Russia's information activities has increased since it was first introduced in the EU discourse by a small group of Member States in January 2015. For some time, it represented the dominant narrative across the three main Union institutions, endorsed in both political discourse and practice.

By the end of 2017, however, an alternative articulation emphasising the threat of unattributed `fake news' has emerged to contest the legitimacy of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. While the two narratives appear to coexist in the European Union discourse at the end of the study period, in December 2017, they are incompatible in terms of their threat attribution suggesting that the situation is temporary. From this perspective, the negotiations on the EU's Multi-Annual Financial Framework post 2020 starting later this year and the European Commission's commitment to present a Union wide initiative to tackle the threat in 2018 represent critical moments in the European Union debate on Russian disinformation. This paper traces the developments that have led to these moments.

The paper begins with a literature review, which notes the importance of ideas and changes in the diplomatic and information space to international politics and introduces three distinct theoretical approaches to study the `battle of narratives', namely, soft power, information warfare and strategic communications. The second chapter further elaborates the third approach grounding this study on the concept of `strategic narratives', presents the methodology, and introduces the sources. Equipped with these instruments, the third chapter is an empirical discussion of the Russian disinformation debate in the European Union institutions since its beginning in January 2015 until the end of 2017.

To reiterate, with its focus on the idea of Russian disinformation threat and not Russian disinformation per se, this paper traces the introduction, performance and contestation of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative in the European Union institutions in 2015-2017.

CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW

`Disinformation', `information warfare' and `hybrid war' are just three examples for naming the phenomena that have risen into unprecedented prominence in the Western expert and policy communities since 2014. For a discussion on these and other related terms, see Giles, Keir (2016a) Unsurprisingly, the surge in research in this area is accompanied by a range of different theoretical and methodological approaches. While whole publications are dedicated for ordering the field, doing so comprehensively is beyond the means of this paper. For example, see Althuis, Jente; Haiden, Leonie eds. (2018); Wardle, Claire; Derakhshan, Derak (2017) Instead, the following literature review is an attempt to introduce the reader, first, to the recent scholarship on the role of ideas in international politics in general and, second, to the recent debate on `Russian disinformation' in particular.

To start with, this chapter positions the paper ontologically and epistemologically in the social constructivist domain recognising the importance of ideas in international politics. The changes in the diplomatic and information space as both enabling and constraining factors in the creation, dissemination and reception of ideas are also discussed. From this contextual overview, the literature review proceeds to looking at three distinct approaches to study Russia's efforts to promote its ideas abroad. The first one is the concept of `soft power' and public diplomacy. While these ideas remain popular, recently increasingly many have argued that Russia's activities differ from Joseph Nye's conceptualisations and that different analytical approaches are needed. Thus, the second approach introduced here is the idea of `information warfare'. Finally, the concepts of `strategic communications' and `strategic narratives' are introduced as examples of most recent, and somewhat less controversial, means to study Russia's narrative promotion. misinformation propaganda threat ukraine

The three-layer structure of the literature review is intentional for it illustrates how the debate on `Russian disinformation' is as much about `what is' as it is about `what should be done'. Although the division of literature into these groups is unavoidably an artificial one and important contributions are left out, it emphasises how polarised the discussion on `Russian disinformation' has become in recent years. In other words, the threat perception, or lack of, determines how the issue is framed, how Russia's role is perceived, what terminology is used to describe it and what links are made to existing academic or political discourses. Simply put, whether Russia's efforts to promote its ideas abroad are framed as `soft power', `strategic communications' or `information warfare' represents a choice between alternative, and often mutually incompatible, narratives available for the observer.

1.1 Importance of ideas in international politics

To begin with, this study adopts a constructivist view of the international system, where the nature of the system as well as that of the actors that constitute it emerges through agents' continuous interaction. Wendt, Alexander (1992); Adler, Emanuel (1997); Reus-Smit, Christian (2005) The actors' exposure to each other's differences makes the given nature of the international system contingent as new ideas are introduced and gradually replace existing institutions. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 17 In this type of a system, ideas are the currency of power in international affairs. Consequently, the study of ideas, including their creation, projection and reception, looks both at the nature of the present system and the process through which it evolves. Hopf, Ted (1998); Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013)

Influencing others by promoting particular ideas, norms and values is recognised as a common state practice in international politics. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013) However, it was not until 1980s that so-called constructivists comprehensively made the case that `identities, narratives, ideas, norms, and discourses' are central to the nature and evolution of international system. Frost, Mervyn; Michelsen, Nicholas (2017), p. 10 Even more recently, a debate regarding the political instrumentalisation of these concepts through dedicated `communications strategies' by different actors has emerged. Ibid. In this task, Manuel Castell's work on `communication power' has been central. Castells, Manuel (2009) For Castells, `the fundamental battle' in any society is the contest over `the minds of the people', for the norms and values people hold determine the direction of development for their societies. Castells, Manuel (2007), p. 238 While coercion plays a role in shaping social order, political institutions based on repression alone are unviable in the long term. Ibid. Thus, Castell argues, the only sustainable means to power is to convince `the human mind' of one's ideas through `the processes of communication'. Ibid., p. 239

Alongside the theoretical innovations, the observable systemic changes in the last half a century make the study of ideas particularly relevant for our time. Proliferation of state and non-state actors in the international system, widening scope of diplomatic agenda and new communication technologies have brought about an unprecedented degree of competition in the diplomatic space. For an overview, see Islam, Tariqul (2005), pp. 62-68; Heine, Jorge (2006) A shift from `club' to `network diplomacy' is a useful way to conceptualise, first, the parallel empowerment of non-state actors and publics in the sphere of foreign policy and, second, the increasing efforts from state actors to communicate directly with these audiences. This idea belongs to Heine, Jorge (2006); see also Kennedy, Liam et al (2005) Taken together, the advent of network diplomacy and other changes in the information space, sometimes termed `the new media ecology', have facilitated the emergence of new actors and spaces for ideational competition as well as intensified the communication efforts of established actors. Castells, Manuel (2007), p. 239 How this development has the potential to impact international politics is discussed in the next section.

1.2 Changes in diplomatic and information space

Manuel Castells argues that the changing communications environment changes how politics works. Castells, Manuel (2009) It is not that media has become the power-holder, but that it is increasingly the `space' where power is legitimised or de-legitimised. Castells, Manuel (2007), p. 242 Linking this with Foucault's idea of `truth regimes', that is the mix of legitimate discourses in a given society, Jayson Harsin observers how the advent of mass self-communication, segmented audiences and targeted messaging can bring about profound `regimes-of-truth changes' in contemporary societies. Harsin, Jayson (2015), pp. 328-329, 332; the idea of mass self-communication belongs to Castells, Manuel (2007) Much recent scholarship explores the potential of social media platforms, big data and artificial intelligence in facilitating such changes. For example, see Agarwal, Nitin et al (2017); Meleshevich, Kirill (2018) and Vosoughi, Soroush et al (2018)

Although Nerijus Maliukevicius' claim that, in contemporary world, `power is transformed into communication structures' overlooks the importance of what is being communicated, it is widely recognised that the new media ecology introduces new risks and opportunities for actors in international politics. Maliukevicius, Nerijus (2007); Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 1

Practically speaking, this duality is illustrated, for example, by the data collection mechanisms used by social media platforms that enable both commercially motivated personalised advertising and politically motivated influence operations. Bertolin, Giorgio et al (2017), pp. 52-53 Similarly, while social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have recently been presented as particularly suitable for malicious influence campaigns, their design also allows for evaluating the authenticity of said content. Ibid., pp. 11-46; Pynnцniemi, Katri; Rбcz, Andrбs (2016), p. 15

The second effect worth noting is the increasing volume of `contributors and contributions' in the diplomatic and information space. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 168 This development is often considered as a challenge for governments and other public authorities, whose traditional primacy and control in these domains it erodes. Cornish, Paul et al (2011), p. 6

Importantly, it is not only the emergence of new actors but also the penetration of existing actors in new domains that contribute to the increasing congestion in the diplomatic and information space. Frost, Mervyn; Michelsen, Nicholas (2017), p. 11 As Nye notes, given the access to competing sources of news for anyone with an Internet connection, instead of information it is `public attention [that] has become a rare commodity.' Nye, Joseph (2008), p. 99

Thirdly, following from the previous observation, the new media ecology is seen to empower new actors, especially the publics, offering them new tools for accessing information and organised action. Castells, Manuel (2007), pp. 249-250 The importance of public opinion is also emphasised by Miskimmon et al who note how democratization of foreign policy making and the newly discovered importance of user generated media have brought `the people' into the international relations both as an actor and as a target audience. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), pp. 20, 28, 179

While the direct effect of courting foreign publics on policy decisions is difficult to observer at best, it is generally accepted that there are 'cumulative effects' as well as `critical junctures' when such influences can play a critical role. Ibid., p. 11 Major national elections or referenda are often mentioned as such examples.

Taken together, some consider these developments a concern for Western societies. For example, Lawrence Freeman argues that the effect of the new media ecology is geographically uneven and that the new tools are `a formidable weapon' specifically in the `more open societies of the West.' Freedman, Lawrence (2006), p. 76

While Western vulnerability remains debated, studies show that targeted online messaging can reinforce existing `information bubbles' in social media platforms and that they provide `ripe conditions' for influence campaigns. Bertolin, Giorgio et al (2017), p. 7 For Castells, the way in which the new media ecology facilitates the spread of rumours and unverified information can make `manipulating or fabricating information' appear increasingly attractive. Castells, Manuel (2007), p. 243 In the long term, he continues, the proliferation of such methods amongst political actors can seriously undermine the legitimacy of formal political systems in public eyes. Ibid., p. 244

As this section shows, the democratisation and fragmentation of the information space carries with it both opportunities and vulnerabilities for new and existing actors in international politics. Importantly for the discussion here, while initially these developments were regarded positively in the West, for example, as a means to bypass uncooperative governments and communicate with their publics directly, recently more reservation has emerged. Nye, Joseph (2008), pp. 97-99

First with reference to terrorism, radicalisation and violent extremism and later in connection to alleged Russian influence operations, the initial enthusiasm has transformed, at least in some European states, into calls for increased legislative and regulatory oversight. It is this discursive shift in general and the debate surrounding the `Russian disinformation threat' in the European Union in particular that serve as the focus of this study.

Bearing in mind these changes in the diplomatic and information space, the rest of the chapter presents three distinct theoretical approaches to study states' efforts to promote their ideas abroad in the changing international environment. The first one is through the Joseph Nye's concept of soft power. As will be illustrated, its suitability to study Russia's activities has been recently regarded with increasing scepticism amongst Western observers.

1.3 Soft power

Joseph Nye's concept of concept of `soft power' emphasising the importance of attraction rather than coercion in getting others to do what you want is seminal for any discussion on international ideational contestation. For the original book, see Nye, Joseph (2004) It is based on the assumption that exposure to one's ideas, values and norms, when these are considered attractive, affects the decision-making of other actors by shaping their underlying preferences. Nye, Joseph (2008), pp. 94-96 Even if a particular set of ideas is not accepted outright, they can `create a climate' in which certain ideas become easier to communicate later on. Lenczowski, John (2009), p. 24

Officially, Russia maintains that many of its activities, such as its state-supported network of non-governmental organisations, foreign language news outlets and cultural and public diplomacy initiatives, mirror the international practice of soft power. Dolinskiy, Alexey (2013)

However, at times, soft power has been framed negatively by Russian state officials. For example, in 2012 Vladimir Putin called some states' use of soft power an attempt to `conduct direct interference in the domestic policy of sovereign countries'. Putin, Vladimir (2012)

Amongst the Western expert community, it is widely maintained that the Russian application of soft power practises is carried out in a top-down, state-directed fashion and that the concept is understood in zero-sum terms. For example, see Maliukevicius, Nerijus (2007) A brief chronological survey illustrates this point.

Russian debate on soft power and public diplomacy was greatly affected by the so-called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003-2005. For a more detailed discussion on these events and their consequences, see Wilson, Jeanne (2009) and (2010)

The regime's response to these events was to better insulate Russia's domestic population from foreign ideas while better communicating `Russian ideas', however defined, to foreign publics. Popescu, Nicu (2006); Wilson, Jeanne (2010), p. 29; Boyko, S. et al (2010) Russia's stance evolved further following the war with Georgia in 2008, which Russia perceives it `lost' in the information sphere, and the popular demonstrations surrounding the re-election of Vladimir Putin in 2012. Rukavishnikov, Vladimir (2011); Lukyanov, Fyodor (2013); Simons, Greg (2014); Giles, Keir (2016b) For example, after 2012, the focus of Russian international broadcasting shifted from promoting positive messages about Russia to discrediting other, namely Western, states. Rawnsley, Gary (2015), p. 282

This realignment was accompanied by significant additional investment to foreign language news outlets such as RT (Russia Today). The Guardian (2009); Rawnsley, Gary (2015), p. 278 The most recent turning point in the debate regarding Russian soft power came in 2014. The conflicting interpretations promoted by Russian and European governments regarding the conflict in Ukraine and the simultaneous deterioration of relations attracted unprecedented attention to Russia's information activities in the Western policy and expert communities.

Whatever the political long-term consequences of the Ukrainian conflict, in the information sphere, 2014 is a turning point in Europe. In fact, it appears that since then the attitudes in some European states have shifted towards a more zero-sum interpretation of the information space.

Specifically, Russia's public diplomacy and soft power activities, such as international broadcasting and nominally non-governmental organisations, are increasingly interpreted as instruments of hostile influence operations by European practitioners. The idea is shared by European and Russian practitioners, Dolinskiy, Alexey (2015); Khlebnikov, Alexey (2016) According to one Russian observer speaking in 2015, it is `ridiculous' to even discuss the prospects of Russian soft power in Europe in the post-Maidan environment. Bai, Eugene (2015) It is within the context of this broader discursive shift that also the idea of `Russian disinformation threat' has emerged. For understanding these developments, the concept of `information warfare' has recently gained more attraction.

1.4 Information warfare

Given the negative and zero-sum interpretation of soft power in the Russian discourse and the post 2014 political tensions, some Western scholars prefer using entirely different terminology to describe Russia's attempts to project ideas outside its borders. They also argue that unlike `soft power', which is a term borrowed from the West, concepts such as `information warfare' and `disinformation' have long existed in the Russian political and academic discourse and practice. Some maintain that the word `disinformation' derives from the Russian `dezinformatsiya', originally introduced by Soviet secret services. In its original usage, it meant `the use of false or otherwise misleading information that is purposely provided to selected audiences to influence their behaviour.' Bertolin, Giorgio et al (2017), p. 5

While there are some shared premises across the Russian and Western literature on information warfare, Russian articulations appear generally more negative. Giles, Keir (2016b), p. 17; Thomas Timothy (2015a), p. 16; Chekinov, S.G. (2010), p. 50 In fact, the sense of threat is prevalent across the Russian specialized literature.

The permanent `information-psychological confrontation' is seen, amongst other things, to threaten `traditional moral values', create `a lack of spirituality' and cultivate `a negative attitude towards one's cultural legacy'. Thomas Timothy (2015a), pp. 16-17 Alternatively, the emphasis is placed on the alarming gap between the public and regime perceptions.

For example, foreign `information operations' are perceived as threats because they `misinform the population about the work of state organs' or `provok social, political, national, and religious conflicts'. Ibid.

Secondly, whereas Western usage of the term `information warfare' is traditionally situated solely within the discourse of war and conflict, in the Russian view `information warfare' is a permanent and normal feature of international politics. Giles, Keir (2016b), p. 4

According to this interpretation, information warfare is `a regular feature of the country's news coverage' and, in fact, Russia is already `in a state of war'. Ibid., pp. 4, 11 Whether these conceptual differences between Russian and Western understandings of information warfare constitute a distinguishable Russian information warfare doctrine remains contested. For the rise and fall of the so-called `Gerasimov doctrine', see Galeotti, Mark (2013); McDermott, Roger (2016); Bartles, Charles (2016); Mckew, Molly (2017) and Galeotti, Mark (2018)

For the discussion here, it suffices to conclude that both Russian and Western scholarship agree on the growing relevance of using `information weapons' and targeting the general publics as a part of the 21^st century confrontations. Supremacy in the kinetic realm alone is not sufficient for achieving military or political objectives.

Perhaps inspired by the idea of an ongoing confrontation, Russian literature on information warfare emphasises the need for `information defence'. Fridman, Ofer (2017), pp. 63, 74-75 If judged by the regime's domestic efforts to insulate the Russian public from foreign ideas, it appears this concept also affects the state policy. For examples of Russia's policy measures bolstering `information defence', see Fridman, Ofer (2017), pp. 79-80 On the international level, this is visible in Russia's efforts to promote a global treaty on `information sovereignty'. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2011)

Amongst other things, the Russian-made Convention from 2011 prohibits `psychological campaigns carried out against the population' and `manipulation of information flows… to adversely affect the psychological or spiritual state of society'. Ibid.

The need for societal resilience, or information defence in Russian parlance, in the conditions of permanent conflict is also recognised in the Western concept of `hybrid war'. Other suggested terms include `multi-modal' and `non-linear' warfare, see Rogers, James et al (2015); Thomas, Timothy (2015b) and Pynnцniemi, Katri et al (2016)

The recent popular usage notwithstanding, many scholars discredit the concept for its ambiguity, overlap with other more precise terminology and lack of novelty as a military-political phenomenon. Renz, Bettina; Smith, Hanna (2016), pp. 1, 5, 11; Cullen, Patrick; Reichborn-Kjennerud, Erik (2017), p. 3 Despite these criticisms, however, the term has entered both NATO and EU discourse with Finland establishing the world's first `hybrid ambassador' post in spring 2018. Bachmann, Sascha Dov; Gunneriusson, Hеkan (2015); NATO (2014); Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE (2018)

As these examples show, the idea of `information defence' has gradually gained more prominence in the Western policy and expert communities in recent years. In fact, as the Russian disinformation threat- narrative has become more widely accepted in Europe, some European articulations regarding the disinformation threat have begun to correspond closely with the prohibited actions listed in the Russian 2011 Convention.

Simply put, some European practitioners have begun to express similar fears today that Russia wanted to codify in an international treaty in 2011. The broader question that derives from these developments is whether soft power and public diplomacy practices will become perceived as `weaponised' more generally or if they continue to possess their originally benign character.

More specifically for this paper, it must be noted that also the `Russian disinformation threat' can be understood in two very different ways, either as a part of a permanent `hybrid war' or as a time-bound military operation. In terms of policy implications, these two interpretations lead to drastically different conclusions and ultimately, for the European Union institutions, represent a choice between two competing narratives. This narrative contestation regarding the Russian disinformation threat and the appropriate EU response is the focus of this study.

The final section introduces the ideas of `strategic communications' and `strategic narratives' as the most recent analytical approaches to study Russia's or other actors' attempts to promote ideas. As will be argued, their focus on contesting narratives makes them suitable also for the present study, which focuses on the European Union's internal policy debate regarding Russian disinformation threat.

1.5 Strategic communications

The novelty in the concept of `strategic communications' is in that unlike the earlier literature studying narratives in the context of international norms and social movements, the more recent work emphasises their use for `malicious' political purposes by, including, state actors. Benford, Robert; Snow, David (2000); Betz, David; Phillips, Vaughan (2017), p. 49

In practice, this shows in the growing popularity of the idea of `strategic communications' or `StratCom' within the military and security policy communities in the 2000s. Freedman, Lawrence (2006), pp. 11-26, 73-93; for an overview of the debate on `StratCom' terminology across the 2000's, see Cornish, Paul et al (2011) and Mullen, Michael (2009). In practice, NATO created a StratCom cell in its European headquarters in Brussels in 2007. Later in 2014, a dedicated NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence was opened in Riga. For a discussion on these developments, see Laity, Mark (2015), pp. 22-23 As explained in more detail in the next chapter dedicated to theoretical and methodological framework, Miskimmon et al take the idea still further and develop the concept of `strategic narratives' in 2013.

What `strategic communications' entail exactly remains debated. For Paul Cornish, it implies `communication through words and deeds in pursuit of national strategic objectives' for the desired `behavioural or social change'. Cornish, Paul et al (2011), p. 4 Similarly, Kirk Hallahan et all call it `purposeful use of communication' to achieve particular objective. Hallahan, Kirk et al (2007)

On the other hand, Mervyn Frost and Nicholas Michelsen oppose the concept's reduction to a `form of discursive coercion… [where] success is simply a matter of narrative construction'. Frost, Mervyn; Michelsen, Nicholas (2017), pp. 11, 16 For them, the strategic communicators cannot escape the `ethical criteria' imbedded in the international system. Ibid., pp. 20, 27

Thus, they describe strategic communications as an exercise of `dialogue', in which different sides `appeal to mutually acknowledged rhetorical grounds for legitimacy'. Frost, Mervyn; Michelsen, Nicholas (2017), pp. 20, 27 Ethical constrains notwithstanding, this observation does not challenge the idea of purposeful narrative creation and promotion, which is the core characteristic across the different definitions. For Miskimmon et al, this is the main premise of `strategic narratives'.

In political science, the concept of strategic communications is commonly used in connection with situations of war or conflict. Betz, David; Phillips, Vaughan (2017), pp. 43, 46 Studying competing narratives, however, does not need to imply physical violence or kinetic action. As Janice Mattern argues, political competition and contest for power takes place also on `the level of subjectivity and reality production'. Mattern, Janice (2005), p. 583

Given the increasing tendency, in Europe, to perceive Russia's attempts to promote its ideas as a part of an ongoing information war or a hostile strategic communications campaign rather than as an exercise of soft power, this observation is particularly pertinent.

Accordingly, the new risks and opportunities facilitated by the changes in the diplomatic and information space on the one hand and the discursive shift towards greater securitisation of the European information space due to recent political tensions on the other provide the setting for this study. Building on these ideas, this paper's contribution to the European debate on Russian disinformation threat is explained in the concluding section.

Conclusions for 1 chapter

As this chapter illustrates, ideas from International Relations, communications, psychology, history and war studies literature are applied to make sense of and engage in the debate on Russian disinformation. Moreover, both rational and post-structural, as well as qualitative and quantitative approaches can be found in the literature. While this presents the reader with a delightful range of material to explore, it makes it more difficult to link one's work to the overall debate in a constructive manner.

From the author's survey of the existing literature on Russian disinformation, it appears many efforts are dedicated to studying either the substantive content or the projection mechanisms of Russia's narratives. For example, see Nimmo, Ben (2016); Giles, Keir (2016c); Rogers, James and Tyushka, Andriy (2017); Kivimдki, Veli-Pekka (2017); Sanovich, Sergey (2017) There appears to be also plenty of scholarship on how these narratives penetrate different communities and how they are used as a part of a specific political, military or hybrid undertaking. For example, see Lange-Ionatamiрvili, Elоna et al (2018); Azhar, Unwala and Shaheen, Ghori (2015); Darczewska, Jolanta (2014); Gyхri, Lуrбnt et al (2017); Applebaum, Anne et al (2017); Pynnцniemi, Katri and Rбcz, Andrбs (2016) and Polyakova, Alina et al (2016) As far as the author is aware, two studies look at the Western institutional responses to the alleged Russian disinformation threat. These are Margriet, Drent et al (2015) and Missiroli, Antonio et al (2016)

However, neither examine the process through which the threat narrative becomes accepted as a legitimate basis for policy making in the first place, what other narratives are subdued and how the narrative contestation takes place. With the focus on the European Union institutions, these are the aims and the contribution to the existing literature of the present study.

In order to complete this task, the paper grounds itself primarily on the recent work on strategic narratives by Miskimmon et al. In other words, the European Union debate regarding Russian disinformation threat is interpreted as a strategic narrative contest. This theoretical and methodological choice and its implications and limitations are explained in more detail in the following chapter.

Finally, it is not the aim of the paper to discuss what Russia does. Instead, the key research question is to understand what European Union institutions believe Russia does, how these perceptions affect EU policy-making and how they are contested. To reiterate, this study does not accept the Russian disinformation threat- narrative as its premise. Instead, it is this very narrative, how it is legitimised and contested, that the study attempts to understand.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part justifies the chosen theoretical approach and presents in more detail the concept of `strategic narrative' distinguishing it from closely related concepts such as `discourse' and `framing'. The second part explains the methodology of the paper by identifying four ideal narrative types and some criteria for assessing narrative performance. The final section introduces the sources and the logic and limitations behind source selection. Before proceeding, however, possible alternative approaches are discussed. While there are several lessons that can be drawn from soft power, information warfare and communications literature for the present discussion, due to the specific research questions motivating the study, none of these will form its theoretical grounding.

Joseph Nye's concept is valuable because it maintains that one way to increase actor's soft power is to present attractive ideas which, in the best-case scenario, will make other actors align their behaviour accordingly. Following this logic, it is rational for all actors to engage in creating and promoting their respective ideas as well as in insulating their populations from `foreign' concepts. For understanding the dynamics of ideational competition in international politics, however, the theory of soft power has surprisingly little to say. Given its widely recognised lack of explanatory power when it comes to studying the `battle of narratives', many have discarded the idea of soft power altogether while others work to improve the concept. For example, see Dale et all (2012); Mattern, Janice (2005) and Solomon, Ty (2014). As Todd Hall notes, if `actors support an attractive foreign policy, the attractiveness of which is defined by the degree to which other actors support it Nye's hypothesis becomes unfalsifiable', see Hall, Todd (2010), p. 204

Although reducing soft power to a `catch-all term that has lost explanatory power' might take things too far, soft power literature generally focuses on studying soft power `assets or capabilities' rather than the promotion and reception of ideas or how they translate into influence. Roselle, Laura et al (2014), p. 70 Also some practitioners have discovered the difficulty of using soft power for strategic purposes. For example, a UK House of Lords report from 2014 concludes that states can `neither direct soft power generation nor treat soft power as a lever that they can pull when desired.' House of Lords (2014), p. 49 Given the concept's limitations, recognised by both academics and practitioners, studying how the competing narratives affect EU policies in the context of the debate on Russian disinformation threat clearly requires a different theoretical approach.

Regarding information and hybrid warfare, both approaches emphasise the ongoing ideational contest in the information space - a premise, which is shared by recent strategic communications and strategic narrative literature. Despite this however, neither seem appropriate in the context of an internal, peace-time policy debate in the European Union. While studying the diverging Russian and Western interpretations of `information warfare' is a valuable undertaking and crucial for sound policies in this area, the focus here is the internal narrative contestation within and between the European Union institutions. For exemplary work on this, see Fridman, Ofer (2017) In other words, the question of this paper is not how or if Russia or the European Union wage information war against each other. Instead, the question is whether the EU has come to believe it is being threatened by such action from Russia, how this belief guides policy decisions and how it is contested.

Finally, in terms of Manuel Castells' contributions, his arguments emphasising the role of ideas and communication in the process of claiming and exercising political power in domestic and international politics are endorsed by this study. From Castells' standpoint, an especially relevant question for the debate on disinformation could be how the new media ecology affects the formation, projection and reception of narratives. Given that the focus of this study is the narrative promotion of national governments and European institutions vis-а-vis each other, however, the role of user-generated content, targeted online messaging or increasing plurality in the media space is not considered relevant for the subsequent discussion. To reiterate, the new risks and opportunities facilitated by the changes in the diplomatic and information space identified in the previous chapter are not at the centre of the following discussion. Rather, they are understood as the necessary context in order to better understand the prevailing sense of threat that appears to drive the European debate on Russian disinformation.

2.1 Strategic narratives

It is hoped that the previous observations regarding the suitability of certain theoretical approaches help explain why they are discarded and instead the concept of `strategic narratives' is chosen. Yet, what is understood by `narrative', what makes it `strategic' and how this concept relates to other closely connected ideas such as `discourse' and `framing' require clarifying.

Definitions of `narrative' vary, but there are some common characteristics amongst those being used to study the use of political, or strategic, narratives. The first one is the idea that narratives are constructed with a certain purpose in mind. Freedman, Lawrence (2006), p. 22 In simple terms, such a narrative `aligns the [political actor's] strategy and the narrative so that they become mutually supportive' and cause desired behavioural changes. Laity, Mark (2015), p. 24 In Miranda Holmstrцm's words, a narrative `is a framework of creating or reinforcing opinions and transforming them into action'. Holmstrцm, Miranda (2015), p. 123

For her, no piece of information has an `intrinsic value' on its own, but this value is created when it is placed in a broader system of meanings, in other words, when it becomes narrativised. Ibid. In the subsequent discussion, multiple examples of such behaviour can be identified.

Miskimmon et al elaborate the idea of `strategy' further by adding that in order for a narrative to be strategic, it needs to present `a meaning of the past, present and future'. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 2 This idea is similar to the concept of `master discourse' which, according to Vivien Schmidt, articulates `where the polity is, where it is going, and where it ought to go' in a form of a political program. Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 311

However, in Schmidt's work the narrative or discourse space is confined to a single polity and her focus is on the vertical influence processes between actors at different levels of the same unit. In contrast, Miskimmon et al understand international politics as a `struggle to determine which narratives actors experience events through', thus emphasising the horizontal narrative contestation across different units. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), pp. 8, 109 The fact that the concept of `strategic narrative' appears to be primarily designed for studying narrative promotion internationally, which is the focus of this paper, reinforces its validity for the present study.

A second important element in defining `narrative' is the acknowledgement that they are socially constructed through agents' interactions. Ibid. The emphasis on agency is again supported in Vivien Schmidt's work on `discursive institutionalism', which maintains that institutional or structural change is best explained through `constructive discourse about ideas'. Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 316 In fact, her claim that action in institutions is not `a product of rationally calculated, path-dependent, or norm-appropriate rule-following' but instead should be perceived as `a process in which agents create and maintain institutions' Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 314 echoes what Miskimmon et al label `agential constructivism'. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), pp. 8, 109 Importantly for the subsequent discussion, accepting the premise that narratives and discourses are socially constructed means that they must be recognised as unstable and subject to continuous challenge. Ibid., pp. 14-16 As will be shown, this is the case with the Russian disinformation threat- narrative.

Thirdly, narratives can concern either specific issues in a given international system or the nature of that system itself, thus possessing both `behavioural' and `constitutive' power. Ibid., pp. 16-17 While actors use narratives purposefully and construct them selectively from the vast repertoire at their disposal, they nevertheless operate within the constraints of the currently dominant narratives. Ibid., pp. 2-8, 13 Thus, strategic narratives, like institutions in discursive institutionalism, can be treated either as `given' or as `contingent'. Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 314

Put differently, depending on the scholar's perspective, narratives can be studied as structures, `structuring the range of thoughts and actions', or as `tools of agency' that are used instrumentally for political gain in a given structure. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), pp. 14-16 Similarly, both rationalist and post-structuralist approaches are possible. Studies employing the concept of `discourse' as their primary structuring device tend to prefer the latter. This concept as well as `framing' are discussed below.

In Vivien Schmidt's words, ideas make up the `substantive content' of discourse and discourse itself `is the interactive process of conveying [these] ideas'. Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 303 Put more precisely, in the words of Parker and Milliken, discourses are particular `systems of statements' or meanings that are found in text, constitute objects and form particular `representations' of the world and social reality. Parker, Ian (1992); Milliken, Jennifer (1999), p. 229 The emphasis on the plural form in this definition is intentional. For in any given moment, there are multiple meanings that can be attached to a particular object as well as different ways of constructing an object from the available `cultural raw material and linguistic resources'. Milliken, Jennifer (1999), p. 239 Thus, although discourses determine what is possible and impossible endorsing a particular `regime of truth' and excluding others, these discursive boundaries are not fixed nor immune to agents' interaction. Ibid.; Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 16

It is this very instability that Miskimmon et al's concept of `strategic narratives' builds on. Parker, Ian (1992) While acknowledging the usefulness of the concept of `discourse' in describing the divergence in subjects' articulations of social reality, the idea of `strategic narrative' emphasises the `causal transformation that takes actors from one status quo to another' that discourses lack. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 7. However, although their argument is adopted as a basis for this paper, some scholars seem to use `discourse' very similarly to `strategic narrative', for example, Schmidt, Vivien (2008), p. 312 In other words, for Miskimmon et al, discourses are the `raw materials of communication' that actors `plot into narratives'. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 7 This approach emphasises the agency and political motivations behind the adoption and promotion of any particular discourse, thus justifying the differentiation between the two concepts.

Given the proximity of the concept of `framing', its relation to `discourse' and `narrative' requires clarifying. Framing, understood as selecting `some aspects of a perceived reality in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, evaluation and treatment recommendation', is a common practice in discourse and narrative formation. Entman, Robert M. (1993), p. 52 The act of framing, just as endorsing certain discourses and narratives over others, is inherently linked with political power. Ibid., pp. 54-55 However, for Miskimmon et al, frames `lack the temporal and causal features narratives possess'. Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 7 If a particular set of frames is employed in a particular logic consistently and across different contexts to promote particular political objectives, then the overall construct qualifies as a strategic narrative. As the subsequent discussion shows, the Russian disinformation threat- narrative fulfils these criteria.

To conclude, the central `strategic narrative' for this study is called the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. In short, this narrative holds that certain events and activities constitute `Russian disinformation' and that this object is a threat to the European Union, its Member states and its citizens. It is a `strategic' construct for it does not only suggest how certain events should be interpreted through specific frames, but also what course of action is needed to respond to the threat that it creates. It is also socially constructed and subject to continuous challenge and re-articulation by different actors. In this study, the Russian disinformation threat- narrative is understood as a `tool of agency' for its logic is meaningful only in the given European institutional context and established inter-state relations and it does not offer a new interpretation of the European state system. As such, it represents an `issue' rather than `system' or `identity' narrative. This three-tier categorisation belongs to Miskimmon, Alister et al (2013), p. 7; the Russian disinformation threat- narrative could be interpreted as an identity narrative if it is discussed in the context of the debate on European Union's identity as a security actor, for example, see Zwolski, Kamil (2012). However, in this paper the focus is on the debate on whether `Russian disinformation' as an object exists in the first place.