The Russian disinformation threat and the EU response: the debate

Despite little support to the alternative narrative in the European Parliament, these ideas are endorsed by some external actors in their reactions once the resolution is adopted. For example, the European and International Federations of Journalists lament the adoption of the resolution for its `lack of clarity' with definitions and for setting a `dangerous precedent'. Gutiйrrez, Ricardo (2016); International Federation of Journalists (2016) Similarly for the Russian state, the resolution is a proof of European double-standards and the Russian journalists' successes in exposing topics that the Western media overlooks. The Moscow Times (2016a); on 1 December, Vladimir Putin notes how Russia was `always reproached for supposedly imposing censorship… but now we see that others are taking this road themselves', Putin, Vladimir (2016) These ideas are also present in RT's English-language reporting, with the interviewed Greek, French, Spanish and British MEPs, who voted against the resolution, accusing it of `subjectivity', `illegitimacy' and `hysteria against Russia'. RT (2016)

While the `Anti-EU Propaganda' resolution is debated in the European Parliament, the Member States have the Russian disinformation threat on the European Council agenda on 21 October. Despite the Czech government making headlines on the same day, accusing Russia of conducting `an information war' on Czech soil, the EU heads of state merely decide to reaffirm their earlier agreement on Russian disinformation threat without initiating new actions. For the Czech statement, see The Guardian (2016a)

In the statement from the president of the European Council, `disinformation campaigns' are mentioned as one element that make up `Russia's strategy to weaken the EU'. European Council (2016a) In response, the Member States agree to `stay the course… and keep the unity of the EU'. Ibid.

For the actors demanding a stronger response, `staying the course' and the fact that Russian disinformation is mentioned in a separate statement rather than endorsed in the actual Council conclusions represent a failure in the narrative promotion. The publicly available Council conclusions only mention that `the European Council held a strategic policy debate on relations with Russia', disinformation is not mentioned, see European Council (2016b)

In light of the conservative European Council position in October and the controversial Parliament resolution in November, the debate regarding the Russian disinformation threat is intensified by the introduction of new stakeholders and new terminology still before the end of the year. On 8 and 12 December, the German, British and Swedish intelligence agencies issue warnings regarding, respectively, hostile `propaganda and disinformation', `propaganda and subversion' and `influence operations' targeting European states. For German, see Reuters (2016), British, see The Guardian (2016b) and Swedish, see The Local (2016) The Swedes and Germans name Russia specifically as the source of these activities whereas in the UK, according to British observers, the speech leaves `no doubt that [Russia] was the target of [the] remarks'. The Guardian (2016b)

Moreover, the British and German statements are made on the same day that RT announces that it has received additional state-funding worth 1.22 billion roubles to start a French channel. Moscow Times (2016b) This could suggest alignment in terms of these actors' threat perceptions as well as coordination regarding public messaging on the issue. In either case, as a new group of actors whose statements either partly or fully endorse the Russian disinformation threat- narrative, these developments can be interpreted as a success for the narrative promotion.

Finally, with regards to new terminology, in an interview to a German newspaper on 18 December, the European Parliament president Martin Schulz from the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament calls for a `European solution' against the `harmful spread of fake news'. Schulz, Martin (2016) As far as the author is concerned, this is the first time a top-level EU politician introduces the term `fake news' in the debate and calls for a Union response. As it becomes clear in 2017, the idea of unattributed and possibly unintentional `fake news' represents a challenge to the legitimacy of the original Russian disinformation threat- narrative.

Analysis of 2016. The texts from 2016 reveal actions taken by the EU bodies that can be interpreted as being aligned with and promoting the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. These include the April Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats and the June Global Strategy, which both explicitly recognise third-party `disinformation' as a threat to the Union and commit to investing more in the Union response.

However, neither document mentions Russia by name. Thus, an even stronger endorsement of the original narrative comes from the European Parliament in its November resolution as well as from one of its political parties in a form of a dedicated conference in June. Despite the diversity of terminology in the Parliament resolution, in both cases, the Russian disinformation threat- narrative is fully endorsed including the emphasis on hostile political intentions, strategic use of false information, Russia's responsibility and a demand for a stronger EU response.

Unlike in 2015, however, it appears there are also actions taken by EU bodies, or their parts, that seem to discredit the original narrative. Notably, an alternative framing of events is visible in the debate surrounding the Parliament resolution. In total, the draft text from the Foreign Affairs Committee attracts some 70 amendments partly or fully contesting the Russian disinformation threat- narrative offering sometimes fundamentally incompatible interpretations of affairs. The fact that several MEPs, including from Greece, France, Spain and United Kingdom, speak publicly against the resolution is notable given that until this point the European Council has agreed on its positions unanimously.

Together, these public statements, the high number of abstentions and votes against the resolution during the Parliament debate and the critical reactions by some external actors, such as the European Federation of Journalists, represent a previously unarticulated public challenge to the original narrative. This rhetorical challenge notwithstanding, none of the alternative framings appears to be publicly endorsed by a Union institution or a Member State.

Thus, despite being openly challenged, the lack of credible alternatives ensures that the Russian disinformation threat- narrative remains generally accepted across the European Union institutions also in 2016.

Analysing the voting patterns of the November Parliament resolution shows that national rather than European party lines mattered in the final vote, especially so in Italy, France, Greece, and Central and Eastern Europe. The strongest support to the resolution came from MEPs from Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, see Votewatch (2016) and Gotev, Georgi (2016) For example, Eastern European MEPs from national parties known for being critical towards the EU were in favour of the EU action to counter anti-EU propaganda whereas southern MEPs from pro-European national parties were less likely to support a coordinated European action. Votewatch (2016) Generally speaking, the southern Member States rejected the resolution or abstained in large numbers whereas Eastern and Central European MEPs voted in favour. Only 3 out of 68 French MEPs and 8 out of 69 Italian MEPs supported the resolution, see Gotev, Georgi (2016)

With overwhelming support from MEPs from the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia, and majorities from Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, the resolution passes with 304 votes in favour, 179 against and 208 MEPs abstaining. European Parliament (2016c) The large number of abstaining MEPs and geographically concentrated support, or lack of, to the resolution suggest that although the Russian disinformation threat- narrative now resonates with more than the initial four Member States who introduce it in January 2015, its pan-European support remains limited.

Most importantly for the developments in 2017, the idea of focusing EU efforts to tackle unattributed `fake news' instead of `Russian disinformation' is first articulated in December 2016.

From textual analysis alone, it is impossible to conclude whether this is intended as a challenge to the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. It is possible that the term `fake news' is merely borrowed from the debate taking place at the same time in the United States, where the November presidential elections bring it into public consciousness, and that it is originally meant to be used alongside and support the narrative emphasising `disinformation'. Whatever the intentions, in practice, the idea of tackling unattributed `fake news' rather than `Russian disinformation' gains prominence in the EU institutions in 2017.

In terms of institutionalisation of the EU response, 2016 brings no visible developments. The fact that the European Council conclusions from October merely agree on the status quo could suggest that there is no further institutionalisation of the EU response.

While there is no evidence suggesting that the power, independence or specialization and routinization of the EU's Task Force is decreased in 2016, maintaining the current situation where the Task Force remains underfunded and understaffed in comparison with its objectives can be considered a failure for the original narrative. Furthermore, in contrast to the European Council conclusions in 2015 when the Council dedicated a paragraph to address the Russian disinformation threat and instructed the Commission to act, in October 2016 the issue is brought up in a separate statement and without public commitment to further action.

With regards to the coherence and fidelity of the narrative in 2016, although the number of actors endorsing the narrative increases, they continue to articulate the threat in somewhat different ways. For example, in addition to the already familiar terms `misinformation', `disinformation' and `propaganda', other articulations such as `information campaigns', `subversion', `influence operations' and `hostile strategic communications' are introduced in 2016.

While, for the actors promoting the original narrative, such diversity is perhaps intentional to illustrate the complexity of the threat and could allow adapting the message to different audiences, in other instances they seem to be used simply interchangeably.

On the other hand, it could signal that despite the term `disinformation' already being endorsed by European Council, different preferences remain amongst the actors promoting the narrative.

In terms of mimicking action between EU and NATO in 2016, there are some instances that could suggest such behaviour. The discussion on `hybrid threats' across the different Union institutions in 2016 resembles the debate that has taken place in NATO for at least since 2014.

More directly connected with Russian disinformation threat, the European Parliament resolution on `Anti-EU Propaganda by Third Parties' adopted in November 2016 bears many similarities in terms of content, style and supporting states with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly sub-committee report adopted in October 2015.

In conclusion, while the idea of the Russian disinformation threat is further legitimised across the EU institutions in 2016, it is not consistently attributed to Russia and the scope of EU's response does not grow to match the initial calls put forward in January 2015.

Furthermore, increasing engagement from the European Parliament as well as other actors, although raising awareness of the issue, also introduces more diversity to the debate. In terms of narrative contestation, the year starts and finishes with a reaffirmation of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative by the EU institutions and Member States. Yet, the part of the consensus regarding the severity of the threat and the appropriate response remains short from the original demands put forward in 2015.

Like in 2015, it appears also in 2016 most Member States seem uncomfortable with EU taking bolder action to tackle Russian disinformation, but that they accept that the concerned countries can do more individually or use the European Parliament's non-binding instruments, not requiring unanimity, to further their agenda.

Thus, alongside the official picture of European unity promoted by the European Council, the debate on appropriate terminology, whether to call out Russia or not, and the appropriate Union-level response continues.

3.3 Developments in 2017

The texts endorsing the Russian disinformation threat- narrative in 2017 in the European Union institutions include the January and November European Council decisions to grant the East Stratcom Task Force additional funding, the November European Council conclusions and two European People's Party (EPP) resolutions from 30 March and 27 September.

To illustrate the growing legitimacy of the alternative narrative focusing on unattributed `fake news' instead of `Russian disinformation', the following texts are included; from the European Commission, the 27 January Security Commissioner speech, 5 April Commission Vice President speech, 28 September Justice Commissioner speech, 3 October EU High Representative speech and the statements made on 13 November by several Commissioners.

To demonstrate how the ideas articulated in these speeches guide the Commission's policy-making, material from the 16 May Juncker mission letter to the new Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society, 24 October European Commission work programme for 2018, Commission website launched in October and public consultation on `Fake News and Disinformation' launched on 13 November are used. From the European Parliament, two press releases from the Socialists and Democrats parliamentary group from 5 April and 6 September and two policy papers from EPP and ALDE from 5 and 6 December, all four addressing the issue of `fake news', are included.

Finally, the continuous efforts of some actors to promote the Russian disinformation threat- narrative and the debate surrounding the appropriate Union response are visible in many texts in 2017. To illustrate this, two European Parliamentary Research Service briefings from April and November, the 25 May Commission Communication on `Online Platforms' and the related 15 June European Parliament resolution, the European Commission Code of Conduct on `Countering Illegal Online Hate Speech' and 11 statements from different Member States are included.

The legitimacy of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative is demonstrated early in the year on 23 January when the European Council agrees to grant 800 000 euros of additional funding to the EU East Stratcom Task Force for the first six months of 2017 due to the upcoming Dutch, French and German national elections. The Guardian (2017a); Financial Times (2017) This threat perception fully endorses the original narrative. Accordingly, for the Latvian ambassador to the European Union, the European Council decision represents a turning point as it shows how the other Member States have finally come to believe that they `encounter same kind of influences that we are used to.' The Guardian (2017a) Despite the additional funding, however, it must be noted that it is intended as a one-off gesture and comes through reshuffling existing funds in the EEAS. In fact, the proposal from the European Parliament to secure long-term funding for the Task Force from the EU budget is not accepted by the Member States and this outcome represents a compromise between the different sides. The Guardian (2017b)

The idea of 2017 being a pivotal year for the European Union is also endorsed by the European Commission. For example, referring to the many upcoming national elections in different EU Member States in a speech on European security on 27 January, the EU's Security Commissioner draws attention to the `new-found capacity for cyber to manipulate democratic processes' by both `state and non-state actors'. European Commission (2017a) Although he does not mention Russia or disinformation specifically, the Commissioner uses the collapse of government websites during the bronze soldier incident in Estonia in 2007 and the closure of Ukraine's power grid in 2016 as examples of how cyber threats can disrupt European societies also beyond elections. Ibid. In both cases, the fact that Russia or at least Russian operators are commonly understood as being behind these incidents could suggest that these examples were intentionally chosen and thus partly endorse the Russian disinformation threat- narrative.

The Commission's ambiguity notwithstanding, other actors continue promote openly the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. For example, the EPP, the largest European Parliament faction, adopts a resolution on 30 March titled as `Russian Disinformation Undermining Western Democracy', which describes Russian disinformation as `an unprecedented threat' and `undeclared war against the liberal values'. European People's Party (2017a), p. 1 The text also calls for the East Stratcom Task Force `to be greatly enhanced in terms of increased funding and personnel', for `the creation of a coordination unit within EU institutions' and for `an EU- and EaP-wide Russian-language TV channel'. Ibid., p. 2

In a similar vein, despite its title 'Fake News and the EU's Response', the April European Parliamentary Research Service briefing defines `intentional fake news' as `disinformation', names Russia as a source of the threat and presents the 2016 Parliament resolution as an example of EU response. European Parliamentary Research Service (2017a) Interestingly, although the 2016 Parliament resolution specifically names Russia and Daesh as the two `third parties' threatening the EU due to their `anti-EU propaganda', only Russia is mentioned by name in the April 2017 parliamentary briefing.

In other contexts over the spring, however, the idea of unattributed `fake news' gains more attention than the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. In a speech to the European Parliament on 5 April titled as `Hate Speech, Populism, Fake News and the EU Response', the European Commission Vice President does not mention disinformation nor Russia but instead focuses on `fake news' and calls for continuing `the discussions on this problem… to better understand and identify possible policy responses'. European Commission (2017b) In the same speech, the Commission Vice President also maintains that `we have to believe in the common sense of our people.' Ibid. The call for further discussion is interesting given that by this stage the European expert community, including the EU's own Task Force, has developed a significant body of knowledge on the issue.

The notion of `common sense' on the other hand could interpreted as reluctance to take action against the phenomenon. On the same day, an S&D press release titled as `EU Must Get Tough on Fake News' similarly emphasises the threat of `the dangerous tide of fake news' and even `propaganda' but does not mention Russia nor disinformation. Socialists & Democrats (2017a) Instead of trusting the common sense of European citizens, however, the S&D parliamentary group calls for the Commission to `explore the available legal options to challenge illegal content online.' Ibid.

The idea of tackling the threat posed by disinformation and fake news through legislative response has by this stage gained momentum in some Member States, most notably in Germany. By May, it becomes clear it is also present in the European Commission's considerations.

The 16 May Juncker mission letter to the new Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society includes the following paragraph: `Commission needs to look into the challenges the online platforms create for our democracies as regards the spreading of fake information and initiate a reflection on what would be needed at EU level to protect our citizens.' Juncker, Jean-Claude (2017), p. 5 The same idea is included in the European Parliament resolution on `Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market' adopted on 15 June, which calls for Union action against `fake news' and for exploring the options for `legislative intervention'. European Parliament (2017) It is noticeable that the earlier Commission Communication on the same topic does not include any of this terminology. European Commission (2017c)

Furthermore, on 28 September, the EU Justice Commissioner publicly resists calls for EU-wide legislation on fake news following the British, French and German examples and instead defends the voluntary Code of Conduct drawn up by the Commission in 2016 and describing it as a `necessary and proportionate reaction'. European Commission (2017d) It is important to note that the 2016 Code of Conduct was initially not connected to the debate on disinformation or fake news whatsoever but was designed for `combating anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim hatred in Europe' by tackling `illegal online hate speech'. European Commission (2016b) Promoting an existing instrument, even when it was developed for a different purpose, rather than accepting the need for new measures could be interpreted as an endorsement of the third narrative type.

In contrast to the situation in autumn 2016, by September 2017 the party positions in the European Parliament start to drift. The second S&D press release from 2017 on 6 September, this time titled as `Commission Must Do More to Tackle the Spread of Fake News', focuses again on fake news and explains why it is a problem for the Union, but does not mention where this `fake news' originates let alone specifically Russia's involvement. Socialists & Democrats (2017b)

This is a very different tone from the 27 September EPP `Position Paper on Russia' that condemns Russia's `systematic and strategic use of disinformation and propaganda' and calls for a stronger EU response. European People's Party (2017b) In contrast to the S&D press release, the EPP Position Paper represents a clear endorsement of the original narrative first introduced in the January 2015 letter and later reaffirmed by the 20 March Council Conclusions and the November 2016 Parliament resolution.

The European Commission, on its part, moves forward with its preferred threat interpretation focusing on unattributed `fake news'. In October, the Commission opens a website titled as `Fake News' informing the public of the EU response in this area. European Commission (2017e) While spreading disinformation is mentioned on the site as a subset of spreading fake news, there is no discussion regarding the perpetrators nor the political motives behind the phenomenon. Similarly, on 3 October, speaking in the opening of the new NATO-EU joint Centre of Excellence in Helsinki, the EU High Representative mentions disinformation and fake news once, but apart from referring to `terrorist activities and terrorist groups' does not elaborate where these threats originate. European External Action Service (2017) Given that the speech celebrates a centre dedicated to hybrid threats and that `systemic spread of disinformation' was identified as a major hybrid threat in the Commission's own Joint Framework in April 2016, the absence of any further exploration of this aspect is notable. Finally, the European Commission work programme for 2018 published on 24 October includes a commitment to `present an initiative on countering fake news' in spring 2018. European Commission (2017f), p. 4 In this document, disinformation is not mentioned.

The European Commission's preference for unattributed `fake news' notwithstanding, several Member States promote the Russian disinformation threat- narrative throughout the autumn. First, on 30 August, Swedish and Danish foreign ministers publicly state that Russian `fake news and disinformation' is `a threat to our countries'. In Swedish, see Regeringskansliet (2017), in English, see East Stratcom Task Force (2017)

This is followed by an orchestrated effort from eight Member States including Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom on 25 October. In a letter to the European Commission, these states draw attention to Russia's `anti-European disinformation campaigns' and argue for `further enhancing the EU's StratCom capabilities'. EU Observer (2017a); unfortunately, the author could not obtain the original letter and relies on secondary sources. On 13 November, the day of the European Council meeting, Estonia, Spain and United Kingdom each speak up separately for strengthening the EU's strategic communication capabilities to, respectively, `deal with exposing misinformation and fake news', `Russian influence operations' and `Putin's government's fake stories and weaponised information'. Mikser, Sven (2017); Spanish government (2017a); May, Theresa (2017a) The newly emerged interest of Spain in promoting the narrative could be explained by the unsanctioned Catalan independence referendum in October, which, according to the Spanish government, attracted unwelcome Russian influence attempts. Spanish government (2017)

In alignment with these national initiatives, the European Parliamentary Research Service briefing from April titled before as `Fake News and the EU's Response' is updated in November with a new title `Disinformation, Fake News and the EU's Response'. European Parliamentary Research Service (2017b) Additionally, unlike the earlier edition, it now refers to the war in Ukraine first and the US presidential elections second as examples of Russian disinformation activities. Despite what otherwise appears as a proofreading exercise, however, Daesh is still not mentioned in the text.

Regardless of the efforts to promote the Russian disinformation threat- narrative by various actors, unnamed sources close to the European External Action Service suggest that `Mogherini personally' and `Russia-wary countries continue to oppose any scale-up of EU activity' against Russian disinformation. EU Observer (2017b); Frederica Mogherini is the current High Representative of the European Union Given the alleged lack of consensus on further EU action, the outcomes from the Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 13 November are interesting. On the one hand, the foreign ministers agree to continue `countering disinformation where and when needed', which represents status quo, and do not mention Russia by name, which represents a setback. EU Foreign Affairs Council (2017) On the other hand, they agree to `enhance further the work of the task forces'. Ibid.

A few weeks later, on 25 November, this commitment materialises when the European Council reaches an agreement to dedicate 1.1 million euros annually for the East Stratcom Task Force for 2018-2020 from the EU budget. The Guardian (2017b) While only a year ago this call from the European Parliament was rejected by the Member States and only a short-term compromise was reached in January, ten months later the president of the European Council justifies the additional spending by listing `cyber-attacks', `fake news' and `hybrid war' as examples of `Russian hostile activities'. Tusk, Donald (2017) Despite the fact that the amount of money remains modest given the scope of activities, it is the first time since the Task Force's establishment in 2015 that it does not rely on annually negotiated national contributions. This development corresponds with the demands in the January 2015 letter.

Alongside the additional investment on the Union level, individual Member States continue to promote the original narrative. On 24 November, the United Kingdom announces that it will spend 100 million pounds over five years to `counter Russian disinformation' in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. May, Theresa (2017b) Furthermore, `Russian disinformation' is extensively discussed in the UK Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee annual report for 2016-2017, which states that `Russian intelligence services are carrying out information operations… including the creation and propagation of forgeries and falsehoods.' House of Commons (2017)

Similarly, the Spanish government publicly announces that its updated national security strategy for 2018 will address `disinformation campaigns'. Spanish government (2017b) This is justified by the argument that over half of the social media accounts `spreading fake news stories related to the Catalan independence' were traced to servers in Russia. Ibid.

These developments notwithstanding, the European Commission proceeds with its `fake news' focused agenda. On 13 November, the same day as the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, the Commission hosts a `Multi-Stakeholder Conference on Fake News' to mark the launch of the public consultation on `Fake News and Online Disinformation' with a plan to set up a high-level expert group to study the issue in January 2018. In the launch event, the Commissioner for digital economy and First Vice-President lament how `Fake news is a direct threat to the very foundations of our democratic society' and how `the flow of information and misinformation has become almost overwhelming.' European Commission (2017g) Neither Russia nor the idea of intentionally spread disinformation is mentioned by the Commission representatives during the event. Interestingly, amongst its questions, the online consultation lists 20 proposals for tackling the issue of `fake news' and asks the user to rate them according to their usefulness. The survey is still available online although replies are no longer recorded, see European Commission (2017h) The 20 options are grouped in two categories, `online platforms' and `news media organisations', thus leaving out public authorities. Although the results of the work of the high-level group are beyond the scope of the paper, the design of the consultation gives some indication regarding the Commission's thinking and is consistent with their earlier aversion to the idea of legislative or regulatory intervention.

While the European Commission generally refrains from making references to politically motivated `disinformation', towards the end of 2017 the European political parties seem to grow split with regards to this question. This conclusion arises from two position papers published by EPP and ALDE, on 5 and 6 December respectively, both dedicated to `fake news'. Whereas the EPP resolution uses `fake news' and `disinformation' interchangeably and names Russia as the source of `propaganda and disinformation… undermining liberal values', the ALDE document refers only to `third parties'. European People's Party (2017c), p. 2; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe (2017) Furthermore, the text by ALDE maintains that the threat of `orchestrated disinformation campaigns' is sufficiently recognised by the European Union and, in fact, the issue of `fake news' needs more attention. In this articulation, the two concepts are understood as distinguishable from each other in terms of the threat they represent as well as the appropriate policy response. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in Europe (2017), p. 2 What this means in practice is not elaborated in the paper. In narrative terms, however, compared to the EPP position which fully endorses the original narrative, the ALDE document is more aligned with the European Commission's preference for unattributed `fake news'.

Analysis of 2017. Like in two previous years, there are visible actions taken by EU bodies or their parts that can be interpreted as being aligned with or promoting the Russian disinformation threat- narrative in 2017. In general, it can be concluded that the narrative continues to be endorsed by the European Union institutions. However, the extent to which it shapes their policies depends on the institution in question. The most notable policy change signalling support to the Russian disinformation threat- narrative is the European Council decision to increase funding for the East Stratcom Task Force and institutionalise it in the EU budget until the end of 2020. Similarly, the shared recognition across the EU institutions that the Dutch, French and German national elections represent a vulnerability to the Union because of hostile third-party information activities endorses the logic of the original narrative although the specific source of this threat is not consistently articulated. Finally, the continuing narrative promotion by the largest political group in the European Parliament, as well as by an increasing number of Member States now including Sweden, Denmark, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Germany and Spain demonstrates the growing legitimacy of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative in the European Union.

In terms of understanding the narrative performance in 2017, two observations are in order. First, assessing narrative coherence reveals that although `disinformation' continues to be complemented with other terms such as `fake news', when terms that do not indicate intentional spread of false information on their own are used by actors promoting the original narrative, Russia's hostile political motivations are emphasised in other ways. Thus, for these actors, these terms are used interchangeably and do not represent competing articulations to the original narrative. Although this allows the actors promoting the Russian disinformation threat- narrative to accept more diversity within their ranks, the loose use of terminology can conceal the different understandings regarding what is meant by these terms. In 2017, this is clearly the case with the term `fake news' with some actors understanding it in the context of the disinformation threat originating from Russia and others as a separate issue.

Secondly, in the context of the meticulously reported possibility of third-party involvement in the US presidential elections by the European media, the several national elections taking place in 2017 are clearly used as a momentum to promote the Russian disinformation threat- narrative. Emphasising the urgency of the disinformation threat was already present in the original narrative in 2015 and 2016, but in 2017 the situation in the United States helps its promoters to extend the scope of the threat to cover all the European Union rather than only the Eastern European Member States. The Spanish government's public statements of Russian disinformation being employed in the Catalan referendum in autumn 2017 and the British government's inquiry into Russia's potential involvement in the Brexit referendum in June 2016 launched in late 2017 both represent examples of successful narrative promotion in this context. The Times (2017)

In terms of institutionalisation of EU's response, the agreement to increase and stabilise the East Stratcom Task Force's funding by the Member States for 2018-2020 represents an increase in its financial independency and, for the first time, allows for multi-year planning of its operations. While it is not publicly dislodged what will be done with the fresh resources, it can be assumed that they will contribute positively to the specialization and routinization of the Task Force's work until the end of 2020. Although assessing the Task Force's `power' remains difficult from the outside, the fact that some national governments publicly cite its work shows that, at least for some actors, it represents an authoritative source. However, the European Commission's call for further study on the phenomenon of `fake news' in April and its insistence to focus on unattributed `fake news' rather than purposeful disinformation more generally could be interpreted as downplaying the relevance of the Task Force's work.

Finally, 2017 sees an alternative narrative gaining popularity and challenging the legitimacy of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative for the first time since its introduction in the EU discourse in January 2015. This is the idea of the threat from unattributed `fake news'. Although 2017 does not witness a single EU Member State openly challenging the idea of Russian disinformation threat or a coordinated Union response, the increasingly common, parallel talk about `fake news' usually obscures the responsible actors and their political motives. Instead of an identifiable group of Member States promoting this narrative, it is most visibly endorsed and promoted by the European Commission with support from the second and third largest factions in the European Parliament.

The Commission narrative choice is evident from several texts across the year. Whereas these occasions, in terms of their context, would provide the Commission with suitable opportunities to publicly address the threat of Russian disinformation and the EU's response, it categorically does not do so. Moreover, it appears the Commission downplays the role of public authorities and government intervention in responding to threats presented by disinformation and fake news and instead emphasises voluntary measures, the responsibility of online platforms and people's `common sense'. Finally, based on the dedicated website on `Fake News' launched in October, the public consultation launched in November and the commitment to `presenting an initiative on countering fake news' in spring 2018, it appears the unattributed `fake news'- narrative is not merely a rhetorical device to appease certain Member States but is adopted as a basis for Commission's policy-making. This narrative choice by the European Commission, despite the earlier endorsements of the Russian disinformation threat- narrative by the Council and the Parliament, represents a challenge to the original narrative and illustrates the ongoing contest regarding the topic at the end of 2017.

In conclusion, the debate on Russian disinformation threat and appropriate EU response intensifies in 2017. The legitimacy questions surrounding the US presidential elections and the prospect of election victories by anti-EU parties in Netherlands, France and Germany, with suspected Russia-sympathies, give amble material for the promoters of the original narrative. While the opportune political momentum and increased attention can help explaining the additional investment in the East Stratcom Task Force, also an alternative narrative emphasising the threat of unattributed `fake news' gains ground in the Union discourse in 2017. By the end of the study period, however, it appears that the Commission's initiatives focusing on tackling `fake news' are not openly challenged by other Union institutions or Member States. Whether we will see such behaviour in 2018 could reveal whether the two narratives can continue to co-exist in the EU discourse also in the future. The next significant moment in this regard will likely be the results from the high-level expert group on fake news and disinformation in spring 2018 and the Commission's subsequent proposal on how to move forward to further address the threat - or not.

CONCLUSION