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ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОЕ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЕ АВТОНОМНОЕ ОБРАЗОВАТЕЛЬНОЕ УЧРЕЖДЕНИЕВЫСШЕГО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ

«НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЙ ИССЛЕДОВАТЕЛЬСКИЙ УНИВЕРСИТЕТ

«ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ЭКОНОМИКИ»

Санкт-Петербургская школа социальных наук и востоковедения

Выпускная квалификационная работа

по направлению подготовки 41.03.04 «Политология»

студентки группы № 163 (образовательная программа «Политология и мировая политика»)

Family law impact of the 2015 immigration crisis on EU transit countries ' refugee and asylum policies

Зайцева Полина Сергеевна

Рецензент

канд. политических наук, проф. М.С. Турченко

Научный руководитель

канд.политических наук, проф. И.С. Григорьев

Санкт-Петербург 2020

Аннотация

In 2015 both the European Union (EU) experienced a huge external migration shock, which had a significant impact on the EU's status-quo - the mass influx of refugees has challenged internal stability and security of the EU member states (MSs). As a result, rapidly growing popular support for anti-immigrant political parties can be witnessed almost in all states of the EU, as well as in the states of the Schengen Agreement. Certainly, the mass `revival' of radical anti-immigrant parties has somehow affected the implementation of refugee and asylum policy at the national levels - in some European states the shift to stricter refugee and asylum policy can be seen even with the unaided eye, e.g. the Visegrбd states' national border closures, Hungary's and Poland's failure to implement the 2015 Relocation Decision, etc. But in the other European states, refugee and asylum policy has remained unchanged even in the post-2015 period. In the present research, we are going to address the question why some EU's plus Schengen MSs tighten their refugee and asylum policy, while the other MSs do not, what particular factors impact this shift. And particular attention will be attached to the transit immigration states in Europe, as far as these states are supposed to be overburdened due to,on the one hand, their peripheral location and,on the other hand, the asymmetrical European migration regime.

radical party immigration crisis Europe

Table of contents

Abstract

Introduction

1.The European Union as a `monotopia'?

1.1The EU's migration regime

1.2The factors of failure of the EU's migration regime

2.Not a `monotopia' yet: the EU's MSs response to the 2015 immigrant crisis

2.1`Cultural divide' in the European society

2.2`Open-door' immigration policy

2.3`Closed-door' immigration policy

2.4Neither `open-door' nor `closed-door' immigration policy

3.Immigration as a security issue

3.1Foundations of the Securitization Theory

3.2Migration as a security issue

3.3Migration as a security issue in the EU transit immigration MSs: special case

4.Empirical analysis

4.1Data

4.2Analysis of the process of securitization in the EU

4.3Regression analysis

Conclusion

Bibliography

Electronic resources

Appendix

Introduction

In 2015 the European Union (EU) experienced a huge external migration shock, which had a significant impact on the EU's status-quo - the mass influx of refugees has challenged internal stability and security of the EU memberstates (MSs). Furthermore, it has changed “the political landscape of Europe”. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 95. For instance, mainstream political parties all over the EU have to turn to stricter migration policies, preventing the radical right-wingparties (RRP) from getting their voices.

However, it was not the year 2015, when thesituation got out of control. It is better to say that the year 2015 can be seen asa critical juncture, while mass migration became a serious issue in 2011, as a direct result of the Arab Spring. In the period from 2011 to 2015 the states of the Mediterranean route into Europe such as Spain, Italy and Greece were mostly affected by the flow of irregularor undocumented migration, but “repeated calls by Italy for solidarity in the EU and the creation of a common migration and refugee policy fell on deaf ears”. Ibid.: 102.The notion of irregular migration is of significant importance here, as for the most part this phenomenon directly affects the peripheral EU MSs, those on whose territories significant parts of the EU's external land and sea borders are situated. Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 50. Scholars suggest that refugees are “more likely to enter and pass through the peripheral MSs undetected in order to apply for asylum in a preferred country”. Irina Molodikova,“Hungary and the System of European Transit Migration,” in Transit Migration in Europe, ed. Franck Du?vell, Irina Molodikova, Michael Collyer (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014): 154.

All the foregoing leads us to the notion of `transit migration' to the EU. Under it, we understand migration in one country with the intention of seeking the possibility there to emigrate to another country as the country of final destination.“Country of Transit,” Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, accessed November 14, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/country-transit_en. As a result of the combination of geographical, historical and geopolitical factors, the major burden of immigration is placed precisely on the states of transit migration.Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 50.

Such inequality has beeninitially `elaborated' by the gradual process of establishment of the asymmetrical European migration regime, which is defined by the combination of normative `principles'.First to be mentioned is the “Schengen principle”, which is associated with the dismantling of internal borders for the development of the EU's internal market, which is guarded by a controlled outer border. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 94.However, it can be seen that the Schengen MSs are responsible themselves for patrolling the common external borders, it means that they have to control the outer border at their own expense. Here we can assume that the expenses are distributed unequally among the transit states (most exposed to migratory flows) and the other MSs. Furthermore, in 2011 the “Schengen principle” was called into question, as it promotes“secondary movements” across the Schengen MSs”. Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 51.

Second is the “Dublin principles” 1990, 2003 and 2013. All the Dublin regulations are based on the same principle: the first MS where fingerprints are stored, or an asylum claim is lodged is responsible for a person's asylum claim. The established system aims at preventing secondary movements, `asylum-shopping' “In the context of the Dublin Regulation, the phenomenon where a third-country national applies for international protection in more than one EU Member State with or without having already received international protection in one of those EU Member States” (“Asylum-Shopping,” Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, accessed November 14, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary_search/asylum-shopping_en). , and situations where asylum-seekers are left `in orbit', with no European state taking responsibility. Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 50.Consequently, the more peripheralMSs, i.e. the transit states, have become overburdened, as the greatest part of management and first reception of asylum-seekers has been placed on them. It is believed that the given principle has led to an increasing number of illegal border crossings in the EU and in the Schengen area. For instance, statistics presented by the European Parliamentary Research Service shows that in 2015 the biggest number of undocumented crossings was across the Mediterranean route (Spain, Italy, Greece) and the Balkan route (Hungary). “Migration and Asylum,” European Parliamentary Research Service, accessed November 14, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/infographics/migration/public/index.html?page=migration.

Today it is widely accepted that the EU response to the immigration crisis was a failure, as there was/is no unified immigration policy. The MSs have made their decisions towards asylum-seeker and refugee policy nationally. F. Tassinari describes the situation after 2015 as following: “national capitals have produced a reality made of unilateral actions that leave little room for consultation, let alone coordination, and create what the popular media has dubbed a “domino effect” of national reactions”. Fabrizio Tassinari, “The Disintegration of European Security: Lessons from the Refugee Crisis,” PRISM, no. 2 (2016): 77.

Though scholars often refer to transit migration states, particularly the states of the Mediterranean route, as the “soft underbelly of the EU” Franck Du?vell, “Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicized Concept,” Population, space and place 18 (2012): 415-427. James Hollifield, “The Migration Challenge: Europe's Crisis in Historical Perspective,” Harvard International Review, no. 3, (1994): 68., as they are supposed to be too soft on immigration issues for a long time, today it can be witnessed that the situation has changed significantly after 2015. The SchengenMSs started to respond differently to the given external migration shock. In our research we are particularly interested why it is the case - why do different MSs implement their own, unilateral immigration policies? Why do some of these MSs tighten the immigration policy, while the otherskeep it almost unchanged? What is the impact of the concept of `transit state' on the implementation of immigration policy? Does the `transit-ness' lead the states to turn to stricter immigration policy?

Based on all of the above, the research question we are going to investigate is - what are the factors, that influence the shift to stricter immigration policy, andis the `transit-ness' one of these factors?In this regard, the goal of the researchis to find out the combination of internal factors, influencing the shift in the immigration policy, and to check up whether the notion of `transit-ness' has an additional impact on it or not.

Regarding the immigration policy as a subject of scientific research, many scholars agree that it became an increasingly prominent topic during the 1990s Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “Threatened by diversity: Why restrictive asylum and immigration policies appeal to western Europeans,” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, no. 1, (2005): 21. Franck Du?vell, “Transit Migrations in the European Migration Spaces Politics, Determinants,” in Transit Migration in Europe, ed. Franck Du?vell, Irina Molodikova, Michael Collyer (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014): 221. , and it still remains extremely popular in the scientific community. Such scholars like L. Quillian (1995), J. Citrin (1997), K. Knudsen (1997), L. M. McLaren (2003), J. Rydgren (2008, 2011), H. F. Moore (2010), A. Bohman (2011, 2018),T. E. Givens (2013), K. Fangen (2018), J. F. Downes and M. Loveless (2018)address the concept of immigration from different perspectives - for instance, how economic factors affect the public opinion toward immigration policy (Citrin et al., 1997), or how the proportion of immigrants correlates with electoral support of the RRP (Rydgren et al., 2011), or how the rhetoric of political parties changes after the immigration crisis 2015 (Fangen et al., 2018). The results of this massive research provide us with an almost full picture of the current immigration processes. We may state that the RRP in Europe have framed immigration as a problem in various ways - socio-economic factors are the most frequently employed framing instruments by these parties. In this regard, immigration is often portrayed as a “threat to ethnonational identity and social security” and as a “cause for unemployment”. Jens Rydgren, Patrick Ruth, “Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?” Scandinavian Political Studies 34, no. 3, (2011): 209.

Talking about the concept of `transit migration', it also has become a very prominent issue today. The book “Introduction Transit Migrations and European Spaces” (2014) written by M. Collyer et al. aims to provide a full-fledged introduction of `transit migration', it endeavors to define the given phenomenon, employing the cases of Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, Malta, Russia and Hungary. And importantly, it claims that the `transit migration' as acategory of analysis is extremely flexible and ambiguous, that makes it particularly difficult for scientific use. Michael Collyer, “Introduction Transit Migrations and European Spaces,” in Transit Migration in Europe, ed. Franck Du?vell, Irina Molodikova, Michael Collyer (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2014): 16.It seems impossible to reach a precise definition of the concept, that can be scientifically robust. As a direct result of both flexibility and ambiguity, the `transit migration' is supposed to be extremely politicized concept, as it “ideally suits to the politics of migration in the European neighborhood”.Ibid.: 16.

Nevertheless, many scholars have attempted to overcome the flexibility of `transit migration'.The article written by J. H. Matlary offers a complex analysis of several aspects of `transit migration'. The analysis describes the main immigration routes into Europe, which are following: the Balkan route, the Mediterranean route and the High North route (insignificant for the present research, as it is not a widely used immigration route into Europe by refugees and asylum-seekers).Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 103. Both the Balkan and the Mediterranean routes (also called as `territorial holes') are often seen as the most attractive for immigrants because they are relatively accessible and low cost.Andrew Geddes, Andrew Taylor,“In the shadow of fortress Europe? Impacts of European migration governance on Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies42, no. 4,(2016): 594-95.As a result, the concentration of all migrant groups (refugees, asylum-seekers, illegal immigrants, etc.) may be witnessed in these regions. Undoubtedly, it has become particularly difficult for the transit states to manage the huge post-2011immigration flows. In the framework of the given research we are aimed to investigate individual responses of the Schengen states towards these “border challenges”, focusing particularly on the individual responses of the transit states. In this regard, J. H. Matlary suggests two broad frameworks through which the EU and the Schengen MSs response to the external migration shocks. It is stated that their response can be defined in terms of their attitude towards mass migration: i.e. either in human rights terms or in threat and security terms.Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 96-106. The former one postulates that “barring a person physically from entering a state is morally unacceptable because everyone shares the same human rights and there is a duty to help everyone”.Ibid.: 99. This view is traditionally shared by the Western European states, particularly Germany, Sweden, Denmark. The latter one refers to migration as a threat to national sovereignty of the state and its security. This view is widely supported by the RRPs throughout the EU and the Schengen area. The brightest example here is East-Central European countries. However, not all the Schengen MSs fall into this strict categorization. For instance, it is still unclear how may be categorized the responses of Italy, Spain or Greece towards the immigration crisis. That is why we would like to address the individual response of each MS.

Though the concept of `transit migration' attracts a lot of scholarly attention today (the findings above confirm the idea), we assume that this concept in the framework of immigration policy studies remains understudied. Although there are several case-studies, relating to the issue of `transit migration', there is still no comparative research about the given issue (in the framework of the EU and the Schengen area as a whole). Now it is even hard to realize the significance of `transit migration' itself - there is still no answer to the question whether the transit-ness of the EU MSs like Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Greece, etc. has an impact on their national immigration policy. We suppose that the lack of answers makes our research scientifically relevant.

One more salient point to highlight here is the fact that`transitmigration' is supposed to provide potential migrants with the most affordable way of getting to the final destination. Slobodan Djajicм, ”Transit Migration,” Rev Int Econ 25 (2017): 1018. Under the `most affordable way' we understand that in the situation when asylum seekers lack liquid assets and/or access to credit, the only possible solution for them to reach the final-destination state is such a multistage migration through one or more transit countries. Ibid.: 1018.Thus, the debate on the `transit migration' often overlaps with the one on human trafficking. It is fair because generally, transit migrants undertake the multistage migration in huge groups, using the services of traffickers.Franck Du?vell, “Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicized Concept,” Population, space and place 18 (2012): 417.The mentioned above immigration routes, particularly the Balkan and the Mediterranean routes, are widely viewed as the most trafficked entry routes into Europe. In this regard, we believe that conducting the research on the `transit migration' has absolute societal relevance in today's world.

To frame our research, we will employ the securitization theory. We suppose that this theoretical approach provides our investigation with the most relevant explanations of how both the immigration crisis and the issue of immigration itself have become a reason for differently formulated responses, and how these issues have become a reason behind the shifting of policy to an emergency mode. Going into certain details, we assume that the issue of mass immigration to the EU and the Schengen area can be seen as a security issue today. It certainly meets strictly defined criteria of security issue in the framework of the securitization theory, B. Buzan formulated these criteria as following: “security issues have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind”. Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Jaap de Wilde, “Security. A New Framework for Analysis,” (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998): 5. For instance, looking at the case of Hungary, the presence of the criteria can be witnessed: V. Orbaмn, the prime minister of Hungary (who at the same time is supposed to be a securitizing actor), articulates the issue of mass influx of asylum-seekers and refugees as an existential threat to national sovereignty and security of Hungary James W. Scott, “Hungarian Border Politics as an Anti-Politics of the European Union,” Geopolitics 2018): 2. (that is supposed to be a referent object). Importantly to point out that this V. Orbaмn's articulation can be seen only as a securitizing move. In the framework of the securitization theory, we can claim that the security issue is successfully securitized “only if and when the audience accepts it as such”. Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Jaap de Wilde, “Security. A New Framework for Analysis,” (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998): 25. Returning to the case of Hungary, such an audience's acceptance can be witnessed. One of the indicators, reflecting the public acceptance, can be the public support of the radical-right party Fidesz, headed by V. Orbaмn. After 2018 parliamentary elections, it won 49,27 % of the popular vote. Thus, we can presuppose that the issue of mass immigration is securitized in the case of Hungary. However, we are going to conduct an analysis of the securitization process all over the Schengen area to be able to confirm this assumption. Nevertheless, if it is the case and a state has the issue of immigration securitized - in this way, it enables a securitizing actor to handle the issue, using whatever means, that are deemed to be most appropriate. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 495. These “whatever means”can be the following: a partial militarization of border areas, a process of renationalization of borders, challenging the Schengen Agreements and the Dublin Criteria, creation of internment camps along its borders, etc. James W. Scott, “Hungarian Border Politics as an Anti-Politics of the European Union,” Geopolitics 2018): 2.

Furthermore, we presuppose that the process of securitization can be found out in the other SchengenMSs, as many scholars have argued that “asylum and migration have been successfully securitized in Europe”. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 509.However, in our research we would like to investigate what these `other Schengen MSs' are, where the issue of immigration is securitized. In the process of the current research we are going to draw a clear division line between MSs' securitized and nonsecuritized issue of immigration. Thus, we believe that this theoretical framework allows us to figure out a combination of particular factors, that enables to frame the issue of immigration as a threat to sovereignty and security. The example of such factors probably can be socio-economic ones, mentioned briefly above.

In view of all this, we can formulate the hypothesis of the research: firstly, we expect that the transit-ness of the Schengen peripheral MSshas an impact on the shift of refugee and asylum policy there, in other words, the Schengen transit MSs have more political and socioeconomic incentives to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy due to the combination geopolitical, historical and institutional factors; secondly, we expect that framing of the issue of immigration as a threat, or as a security issue is an underlying cause for the shift of the refugee and asylum policy, in other words, the Schengen MSs with observed process of the articulation of immigration as a security issue tend to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy relative to the MSs with the non-securitized issue of immigration; thirdly, we expect that growing electoral support of the political parties, maintaining a strong anti-immigrant position, contributes to the overall shift to stricter refugee and asylum policy; fourthly, we expect that socioeconomic arguments, widely presented by the political parties with a strong anti-immigrant position, tend to be a factor, promoting the shift to stricter refugee and asylum policy; finally, we expect that the Schengen MSs, that are mostly exposed to the flows of irregular immigration, tend to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy relative to the MSs, that are exposed to these flows to a lesser extent.

To be able to examine the hypothesis stated above, we will employ the quantitative research method, namely the multiple linear regression (MLR). We believe that the regression analysis is one of the most relevant methods for the present research, as it enables us to address the research question through statistics and to find out all the causalities in question. In this way, the shift to stricter immigration policy is supposed to be a dependent variable (DV)in the regression analysis. We operationalize the givenDV as the number of returned to the country of origin applicants for asylum. Furthermore, we have elaborated eight independent variables (IVs), and they are the following: (i) year, i.e. the period from 2011 to 2018; (ii) the total number of applications for asylum in a given Schengen country “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data (rounded),” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en.; (iii) the total number of TCNs found to be illegally present in a given Schengen country “Third Country Nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded),” Eurostat, accessed May 4, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en.; (iv) the level of popular electoral support for anti-immigrant political parties; (v) the level of GDP “GDP and main components (output, expenditure and income),” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=namq_10_gdp&lang=en.; (vi) the level of unemployment “Total Unemployment Rate,” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00203/default/table?lang=en.. For the other two independent variables, (i) status of the issue of immigration and (ii) location of the country, we have coded these variables as dummies: (i) status of the issue of immigration (where securitized - 1, nonsecuritized - 0); (ii) location of the country (where transit - 1, nontransit - 0).

In addition, above we have mentioned the particular period, which will be under investigation, namely the period from 2011 to 2018. We believe that this period will enable us to capture the whole picture of the immigration policy shift in the EU. In this connection, we will apply panel research design. Importantly, we divide thisperiod into two smaller periods: 2011-2015 and 2015-2018. Such a division can be justified in terms of the 2015 migration crisis (in the very beginning of this introductory chapter we have already mentioned the year 2015 as a critical juncture), after which the biggest number of asylum-seekers and refugees headed to the EU memberstates.

One more important thing to mention is the selection of the cases. We have decided to include almost all the EU and SchengenMSs in the research (except for Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus, as they are not in the Schengen Area yet), in order to be able to compare the immigration policy of both the transit states (Malta,Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland) and the other 18 EU MSs. Thus, the number of cases we will investigate is 26.

The final point to be highlighted here is research tasks, which will allow us to examine all the given hypothesis and to get an answer to the research question, thereby reaching the goal of the research. Firstly, with the help of existing research in the field, we are going to find out the difference in the immigration policy implementation across the Schengen MSs. Therefore, we will figure out whether the Schengen transit immigration MSs are those states with the stricter immigration policy or not. Secondly, through the framework of the securitization theory, we are going to make a division between the Schengen MSs with securitized and nonsecuritized issue of immigration. By so doing, we are going to identify securitizing actors for every case, analyze their rhetoric and `instruments', that they employ to justify the policy shift.Finally, we are going to conduct the regression analysis with the statistical data findings to be able to find out whether the shift to stricter immigration policy is causally connected with the concept of `transit-ness', the process of securitization and the other independent variables, employed in the present research.

This research paper proceeds as follows: in the first section we overview the EU's plus the Schengen area's migration regime, its legal foundations and issues, that it faces today; then, in the second section we describe the process ofdevelopment of immigration as a security issue; after that, we move to the twofold empirical analysis, the first part of which is dedicated to the analysis of the process of securitization in the Schengen MSs, and the second - to the MLR analysis.

1. The European Union as a `monotopia'?

It may be quite challenging to define the EU's migration regime, because it is often described as something non-existent - many scholars point out that the EU's migration policy does not exist as a single entity in institutional and political terms.Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 44. Today it is still rather a combination of various ad hoc instruments. Even despite the fact that since 1990s the EU has advanced the idea of itself as a `monotopia', which means a single territorial space with the lack of any constraints towards the free movement of people. Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 90. In this regard, the most suitable definition of the EU's migration regime is the following - “any form of regulation and management of movement of people towards the EU common territory and across MSs' internal borders”. Ibid.: 44. Let's briefly overview the core regulations, that have been introduced since 1990s.

The basis for the EU's migration policy was established by two important documents: the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. The former one refers to the convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (SIC), which was initially signed by five MSs (BE, FR, DE, LU, NL) in 1985. The main goal of this agreement was the full removal of frontier controls, i.e. internal borders of the Schengen Area may be crossed at any point without any checks on persons. Sandra Lavenex, William Wallace, “Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a `European Public Order?'” in Policymaking in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Mark A. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 460. However, the signatories (i.e. MSs of the Schengen Area) are responsible for the control over the external borders on their own. Nowadays the Schengen Area consists of 26 countries (including non-EU states, such as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). It is important to point out here that selection of cases for the current research has been made taking into account the Schengen Agreement, it means that we have selected only those EU's MSs, that are the signatories of the Agreement. That is why Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania, that are not in the Schengen Area yet, are excluded from the research. It allows us to compare only those European states, that operate within a single system, so-called `free movement zone' James Hampshire, “European migration governance since the Lisbon treaty: introduction to the special issue,” Journal of ethnic and migration studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 538..

Furthermore, the SIC draws a clear dividing line between a resident (i.e. a national of a MS), an alien (i.e. any person other than a national of a MS), and an asylum-seeker (i.e. an alien who has lodged an application for asylum). Importantly, later these three categories have become a defining principle for the separate fields of the European migration policy that are the following: first is mobility of the EU's citizens and the Schengen Area's citizens; second is migration of Third Country Nationals (TCNs); and third is asylum. In the present research the main focus is on the latter one - the refugee and asylum policy, that deals with people's forced movements driven by the search for international protection from persecution, military conflicts, human rights violations, that take place in the countries of origin.Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 44. However, we cannot avoid the fact that such a categorization is obvious oversimplification of the reality, it means that in practice there are overlapping situations and interdependencies between these three areas.Ibid.: 46. For instance, it might be noticed that the media quite often do not distinguish these different categories.

Coming back to the core regulations of the European migration policy, the next one to be mentioned is the Dublin Regulation on Asylum, which was initially signed in 1990. As far as the internal borders of the EU were/are absolutely open, there was a need to prevent somehow secondary movements across the EU. The Dublin Regulation was seen as a solution, because it established the responsibility of the MS in the territory of which an asylum-seeker first enters for the examination of an asylum claim.Sandra Lavenex, William Wallace, “Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a `European Public Order?'” in Policymaking in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Mark A. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 460. For the purpose of efficient functioning of the Dublin Regulation, the EURODAC fingerprinting system was established in 2003. Now if someone applies for asylum in the EU, his/her fingerprints are transmitted to the EURODAC database - it allows MSs to keep track of asylum-seekers.Emek M. Ucarer, “Justice and Home Affairs,” in European Union Politics, ed. Michelle Cini, Nieves Borragan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 316.

As it was stated above both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation comprise a foundation of the whole European migration policy. It may be witnessed that the system has not been changed significantly since early 1990s. However, there were some (successful and not) attempts to harmonize the fragmented system. One of the most significant attempts took place at the Tampere European Council in 1999 (also known as “Tampere milestones”). On matters of immigration and asylum, Tampere actively advocated a `comprehensive approach' - in this way, the EU's migration policy should be linked not only with `domestic policy tools', but also with particular `foreign policy tools', that are mainly aimed at the elimination of push-factors (i.e. ones that compel individuals to leave their country of origin) such as poor economic conditions, military conflicts, human rights violations, persecution of people, etc.Ibid.: 316. Furthermore, Tampere offered creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), consisting of common minimum standards for reviewing asylum claims.Sandra Lavenex, William Wallace, “Justice and Home Affairs. Towards a `European Public Order?'” in Policymaking in the European Union, ed. Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Mark A. Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005): 473. These common minimum standards are supposed to be necessary, as far as theyfurther promote the principle of equal treatment of refugees and asylum-seekers. During the Tampere European Council, it was decided that CEAS should be implemented in two phases, that were the following: the first phase referred to the adoption of common minimum standards; and the second phase referred to a more ambitious plan - development of a single asylum procedure. “Asylum Policy,” Fact Sheets on the European Union, European Parliament, accessed March 31, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/151/asylum-policy. As it can be seen today, the second phase still remains not more than just an ambitious plan.

1.2 The factors of failure of the EU's migration regime

The 2015 European Migration Crisis has revealeda number of weaknesses of the EU's migration regime. These soft spots resulted in the situation we can observe today - the EU did not manage to respond properly to the mass influx of refugees, which was caused by the Arab Spring started in 2011. The enormous inflow of refugees challenged internal stability and security inside the EU borders. Scholars all over the world are trying to find out particular failures of the EU's migration regime - many of them claim that the main failure is its regulatory basis (`the Schengen Agreement plus the Dublin Regulation' system), others describe the failure in the light of solidarity crisis between European countries. Furthermore, these failures are very often supposed to be closely connected with so-called `transit states' in the EU, i.e. the peripheral EU MSs, on whose territories significant parts of the EU's external land and sea borders are situated. Ferruccio Pastore, Giulia Henry, “Explaining the Crisis of the European Migration and Asylum Regime,” Italian Journal of International Affairs, no. 1 (2016): 50.In the present research by `transit states' we mean the following countries: Malta, Spain, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland. Soon after the beginning of the Arab Spring, these transit states have become increasingly overburdened because of the huge inflow of refugees and asylum seekers. For instance, in 2014 Italy and Hungary were among those five EU states that received the most asylum applications. Florian Trauner, “Asylum Policy: the EU's `crises' and the looming policy regime failure,” Journal of European Integration 38, no. 3 (2016): 315. Why was it the case? Let's look through the failures of the EU's migration regime in more detail.

As it was already mentioned, scholars often refer to `the Schengen Agreement plus the Dublin Regulation' system as to the major factor of failure of the migration regime. C. Wihtol de Wenden points out that the `Dublin regime' has passed the task to deal with the growing number of refugees and asylum-seekers to the European countries positioned along the EU's external borders; and many of these countries lack the appropriate infrastructure to cope with the immigration inflows due to relatively difficult economic situation after 2008. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, “Actual Patterns of Migration Flows: The Challenge of Migration and Asylum in Contemporary Europe,” in Solidarity in the European Union. A Fundamental Value in Crisis, ed. Andreas Grimmel, Susanne My Giang (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017): 74. In other words, countries in Southern, South-Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe, being borderlands, have to be responsible for the majority of asylum applications, while countries in North-Western Europe “hide behind the shield of the Dublin Conventions”.Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 93. However, being responsible for the majority of asylum applications, quite often the peripheral EU MSs, those are transit states, are not countries of final destination for asylum-seekers. It is widely accepted that their common aspiration is to continue travelling throughout the Europe to its Northern countries and to rebuild their life in a place, where socio-economic conditions for refugees are relatively better. Ibid.: 97. In this regard, aside from the transit states' burden of reception, there is one more issue concerning the Dublin Regulation. As it was already mentioned previously, the second phase of the CEAS implementation, i.e. development of a single asylum procedure, still remains unfinished. It means that the EU has not managed to establish a comparable and uniform system of reception. Florian Trauner, “Asylum Policy: the EU's `crises' and the looming policy regime failure,” Journal of European Integration 38, no. 3 (2016): 313. In this connection, it does matter where an asylum seeker submits his/her application. F. Trauner refers to this situation as to a “lottery for refugees within the CEAS” Ibid.: 314., meaning that asylum-seekers have very different prospect of being granted asylum, and this prospect is fully dependent on the first country of entry. And seems reasonable to assume that this “lottery” may be an element contributing heavily to the development of irregular migration to the EU.

Being so controversial during the crisis, the Dublin regime was called into question, as far as it has aggravated the North-South tensions over refugee and asylum policy in the EU. In the light of these tensions, scholars frequently mention the fact that for a long time the peripheral EU MSs, especially Southern states, have asked other European countries to help them with the reception of a huge number of refugees and asylum-seekers.James Hampshire, “European migration governance since the Lisbon treaty: introduction to the special issue,” Journal of ethnic and migration studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 546. Playing a role of “bridges” between asylum-seekers' countries of origin and their final destination in North-Western EuropeMaurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 97., the transit states were financially and administratively overburdened. The EU took into consideration the transit states' requests and in 2015 it proposed a burden-sharing deal, according to which 40000 asylum-seekers should have been spread between the countries of the EU according to their wealth and population. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, “Actual Patterns of Migration Flows: The Challenge of Migration and Asylum in Contemporary Europe,” in Solidarity in the European Union. A Fundamental Value in Crisis, ed. Andreas Grimmel, Susanne My Giang (Cham: Springer International Publishing AG, 2017): 73. Despite the fact that the proposal could be relatively effective measure, it was met with strong resistance by some MSs, especially Central-Eastern European countries.

Why was it so? F. Trauner points out that “the question of solidarity and refugee burden-sharing is an old-standing issue in the EU's asylum policy”.Florian Trauner, “Asylum Policy: the EU's `crises' and the looming policy regime failure,” Journal of European Integration 38, no. 3 (2016): 315. In the present case it has become an issue in the following way - by accepting this proposal, MSs had to agree with possible limitation of their sovereignty, because they would be constrained in their ability to regulate migration flows on their own.James Hampshire, “Speaking with one voice? The European Union's global approach to migration and mobility and the limits of international migration cooperation,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 573. In this connection, resistance to the burden-sharing deal may be described in terms of a lack of trust between the EU's MSs, or so-called solidarity crisis. In other words, it means that even if sharing competence with the EU (as a supranational actor) may increase a national government's capacity to regulate immigration, the issue of sovereignty will remain a cornerstone on the national level. Scholars point out that the reason for it is an extreme sensitiveness of the immigration policy area on the level of national governmentsIbid.: 573., which can be justified in terms of that immigration policy and its outcomes are both visible and emotive for the public. In this regard, political actors at the national level attempt to play a role of `safeguards' of state's sovereignty.

Thus, apart from the solidarity crisis on the EU level, another issue has occurredat the MSs' level - domestic politicization of immigration, which is often connected with such phenomena like radical-right political parties, growing skepticism towards European integration and toughening of immigration control.James Hampshire, “European migration governance since the Lisbon treaty: introduction to the special issue,” Journal of ethnic and migration studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 544. Domestic politicization in the EU have plenty of illustrations. For instance,since 2015 the states of the Visegrбd Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have taken relatively negative stance towards the issue of immigration - they rejected any form of relocation of asylum-seekers and de factoclosed their national borders.Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 93. Such a negative position was/is justified in the framework of multiple challenges towards homogenous identity and the threat of terrorism. Furthermore, domestic politicization of immigration has contributed to the process of `renationalization' of the EU policymaking in the field of security policy. Fabrizio Tassinari, “The Disintegration of European Security: Lessons from the Refugee Crisis,” PRISM, no. 2 (2016): 71. This process may be described by the desire of some MSs to restore their national borders and other symbols of the state sovereignty.

Summing up, we can observe that the EU's migration regime has faced a lot of serious challenges during the times of the refugee crisis both at the supranational and national levels. And, it did not manage yet to find out effective solution, as far as today we can witness the mentioned-above process of renationalization. The EU's MSs have mostly acted on their own. We assume that the EU in the light of its migration regime can hardly be described as a `monotopia', it is rather very fragmented. That is why, the next subchapters will be dedicated to the response of the national governments to the 2015 immigrant crisis.

2. Not a `monotopia' yet: the EU's MSs response to the 2015 immigrant crisis

Scholars often point out that in the end of 2000s immigration policy in the EU has shifted from the level of `low' politics to the one called `high' politics. Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration and Invisible Welfare,” (London: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2013): 1. In other words, it means that immigration policy has started to be seen as a matter of the very survival of the state. We may assume that this shift is an important element, that somehow defines the policy at the national level. Nevertheless, its power can differ markedly between states of the EU. Many scholars refer to the differentiation as to the phenomenon of `cultural divide' in European society, highlighting the role of both immigration and Euroscepticism as the main stumbling blocks. Andrew Geddes, Leila Hadj-Abdou, “Changing the path? EU migration governance after the `Arab spring',” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 1 (2018): 146. We have already mentioned above that the key trend, illustrating the `cultural divide', is the growing support for populist and radical-right political parties across the EU.