However, we should emphasize that it is not anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic political parties that have led to the `cultural divide'. Certainly, the causes for it are much more deep-rooted. It is important to mention here that national contexts of the EU's MSs vary considerably. Hence, the EU as a polity is extremely fragmented, and we can observe rather different interpretations of the issue of immigration across the EU. In this connection, A. W. Neal provides the example of different understandings of `threat' and `insecurity', depending on the past - he notices that the Nordic states have not had the same experience of mass maritime migration as the Mediterranean states have had, that is why, their understanding of `threat' as well as their policy response may vary greatly. Andrew W. Neal, “Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX,” JCMS 47, no. 2 (2009): 336-337. Consequently, it is inappropriate to employ a single logic, while addressing the immigration policy of the European states.

In order to understand the logic of immigration policy in the EU's MSs, it is better to use a complex one, which takes into account peculiarities of the MSs' immigration policy response. In this regard, scholars often mention in their studies the phenomenon of “the EU's bifurcation” into western and eastern halves, where western half is quite liberal in its views towards the issue of immigration, while eastern half - more sceptical towards it. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 94. Such a `bifurcation' may manifest itself in differing strategies, used by the national governments. A. Triandafyllidou and M. Ambrosini have elaborated the matrix of possible strategies. According to this matrix, there are two general strategies: gatekeeping (as more liberal) and fencing (as less liberal) - and these strategies may be employed for both external and internal control policies. Anna Triandafyllidou, Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gatekeeping serving the Labour Market,” European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011): 255. The strategy of gatekeeping involves the following measures: visa procedures, paper controls at ports of entry, cooperation with countries of origin and transit to prevent irregular migration, etc.Anna Triandafyllidou, Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gatekeeping serving the Labour Market,” European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011): 255. While fencing involves border controls outside ports of entry, at land or sea, internal control at public places, cooperation with transit or origin countries for expulsion or readmission procedures, etc. Ibid.: 255. As it can be seen, the given strategies are nearly opposite. And the choice of a particular strategy depends heavily on the national contexts, specifically on geographical, historical and geopolitical factors. If the EU's MS is a borderland, with high probability it is a transit migration state. It means that hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum-seekers move through its territory (often irregularly) towards their preferred country of destination. In this regard, we might expect that the transit state's choice of the strategy is most likely predetermined, it might probably toughen its immigration regime. However, we are going investigate this probability in the present research.

In accordance with the policy strategies, scholars classify the EU's MSs immigration policy response by two broad categories: `open-door' policy, or liberal one, and `closed-door' policy, implying the framing of immigration as a security issue. The next subchapters will be devoted to detailed explanation of these categories.

2.2 `Open-door' immigration policy

The `open-door' immigration policy implies the framing of migration in human rights terms, in this way the migration influx is seen as a refugee issue. Hence, refugees and asylum-seekers, arriving in Europe, must be received and allowed to seek asylum. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 96. Such an approach often refers to a rhetoric of universalism, which states that everyone is equal, regardless and without any exception. Consequently, the more prosperous states are morally obliged to help everyone in need, and to receive and accept as much asylum applications as possible. The best example of the state employing the rhetoric of universalism is Germany. It is widely known that Germany traditionally holds an absolute principle of welcoming every refugee and asylum-seeker, who has managed to reach its territory. Ibid.: 97. For instance, in 2015 Germany headed by A. Merkel refused to define an upper limit of the number of asylum-seekers, entering its territory. Certainly, such a decision has led to the conflict at the domestic level. However, some authors claim that it was a mere matter of ethics rather than a matter of politics. Ibid.: 98. Regardless the controversy of the decision, it was of significant importance for A. Merkel to hold a principle of open borders.

Furthermore, in 2015 Germany was among the EU's MSs with the lowest rejection rate (47.9%) - and, it approved more than a half of all applications (50.2%) at the first instance. These numbers are presented on the table 1, where the states are classified in accordance with their refugee rate (i.e. how many asylum applications were approved) and rejection rate (i.e. how many asylum applications were rejected).

As it is indicated in the table, the other states with the low rejection rate are Sweden, Malta, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium. These countries plus Norway and Denmark are also viewed as examples, illustrating the clear domination of the human rights framing. Janne Haaland Matlary, “Mass Migration and Border Control,” in Hard Power in Hard Times, ed. Janne Haaland Matlary (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018): 99. Furthermore, it is important to highlight the fact that all the states listed, except for Malta, are not transit immigration states. We may assume that one of the possible reasons why these states hold a quite liberal position towards the issue of immigration is the lack of additional `incentives' for toughening the immigration regime. The situation with the transit states is obviously different.

H1:The Schengen non-transit MSs have less political and socioeconomic incentives to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy, that is why these MSs tend to maintain liberal position towards the issue of immigration.

H2:The Schengen transit MSs have more political and socioeconomic incentives to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy due to the combination geopolitical, historical and institutional factors, that is why these MSs tend to shift to stricter refugee and asylum policy.

Table 1. Applications and granting of protection status at first instance in 2015

Source: Author's elaboration on the basis of the data presented in the Asylum Information Database. “Country Reports on Asylum in 23 Countries,” Asylum Information Database, accessed April 11, 2020, http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports.

2.3 `Closed-door' immigrationpolicy

While the `open-door' immigration policy is generally common for the western European states, the opposite to it, `closed-door' policy has become a widespread phenomenon in the countries of the Central-Eastern Europe. J. Dennison and A. Geddes mention in their research paper that `conservative' value orientations (relatively popular in this region) have led to the prioritization of security, tradition and conformity. James Dennison, Andrew Geddes, “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 108. Hence, immigration has started to be seen as a security issue. According to this view, it is no more a question of ethics, but rather a question of the survival of the state. Here the 2015 immigration crisis is widely associated with “disorder, chaos and a lack of government control”. Ibid.: 108.

Consequently, two types of rhetoric may be observed in the case of the `closed-door' immigration policy. The first one refers to the re-articulation of borders, during the crisis they have acquired a new prominence.Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 3. More precisely, political borders have regained its symbolic meaning, being the epitome of migration control and satisfying the citizens' demands for protection. Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration and Invisible Welfare,” (London: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2013): 7. The second type of rhetoric is a `division of insiders from outsiders', it is also known as the rhetoric of `us and them'. It aims to separate the `civilized' from the `barbarians'.Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration in Southern Europe. Actors, Dynamics and Governance,” (Cham: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2018): 3. In the light of this, the ingoing flows of refugees and asylum-seekers are interpreted as a threat to national sovereignty, cohesion and identity. James W. Scott, “Hungarian Border Politics as an Anti-Politics of the European Union,” Geopolitics 2018): 13.

Furthermore, the success of these types of rhetoric may be illustrated by the public polls on the attitude towards the immigration of people from outside the EU. The results of the public polls are presented on the table 2, however, it should be noted that these results reflect the general attitude towards the immigration from non-EU countries, not the attitude towards the inflow of refugees and asylum-seekers.

Table 2. Public opinion towards the immigration of people from outside the EU, 2015

Source: Author's elaboration on the basis of the data presented on the European Commission Website. “Public Opinion on Immigration of people from outside the EU,” European Commission, accessed April 11, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinionmobile/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/59/groupKy/279/chartType/barChart/savFile/702.

As it was expected, in 2015 the most negative attitudecharacterized the Central-Eastern European states and some of the Southern European states. And as we know, scholars often attribute such a trend in the public opinion to the success of (populist) radical-right political parties. C. Levy points out that the common denominator shared by this group of political parties across the EU is a “harsh stance against refugees and asylum-seekers”. Carl Levy, “The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime,” Government and Opposition Ltd. (2005): 26. Consequently, the perceived loss of European border control, the `failure' of multiculturalism, the Eurozone crisis, the increasing popularity of Eurosceptic sentiments and, of course, the securitization of the issue of immigration - all of these have played into the hands of the radical-right parties in the EU. Ibid.: 30. In the period from 2014 to 2016 the rapid growth of their support can be witnessed. James Dennison, Andrew Geddes, “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 110. But why have the radical-right parties experienced such a quickly growing popularity?

There are two generally accepted reasons for the growth. First of all, the radical-right parties very often (if not always) employ the economic arguments, that highlight the grievances about the perceived economic effects of mass immigration. Ibid.: 116. These perceived economic effects are the following: an increasing burden for taxpayers and the welfare system, a possibility of unemployment, an increasing job competition and the free-rider problem. Jens Rydgren, Patrick Ruth, “Voting for the Radical Right in Swedish Municipalities: Social Marginality and Ethnic Competition?” Scandinavian Political Studies 34, no. 3, (2011): 209. In this connection, citizens, attempting to protect their jobs and wages from `unfair' competition, start to support the radical-right parties. Daniel Oesch, “Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe,” International Political Science Review 29, no. 3 (2008): 351. By so doing, they start to share more conservative views towards immigration - it can be seen on the table 2. Furthermore, there is the second explanation, the core of which is the `cultural backlash' theory. This theory states that the national identity is entrenched in community traditions, that is why, it is absolutely unique, not universal. James Dennison, Andrew Geddes, “A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti-Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe,” The Political Quarterly 90, no. 1 (2019): 110. In this regard, mass immigration is seen as a threat to the cultural homogeneity. Again, citizens, aiming to preserve the national identity, start to vote for the radical-right parties.

All in all, the combination of these arguments coupled with the use of strategical rhetoric have led this group of political parties to rapidly growing success. And it can be witnessed not only at the domestic level, but also at the EU's level. On the table 3 the share of votes for radical-right political parties in the European Parliament after the 2019 elections is presented. Even at the level of the EU we can observe the common trend that the states of Central-Eastern Europe (mostly) are now dominated by Eurosceptic and anti-immigration sentiments. In this connection, we may assume that this region together with some other states such as Italy, France and Austria are characterized (to a various degree) by rather restrictive immigration policy.

Notably, almost all the states with the `closed-door' immigration policy are the transit migration states. And as it was mentioned above, we expect that their `transit-ness' gives them additional `incentives' for toughening the immigration policy.

H3: Broad popular support of the political parties, maintaining a strong anti-immigrant position, tend to contribute to the overall shift towards stricter refugee and asylum policy.

H4:Socioeconomic arguments, widely presented by the political parties with a strong anti-immigrant position, tend to be a factor, promoting the shift to stricter refugee and asylum policy.

2.4 Neither `open-door' nor `closed-door' immigration policy

As it was mentioned above, the EU MSs' immigration policy response is widely characterized by the phenomenon of the “EU's bifurcation” into western and eastern halves. However, it can be noticed that the Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy cannot be categorized under this division. The state of affairs in the field of immigration in the Southern European MSs can be described rather as `something in between'.

Scholars claim that the Southern European states are the “EU's soft underbelly”, because they are significantly exposed to the flows of irregular immigrants, and they do not have enough state capacity to deal with the situation more effectively. Andrew Geddes, Andrew Taylor, “In the shadow of fortress Europe? Impacts of European migration governance on Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42, no. 4, (2016): 591. Furthermore, their migration management policy is often described as internally contradictory. It is believed that the given contradiction is a direct result of mismatch between the general closure towards economic immigration and the economic demand for low-skilled labour. Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Migration and Invisible Welfare,” (London: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 2013): 31.

Table 3. Share of votes for populist and nationalist parties in the European Parliamentary Elections of 2019, by country

Source: Statista. “Share of votes for populist and nationalist parties in the European Parliamentary Elections of 2019, by country,” Statista, accessed April 12, 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1027735/populist-vote-share-in-eu-elections/.

In the light of this, immigration is seen as a “necessary evil” there. Anna Triandafyllidou, Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gatekeeping serving the Labour Market,” European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011): 253. All in all, the Mediterranean states are neither liberal, nor restrictive in their immigration policy response. They are somewhere in between, because immigration is tolerated as it responds to the needs of the labour market. Ibid.: 264.

As it was mentioned before, the Mediterranean states are also the transit states. What is important is the fact that we do not observe expected toughening of the immigration regime there. However, we may see that today the issue of immigration is framed as a question of security and public order. Anna Triandafyllidou, Maurizio Ambrosini, “Irregular Immigration Control in Italy and Greece: Strong Fencing and Weak Gatekeeping serving the Labour Market,” European Journal of Migration and Law 13 (2011): 264. Thus, refugees and asylum-seekers are presented as a people that are potentially dangerous for the state and its citizens. This can be supported by the data presented on the tables 2 and 3.

3. Immigration as a security issue

It is widely accepted that in 2000s asylum and migration have been securitized in the EU. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 509. We believe that it is true for the EU as a subnational entity. However, as it appears from the previous chapter, asylum and migration policy measures vary significantly among MSs. In this regard, the purpose of this chapter is to find out where in the EU the issue of immigration is securitized (not politicized) and what factors contribute to the process of securitization. For this purpose, the securitization theory will be employed in the present research.

In the framework of this theory we understand that `security' is not always a good thing, in certain circumstances `security' is closely interrelated with existential threats. Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Jaap de Wilde, “Security. A New Framework for Analysis,” (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998): 5. In that sense, security is understood in traditional military-political terms, and it may be defined as follows - an emergency condition, providing a state representative with a right to use whatever means for the survival of a state. Ibid.: 21. In other words, certain issue can be presented by state representatives as a security issue, which in turn `allows' to take any measures beyond the established rules to put an end to a threatening activity. The word combination `can be presented' is of significant importance here, because security issue is the direct result of state representatives' efforts to shape citizens' attitude towards an issue. Or as T. Balzacq states - “(efforts) to shape the world around”. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 495. Thus, the process of issue's securitization is based on a special rhetoric, so-called rhetoric of existential threat. In this connection, various threat images can be constructed as a result of discursive processes, occurring among a state representative and his/her audience. Thierry Balzacq, “The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies,” JCMS 46, no. 1 (2008): 75-76. Accordingly, the issue may become a security issue, even if it does not pose any existential threat, thus the security issue does not necessarily reflect the empirical reality. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 495.

The securitization theory examines the process of security issues' formation. The units of security analysis are the following: first of all, there are referent objects, i.e. things that are supposed to be existentially threatened (e.g. for a state, referent object is usually sovereignty, while for a nation - identity); then there are securitizing actors, i.e. state representatives, claiming an issue to be the security issue. Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Jaap de Wilde, “Security. A New Framework for Analysis,” (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998): 36. And it is important to highlight that a securitizing move becomes successfully completed, only if the audience accepts it to be the security issue.

3.2 Migration as a security issue

Most notably, over the last few decades the securitization theory has been most frequently applied in the field of immigration studies. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 509. And as it was mentioned before, many scholars believe that asylum and migration policy has been successfully securitized in the EU. But there is still a debate on the underlying causes for the development of immigration as a security issue in the EU.

September 11 attacks are most commonly seen as a point of departure. Some scholars point out that since 2001 there has been a rapidly growing trend of asylum-seekers' and refugees' representation as a threat to sovereignty and identity of a state. Matt McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14, no. 4 (2008): 563. Terrorist attacks and other crimes against humanity have contributed to the process of securitization of immigration. But how has this process evolved over time?

In the framework of the securitization theory, scholars conclude that the issue of immigration has started to be a security issue through a “speech act” Vicki Squire, “The Securitization of Migration: An Absent Presence?” in The Securitization of Migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 23., meaning that it has been constructed by state representatives, that usually link terrorism and migration. It is accepted that such security discourses are articulated by political actors around four main axes: socio-economic, political, “securitarian” and “identitarian”. Thierry Balzacq et al., “`Securitization' revisited: theory and cases,” International Relations, no. 4, (2016): 510. The framing of immigration as a socio-economic threat usually refers to the notion that mass immigration constitutes a burden for taxpayers on the one hand and for a whole welfare system on the other hand. Katrine Fangen, Mari Vaage, “The Immigrant Problem and Norwegian Right-Wing Politicians,” New Political Science 40, no. 3 (2018): 465. The preservation of a state's sovereignty traditionally refers to the framing of immigration as a political threat. Furthermore, the articulation around the “identitarian” axis always refers to a cultural threat, i.e. mass immigration undermines cultural values, existing inside a community. Andrea Bohman, “Who's Welcome and Who's not? Opposition towards Immigration in the Nordic Countries, 2002-2014,” Scandinavian Political Studies 41, no. 3 (2018): 285. And the name of the “securitarian” axis is indeed self-explanatory, in this way the framing of immigration as a security threat refers directly to a state's security and to the `linkage' between terrorism and migration.

As a result of a long-term process of such articulation, today securitization of immigration is seen as the core `justification' for the development of migration policy and its practices. Vicki Squire, “The Securitization of Migration: An Absent Presence?” in The Securitization of Migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 32. In other words, such articulation conditions “the development of exclusive or exclusionary policies”Ibid.: 28., that are quite often described as very controversial ones.

In addition, security studies scholars have identified three main policy areas in the EU where immigration is securitized. First to be mentioned is the border control regime of the EU, and its main constituent part - an independent agency FRONTEX. Due to the fact that borders have regained their symbolic meaning, FRONTEX was established specifically for enhancing the EU border control regime. Lena Karamanidou, “The Securitization of European Migration: Perceptions of Threat and Management of Risk,” in The Securitization of Migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 45. It is believed that this agency is the most apparent instance of securitizing practices, since its main goal is the prevention or minimization of risks and threats, posed by immigration. Ibid.: 45-46. Second policy area where immigration is securitized is the EU externalized migration polices. Such policies are directly associated with the so-called process of `externalization', which refers to the linkage between the EU immigration policies and relation with other (usually non-EU transit) states. The brightest examples of `externalization' is the EU-Turkey deal, in terms of which about 70,000 refugees with rejected asylum applications were returned to Turkey in 2016. Andrew Geddes, Leila Hadj-Abdou, “Changing the path? EU migration governance after the `Arab spring',” Mediterranean Politics 23, no. 1 (2018): 149. In this regard, the process of `externalization' is also called as a regime of “policing at distance”, since the border control is exercised beyond the territory of the EU. Lena Karamanidou, “The Securitization of European Migration: Perceptions of Threat and Management of Risk,” in The Securitization of Migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis, Khursheed Wadia (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 51. In that way, refugees and asylum-seekers are initially prevented from accessing the territory of the EU. And the last policy area to be mentioned is practices of detention and deportation of refugees and asylum-seekers. These practices have been historically used as powerful instruments of controlling immigration flows, that are supposed to be `undesirable'. Ibid.: 52. Consequently, practices of detention and deportation contribute to the process of immigration securitization, drawing clear division line between the national community and refugees (the logic of dichotomization `us and them' can be witnessed). There are about 260 detention centers in the EU with total capacity 32,000. “Migrant detention in the European Union: a Thriving Business,” Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, accessed April 17, 2020, https://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/migrant-detention-eu-en.pdf.

Keeping in mind all mentioned above, we suppose that the articulation of immigration as a security threat might be one of the possible factors, contributing to the shift towards stricter immigration policy in the EU MSs. The `outbreak' of the process of securitization can be fairly enough seen as an initial stage in this shift - according to this logic, in the first-place state representatives should highlight the problem, articulate its `threatening' essence; and only after that the significance of other factors can be observed.

H5: The Schengen MSs with observed process of the articulation of immigration as a security issue tend to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy relativeto the MSs with the non-securitized issue of immigration.

H6: The Schengen MSs without observed process of the articulation of immigration as a security issue tend to pursue softer refugee and asylum policy relativeto the MSs with the securitized issue of immigration.

3.3 Migration as a security issue in the EU transit immigration MSs: special case

H7: The Schengen MSs, that are mostly exposed to the flows of irregular immigration, tend to pursue stricter refugee and asylum policy relative to the MSs, that are exposed to these flows to a lesser extent.

4. Empirical analysis

In accordance with the matrix, elaborated by A. Triandafyllidou and M. Ambrosini, the shift to stricter immigration policy is operationalized as the number of returned to the country of origin applicants for asylum, and this number serves as a dependent variable (DV) in the present research. As it was mentioned earlier, the process of return to the country of origin is supposed to be a part of the fencing strategy, which is less liberal alternative in the given matrix. Information on the number of returned refugees and asylum-seekers was collected from the Eurostat database. “Third Country Nationals Returned Following an Order to Leave annual data (rounded),” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eirtn&lang=en. At the time of data collection, the Eurostat database contained information on the number of returns for all the Schengen countries in the period from 2008 up to 2019.

Furthermore, we have elaborated eight independent variables (IVs) for the present research. Six IVs are continuous, and they are the following: (i) year, i.e. the period from 2011 to 2018; (ii) the total number of applications for asylum in a given Schengen country “Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex - annual aggregated data (rounded),” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&lang=en.; (iii) the total number of TCNs found to be illegally present in a given Schengen country “Third Country Nationals found to be illegally present - annual data (rounded),” Eurostat, accessed May 4, 2020, https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_eipre&lang=en.; (iv) the level of popular electoral support for anti-immigrant political parties; (v) the level of GDP; (vi) the level of unemployment “Total Unemployment Rate,” Eurostat, accessed May 5, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00203/default/table?lang=en.. Data for the independent variable, named `the level of popular electoral support for anti-immigrant political parties' was collected manually, and the list of anti-immigrant political parties, analyzed in the present research, is presented in the appendix 1. For the other two independent variables, (i) status of the issue of immigration and (ii) location of the country, we have coded these variables as dummies: (i) status of the issue of immigration (where securitized - 1, nonsecuritized - 0); (ii) location of the country (where transit - 1, nontransit - 0).

Concerning the dummy variable, named `status of the issue of immigration', we have analyzed the official speeches of high states representatives, such as presidents, prime-ministers and leaders of political parties, whose popular electoral support is significantly high. For the analysis, we have collected text corpora of national state representatives' speeches for the period from 2015 up to 2018. The full corpus consists of 61, 476 words (2-4 speeches per one country - the number depends on the availability of transcribed speeches in English). Furthermore, there are six countries (namely Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta), whose status of the issue of immigration is particularly difficult to establish due to the lack of transcribed speeches of state representatives' in English. That is why, status of these countries was not defined. The analysis itself will be presented in the next subchapter in detail. Finally, concerning the dummy variable, named `location of the country', we have classified all the Schengen states into two categories: transit or nontransit. The criteria for the classification were the following: firstly, the geographical location of the country (whether the country is on the periphery of the EU or not); secondly, the number of first instance applications per inhabitant; thirdly, the number of TCN found to be illegally present per inhabitant. In accordance with these criteria, we have classified 8 Schengen countries as transit, namely Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Spain. While other 18 Schengen states are supposed to be nontransit.

4.2 Analysis of the process of securitization in the EU

The idea of analyzing the process of securitization in the EU is not new, there was a huge number of attempts made in this field. And the most frequently cited conclusion is that the securitization of immigration can be observed in the EU with an “abnormally high presence of security language”. Stephane J. Baele, Olivier C. Sterck, “Diagnosing the Securitization of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims,” Political Studies 63 (2015): 1133. However, we clearly understand that this “abnormally high presence” is the relative importance. As it follows from the previous chapters, asylum and migration policies vary from one MS to another. Representations of the immigrant population also vary significantly. At last, the contexts of the MSs are quite different. It means that theoretically the issue of immigration can be either securitized (the issue is presented as an existential threat, and it requires emergency measures), or politicized (the issue is a part of public policy, and it requires government decision and resource allocations), or even nonpoliticized. Barry Buzan, Ole Waver, Jaap de Wilde, “Security. A New Framework for Analysis,” (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1998): 23-24. And we should take into consideration this spectrum (but we should note that in some instances such a division is rather blurred). That is why, in the present research we are analyzing the discourses on immigration and asylum, that exist on the domestic levels of the EU'S MSs. As a result of the analysis, we will get an IV for further statistical analysis. This variable is supposed to show us the overall pattern of treating the issue of mass immigration in a country.

For this purpose, we have selected official speeches of high state representatives and checked these speeches for the presence of security language. In their research, J. S. Baele and C. O. Sterck have complied a list of words, that are the most common for the security language. And we suppose that this list is a suitable basis for our analysis. The complete list of the `security-language' words is presented in the appendix 2.

Furthermore, the results of the analysis of the process of securitization in the EU's MSs are presented in the table 5. As it can be seen from the table, there are six states (namely Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta), whose status of the issue of immigration is particularly difficult to establish because of the unavailability of state representatives' speeches. That is why, we have not managed to categorize these states. Nevertheless, the other 20 cases were successfully analyzed, and the results for them can be found in the table.

The results we have received are the following: we have found the relatively high level of the `security-language' words during the period from 2015 to 2018 in six cases (namely Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Slovakia), while in other 14 cases the level of the `security-language' words is relatively insignificant. So, let's have a look at the analysis of the cases in a more detail.

By means of the methods of text-mining, we have developed two separate lists of the most frequently used words (these lists are presented in a form of wordclouds and can be found in the appendix 3 and 4). For the six states, that appeared to have the securitized issue of immigration, some of the most frequently used words are the following: `us', `migration', `sovereignty', `manage-'. The frequent use of these words is supposed to be the first prerequisite for us to think about these states as the states with the securitized issue of immigration. Further, we have analyzed the texts of speeches themselves and have looked through the contexts in which the mentioned-above words were used. For instance, looking at one of the speeches of Milos? Zeman (current president of the Czech Republic) extensive use of the security language can be observed: “(…) Muslims, whose culture is incompatible with European culture, I do not believe in their ability to assimilate”. Vladimir Naxera, Petr Krcal, “This is a Controlled Invasion”: the Czech President Milos Zeman's Populist Perception of Islam and Immigration as Security Threats,” Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics 12, no. 2 (2018): 1. In this example the representation of immigration in terms of `identitarian' threat can be noticed. The idea that `Muslims (`them, not us') are not able to assimilate' can be interpreted as a powerful verbal instrument of the rhetoric of dichotomization `us and them'. Such the representation of `them' contributes to the image of refugees and asylum-seekers as people, who can potentially ruin traditional social structures. That is why, they are supposed to be ...