Стратегии интернационализации компаний: влияние факторов неопределенности

Другие авторы утверждают, что создание дочернего предприятия в зарубежной стране является наиболее предпочтительным в условиях высокого уровня неопределенности спроса на факторы производства [Belderbos, Zou, 2007; Song, 2014a; Song, 2014b]. В работе [Chi, Seth, 2009] авторы делают обобщение, что факторами, влияющими на процесс принятия решения о выборе способа проникновения МНК на зарубежный рынок, являются, во-первых, способность компании получить новые знания о данном рынке в будущем (опцион ожидания), а, во-вторых, стоимость опциона переключения с одного способа проникновения на другой.

Реальные опционы и определение момента времени проникновения на зарубежный рынок (marketentrytiming). Включение опциона ожидания в процесс принятия решения о моменте времени проникновения на зарубежный рынок позволяет компании существенно повысить ее конкурентоспособность по отношению к другим компаниям в отрасли. Так называемая «инвестиционная отсрочка» дает МНК возможность ожидать получения большей информации о состоянии рынка для того, чтобы принять разумное решение о моменте капиталовложений [Fisch, Ross, 2014]. Ценность подобного подхода заключается в том, что компания уже будет иметь несколько подготовленных заранее вариантов возможных решений.

В работах [Folta, Miller, 2002; Rivoli, Salorio, 1996] авторы уточняют, что опцион ожидания становится более ценным, в условиях, когда МНК рассматривает возможность долгосрочных капиталовложений, которые будет сложно изъять в будущем. В работе [Song, 2014a] также уточняется, что вероятность изъятия инвестиций увеличивается при повышении уровня неопределенности спроса на факторы производства (например, труд).

Реальные опционы и результаты деятельности МНК. Результаты эмпирических исследований, рассмотренных в рамках данного обзора, показали, что, несмотря на то, что применение реальных опционов само по себе не сможет избавить компанию от всех ее рисков и неопределенностей, МНК, использующие их, показали более высокие результаты их деятельности, чем компании, не использующие их. В работах [Brouthers, Brouthers, Werner, 2008; Belderbosetal., 2014] авторы доказывают, что при использовании реальных опционов компании добираются значительного снижения риска убытков (downsiderisk). В работе [Driouchi, Bennett, 2011] авторы показывают, что с использованием реальных опционов компании могут достигать более высокого уровня рентабельности активов. Кроме того, в работе [Grullon, Lyandres, Zhdanov, 2012] авторы доказывают, что при использовании реальных опционов волатильность доходности акций компании также значительно снижается.

Заключение

В результате данной статьи был выполнен краткий обзор современной литературы по исследованию факторов неопределенности в контексте стратегий международных компаний. Несмотря на то, что применение теории реальных опционов в контексте МНК является относительно недавним направлением исследований, она позволила сформировать понимание действительных выгод для международных компаний в формировании механизма быстрого и гибкого реагирования на неопределенные ситуации. Настоящий обзор подчеркивает усиление роли концепции неопределенности в современных исследованиях в международном менеджменте, а также демонстрирует значительный прогресс в развитии подходов к управлению неопределенностью за последние 20 лет. Безусловно, в данной сфере необходимо дальнейшее развитие теоретических исследований. Одним из возможных направлений для будущих исследований является изучение взаимосвязей между различными факторами неопределенности на развивающихся ранках, и отражения данной зависимости на управленческих решениях в контексте стратегий МНК и их подразделений. Кроме того, иным направлением исследований может стать сравнение стоимости разных видов опционов при смене стратегии МНК - например, продажу части акций дочернего предприятия, выход из альянса и формирование совместного предприятия, заключение нового контрактного производства и т.д. Последним, но не менее важным, направлением для будущих исследований является исследование неоднородности способностей различных международных компаний и их асимметрии между ними при учете неопределенности в своих стратегиях.



Литература

Бухвалов, А. В. (2004а). Реальные опционы в менеджменте: введение в проблему. Российский Журнал Менеджмента, 1, 3-32.

Бухвалов, А. В. (2004б). Реальные опционы в менеджменте: классификация и приложения. Российский Журнал Менеджмента, 2, 27-56.

Бухвалов, А. В., Катькало, В. С. (2012). От истоков исследований менеджмента к будущим парадигмам?: анализ инновационных компаний. Российский Журнал Менеджмента, 10(4), 49-60.

Грант, Р. М. (2012). Современный стратегический анализ. 7-е изд. - СПб.: Питер, 2012. - 544 с.

Контрактор, Ф. Д. (2013). Почему существуют многонациональные компании? Теоретические замечания о влиянии международной экспансии на эффективность фирмы и современной критике методологии подобных исследований. Российский журнал менеджмента, 11(3), 77-98.

Медведев А. Г. (2009). Эволюция «Международного менеджмента» как научной области и учебной дисциплины: опыт и перспективы. Вестник С.-Петербургского ун-та. Сер. Менеджмент 8(4), 154-178.

Медведев, А.Г. (2013) Уровень интернационализации фирмы и эффективность ее деловых операций. Российский журнал менеджмента, 11(3), 53-70.

Медведев, А.Г. Международный менеджмент: стратегические решения в многонациональный компаниях: учебник / А.Г. Медведев; С.-Петерб. гос. ун-т. - СПб.: Изд-во «Высшая школа менеджмента», 2014. - 496 с.

Стиглиц Дж. (2003) Глобализация: тревожные тенденции. Пер. с англ. Г. Г. Пирогова. М.: Национальный общественно-научный фонд, 304 с.

Ahmed, Z. U., Mohamad, O., Tan, B., &Johnson, J. P. (2002). International risk perceptions and mode of entry: a case study of Malaysian multinational firms. Journal of Business Research, 55(10), 805-813.

Ahsan, M., & Musteen, M. (2011). Multinational enterprises' Entry Mode Strategies and Uncertainty: A Review and Extension. International Journal of Management Reviews, 13(4), 376-392.

Bartlett, C. A., & Beamish P. W. (2010) Transnational Management: Text Cases and Readings in Cross Border Management. 6th ed. Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Belderbos, R., & Zou, J. (2007). On the Growth of Foreign Affiliates? Multinational Plant Networks, Joint Ventures, and Flexibility. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(7), 1095-1112.

Belderbos, R., Tong, T. W., & Wu, S. (2014). Multinationality and Downside risk: The Role of Option Portflio and Organization. Strategic Management Journal, 35(1), 88-106.

Boubakri, N., Cosset, J. C., & Saffar, W. (2013). The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(3), 641-658.

Brouthers, K. D. (2002). Institutional, Cultural and Transaction Cost Influences on Entry Mode Choice and Performance. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(2), 203-221.

Brouthers, K. D., & Brouthers, L. E. (2003). Why Service and Manufacturing Entry Mode Choices Differ?: The Influence of Transaction Cost Factors , Risk and Trust. Journal of Management Studies, 40(5), 1179-1204.

Brouthers, K. D., & Dikova, D. (2010). Acquisitions and Real Options: The Greenfield Alternative. Journal of Management Studies, 47(6), 1048-1071.

Brouthers, K. D., Brouthers, L. E., & Werner, S. (2008). Real Options, International Entry Mode Choice and Performance. Journal of Management Studies, 45(5), 936-960.

Buckley, P. (2014). Forty years of internalisation theory and the multinational enterprise. Multinational Business Review, 22(3), 227-245.

Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1985). The Economic Theory of Multinational Enterprise. London: McMillan Press Ltd.

Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1998). Models of the Multinational Enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(1), 21-44.

Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (2009). The internalisation theory of the multinational enterprise: A review of the progress of a research agenda after 30 years. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(9), 1563-1580.

Buckley, P. J., & Ghauri, P. N. (2004). Globalization, economic geography and the strategy of multinational enterprises. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(2), 81-98.

Buckley, P. J., & Strange, R. (2011). The governance of the multinational enterprise: Insights from internalization theory. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 460-470.

Campa, J. M. (1994). Multinational Investment under Uncertainty in the Chemical Processing Industries. Journal of International Business Studies, 25(3), 557-578.

Cantwell, J., Dunning, J. ?., & Lundan, S. M. (2010). An evolutionary approach to understanding international business activity?: The co-evolution of MNEs and the institutional environment. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(4), 567-586.

Chen, W. (2011). The effect of investor origin on firm performance: Domestic and foreign direct investment in the United States. Journal of International Economics, 83(2), 219-228.

Chi, T., & McGire, D. J. (1996). Collaborative Ventures and Value of Learning: Integrating the Transaction Cost and Stategic Option Perspectiives on the Choice of Market Entry Modes. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(2), 285-307.

Chi, T., & Seth, A. (2009). A dynamic model of the choice of mode for exploiting complementary capabilities. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(3), 365-387.

Chod, J., Rudi, N., & Van Mieghem, J. a. (2010). Operational Flexibility and Financial Hedging: Complements or Substitutes? Management Science, 56(6), 1030-1045.

Chung, C. C., Lee, S.-H., Beamish, P. W., & Isobe, T. (2010). Subsidiary expansion/contraction during times of economic crisis. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(3), 501-516.

Chung, C. C., Lee, S.-H., Beamish, P. W., Southam, C., & Nam, D. (Dale). (2013). Pitting real options theory against risk diversification theory: International diversification and joint ownership control in economic crisis. Journal of World Business, 48(1), 122-136.

Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Maloney, M. M., & Manrakhan, S. (2007). Causes of the Difficulties in Internationalization. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(5), 709-725.

Cuypers, I. R., & Martin, X. (2010). What Makes and What Does Not Make a Real Option? A Study of Equity Shares in International Joint Ventures. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(1), 47-69.

Delios, A., & Henisz, W. J. (2003). Policy Uncertainty and the Sequence of Entry by Japanese Firms, 1980-1998. Journal of International Business Studies, 34(3), 227-241.

Demirbag, M., Glaister, K. W., & Tatoglu, E. (2007). Institutional and transaction cost influences on MNEs' ownership strategies of their affiliates: Evidence from an emerging market. Journal of World Business, 42(4), 418-434.

Driouchi, T., & Bennett, D. (2011). Real options in multinational decision-making: Managerial awareness and risk implications. Journal of World Business, 46(2), 205-219.

Driouchi, T., & Bennett, D. J. (2012). Real Options in Management and Organizational Strategy: A Review of Decision-making and Performance Implications. International Journal of Management Reviews, 14(1), 39-62.

Dunning, J. ?., & Lundan, S. M. (1993). Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Eden, L., & Lenway, S. (2001). Introduction to the symposium multinationals: The Janus face of globalization. Journal of International Business Studies, 32(3), 383-400.

Fernandes, R., Gouveia, B., & Pinho, C. (2014). Exploring modes of entry into international markets: direct investment or contractual relations. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 15(1), 56-73.

Filatotchev, I., Strange, R., Piesse, J., & Lien, Y. C. (2007). FDI by firms from newly industrialised economies in emerging markets: corporate governance, entry mode and location. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(4), 556-572.

Fisch, J. A. N. H., & Zschoche, M. (2012). The Role of Operational Flexibility in the Expansion of International Production Networks. Strategic Management Journal, 33(13), 1540-1556.

Fisch, J. H., & Ross, J. M. (2014). Timing Product Replacements under Uncertainty--The Importance of Material-Price Fluctuations for the Success of Products That Are Based on New Materials. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 31(5), 1076-1088.

Folta, T. B., & Miller, K. D. (2002). Real Options in Equity Partnerships. Strategic Management Journal, 23(1), 77-88.

Gaba, V., Pan, Y., & Ungson, G. R. (2002). Timing of entry in international market: An empirical study of US Fortune 500 firms in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 33(1), 39-55.

Grullon, G., Lyandres, E., & Zhdanov, A. (2012). Real Options, Volatility, and Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 67(4), 1499-1537.

Hallsten, M., Korpi, T., & Tahlin, M. (2010). Globalization and Uncertainty?: Earnings Volatility in Sweden , 1985 - 2003. Industrial Relations, 49(2), 165-189.

Hennart, J.-F. (2012). Emerging market multinationals and the theory of the multinational enterprise. Global Strategy Journal, 2(3), 168-187.

Jiang, B., Baker, R. C., & Frazier, G. V. (2009). An analysis of job dissatisfaction and turnover to reduce global supply chain risk: evidence from China. Journal of Operations Management, 27(2), 169-184.

Jiang, M. S., Aulakh, P. S., & Pan, Y. (2008). Licensing duration in foreign markets: A real options perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 40(4), 559-577.

Ketokivi, M., & Jokinen, M. (2006). Strategy, uncertainty and the focused factory in international process manufacturing. Journal of Operations Management, 24(3), 250-270.

Kim, W. C., & Hwang, P. (1992). Global Strategy and Multinationals' Entry Mode Choice. Journal of International Business Studies, 23(1), 29-53.

Kleijnen, J. P., & Smits, M. T. (2003). Performance metrics in supply chain management. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 54(5), 507-514.

Kogut, B., & Kulatilaka, N. (1994). Operatning Flexibility, Global Manufacturing, and the Option of a Multinational Network. Management Science, 40(1), 123-139.

Lai, J. H., Chen, L. Y., & Chang, S. C. (2012). The board mechanism and entry mode choice. Journal of International Management, 18(4), 374-392.

Lee, B.-S., & Min, B. S. (2011). Exchange rates and FDI strategies of multinational enterprises. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 19(5), 586-603.

Lee, S., & Makhija, M. (2009). Flexibility in Internationalization: Is It Valuable during an Economic Crisis? Journal of International Business Studies, 30(5), 537-555.

Leiblein, M. J. (2003). The Choice of Organizational Governance Form and Performance: Predictions from Transaction Cost, Resource-based, and Real Options Theories. Journal of Management, 29(6), 937-961.

Li, J. (2007). Real Options Theory and International Strategy: A Critical Review. In Jeffrey J. Reuer, Tony W. Tong (ed.) Real Options Theory (Advances in Strategic Management, Volume 24) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p.67-101

Li, J., & Li, Y. (2010). Flexibility versus commitment: MNEs' ownership strategy in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(9), 1550-1571.

Li, J., & Rugman, A. M. (2007). Real options and the theory of foreign direct investment. International Business Review, 16(6), 687-712.

Li, J., Li, Y., & Rugman. (2012). Real Options Theory and International Investment Strategy: Past, Present and Future. In Handbook of Research in International Strategc Management, 342-539.

Lopez-Duarte, C., & Vidal-Suarez, M. M. (2010). External uncertainty and entry mode choice: Cultural distance, political risk and language diversity. International Business Review, 19(6), 575-588.

Lukas, E. (2013). Modeling the transitional dynamics of international joint venture policies: An option pricing approach. International Review of Economics & Finance, 27(1), 21-36.

Manuj, I., & Mentzer, J. T. (2008). Global supply chain risk management strategies. International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 38(3), 192-223.

Meyer, K. E., & Thaijongrak, O. (2013). The dynamics of emerging economy MNEs: How the internationalization process model can guide future research. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 30(4), 1125-1153.

Moskowitz, H., Kazaz, B., & Dada, M. (2005). Global Production Planning under Exchange-Rate Uncertainty. Management Science, 51(7), 1101-1119.

Narula, R., & Dunning, J. H. (2010). Multinational Enterprises, Development and Globalization: Some Clarifications and a Research Agenda. Oxford Development Studies, 38(3), 263-287.

Nichols, N. A. (1994). Scientific management at Merck: An interview with CFO Judy Lewent. Harvard Business Review, 72(1), 88-99.

Ragozzino, R., & Moschieri, C. (2014). When Theory Doesn't Meet Practice: Do Firms Really Stage Their Investments? The Academy of Management Perspectives, 28(1), 22-37.

Rangan, S. (1998). Do Multinationals Operate Flexibly? Theory and Evidence. Journal of International Business Studies, 29(2), 217-237.

Reuer J.J. & Tong T.W. (2007a). How Do Real Options Matter? Empirical Research on Strategic Investments and Firm Performance. In Jeffrey J. Reuer, Tony W. Tong (ed.) Real Options Theory (Advances in Strategic Management, Volume 24) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p.145 - 173

Reuer J.J. & Tong T.W. (2007c). How Do Real Options Matter? Empirical Research on Strategic Investments and Firm Performance. In Jeffrey J. Reuer, Tony W. Tong (ed.) Real Options Theory (Advances in Strategic Management, Volume 24) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, p.3-28

Reuer, J. J., & Leiblein, M. J. (2000). Downside Risk Implications of Multinationality and International Joint Ventures. The Academy of Management Journal, 43(2), 203-214.

Reuer, J. J., & Ragozzino, R. (2006). Agency hazards and alliance portfolios. Strategic Management Journal, 27(1), 27-43.

Reuer, J. J., Tyler, B. B., Tong, T. W., & Wu, C. W. (2012). Executives' Assessments of International Joint Ventures in China: A Multi-Theoretical Investigation. Management and Organization Review, 8(2), 311-340.

Rivoli, P., & Salorio, E. (1996). Foreign Direct Investment and Investment under Uncertainty. Journal of International Business Studies, 27(2), 335-357.

Rugman, A. M., & Li, J. (2005). Real options and International Investement. Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA: An Elgar Reference Collection.

Sanchez-Peinado, E., Pla-Barber, J., & Hebert, L. (2007). Strategic variables that influence entry mode choice in service firms. Journal of International Marketing, 15(1), 67-91.

Schilling, M. A., & Steensma, H. K. (2002). Disentangling the theories of firm boundaries: A path model and empirical test. Organization Science, 13(4), 387-401.

Slangen, A. H. L., & van Tulder, R. J. M. (2009). Cultural distance, political risk, or governance quality? Towards a more accurate conceptualization and measurement of external uncertainty in foreign entry mode research. International Business Review, 18(3), 276-291.

Song, S. (2014). Entry mode irreversibility, host market uncertainty, and foreign subsidiary exits. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 31(2), 455-471.

Song, S. (2014). Subsidiary Divestment: The Role of Multinational Flexibility. Management International Review, 54(1), 47-70.

Song, S., & Lee, S.-H. (2012). Host Country Uncertainty, Intra-MNC Production Shifts, and Subsidiary Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 33(11), 1331-1340.

Tallman, S., & Fladmoe-Lindquist, K. (2002). Internationalization, Globalization, and Capability-Based Strategy. California Management Review, 45(1), 116-135.

Tallman S, Yip G. 2009. Strategy and the multinational enterprise. In The Oxford Handbook of International Business (2nd edn.), Rugman A (ed). Oxford University Press: New York; 307-340.

Tan, D., & Mahoney, J. T. (2006). Why a Multinational Firm Chooses Expatriates: Integrating Resource-Based, Agency and Transaction Costs Perspectives. Journal of Management Studies, 43(3), 457-484.

Tang, O., & Nurmaya Musa, S. (2011). Identifying risk issues and research advancements in supply chain risk management. International Journal of Production Economics, 133(1), 25-34.

Teece, D. J. (1986). Transactions cost economics and the multinational enterprise. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7(1), 21-45.

Teece, D. J. (2014). A dynamic capabilities-based entrepreneurial theory of the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 45(1), 8-37.

Teece, D., & Pisano, G. (1994). The dynamic capabilities of firms: an introduction. Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(3), 537-556.

Tihanyi, L., Griffith, D. A., & Russell, C. J. (2005). The effect of cultural distance on entry mode choice, international diversification, and MNE performance: A meta-analysis. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(3), 270-283.

Tong, T. W., & Reuer, J. J. (2007b). Real Options in Multinational Corporations?: Organizational Challenges and Risk Implications. Journal of International Business Studies, 38(2), 215-230.

Tsang, E. W. (2005). Influences on foreign ownership level and entry mode choice in Vietnam. International Business Review, 14(4), 441-463.

Tsang, E. W. K. (2000). Transaction Cost and Resource-Based Explanations of Joint Ventures: A Comparison and Synthesis. Organization Studies, 21(1), 215-242.

Vahlne, J. E., & Johanson, J. (2013). The Uppsala model on evolution of the multinational business enterprise - from internalization to coordination of networks. International Marketing Review, 30(3), 189-210.

Westney, D. E., & Zaheer, S. (2001). The multinational enterprise as an organization. In The Oxford Handbook of International Business (2nd edn.), Rugman A (ed). Oxford University Press: New York.

Wu, D., & Olson, D. L. (2008). Supply chain risk, simulation, and vendor selection. International Journal of Production Economics, 114(2), 646-655.

Zhao, H., Luo, Y., & Suh, T. (2004). Transaction Cost Determinants and Ownership-Based Entry Mode Choice: A Meta-Analytical Review. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(6), 524-544.

Zhao, L. (2001). Unionization, vertical markets, and the outsourcing of multinationals. Journal of International Economics, 55(1), 187-202.

Zhou, V. Y., & Wang, P. (2013). Managing foreign exchange risk with derivatives in UK non-financial firms. International Review of Financial Analysis, 29(1), 294-302



Working Paper, № 4 (E) - 2016.

Graduate School of Management,

St. Petersburg State University: SPb, 2016.

INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE ACQUISITION BY A FOREIGN OR LOCAL PARTNER

A. Bukhvalov, O. Alekseeva

Managing on international joint venture post-formation is a critical decision for both foreign and local managers. Reviewing the literature in international and strategic management, the authors discuss recent findings of research on international joint venture acquisition by a foreign or local partner over the past 15 years. In doing so, the authors provide an in-depth review of theoretical foundation of IJV acquisition by one of the partners, the dominant determinants and a framework of research on IJV acquisition by a foreign or local partner. This proposed framework groups eight determinants and integrates the antecedents of IJV formation - described by complementary assets between partners and previous experience of a foreign and local partner, initial IJV characteristics influence - described by ownership structure, control and bargaining power, shifts of IJV characteristics - by three previous determinants and IJV performance, moderators - uncertainty, learning and new experience influences, and the decision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. As a conclusion, the authors provide several recommendations for future research.

Keywords and phrases: international joint venture (IJV); IJV acquisition by one of the partners; determinants of IJV acquisition by one of the partners.



Introduction

How firms manage their collaborations is a central concern of strategy researchers (Tong & Li 2013). Forming international joint ventures (IJVs), a form of strategic alliances, remains a well acknowledged and frequently implemented international market entry strategy (Nemeth & Nippa 2013), especially in emerging markets (Lu & Ma 2008; Abramkov & Panibratov 2012). Yet they are also known to cause substantial management challenges, conflicts of interests, drawbacks, and inefficiencies; many strategic alliances fail to realize their expected potential (Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Kumar 2014). Following (Preffer & Nowak 1976), researchers defined joint ventures (JVs) as “legally and economically separate organizational entities partially held by parent organizations that collectively contribute resources to pursue strategic objectives”. The JV becomes an international joint venture (IJV), when it involves at least one foreign partner (Lukas, 2013). In cases when new entity is started, a foreign firm can enter greenfield IJV with local partner by shearing the IJV's ownership with him. When taking over existing local firm, a foreign firm can also form IJV through partial acquisition with the current owner by acquiring only partial equity of the target (Chen & Hennart 2004).

IJVs had attracted significant research attention during the last decades. Thereby, the initial focus of research was on IJV formation (Chung & Beamish 2010) - a variety of key objectives and aspects have been studied from different theoretical perspectives - see the literature reviews in (Makino et al. 2007; Beamish & Lupton 2009). Generally, IJVs provide foreign companies with advantages to rapidly expand their presence in new geographical markets, share risks andcreate economies of scale, learn new skills and get new experience in host markets, receive needed resources and facilitate effective resource sharing between partners (Park & Ungson 1997). But while IJVs offer these opportunities, they at the same time are also well known to cause various challenges (Kaplan et al. 2010; Ernst & Bamford 2005; Dyer et al. 2004). For example, researchers have examined inter-partner conflicts (Chung & Beamish 2010), challenges with knowledge transfer (Steensma et al. 2008), partner's potential opportunistic behavior (Puck et al. 2009) and utilization of partner's resources outside the venture for private benefits (Kumar 2010b). The paradox in this regard is that the same advantages that IJVs provide also make them particularly sensitive to additional challenges (Kumar 2010b).

As the research field on IJV formation reached a certain level of maturity, the focus shifted towards IJVs' post-formation (Chung & Beamish 2010). Research on IJV post-formation - according to previous literature reviews on this topic (see Zeng & Yan 1999; Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Beamish & Lupton 2009) - finds its foundation in pioneering study by Franko (1971). It has been 16 years since Zeng & Yan (1999) have published the first literature review on this subject. While research examining IJVs has greatly enhanced our understanding of IJV post-formation since then, many scholars are still concerned about the dominance of static perspective in several topics, such as IJV research on collaborative learning (del Mar Benavides-Espinosa & Ribeiro-Soriano 2014), on ownership structure (Iriyama et al. 2014; Chung & Beamish 2010) and on bargaining power (Contractor & Reuer 2014). Moreover, they mention the lack of precise differentiation of IJV post-formation modes, i.e., acquisition by one of the partners, dissolution, or sale to a third firm (Nemeth & Nippa 2013) and the debated conceptualization of IJV performance and its determinants (Ren et al. 2009).

As a result, there are still several often-debated issues on this topic, especially on IJV acquisi-tion by one of the partners.

In this study, we focus on phenomenon of IJV acquisition by one of the partners, which lies at the intersection of three fields - strategic management, corporate governance (a transfer of property rights) and corporate finance (IJV performance). We consider two-partners IJVs. Generally, a local partner is more likely to have an extensive network in the host country (cli-ents, suppliers, business groups, etc.). In contrast, a foreign partner will find it more difficult to access such networks, but it has more advanced technologies and management skills. The initial purpose for IJV formation was in achieving a synergy between two partners. Suppose that an IJV agreement did not provide one of the partners with an explicit right to acquire the stake of another one. After exercising the venture for some time, under what conditions are the partners more likely to decide to transfer the equity stake of one partner to its counterpart? Why a giving partner, rather than its counterpart, is more likely to acquire the partner's stake and will obtain full equity control of the venture?

This review differs from the previous ones in two significant ways. First, it provides a synthesis on IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner as a distinct IJV post-formation mode. Second, it discusses the major determinants of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. IJV acquisition by one of the partners means that one partner acquire the other partner's share (Bleeke & Ernst, 1991; Hennart et al. 1999) and obtains full equity control of the venture (Brouthers & Bamossy, 2006). Studies using such labels as internalization by one of the part-ners (Park & Ungson, 1997), conversion of joint ventures into wholly owned subsidiaries (Steensma et al. , 2008; Puck et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2013), one partner acquires the JV business (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997), decision to buy out or sell off an IJV (Reuer, 2002), ac-quisition of joint venture (Kogut, 1991; Chi & McGuire, 1996; Chi, 2000; Folta & Miller, 2002; Reuer & Tong, 2005; Li et al, 2010; Iriyama & Madhavan, 2014) and joint venture buy-outs (Marjit & Chowdhury, 2004; Habib & Mella-Barral, 2007; Sinha, 2008; Hek & Mukher-jee, 2011; Lukas, 2013) tend to explore the same management phenomenon and are included to this review.

Two main factors motivated this review of the research on IJV acquisition by a foreign or local partner. First, while several scholars continue to add new and diverse insights on IJV acquisition by one of the partners (Chi & Seth 2009; Mata & Portugal, 2015), and other scholars call for revising previous research (Makino et al. 2007; Nemeth & Nippa 2013; Iri-yama et al. 2014), the field would benefit from an overview of the dominant determinants of IJV acquisition by one of the partners. There is need for a framework to integrate research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners and provide direction for future research. Second, nota-ble findings in research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners from related disciplines, such as finance (Habib & Mella-Barral, 2007; Lukas, 2007; Banerjee & Mukherjee, 2010; Lukas, 2013), accounting (van der Meer-Kooistra & Kamminga, 2015), economics (Sinha, 2001; Hek & Mukherjee, 2011), and behavioral economics (Marjit & Chowdhury, 2004; Sinha, 2008), have not been integrated into the management literature. Applying a modeling approach, researchers from these disciplines offer unique perspectives on IJV acquisition by a foreign or local partner.

The goal of this review is to systematically examine the theoretical foundation of the is-sue that has been covered the past 15 years, to identify determinants of IJV acquisition by one of the partners, and to suggest important areas of future research. Additionally, we develop a framework of research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners. On the basis of this review and discussion of the literature, we propone several suggestions for future research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners.



1. Background

Traditionally, multinational companies (MNCs) have formed joint ventures with local partners to enter emerging markets, exploit the opportunities they present, and acquire skills and knowledge about the local environment. Until the end of the 1990s, IJVs accounted for over 60% of foreign direct investments (FDIs) in developing markets (Kale & Anand 2006). In a research conducted by Gulati et al. (2008), it has been noted that in 2000 about 10,200 alliances (equity and non-equity) were formed worldwide, furthermore, by 2007 almost 80% of Fortune 1000 CEOs said strategic alliances (and IJVs as a part) have been responsible for more than 25% of their companies' revenues. Additionally, government regulations play an important role in influencing the formation and structuring of IJVs in several emerging mar-kets, where regulatory restrictions typically mandated the formation of IJVs in these countries till the mid-1990s (Kale & Anand 2006). For example, foreign ownership regulations have been established in several industries in India, the industrial policy in South Korea had a great impact on foreign equity participation, and IJVs were the only available entry mode to foreign companies in most industries in China (Lu & Ma 2008). However, later subsequent regulatory restrictions were relaxed in most emerging economies that influenced on existing IJVs and new ones - such as in India many existing IJVs have been terminated; also, in China, many IJVs were acquired by foreign partners (Kale & Anand 2006; Chang et al. 2013; Athreye et al. 2009). Additionally, while until 1997 IJVs were the dominant mode of ownership chosen by foreign firms in China, firms entering after 1997 preferred to establish WOSs. In 2004, about 50% of existing FDIs in China were organized as IJVs and approximately 40% as WOSs, however, in the same year only 27% of new investment projects were still formed as IJVs, while more as 70% started as WOSs (Puck et al. 2009).

Nevertheless, IJVs are still one of the most important alternatives for companies pursu-ing international market entry strategies (Makino et al. 2007; Nemeth & Nippa 2013). A study conducted in 2009 by the professional service company KPMG reported that 50% of the sur-veyed companies expected an increase in joint venture involvement over the next two years, with more than half of these being international (Joint Venture …, 2010). More recently, in 2014 an American multinational management consulting firm, McKinsey, reported that inter-national joint ventures are still associated with growth in the coming years. In fact, 68% of companies from the survey expect an increase in their joint-venture activities over the next five years (Rinaudo & Uhlaner, 2014). Similarly, in 2015 a multinational professional services firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers, reported that forming JVs with local partners has remained a viable option for MNCs in recent years (for example, 78% of the interviewed companies expressed their willingness to enter new partnerships in China). According to data from China's Ministry of Commerce, IJVs remain the second-largest ownership mode for utilizing foreign direct investments after WOSs (China Deals …, 2015).

IJVs, on average, create value for partners (Kumar 2010a), especially partner-IJV busi-ness relatedness and R&D activity are found to have a great impact (Merchant & Schendel 2000). This value creation has been proved by a number of research examining stock price reactions to JV formation, e.g. (Reuer 2000; Tong et al. 2008; Kumar 2010a; Merchant 2014). However, many studies have shown that IJVs also confront a high rate of acquisition by one of the partners (see Table 1). Although, Kogut (1991) have used such metaphors for describ-ing IJV as an “instrument to manage the dependency of the partner firms on the uncertainty of resources”; a “bridge” and “a platform for possible future development”. Some researchers have agreed that IJVs are associated with a temporary organizational mode (Steensma et al. 2008).

Table 1. Tabulation of Research on IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners

Authors	Location	Years	Findings
(Bleeke & Ernst 1991)	USA, Europe, Japan	1960-1990	49 IJV in the sample, 75% of which were acquired by one of the partners.
(Kogut 1991)	IJV located in USA, which had at least one American partner	1975-1983	92 IJV in the sample, 30% of which were terminated by dissolution, 40% by acquisition.
(Park & Ungson 1997)	USA, Japan	1979-1988	186 IJV in the sample, 42% of which have been terminated by acquisition, 43% by dissolution, and others were censored.
(Folta & Miller 2002)	IJV in USA	1978-1999	285 IJV in the sample, 8% of which were terminated by acquisition of one partner, 12% - were terminated by acquisition of the third party, 30% - were dissolved, 50% - remained the IJVs.
(Steensma et al. 2008)	IJV in Hungary	1996-2001	150 IJV in the sample, 42% of which were converted into wholly-owned subsidiary of MNE partner, 41% remained the IJVs, 17% were liquidated.
(Puck et al. 2009)	IJV in China	2002-2006	94 IJV in the sample, 29% of which were converted into wholly-owned subsidiary of MNE partner, 71% remained the IJVs.
(Cui et al. 2011)	JV located in USA (mixed sample of IJVs and domestic JVs)	1990-2001	150 JVs in the sample, 49% of which were terminated by acquisitions, 9% - by dissolution.
(Chang et al. 2013)	IJV located in China	1998-2006	19,557 minority international joint ventures, 4.3% of which were converted to wholly-owned subsidiaries of MNE partner, others remained joint ventures.
(Iriyama & Madhavan 2014)	IJV with one Japanese partner	1986-2003	218 IJV in the sample, 63% of which were acquired by one of the partner.
(Mata & Portugal 2015)	IJV located in Portugal	1983-2008	3697 IJV in the sample, 45% of which have been terminated by acquisition; 32% by closure.

Source: created by the authors

2. Theoretical Perspectives

Research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners explains this phenomenon by draw-ing mainly on transaction cost economics (TCE), e.g. (Park & Russo 1996; Park & Ungson 1997; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; Puck et al. 2009; Chang et al. 2013), real option theory, e.g. (Kogut 1991; Folta & Miller 2002; Kumar 2005; Reuer & Tong 2005; Tong et al. 2008; Chi & Seth 2009; Cuypers & Martin 2010; Tong & Li 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Chi 2000; Chi & McGuire 1996), bargaining theory, e.g. (Inkpen & Beamish 1997; Reuer 2002; Brouthers & Bamossy 2006; Steensma et al. 2008; Mata & Portugal 2015; Chi & Seth 2009) and learning theory (Cuypers & Martin 2007; Habib & Mella-Barral 2007; Kumar 2010a; Chang et al. 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Mata & Portugal 2015). Several researchers implement these theories in complementary manner, for example (Chi & McGuire 1996; Inkpen & Beamish 1997; Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004).

Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).

According to TCE, IJV formation occurs due to the lower transaction costs compared to alternative international entry modes (Nemeth & Nippa 2013). Foreign firms are more likely prefer the formation of an IJVs, when a local firm offers complementary knowledge - such as a deep understanding of local markets or access to distribution channels and natural resources, which cannot be easily purchased on the host market (Chang et al. 2013). While TCE can explain the adaptation of governance structures to changing circumstances (Cuypers & Martin 2007), it has been criticized for its static perspective (Cuypers & Martin 2007). Following the TCE perspective, Park and Russo (1996) and Chang et al. (2013) found that high assets speci-ficity and the high ratio of intangible assets - in case of incorporated R&D activity into IJV - is positively associated with IJV acquisition by one of the partners. Although Puck et al. (2009) documented that the decrease of perceived external uncertainty - political, legal, eco-nomic, and social - is positively associated with IJV acquisition by foreign partner. Analyzing another ex ante determinant, Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) proposed that high initial equity stake by one of the partner will be a signal of his dominance in a conflict dissolution and higher control within the IJV that can has positive effect on propensity of IJV acquisition by dominant partner.

Real Option Theory (RO).

RO theory deals with decision making under various types of uncertainty. According this theory, IJV partner (as a call option holder) will hold the option open either until it expires or until the value of the underlying asset exceeds the strike price at which the firm can increase its equity share (Cuypers & Martin 2007). According to this perspective, IJVs are associated with organizational mechanism that help partners manage different types of uncer-tainty (exogenous and endogenous) in a proactive manner (Reuer & Tong 2005). B. Kogut in (Kogut, 1991) was the first who implemented the RO theory to the issues of IJV acquisition by one of the partner by examining the effect of demand uncertainty on the timing when one JV partner will acquire the stake of the other one (in other words, exercise call option). After this paper a number of researchers have examined IJV acquisition by one of the partners either theoretically, applying mathematical models, e.g. (Chi & McGuire 1996; Chi & Seth 2009; Chi 2000) or empirically, e.g. (Folta & Miller 2002; Kumar 2005; Reuer & Tong 2005; Tong et al. 2008; Cuypers & Martin 2010; Tong & Li 2013; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014).

While some researchers (Kogut 1991; Chi & McGuire 1996; Chi 2000; Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014) assumed that all IJVs - both with explicit and implicit call options - can capture the growth option value for partners, other researcher (Reuer & Tong 2005; Tong et al. 2008) criticized this assumption. Explicit call options are contractual clauses conferring a partner in an IJV the legal right to acquire equity stake of its counterpart (Tong & Li 2013). According to this point of view, without a explicit call option clause the gains from IJV acquisition by one of the partners may be partially or fully appropriated by the selling partner, who may also appreciate the business's enhanced value (Reuer & Tong 2005).

Bargaining and Learning Perspectives.

The initial ownership structure in an IJV is the outcome of negotiations, in which rela-tive bargaining power is a deciding factor; subsequently, the relative bargaining power be-tween both partners explains deviations from full ownership in an IJV (Cuypers & Martin 2007). The authors (Inkpen & Beamish 1997) were the first who studied the dynamics of bar-gaining power between partners after IJV formation. They have proposed that learning is the most important determinant of changes in relative bargaining power between IJV's partners. Previously, authors have used various metaphors to describe IJVs (Kumar 2010a), for exam-ple, a “learning race” by Hamel (1991) - as knowledge and know-how are acquired from the partner, the dependence of one partner on the other is reduced and the likelihood of IJV acquisition by this partner increases (Cuypers & Martin 2007; Steensma et al. 2008; Mata & Portugal 2015). However, other authors (Hennart et al. 1999; Habib & Mella-Barral 2007; Kumar 2010a) have found no evidence of learning races between the IJV partners. Addition-ally, contrary to the expectation of the learning perspective, Chang et al. (2013) have found that older IJVs are less likely to be acquired by one of the partners.

3. A Framework of Research on IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners

The authors identified eight determinants of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partners: complementary assets, ownership structure, control, bargaining power, experience, learning, uncertainty and IJV performance. Each of these determinants is reviewed in detail below, and the discussion on research using each determinant is offered. As a result of this review, a framework of research on IJV acquisition by one of the partners has been developed (see Fig-ure 2). The proposed framework groups eight determinants and integrates the antecedents of IJV formation (complementary assets between partners and previous experience of a foreign and local partner), initial IJV characteristics influence (described by ownership structure, con-trol and bargaining power), shifts of IJV characteristics (three previous determinants and IJV performance), moderators - uncertainty, learning and new experience influences, and the de-cision of IJV acquisition by one of the partners.

Complementarity.

One of the most structural parameter that may influence the decision of JV acquisition by one of the partners is the degree of resource complementarity between partners, defined as “the extent to which the resources of foreign and local companies are dissimilar yet potentially combinable to generate synergies” (Cui & Kumar 2012). According to Kumar (2010a), these complementary resources may include technical knowledge, production knowledge, financial resources, and knowledge related to a target market such as customer characteristics, distribution channels, knowledge of culture and institutions, etc. While IJVs enable partners to combine complementary knowledge and exploit various opportunities (Kumar 2005; Kumar 2010b), this is not a sufficient condition: it does not guarantee a positive joint value for both partners (Chi & Seth 2009; Kumar 2014). Although, the divergence in complementary assets between the IJV partners is more likely leads to potential divergence between the partners' understanding of the IJV value (Tong & Li 2013). These researchers have found that the greater a firm's complementarity with the IJV compared to its partner, the more likely this partner will acquire the stake of the other partner (Tong & Li 2013). On the other hand, ac-cording to learning perspective the proportion of resource complemetarity between IJV part-ners will differ in time (Chi & Seth 2009; Fang & Zou 2010) - as more partners learn about each other, the initial conditions will evolve (Inkpen & Currall 2004). Besides looking at the direct relationship between complementarity and IJV acquisition by one of the partners, some studies have investigated the indirect impacts of complementarity on IJV acquisition by one of the partners through other underlying mechanisms such as learning and experience (Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014).

Figure 2

A Framework of Research of IJV Acquisition by One of the Partners

ANTECEDENTS

-Complementary assets between partners

- Previous experience of a foreign and local partner

INITIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IJV

- Ownership structure

- Control

- Bargaining power

SHIFTS OF IJV CHARACTERISTICS

- Ownership structure

- Control

-Bargaining power

- Performance

IJV ACQUISITION

- By foreign partner

- By local partner

UNCERTAINTY FACTORS

- Exogenous uncertainty

- Endogenous uncertainty

LEARNING FACTORS

- Continuous learning

- New experience

Note: The solid line means the direct effect; the dashed line - the moderating effect.

Source: created by the authors.

Ownership structure and control.

Other important determinants that influence the decision of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner are the ownership structure and control. The ownership structure of IJV partners determines the division of control between them (Makino et al. 2007). According to Ren et al. (2009), control is associated with the amount of decision power, which each partner implements in influencing the IJV in order to achieve its goal. Several researchers noted that equity has been interpreted as a measure of control and dominance in an IJV - major control of the partner leads to the less propensity for conflicts, because major decisions can be easily made by a dominant partner (Dhanaraj & Beamish 2004; Mata & Portugal 2015). While others argued that equal split of ownership creates more interdependence between partners, because the balanced ownership structure creates impetus from both sides to save the cooperative partnership (Chung & Beamish 2010), especially under high uncertainty about partner capabilities (Chi & Seth 2009).

As larger equity stake do not necessarily lead to better IJV performance (Beamish & Lupton 2009; Ren et al. 2009), as researchers differ substantially in their findings with regard to the link of ownership structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners. For example, Puck et al. (2009), Iriyama and Madhavan (2014), Mata and Portugal (2015) demonstrated that majority ownership structure is associated with the high likelihood of IJV acquisition by the dominant partner. On the contrary, Tong et al. (2008), Cuypers and Martin (2010), Tong and Li (2013) empirically found that minority partner will have the higher propensity for IJV acquisition. More specifically, Chang et al. (2013) found that the relationship between the ownership structure and the likelihood of IJV acquisition by foreign partner is an inverted U-shape. This lack of consensus on the link of ownership structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners has affiliated researchers to adopt a different view of ownership effect. For instance, Steensma et al. (2008) observed a moderating effect of conflicts on the relationship between ownership structure and propensity of IJV acquisition by foreign or local partner. Future research is encouraged to continue this path to examine the other factors that influence the relationship between ownership structure and IJV acquisition by one of the partners.

Bargaining power.

Bargaining power among IJV partners is determined by each company's resource contribution to the IJV or the relative strategic importance of the IJV to each company (Ren et al. 2009). Researchers argued that the initial ownership structure reflects the initial distribution of bargaining power among partners and control over the firm (Yan & Gray 1994; Mata & Portugal 2015). Partner with greater equity stake may be advantaged in the negotiation with other partner because of greater bargaining power (Iriyama & Madhavan 2014). Researchers have found that a partner with greater bargaining power tends to acquire the equity stake of the other partner because it has higher control over the IJV and thereby can easily achieve its private benefits (Bleeke & Ernst 1995; Chi 2000; Chi & Seth 2009; Iriyama & Madhavan 2014; Mata & Portugal 2015). Furthermore, IJV acquisition associated with shifts in partners' bargaining power - “[t]he key understanding whether an alliance is likely to lead to a sale is to project how bargaining power will evolve” (Bleeke & Ernst 1995). The authors (Inkpen & Beamish 1997) have assumed that shifts in bargaining power occur when a partner of an IJV acquire sufficient knowledge and skills to eliminate a partner dependency. Most researchers studied bargaining power shifts, predominantly, from a foreign partner perspective of view. While some scholars have added that the decrease of MNC's bargaining power is associated, for example, with external uncertainty, especially in emerging markets (Reuer & Tong 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & Kamminga 2015), most researchers associated greater bargaining power with MNCs, a-priory. However, some scholars concern about domination of such view and call for new studies on bargaining power shifts (Contractor & Reuer 2014).

...