Republicanism and rule-following: subjectivity in the later ludwig wittgenstein's philosophy of language and philip pettit's theory of freedom

Chapter III. Pettit's solution to rule-following paradox and its implementation in his political theory

Pettit's solution to the rule-following paradox

In order to resolve the paradox of rule-following Pettit applies to it the theory of response-dependence that was developed in dispositionalism - a theory for which skeptical paradox is a typical kind of criticism. Originally, response-dependence theory was introduced by Mark Johnson (1989) and then developed by Crispin Wright (1989). Their original idea was that objects make normal subjects in normal conditions disposed to perceive them in a certain way, their qualities become salient to the subjects so they have certain responses and conceive of the rule corresponding to the salient quality. This approach should have shown how rules are at the same time dependent on the reality and fallibly readable. What Johnson and Wright tried to do in their works is to outline the criterions for normal subjects and conditions so their account could be fully objective and not require any subjectivity that could contaminate it.

Skeptical paradox poses a number of problems before dispositionalist theories. Frank A. Hindriks describes them the following way:

The normativity problem pertains to the fact that a rule prescribes a particular application for all the situations to which it applies. In each situation, there is a correct and an incorrect way of applying a rule. A theory of rule-following must be able to account for mistakes. (Hindriks 2004, 67)

The ?niteness problem pertains to the idea that rules apply to an in?nite number of situations. Accounting for this is thought to be problematic because, given their limitations, human beings are unlikely to be able to grasp something that pertains to an in?nite number of situations. That human beings are ?nite seems to imply that it is indeterminate which of a set of rules they follow. (Ibid, 68)

The justi?cation problem pertains to the claim that a rule-following subject must be able to justify the way in which she applies a rule. (Ibid, 69)

Dispositionalism cannot solve normativity problem because it cannot explain how particular responses can be mistaken. It cannot help with infinity problem because our responses are finite. Finally, dispositionalists cannot solve justification problem because dispositions are not rational, they do not demand explanation, they are intuitive, they are “no better than a stab in the dark” (Kripke1982, 23).

Kripke thinks that Wittgenstein does not solve these problems per se but suggests not to start asking questions that lead to them while communication and language work well. The only option that Kripke leaves us is going with the flow assuming that everything is fine until we face misunderstanding caused by different interpretation of rules. In this case, we have to rely on practices of interpretation that are accepted in a particular community.

Pettit (1990; 1991) combines communitarian and dispositionalist approaches. He supposes that rules are formed in two stages. Just like in Johnson and Wright's works objects have particular objective properties that become salient to the subjects and make them disposed to conceptualize them in a particular way. The subjects are disposed to distinguish similar properties in similar objects and perceive the rules of interpretation of these properties as similar. If the subjects and the circumstances were normal then this inclination would lead the subjects to interpret the rules correctly. An important thing in Pettit's (1993) theory is that the rules are a priori connected not to the objects as In realist view but to the circumstances. The objects still exemplify an infinite number of rules. The circumstances restrict this number to a particular rule.

The rules in Pettit's theory have an a priori connection to the inclination of the agents to interpret particular properties of the objects when the agents are given full information about the objects. However, the formation of this connection for the agents should be proceeded in a posteriori fashion. The rule itself is not a priori. “It is a matter for empirical checking that the inclination leads a subject correctly or incorrectly” (Ibid, 95).

This empirical checking is performed both in interpersonal and intrapersonal domains. Pettit calls his account “ethocentric” since “ethos” means both “habit” and “practice”.

“It identifies normal circumstances by reference, first, to the habits of response among subjects - say, their dispositions to have certain sensations in the presence of red objects - and, second, to their practices of negotiation about discrepancies in those responses.” (Ibid, 93).

Unlike Johnston and Wright, Pettit does not try to identify the criterions for normal subjects and conditions. He leaves it to the subjects to identify them for themselves. When communicating to other subjects we either face mutual understanding or not. We tend to seek for consistency in verdicts of different people at different time. As well as in Kripke's interpretation we have no problems when our interpretation of a particular rule is consistent in time or with interpretations given by other people. However, when our interpretations diverge we tend to think that something has gone wrong and seek explanation for that. When the verdicts made in the similar circumstances diverge, the verdicts are considered as less reliable. That is how favorable and unfavorable conditions get picked out.

It is only the process of adaptation of the concept that is important. We do not have to question our rule-following every time we follow a rule because we follow it out of habit. We only need to reconsider this habit when our verdicts concerning particular objects diverge from the verdicts of other people. When it happens we do not have to question the rule itself but only the normality of subjects or circumstances in which the rule was adopted or is applied. In such a way, the process of rule-following becomes a customary practice. The subjects do not need to question the rule every time we follow a rule as in the skeptical paradox suggests. They follow them automatically and only need to question them when face discrepancy. This leaves a space for the rules to be still fallible and explains why discrepancies in our perception of rules emerge.

This way Pettit combines moderate realism saying that we acquire our inclination to interpret particular properties in a particular way in particular circumstances with social constructivism saying that these inclinations have to undergo a process of deliberation among the subjects in order to be recognized as rules and this recognition should be both interpersonal and intrapersonal.

As well as in Wittgenstein and Kripke's interpretation the rules remain mostly socially determined. Therefore, the way the agent interprets the world in Pettit's theory depends on the way other agents do that. They coordinate the way they see and understand the world. In Wittgenstein's words, they mutually construct their [inner] worlds that are limited and determined through the language and concepts they use. Pettit's theory as well as Wittgenstein and Kripke's one does not limit the subjects to their own private worlds but broadens these worlds into the intersubjective space turning this space into common, intersubjective world. Consequently, the subjects are influenced by this intersubjective, external world but, at the same time, they can influence and form this world too. In such a way, they become a part of this world.

The main difference between Pettit's and Wittgenstein-Kripke's theories is that Kripke provides purely sociotropic or communitarian mechanism of adoption of the concepts and rules. He solves the paradox of rule-following pointing to the society and practices of interpretation that are common in this society. He also admits that it is possible that our interpretations of the rules may be completely different and we may not be able to do anything about that as we live in completely different worlds.

Pettit makes the theory of rule-following reality-based and open to pluralism. He describes how the rules are connected to the properties of objects. At the same time, he leaves a possibility of fallacy of these rules saying that subjects can fail in description of these properties if the circumstances in which the rules were adopted or applied or the subjects that apply and adopt them were not normal. The discrepancy in responses of the agents is explained in his theory not just by the difference in communal practices of interpretation but also by the differences in the circumstances of the application of a particular rule and the agents applying the rules. However, this difference in his theory is not insurmountable as in Kripke's one. It can be overcome through deliberation and discussion of the differences in knowledge of the agents.

Implementation of the solution of the rule-following paradox in Pettit's political theory

Now let us proceed to Pettit's political theory. I am particularly interested in his book A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (2001) because it is a rare philosophical book that starts building a political theory on the basis of epistemology. There he does not directly refer to Wittgenstein and Kripke or to the paradox of rule-following. Nevertheless, he often references his research on this matter and implements the same logic and same theoretical instruments such as response-dependence as when solving this paradox.

He points out three main connotations of freedom that were previously suggested in one of his earlier works:

The first is that the agent can be rightly held responsible for what he or she did; if the action was free then there can be nothing against thinking that the agent should have to answer for it. The second is that the action freely chosen is one that the agent can own, thinking: this bears my signature, this is me. And the third is that the agent's choice was not fully determined by at least certain sorts of antecedents; it was not fully determined, for example, by a hypnotic suggestion or an unconscious complex or childhood conditioning. (Ibid, 6)

Here, we already see three sides of freedom: objective (underdetermination), subjective or sociotropic (ownership), and intersubjective (responsibility) as their combination. Pettit already tried to combine these accounts in his epistemology. The objective part is represented by the condition of normal circumstances in which the properties become salient to the agents making them disposed to interpret them according to a particular rule but still remain fallible. The subjective side is represented by the condition of normal agents that become disposed to follow a particular rule that they form under the influence of the objects in normal circumstances. The intersubjective account is represented by the combination of these two conditions.

Unsurprisingly, Pettit prioritizes the last account that is based on responsibility as it fits his threefold scheme the most and unlike the other two accounts implies that all three of them should be present. “There is a certain underdetermination and a certain ownership implied in the very idea of being fit to be held responsible for something“ (Ibid, 7). In order to be fit to be held responsible the agents must recognize their actions and their beliefs that led to these actions as their own and no other factors other than their awareness of what they ought to do should be counted as something that could fully determine what they actually do. Underdetermination and ownership on the contrary do not automatically imply responsibility. Underdetermination does not fit the requirement of threefold mutual interdependence of the connotations of freedom because the agents are not necessarily responsible for everything that happens inside them - like illness or anger, for example - or that is done by their hands - like if one accidentally falls or performs an action in the heat of passion. Ownership fails to satisfy this requirement because not everything the agents own is something they can be held responsible for. For example, it can be something like genes, property, or legacy that they inherited from their ancestors. They cannot change these things and never could so they cannot be praised or held responsible for them.

The conundrum connected to underdetermination is following. “At the moment of choice [of a course of action] it must have been possible for the agent, regardless of the causal regime and causal history of the world up to that point, to have done otherwise” (Ibid, 9). The agent must possess the capacity “to have done otherwise as their capacity to have acted, if not counter to all the causal influences on the action, at least counter to those particular antecedents” (Ibid.). This conundrum is obviously reminiscent of the normativity problem since it requires the explanation of how the agent could act contrary to all circumstances, how their actions could be unpredictable and fallible.

This capacity according to Pettit is grounded in our discursive practices. When we communicate with someone whom we consider as an equal discursive partner, we tend to expect them to follow the same rules and reasons we elaborated together. Therefore, if they do something that goes against our common reasoning we can assume that this action does not necessarily elicit something about their general dispositions towards reason itself, about them being completely unreasonable but “that a freak malfunction blinded or inured [them] to the claim of the reasons, or an untypical visitation of impulse or passion, oversight or illogic” (Ibid, 96). It means that we assume that the circumstances were not normal and that if we could “discourse with [them] at the moment of action, making reason's claims more salient and compelling, then [we] might well have nudged [them] towards the right action” (Ibid.). Otherwise, we will think that their beliefs and desires have changed so our interpretation of rules became different but we can still explain this difference through reasoning maintaining the unity of our common world.

Here, Pettit uses the same logic and even the same language (“salient”, “disposed”, and “rules”) as when he solves the skeptical paradox. He shows how and why other persons' actions can be different to our understanding of a reasonable action as well as he shows how other persons' interpretation of rules and properties can be different in case of rule-following. The rules in both cases remain fallible due to the differences in the circumstances or in the interpretation of the rules. Nevertheless, the agents remain owning their actions, beliefs and desires and responsible for them.

While Pettit's criticism of the account of freedom as underdetermination explores the requirement of rule-following for freedom of a person, his criticism of the account of freedom as ownership of one's action is meant to investigate a more fundamental requirement of “intentional ascent” that is needed for a subject to be thinking even before rule-following. “Intentional ascent is the requirement that an intentional system should not only have intentional states with contents--states like the belief that p, the desire that q, and so on--it should also have intentional states that are about such contents” (Pettit 1993, 61).

In the theory of freedom as ownership in order to consider their first-order actions and volitions as their own, the agents should also own their second-order volitions (or at least any higher order volitions) and be able to act and want the other way they actually do. Pettit illustrates the difference between first and second-order volitions on the example of drug-addicts. While drug-addicts may have an immediate desire to take a drug due to their addiction, they may also have a higher-order volition not to be addicted to drugs.

The problem with this account is that to own means to actively endorse and not to feel as a bystander towards something and the agents to not necessarily actively approve or disapprove of their beliefs and desires. They may be indifferent towards them and consequently they would be inconsistent in the way they choose the course of actions and their interpretation of the rules. “Such a person would quickly prove unconversable, being incapable of being successfully held to discursive standards” (Pettit 2001, 89).

This conundrum is connected with the justification problem. The response that cannot be justified also cannot be regarded as a rule guarding a rule-follower the same way the agent that feels indifferent towards their beliefs and desires and that cannot justify them cannot be regarded as guarded by them.

The same problem concerns an intentional subject without intentional ascent.

If an agent was unable to form beliefs of this kind, then it would not know what it was for the properties in question to be instantiated. And in that case it could not form desires for the properties in question and could not therefore act intentionally with a view to having its intentional states display the properties. In brief, it could not think. (Pettit 1993, 65)

Pettit again partially uses his solution to rule-following paradox to solve this problem. In order to overcome this problem, agents should be actively involved in discursive practices together with others, make promises and be held responsible for them. His solution repeats the idea that the agents should participate in discursive practices with other agents in order to choose the rules and the cases in which they are relevant that Pettit used to solve the skeptical paradox.

Finally, the problem with interpretation of freedom as being fit to be held responsible is that responsibility should be recursive. The agents should be responsible not only for their actions but also for their desires and beliefs that led to these actions and for the desires and beliefs that underlie these desires and beliefs and so on into infinity. That also means that they should own this desires and volitions and they should not be fully determined by the preceding events. This conundrum is connected to the finiteness problem because finite subjects cannot give infinite justifications to their beliefs and desires and the beliefs and desires that they are based on and so on.

Again, Pettit combines objectivistic and sociotropic approaches when solving this problem. On the one hand, we have a set of events that cause our reactions, responses, desires and volitions that objectively exist. On the other hand, we have an infinite regression of responsibility for these reactions, responses, desires and volitions. In order to combine them Pettit again turns to discursive control.

“To discourse is to reason and, in particular, to reason together with others” (Ibid, 67) - says Pettit referring to Tomas Michel Scanlon. Reasoning is our subjective instrument of interpretation of external, objective events. However, it only effectively works when is done together. Otherwise, it leads to a solipsist, privatized interpretation of the world, which cannot establish any rules because any finite set of examples can be interpreted anyway possible when the agents do not face any discrepancy between their responses and the reality or the responses of other subjects.

As well as Wittgenstein and Kripke Pettit suggest that the agents should interpret the world together with each other controlling for each other's responses and discussing discrepancies in them. His solution is that the subjects should be immersed into discursive and reasoning practices in order to be fit to be held responsible and consequently to be fit to counted as free. In this way they would avoid determination and take responsibility for their beliefs and desires that drive them because they themselves formed the discourse that determines these beliefs and desires.

Under this line of thought, the indefinite regress with which the recursive problem threatens us is replaced by a harmless circle or, better, spiral. You are fit to be held responsible for acting with or against reason so far as you are disposed to respond to reason. Yet you are fit to be held responsible for being disposed to respond to reason - strictly, for continuing to be disposed to respond to reason so far as you are fit to be held responsible for routinely succeeding in acting with reason. (Ibid, 99)

That is why according to Pettit in order to be fit to be held responsible the agents should understand the concept of responsibility. That is the first requirement for a thinking subject. In order to follow the rules, in order to be held responsible, they should be also capable of understanding what responsibility is. Their intentional states should be meaningful.

Otherwise, they would be excluded from the discourse and would not be fit to be blamed or praised for their actions. They would not know what actions are bad or good. They would not take part in the process of determination of good and bad. Consequently, they would not be able to go against common reason when performing actions because they were never a part of the process of reasoning. They would just be in the best-case intentional agents but not thinking subjects.

Thus, the concept of freedom as being fit to be held responsible is perspective-dependent the same way as all the other concepts are response-dependent. It is a priory connected with the ideal circumstances, in which it can become salient and lead the subject to correct responses concerning it. At the same time, the process of its adoption is a matter of empirical checking and collective reasoning, during which favorable and unfavorable circumstances get picked up and a certain perspective gets chosen. It does not compromise realism since the identified properties are objective and there is an a priori connection between freedom and responsibility. At the same time, it does not endorse it too much because they become salient only from a certain perspective that is determined in the process of reasoning.

It may be that we can only get to conceptualize freedom from the responsibility perspective - it may be that freedom only becomes salient from that perspective - but there is no reason to think that freedom is called into existence by the adoption of the perspective or that there is nothing more to being free than being seen in a certain way from that perspective. (Ibid, 29)

Observers who were not party to that practice - Martians, perhaps - might be able to identify the property of freedom as the property that leads those who are party to the practice to ascribe fitness to be held responsible; this parallels the way in which colour-blind people are able to identify the property of redness as the property that leads those who are not colour-blind to ascribe redness. (Ibid.)

Having defined freedom as fitness to be held responsible Pettit continues to develop this definition in three interconnected dimensions and in each of them freedom has three connotations. In the first dimension freedom is associated with freedom of action, self and person. In the second dimension freedom is connected to rational, volitional and discursive control. The third dimension explores the connotations of freedom as non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. I will talk about them briefly because in dealing with them Pettit implements the same logic the same logic as before and this discussion is not essential for the sake of my argument but I will refer to these conceptions further.

The first half of the book is dedicated to the types of control as they are applied to action, self and person. Free action is defined as an action that is subjected to a particular type of control. Free self refers to intrapersonal constitution of the agent. Free person is the interpersonal status that the agent enjoys.

The theory if freedom as rational control requires of the agents nothing more than to operate as intentional subjects and act in accordance with their beliefs and desires. The problem of this theory as in concerns the free action that is its primary target is that it does not require recognition of any standards of rationality that guide the agent's actions. The agents following rational control do not need to be thinking subjects. Such an agent cannot be held responsible for anything. This line of criticism is very similar with the normativity problem that emerged from rule-following paradox. The standards Pettit is talking about require right and wrong interpretation of rules and actions that are guided by beliefs and desires.

Being applied to the free self requires identification, in case of rational control it is identification with ones beliefs and desires. This theory fails in this domain because it does not explain why the agent that operates under rational control must identify with the actions they perform.

Finally, free personhood tells about the relationships of the agent with other individuals. First and foremost, being a free person means that the agent is not coerced by the others into doing something they do not want. The theory of rational control fails on this account as the agent can retain rational control being coerced into doing something because hostile coercion still lives us with a choice and having and making such a choice is compatible with having rational control over one's actions.

Volitional control requires of the agents not to feel as bystanders towards their own actions, beliefs and desires. This theory is primary made to explain the freedom of self. In this domain, it tries to solve the bystander problem by introducing first- and second-order of beliefs and desires. I have already said that such a theory fails because the choice of second-order desires as superior to all other levels is arbitrary. There can be an infinite regression of orders of volitions that this theory cannot explain how to choose from, which is why it is connected with the justification problem since it cannot account for how the agents should choose a rule to follow out of infinite number of possible rules. The same problem is faces by this theory when it is applied to the free action. It cannot account for infinite regression of beliefs and desires of different levels explaining each other. Finally, this theory faces the same problem as the previous one when applied to free person as it is again compatible with coercion. At the moment of coercion, the agents still have a choice between different options and act in accordance with the beliefs and desires that are relevant to the situation.

The last type of control is discursive control that is first of all applied to the free person but it extends of the free self and the free action. According to this theory, an agent will be a free person as far they have the ability to discourse and they have the access to discourse that is provided within such relationships. This theory does not consider any form of coercion as compatible with freedom; it gives resolves the bystander problem by the fact of the agent's participation in the discourse where they refer to themselves in the first person and endorsing certain responses; and it successfully passes the test on freedom of action as the actions of the agent that has discursive control correlate with their beliefs and desires and these beliefs and desires are publicly expressed and justified.

The second half of the book is dedicated to political entities and collective subjects. There Pettit presents three ideals of freedom that can be applied from collective agents in order to judge whether the individuals composing them are free: these are the ideals of non-limitation, non-interference and non-domination. The ideal of non-limitation suggests that any limitation on the agents' actions - be it intentional or non-intentional, interpersonal or impersonal limitations - takes away their freedom. The problem with this ideal is that it does not discriminate between different kinds of limitations and, as a consequence, allows for some kinds of limitations to be imposed on the agents for the sake of diminishing other limitations. This approach allows for obstruction and coercion made for the sake of achievement of “greater freedom”. However, the agents that are coerced cannot enjoy discursive control over their lives because their voice is excluded from the process of deliberation.

The ideal of non-interference demonizes only interpersonal limitations imposed by other agents while treating impersonal limitations imposed by nature as secondary evil. However, this ideal does not discriminate between arbitrary and non-arbitrary interference that was authorized by the agents for their own good such as for example sailors tying Ulysses at his request so he could listen to the sirens but not kill himself because of their magic. Condemning all kinds of interference this ideal of freedom tends to view some non-coercive practices as coercion. What's more, this ideal is incapable of recognizing hostile coercion that does not require interference. Take, for example, a wife at the times when women were not allowed to have a job whose wellbeing is dependent on benevolence of her husband. Her discursive power is obviously diminished compared to his so she cannot enjoy full discursive control over her life creating rules for herself.

Finally, Pettit introduces the political ideal that he is most famous for, the ideal of non-domination. This ideal requires not just absence of any experience of interference but “any exposure to a power of arbitrary interference, whether or not that power is exercised” (Ibid, 139). Including “arbitrariness” in it, this definition excludes authorized non-hostile coercion from being counted as violation of freedom. Addition of “exposure to power” instead “experience of power” makes it more sensitive to coercion that does not manifest itself in actual interference. Such a definition lets the agents enjoy discursive control and fulfills all the requirements of free actions, free self and free person. Non-domination requires the agents to be involved in communal practices on equal terms with others so they could together elaborate the rules according to which they would they should live and act.

Conclusion

To sum it up, Pettit restricts Kripke's solution of skeptical paradox by making it a little more realistic in a sense that he ties the language and the rules not only to the community that implements the rules in a particular way but also to objectively existing properties, which become salient to us when we contemplate them. At the same time, he restricts realism by the paradox of rule-following stating that the properties can only become salient to agents and be interpreted in a certain way from a particular point of view that is determined by the practices adopted by the society of language-users. In his interpretation, qualities of the objects become salient to the agents and make them disposed to certain interpretation.

However, these interpretations are bound to discursive practices so the rules emerge only in the process of common reasoning. The same story goes in political life. The agents learn particular concepts in the process of collective reasoning. Being immersed in the discourse, they get authorized by other agents as reasonable. In such a way, they become fit to be held responsible for their actions and therefore to be considered as free. Nevertheless, these actions remain underdetermined and the agents consider these actions as their own because the process of reasoning does not insure that all our interpretations of the concepts and rules will always coincide.

Chapter IV. Epistemological argument against domination based on application of private language argument in political theory

Introduction

Now, when we finally connected Pettit's epistemology and political theory and showed how Wittgenstein's ideas influenced political philosophy, we can explore the implications of Pettit's research on Wittgenstein on his political thought. I particularly want to concentrate on the relationships of rule-following with private language. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, they represent two sides of one coin. Rule-following implies impossibility of private language because rule can only be public. It can only be followed together with others because otherwise the practice of rule-following cannot be fallible since only one subject determines the rule so it cannot be assured that they indeed follow a rule and not interpret accidental series of facts or events as a rule without possibility of their interpretation to be challenged.

The same I suppose is true for freedom and domination as its antipode. In this chapter, I want to take the epistemological argument against socialism made by Hayek and Giddens that was discussed in the second chapter, show how and why it is wrong, and turn it into an epistemological argument against domination. Pettit does not really talk about private language argument and, consequently, about the problems connected with domination because these things seem obvious to him; it is an ideal that a society must strive to achieve but he does not explain why it is an ideal. Using the theory of his continental counterpart in republican theory Hannah Arendt I want to explore the nature of unfreedom and show that in its essence it contradicts to the existence of political society. Relying on the discussion about rule-following and private language I want to show that only free and equal cooperation based on political institutions as a form of life can constitute a political society while attempts to destroy other people's freedom destroy political community and become its form of death.

The argument against domination

Totalitarian movements as an extreme case of domination and absence of rules

I think Hannah Arendt's (1963; 1968) works on totalitarianism can be illuminating in this matter. It should be noted that although Pettit and Arendt both belong to republican tradition their understanding of the mechanisms that insure freedom of the society is quite different (Gloukhov 2015; Breen 2019). However, I do not consider Arendt's theory of freedom; I am only interested in her theory of totalitarianism. As Arendt shows, totalitarian regimes have to rely on compliance of the people. Holocaust was successful in killing Jews only in countries that helped the Germans because their citizens already had prejudice towards them. This is supported, for example, by the fact that Nazi media-propaganda against Jews affected only those who already had prejudice against them (Adena et al. 2015). Even in totalitarian regimes, the government cannot suppress alternative opinions to the point of non-existence so they have to make people believe that the government is always right so it would be unnecessary to change the rulers or influence their decisions from the bottom up. As Arendt shows, totalitarian rules do not impose their will on the masses but vice versa guess what the masses want. They feel frustration and anger in the masses, find out their worst desires and intentions, and exploit them creating a movement that destroys everything at its way and constantly demands sacrifices. Totalitarian leaders do not operate facts - they create a reality that becomes the reality when they proclaim it because the masses make it come to life.

Arendt's totalitarianism is off course is an extreme example of non-free government. However, it is illuminating in two ways. First, is that such a non-free government does fully deprive agents from their agency and free will. They are no doubt intentional agents but it is hard to call them rule-following agents. Their reality is constantly falsified and as a result the empirical checking is impossible; they have to adjust their beliefs and desires to the beliefs and desires of the leader and the masses; rule-following is impossible because the rules are constantly changing to the point of non-existence. This is why the main characteristic of totalitarian regimes according to Arendt is that they are based on totalitarian movements. They can only exist when everything is changing and nothing is stable. They always need to destroy something and redefine the borders of the Political. Unlike liberal/socialist or conservative/communitarian regimes that want to stabilize them they cannot exist without wars and purges, which means that they are constantly destroying either some other political communities or their own community. Despite the promise of unity that these regimes bring the individuals in them are extremely atomized. They live in a state of constant terror and exclusion from the political community, which leads to them being proclaimed the enemy of the people and killed.

The absence of rules and atomization are sings and the result of privatization of language in politics. Combined with an intense struggle for power, control for the interpretation of rules and for the elusive reality it leads to the horrors of totalitarian regimes that constantly destroy everything stable because it cannot be controlled. The reality and control over it always slips away exactly because private language is impossible. Arendt's description of the structure of the totalitarian movement is very similar to Wittgenstein's description of the way our realities are interconnected by the use of language presented in his work On Certainty (2008) that has been discussed in the first chapter. The closer the subjects to each other, the more their use of language is similar because their practices of its use are similar - the more they expect each other to give similar interpretations to things and events. The same way the movement has its core and periphery that have very different understanding of the rules and interpretations of events proclaimed by the government and they consider themselves as parts of the same movement because the understanding changes through different layers of the party depending on how close they are to the leader.

This leads us to the second illuminating moment - interdependence of political agents. Since the agents cannot be fully deprived of their agency and free will, the government has to find ways to make its subjects do what the government wants. In democracies this problem is partially resolved by the fact that ideally it is the government that performs the will of the agents so following the instructions of the government the agents perform their own will and not someone else's. Autocracies and totalitarian regimes try to do otherwise and make people do what they want. However, they actually cannot do that not convincing people that they act for their good or perform their will or that following the instructions of the government the people would achieve these things. The government has to take into the account the will of the people because the people still hold some amount of discursive power but it is just distributed unequally.

This picture is very similar to the relationships between rule-following and private language. Private language is impossible because any language is based on rules and rules can be rules only when they can be fallibly read, which can only be noticed and pointed out by other agents. This makes the language users interdependent in each other. The same way political actors are interdependent on each other and cannot fully deprive other actors of their power and rule the political community solely by their own will not looking at what the others want.

Roman institute of dictatorship as an example of collective rule-following that is successfully performed even when pluralism of opinions is restricted

There are cases, however, when political community is at a first glance successfully led by the will of one person and this will is not challenged. I want to address the institute if dictatorship in Roman Republic as an example of it. I think “dictatorship” is an extremely appropriate word here because it combines both exclusive power concentrated in one hands and an exclusive ability to speak since the word comes from Latin dicere “say, speak”. Dictators are the people that get an exclusive right to speak and give interpretations to the rules. Ancient Roman institution of dictatorship is a great example of suspension of pluralism and politics made in extraordinary circumstances when res publica is in danger. In normal times, all other authorities share power so that they could oppose each other and no person could oppress other citizens by holding too much of it. Different branches of the public power - imperium - were necessary to balance each other and the public power itself was necessary to balance the private power of mighty individuals - dominium (Петтит 2016). It is notable that imperium - public power - was originally created for protection against dominium - private power - while in liberal philosophical thought it is considered vice versa and it is the private sphere that should protected against the public power.

In case of danger, different branches of power in Roman Republic temporary give up these powers risking giving them to one person so that agonism would not endanger the community in times of antagonism with another political entity. They do that because the antagonism threatens the existence of the community from outside while agonism that usually preserves its unity from within by not letting peaceful competition between the citizens to turn into antagonism can lead to hesitancy and incoordination that could cost it its freedom or even existence. To preserve themselves the members of the community have to give up their disagreements and in a way even agency transferring it to the dictator and acting in accordance with their will as if it is their own will. Nevertheless, they paradoxically remain free.

The citizens paradoxically remain free while having renounced their ability to choose a course of actions. This paradox could be resolved if we return to the idea of different orders in beliefs and desires. On lower-levels, the citizens might want to disagree with the dictator and act according to their own beliefs and desires. At the same time, since at times of crisis the survival might need sharp and extremely coordinated action, they might abandon their lower-level beliefs and desires and submit to the will of the dictator because their higher-order beliefs and desires tell them that they should do so because they want to survive the state of emergency.

However, there is still a problem. As I have shown before, when people have to adjust their beliefs and desires because their life is at threat it is coercion. In order to remain free they should be protected from arbitrariness of dictator's will. They need to believe the dictator will not, for example, surrender their community to the enemy in exchange for some benefits for themselves or use the extraordinary power that was given to them to oppress other citizens or for profit. That problem is again resolved by the fact that there are institutions in place that would ensure that the most suitable person would be chosen for the position of the dictator, that there would not be abuse of power on the side on the dictator. These institutions are a part of life of the citizens and the trust to the dictator is based on the trust to the institutions. Only this way the appointment of a dictator does not split the collective political agent by creating hierarchy between the dictator and other citizens.