An analysis of Anselm’s philosophical theology and the problem of man’s freedom in his De Concordia

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An analysis of anselm's philosophical theology and the problem of man's freedom in his de concordia

Rostislav Tkachenko

Abstract

Rostislav Tkachenko

An Analysis of Anselm's Philosophical Theology and the Problem of Man's Freedom in His De Concordia

The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this “knowledge-will” framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm's intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God's foreknowledge and will, on the one side, and human free will, on the other side, as it is presented in the work entitled De Concordia. In this treatise Anselm of Canterbury partially uses and further elaborates some ideas of Augustine and Boethius, while integrating, updating and synthesizing them in a creative manner, and partially develops a number of thoughts of his own. As a result, there is a set of the well-formulated and comprehensive theses concerning (i) different types of (metaphysical) necessity, (ii) a proper definition of freedom of choice and will, (iii) the nature of will per se, and, finally, (iv) unique relation of “simultaneity” that exists between God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's rational will. These ideas are presented and explicated in the article along with detailed exposition and analytical examination of the main line of argumentation found in the De Concordia.

Rostislav Tkachenko, Ph.D. candidate at Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven; Th.M. (Master of Theology and Religious Studies), Assistant Professor of Historical Theology at Odessa Theological Seminary of Evangelical Christians-Baptists, Adjunct Professor of Historical Theology at Lviv Theological Seminary

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Ðîñòèñëàâ Òêà÷åíêî, Äîêòîðàíò áîãîñëîâ 'ÿ â Ïðîòåñòàíòñüêîìó (ªâàíãåë³÷íîìó) Áîãîñëîâñüêîìó óí³âåðñèòåò³, ì. Ëåâåí, Áåëüã³ÿ (Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven, Belgium), ìàã³ñòð áîãîñëîâ'ÿ ³ ðåë³ã³ºçíàâñòâà; âèêëàäà÷ ³ñòîðè÷íîãî áîãîñëîâ'ÿ â Îäåñüê³é áîãîñëîâñüê³é ñåì³íàð³³ ªÕÁ, ïîçàøòàòíèé âèêëàäà÷ ³ñòîðè÷íîãî áîãîñëîâ 'ÿ ó Ëüâ³âñüê³é áîãîñëîâñüê³é ñåì³íàð³¿Õª

Ðîñòèñëàâ Òêà÷åíêî, Äîêòîðàíò áîãîñëîâèÿ â Ïðîòåñòàíòñêîì (Åâàíãåëè÷åñêîì) Áîãîñëîâñêîì óíèâåðñèòåòå, ã. ˸âåí, Áåëüãèÿ (Evangelische Theologische Faculteit, Leuven, Belgium), ìàãèñòð áîãîñëîâèÿ è ðåëèãèîâåäåíèÿ; ïðåïîäàâàòåëü èñòîðè÷åñêîãî áîãîñëîâèÿ â Îäåññêîé áîãîñëîâñêîé ñåìèíàðèè ÅÕÁ, âíåøòàòíûé ïðåïîäàâàòåëü èñòîðè÷åñêîãî áîãîñëîâèÿ â Ëüâîâñêîé áîãîñëîâñêîé ñåìèíàðèè ÕÂÅ

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to discover, understand, present and analyze the key ideas of St. Anselm concerning the notions of (God's) knowledge, (divine and human) will and the mode of divine-human relations in the context of this «knowledge-will» framework. It is going to be done on the basis of a specific book written by Anselm of Canterbury and dedicated to the just-announced philosophical and theological problem. This issue - that of the relations between different subjects' «knowledges» and wills - has been regarded as both interesting and even compelling for centuries, and its various nuances have been studied by many thinkers (Augustine, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent, William Ockham and others in the Middle Ages; Calvin, Arminius, Voetius, Descartes, Molina, Suarez, Spinoza and many others in the modern times). This is why its perennial philosophical significance goes without saying.

However, the potential of medieval discussions on the discussed subject has not been fully uncovered and brought to the fore. Specifically, Anselm's work entitled «On the harmony (or agreement) of the foreknowledge, and predestination, and grace of God with the free choice» and frequently abbreviated De Concordia did not receive sufficient attention and analytical consideration. Some classical introductions to the history of - medieval or generally western - philosophy (e.g. by Gilson, Kenny, Copleston and some others) give only fragmentary and partial information about the whole issue, sometimes omitting or underemphasizing the Anselmian contribution. Some scholars conducting a more detailed research on the topic (e.g. Craig [Craig, 1988], Hopkins and Visser and Williams See chapters «Doctrine of Man, Freedom, and Evil» in [Hopkins, 1972: p. 122-186]. Cf. [Hopkins, 1967; especially P. 26-44]. See chapters «Modality» and «Freedom» in [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 149-169, 171-191]; see also [Visser & Williams, 2004: p. 179-203].) do more justice to both the topic and its treatment by St. Anselm. Nevertheless, Craig due to some reasons omits Anselm in his exposition of medieval theories of the divine foreknowledge and its relation to the theoretically contingent future of creatures, Hopkins concentrates on other treatises by Anselm and at one point even mistranslates him (I will show and discuss it later), and Visser and Williams present a good exposition of

Anselm's view, yet they do not fully unfold the conceptual contents of the De Concordia. This is why a systematic exposition and (re)analysis of this oeuvre, together with a reappraisal of its author's theology of the knowledge and the will, is needed.

Thus, the object of the given paper is a specific area of Anselm of Canterbury's philosophical theology: the understanding of relations between God's (fore)knowledge and will on the one side and human free will on the other. The material source for such a study is to be found in such oeuvres as his earlier De libertate arbitrii (DLA) [Anselmus, 1938b] and De casu diaboli (DCD), and later De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae dei cum libero arbitrio (DC) [Evans, 2002: p. 86-87]. But it is the latter work that will be examined in detail within the scope of this essay, although from time to time I will refer to or mention the former ones or even some others (e.g. Cur Deus homo). Hence, by and large, this essay is primarily an examination of St. Anselm's De Concordia and the ideas contained in it.

The Latin text is taken from the critical edition of Anselm's Opera Omnia, edited and published by F.S. Schmitt [Anselmus, 1940b]. The English translation is taken from the edition of Anselm's key theological and philosophical texts prepared and published by J. Hopkins and H. Richardson [Anselm, 2000d]. I will avoid referring to the specific pages of these magnificent collections of primary texts and prefer to cite them according to the internal division of the text: DC (title = De Concordia) II (book), 3 (paragraph).

As for the tools used for conceptual and philosophical analysis of this medieval text, I will employ insights and observations made by Jasper Hopkins [Hopkins, 1972; & 2003: p. 138151], G.R. Evans [Evans, 2002], Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams [Visser & Williams, 2009] and some others. But primarily I will draw upon Hopkins' and Evans' work, although, as I hope, my dependence on them will not bear an uncritical and overwhelming character. My specific goal here is to see what understanding Anselm of Canterbury had of the knowledge and the will in God and in humans, and in which sense it was (not) unique, (not) innovative or possibly influential for later generations of medieval thinkers. It is crucial to know that before one starts investigating any later medieval developments (such as the thought of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas on the subject), since the medieval theology is a story of continuity and discontinuity and of preservation and constant renewal of western thinking [De Rijk, 1985: p. 68-69; Bély, 2013: p. 413]. Hence, these continuities and discontinuities need not to be overlooked and have to be carefully analyzed.

1. Terminological and conceptual introduction to St. Anselm's thinking on the «knowledge-and-will» issues

Before proceeding to the survey and analysis of the text of the De Concordia, I would like to shortly introduce and clarify terms and concepts which Anselm uses when writing about the «knowledge-and-will» issues. Of specific importance are such terms and concepts as (fore)knowledge ((prae)scientia), predestination (praedestiantio), will (voluntas), choice (arbitrium), necessity (necessitas), freedom (of the will) (libertas), and, finally, grace (gratia). Their meanings should be explained in the following manner on the basis of Anselm's own definitions and explications I put this short glossary in the beginning for purely didactic reasons. In fact, this section was written only after some basic studies in the primary texts have been done. Thus, it is not to be understood as my own reading into Anslem's text or an unlawful imposition of my own ideas upon his world of thought. Rather, it is an effort to clarify the terms and concepts used as early and as clearly as possible..

Scientia always refers to the knowledge - whether divine or human - of the true fact, real person or real thing. Thus, it means the possession of the truthful information about some really existing objects or really happening events. Consequently, praescientia refers to the - divine only - possession of unquestionably true information about the events which are going to occur in the future. Nam non est aliud praescire quam scire futurum, et ideo si praescit deus aliquid, necesse est illud esse futurum (DC I, 3) «... [S]ince to foreknow is nothing other than to know the future; and so if God foreknows some event, it is necessary that this event be going to occur».

Unless otherwise indicated, all the English translations of Anselm's writings are taken from J. Hopkins and H. Richardson's work, already cited above:[Anselm, 2000a; specifically: 2000b; 2000e]..

Praedestiantio, quite simply, is the same as foreordination (praeordinatio) and predetermination (praestitutio). Thus, it means the divine act of deciding on what is going to occur (praeordinare, quod est statuere futurum esse) before it has actually occurred (DC II, 1).

Voluntas or velle is to be better identified as the voluntas rationalis (DLA 13). It means a rational will that can be found both in God and man. «In relation to reason the will is the faculty of consent whereby a person chooses to act upon certain of his desires. But the will itself is also an instrument of desire (concupiscentia et desiderium)» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. Thus, the voluntas is a multifunctional faculty or ability characteristic for rational beings: it can be either (i) the desire or wish for something, quoniam et concupiscentia et desiderium voluntas est (DCD 7) Unless otherwise indicated, all the Latin quotations from Anselm's writings are taken from [Anselmus, 1938a; 1940a; 1940b]., or (ii) the ability to make decisions on the basis of preceding rational deliberation, atque voluntatis est ut ipsa quoque reprobet ac eligat, quemadmodum rationis intellectus monstrat. Ad hoc enim maxime datae sunt rationali creaturae voluntas et ratio (DC I, 6) «Moreover, it is the prerogative of the will to reject, and to elect, in accordance with what rational discernment teaches. For to this end, especially, will and reason have been given to rational creatures»..

In a more complex analysis, the will in Anselm's works means three different things: (a) the deliberative force or «the instrument of willing» (voluntas instrumentum), interpreted by J. Hopkins as «the faculty of will» itself, (b) the affection (voluntas affectio), i.e. «various dispositions, inclinations or affections» of will, and (c) the actual use of this deliberative faculty in light of its dispositions (voluntas usus), i.e., the very acts of willing, the volitions themselves (DC III, 11) [Hopkins, 1972: p. 142-143]. These three aspects are to be clearly differentiated - yet, without separation - from one another, since all of them elucidate on the meaning and the mode of functioning of the will as such. Yet, only the first category can serve as a definition of the will qua will. The second speaks more of the substructure or specific aspects of the will's activity while the third highlights the practical aspect - the «work» of the faculty.

Arbitrium for Anselm is the same as a rational creature's (free) choice of something or (free) judgment (iudicium) on something (DC I, 6). This is the mode of the will's proper functioning. The will is said to operate per liberum arbitrium or sola arbitrii libertate, when it is not constrained by any kind of necessity and acts sponte, i.e. freely, spontaneously, on its own (DC II, 3; III, 1). The archbishop of Canterbury straightforwardly states that there are two options or modes of decision-making: aut sponte aut ex necessitate (DLA 2). Thus, the arbitrium implies a rational choice or rational decision made freely. A good example of such a choice made can be found in the story of the fall - both that of angels and human beings. Anselm speaks of it, explicating the notion of (free) choice, in DLA 2:

Per liberum arbitrium peccavit apostata angelus sive primus homo, quia per suum arbitrium peccavit, quod sic liberum erat, ut nulla alia re cogi posset adpeccandum. Et ideo iuste reprehenditur, quia cum hanc haberet arbitrii sui libertatem, non aliqua re cogente, non aliqua necessitate, sed sponte peccavit1.

It is obvious, then, that necessitas is seen as an opposite of free choice. It refers to an external - in relation to a rational creature with the faculty of will - power of coercion, compulsion and restraint, which he sometimes calls the vis necessitatis. Necessitas enim videtur sonare coactionem vel prohibitionem (DC I, 1)8. It is easy to note that, following Augustine, Anselm «thinks of necessity as either compulsion or prevention - and therefore of freedom as the absence of both» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 156, n. 60]. Hence, the necessity for him means an impersonal power or force of «causal compulsion» which can - and sometimes does - compel or coerce a person to do something unwillingly. As S. Visser and T. Williams put it, «we can understand Anselm's notion of necessity entirely in terms of compulsion. What necessarily is, is what is compelled to be; what necessarily is not, is what is compelled not to be» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150].

At the same time it is extremely important to note that Anselm distinguishes between two types of necessity (which will be analyzed in more detail later): the antecedent necessity (necessitas praecedens) and the subsequent necessity (necessitas sequens). The former actually «causes the event to occur» (facit rem esse) while the latter «does not compel anything to occur» (nihil cogit esse), but still reflects the necessary truth of «a relation of causal compulsion between concepts» [Idem, p. 158]. Anselm's example of this double notion of necessity is taken from the world of nature: the sunrise can be said to be necessary in both senses (DC I, 3):

Ortus vero solis duabus necessitatibus futurus intelligitur, scilicet et praecedenti quae facit rem esse - ideo enim erit, quia necesse est ut sit -, et sequenti quae nihil cogit esse, quoniam idcirco necessitate futurus est, quia futurus est9.

Thus, it is one thing when something has to occur because of the natural law or the operation of a certain (external) power, and another - when something has to be called necessary due to a certain logical or ontological principle10. The difference will be further elucidated in the subsequent sections.

As for the Anselmian notion of libertas, it has to be understood also along the Augusti- nian lines [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157-158]. In general, he speaks of any kind of freedom as ability or power, since omnis libertas estpotestas (DLA 3)11. But, in specific, most often he prefers to think about the freedom of the will, which he defines as «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for the sake of this uprightness itself» (DLA 3) or, in other words, «the capacity to choose the good» [Evans, 2002: p. 88]. In DC I, 6 he unambiguously says: Libertas autem ista est : potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinein12.

Thus, this freedom is not a possibility to choose between several options or specifically between the good and the evil, although it is possible that alternative possibilities can appear before the free will. Rather, it is to be identified with the freely exercised ability to choose good and, as a result, possess the uprightness (rectitudo) of the will and the soul, since the real uprightness is closely connected to and implies the notions of truth, rightness and justice [Hopkins, 2003: p. 148]. The key thing is that this capacity or power needs to «have its origin in the agent rather than in some external cause» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 179].

Consequently, the freedom of the will tends to mean but an ability to make non- necessitated, and therefore free, decisions to choose the good (as it is envisaged by the good God). Thus, it is very similar to the notion of the free choice as a voluntary rational choice, although the freedom of the will additionally implies - and St. Anselm constantly highlights that (DC I, 6-7; III, 3-4) - both the rightness of choice and the uprightness of the will making this choice. Nevertheless, this difference is of relative importance, for in other aspects the concepts of the free will and the free choice seem to overlap. In DLA 13 the archbishop of Canterbury even coins a complex name for their symbiosis: libertas arbitrii rationalis voluntatis - «freedom of choice of a rational will» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. However, the idea of alternative possibilities, laid down before this will, should not be utterly dismissed. «Alternative possibilities come into the picture as a kind of by-product. They are not constitutive of freedom; they just happen to be available, given the requirement that free action have its origin within the agent, in conjunction with the relevant circumstances of the particular case» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 179]. And exactly this «origin within the agent» plus his will's orientation to the good constitute together the Anselmian understanding of the freedom of will.

Finally, gratia means but God's saving or «donating» activity whereby he absolutely freely and without any obligation or necessity imposes on or gives to man certain «gifts». By gifts St. Anselm understands either the proper rightness of the will or the justification and final salvation of the sinner. In any case, God's grace plays a crucial role both in the process of human salvation and in the act of «correction» of human will.

«Et quamvis non omnibus det, quoniam “cui vult miseretur, et quem vult indurate”: nulli tamen dat pro aliquo praecedenti merito, quoniam “quis prior dedit” deo, “et retribuetur ei?” Si autem voluntas, per liberum arbitrium servando quod accepit, meretur aut augmentum acceptae iustitiae, aut etiam potestatem pro bona voluntate, aut praemium aliquod : haec omnia fructus sunt primae gratiae, et “gratia pro gratia“, et ideo totum est imputandum gratiae, “quia neque volentis est” quod vult, “neque currentis est” quod currit, “sed miserentis est dei”» (DC III, 3) «And the freedom [which is under discussion] is the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake». «Now, God does not give to everyone; for “He shows mercy to whom He wills to, and He hardens

whom He wills to”. Nevertheless, He does not give to anyone on the basis of any antecedent merit; for “who has first given to God and it shall be recompensed to him?” But if by free choice the will keeps what it has received and thereby merits either an increment of received justice or, as well, the power for a good will, or some kind of reward: all of these are the fruits of the first grace and are “grace for grace”. And so, everything must be imputed to grace because “it is not of him who wills” that he wills “or of him who runs” that he runs, but, instead, “is of God, who shows mercy”»..

Having now shortly introduced the key terms and concepts, I would like to proceed to a presentation of the overall structure and key ideas of the De Concordia. The next section will serve this purpose.

2. Survey and analysis of the De Concordia's key ideas and arguments

The treatise entitled De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio consists of three parts which examine different topics, announced in the title. The first part treats the problem of a philosophical and theological harmonization of the divine foreknowledge and the free choice. It consists of seven paragraphs and is properly named - Quaestio I. De praescientia et libero arbitrio («First Controversy: Foreknowledge and Free Choice»). The second part is much shorter - it has only three paragraphs - and touches upon a related issue - that of the relation between God's predestination and human's «access» to the same free choice. It is dubbed Quaestio II. De praedestinatione et libero arbitrio («Second Controversy: Predestination and Free Choice»). Finally, the third section deals with a purely theological question about the activity of God's grace and the functioning of free will. Its title is Quaestio III. De gratia et libero arbitrio («Third Controversy: Grace and Free Choice»). This part is the biggest, consisting of 14 paragraphs. I will briefly introduce the content of each of these sections and look in detail at the arguments and ideas the author sets forth.

2.1 God's foreknowledge and free choice

He starts by formulating the problem at stake and indicating the direction, which he wants to follow in the search for its solution. The issue discussed is that of a possible harmony (concordia) or, in reverse, mutual exclusion of God's foreknowledge, predestination and grace on the one side and the free human will on the other. Thus, the bulk of the problem lies in a «seeming opposition between forces which make absolute demands» [Evans, 2002: p. 87; cf. Mumford & Anjum, 2014: p. 21ff] wherein the absoluteness of divine knowledge and power seems to discard or destroy the absoluteness or, at least, reality of the human freedom of choice. And Anselm's basic thesis - or, rather, aspiration - is the conviction that it is possible «simul esse et praescientiam dei, quam sequi necessitas futurarum rerum videtur, et libertatem arbitrii, per quam multa sine ulla necessitate fieri creduntur» (DC I, 1)14. He offers several arguments in support of his position.

At first (in DC I, 1) he offers a more logical argument a contrario:

It seems that it is impossible for God's foreknowledge and human will's free choice15 to coexist (simul esse)16. [Basic premise] ⁴ «...let us posit as existing together both God's foreknowledge (from which the necessity of future things seems to follow) and freedom of choice (by which many actions are believed to be done without any necessity)». Although Anselm speaks here about the liberum arbitrium - the free choice - it is indeed possible and totally adequate to translate it sometimes as the «freedom of will» or «will's free choice» because,

(1) as I have noted above and J. Hopkins showed in his research, the two concepts are closely connected in Anselm's philosophy and he really «tends to speak of voluntas libera (free will) and arbitrium liberum (free choice) interchangeably» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 141]. Additionally, (2) in some cases the translation «free will» fits better with the context of De Concordia and the contemporary use these terms. But whenever possible I will try to retain Anselm's own terminology. Hopkins translates simul esse as simply «co-exist». But it also can be translated as «be together», «act jointly», «exist simultaneously», «be at the same time» or even «stand in partnership or combination with each other». See [Glare, 2005], s.v. «simul»; [Stelten, 2004], s.v. «simul».

I will follow Hopkins' wording in most cases but sometimes I am going to disagree with him and offer my reading.

But, logically speaking, impossibility entails some other impossibility: «an impossible thing is one from which, when posited, some other impossible thing follows» (Quod si est impossibile, oritur inde aliud impossibile). [Logical premise]

Then, if the co-existence of God's foreknowledge and human free choice is indeed impossible, some kind of impossibility should arise from a postulation of its possibility. But is it impossible?

The assumption that the foreknowledge and the free choice are possibly compatible entails a conclusion that «if something is going to occur without necessity, God foreknows this, since he foreknows all future events» (si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui praescit omnia futura).

Subsequently, if God foreknows this non-necessitated event which happens by free choice, it must occur necessarily (Quod autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est, sicut praescitur).

But then, «it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity» (Ne- cesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum sine necessitate).

As a result, it appears that the two necessities mentioned - that of God's perfect knowledge of all future events and that of God's knowledge of non-necessitated and voluntarily done future events - do not contradict each other. «For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and, on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity» (quoniam et necesse est quod deus praescitfuturum esse, et deus praescit aliquid esse futurum sine omni necessitate).

Hence, it becomes obvious that the postulation of a possibility of the (seemingly impossible) coexistence of God's foreknowledge and the free choice does not entail any impossibility (nulla ex hoc nascitur impossibilitas). Rather, it produces a thesis about (another) possibility: since it is possible to say that God necessarily knows about some necessarily free events in the future, it is also possible to conclude that a certain kind of harmony between the two phenomena - i.e. the necessarily perfect foreknowledge and the necessarily free (non-necessitated) choice - can exist.

This specific form of argument seems to correspond to a basic - yet, implicit - conviction of St. Anselm that «the necessity of a proposition or an inference depends on the selfcontradictory character of its negation or rejection» [Weinberg, 1991: p. 62]. Thus, a thesis A must be necessarily true if the impossibility of non-A has been proven, the Anselmian «A» being possibility of the co-existence of God's foreknowledge and human free choice. Since its impossibility was excluded, it must be indeed possible.

Nevertheless, this argument speaks only about a possible coexistence and concordance between the two «opposite» things. Therefore, Anselm proceeds to some more constructive theses and hypotheses, which are to prove that this harmony does exist and should be rationally accepted. In order to reach this goal he examines the meaning of «necessity», the nature of futurity and eternity, and, afterwards, the mechanism of willing.

Firstly, he qualifies the notion of necessity (DC I, 2): when it is said that something is necessary, or that it is necessary for something to happen (necesse esse), or that something happens by necessity (ex necessitate) there can be several interpretations. It is not inevitable that necessity be identified with certain power (vis) of coercion or compulsion (coac- tio). It can mean a purely logical necessity when, for example, we say that it is necessary for God to be immortal (necesse est deum esse immortalem) and not to be unjust (necesse est deum non esse iniustum): it is simply logical for a perfect being to be immortal and just, since the immortality is a perfection and, thus, must be ascribed to God, while injustice is a vice and, thus, must not be said of a divine being. The most perfect being, i.e. that than which nothing greater can be thought (a well-known definition found in Anselm's Proslo- gion), must be perfect but this is a theo-logical and onto-logical necessity Here, by the term «theo-logical» I mean logic functioning within the realm of theological discourse and by the term «onto-logical» I imply the same logic which has to do with ontological issues, since the question of God's being is always a question of the being per se. After all, in classic medieval thought (Anselm, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, and others) logic is always connected with ontology. «This type of Christian philosophy of language passionately focuses on actual reality» [Vos, 2006: p. 194]., simply discovered by a rational mind, and not a power of coercion which compels God to be such and such. Hence, this logical necessity, found within and applied to the realm of theology proper, does not necessitate anything, since it does not compel or cause things or events. Thus, it appears to be an example of specific «theo-logic» or theological logic, which avoids real necessitarianism. But Anselm continues his analysis and says even more.

Another distinction should be made between the two seemingly identical modi loquendi: (a) necesse est esse («it is necessary that [something] is») and (b) ex necessitate est («something is [or happens] by necessity») (DC I, 2-4). In Hopkins' wording, «“It is necessary for X to happen” does not always mean the same thing as “X happens by necessity”. For it is not redundant to say “It is necessary for X to happen by necessity” or self-contradictory to say “It is necessary for X to happen freely”» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159]. It is exactly the point of the theologian from the town of Aosta: he frequently opposes the «by free choice» (per liberum arbitrium) and «as the result of freedom-of-will» (ex libertate voluntatis) constructs not to the «it is necessary that» (necesse est) formulations, but to the «by necessity» (ex necessitate) ones (DLA 2; DC I, 4). The latter wording implies a causal relation between the necessity and the event whereby the necessity brings the event about by making it happen (cogit esse) or directly «generating» it (facit esse) (DC I, 3). This is what I would call a metaphysical or actual necessity, which is real (it exists as a specific power in the world of Actua) and active (it compels, induces or produces things and events). Anselm calls it a «preceding» or antecedent necessity (necessitas praecedens) since it «precedes» things both casually and logically. This type of necessity emerges as a cause (causa est) of certain events and, in this role, may signify either natural laws which operate necessarily (because God created them in this way), or any other external agency wherein one «particular concrete object» - be it God, Satan, angel, or human being - somehow induces or forces another «particular concrete object» - be it angel, Satan, or human being - to do something [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150-154]. Thus, it becomes obvious that the antecedent necessity refers to a physical or metaphysical power which can be identified with the world- order, established by God, or coercive actions of particular beings or entities (who have such power) whereby they directly cause some events or compel other beings to do certain things without participation of these less powerful beings' wills. (The last qualification is based on Anselm's frequent contrast between those events that take place ex necessitate and those happening ex libertate voluntatis or per liberum arbitrum. In the first case there is no reference to willing or voluntary participation of the compelled being in the act that occurs by necessity. But in the second one there is a clear indication that the will of a specific being actively participates in the making of an event's happening.)

However, Anselm contends, there is another kind of necessity, which «does not affect anything» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159] because it has neither causal power, nor (meta)physical reality. Rather, it is the necessity «which holds when there is a relation of causal compulsion between concepts» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 158]. Cf [Hopkins, 1972: p. 79, 159-160]. Hopkins states (p.79) that this is «a kind of necessity which can be ascribed to propositions rather than to events». It can even be called «propositional» whereas the antecedent necessity can be called «natural». and, hence, refers to some unavoidable semantic or logical connections between the terms, concepts or, to certain extent, objects. This relation can be seen in the following examples Anselm draws (DC I, 2):

Nam cum dico : si erit, ex necessitate erit : hic sequitur nécessitas rei positionem, non praecedit.

Idem valet, si sic pronuntietur : Quod erit, ex necessitate erit. Non enim aliud signi- ficat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse.

... non idem est rem esse albam, et rem albam esse albam. Lignum enim non est semper necessitate album, quia aliquando priusquam fieret album, potuit non fieri album ; et postquam est album, potest fieri non album. Lignum vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest, ut album simul sit non album «[1] For when I say «If it will occur, of necessity it will occur», here the necessity follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing.

[2] The sense is the same if we say «What will be, of necessity will be». For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time.

[3] By comparison, for a thing to be white is not the same as for a white thing to be white. For example, a staff is not always necessarily white, because at some time before it became white it was able not to become white; and after it has become white, it is able to become not-white. But it is necessary that a white staff always be white. For neither before a white thing was white nor after it has become white can it happen that a white thing is not-white at the same time»..

In every case, the same formula is used [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 159]. The propositions follow either a simpler «identity» pattern:

Necessarily, if p, then p.

or a more complex way of saying the same truth:

Necessarily, if x is F, x is F.

Anyway, his examples with a white staff being necessarily white and the future event being necessarily future obviously tend to be perfect expressions of the two fundamental laws of formal logic: the law of identity (A = A) and the law of non-contradiction (A Ô non-A). Thus, a white staff is necessarily a white staff because it is exactly what it is, and this cannot be otherwise, because a white staff cannot be white and not white at the same time in the same sense. But this kind of logical identification or entailment really «follows, rather than precedes, the presumed existence of the thing». Therefore, quite logically, Anselm calls it a «subsequent necessity» (necessitas sequens), which has a bearing on purely logical connection between terms and concepts as well as on some ontological aspects of the reality (e.g. a thing's identity to itself, or the truth value of a statement about certain state of affairs, etc).

In CDH II, 17 Anselm skillfully and clearly contrasts the two necessitates with each other (italics are mine):

For there is a necessity which precedes and is the cause of a thing's being the case (causa est ut sit res); and there is a necessity which succeeds and is caused by the thing's being the case (quam res facit). When the heavens are said to revolve because it is necessary for them to revolve, then this is a necessity which precedes and efficiently causes. But when I say that because you are speaking, you are - necessarily - speaking, this is a necessity which is subsequent and does not efficiently cause anything but, instead, is caused (sequens vero et quae nihil efficit sed fit, est cum dico te ex necessitate loqui, quia loqueris). For when I make this statement, I signify that nothing can cause it to be the case that while you are speaking you are not speaking; I do not signify that anything is compelling you to speak. For although the force of their natural state compels the heavens to revolve, no necessity causes you to speak (te vero nulla necessitas facit loqui). Now, wherever there is antecedent necessity there is also subsequent necessity; but it is not the case that where there is subsequent necessity there must be antecedent necessity.

Here we see that the key difference between the two types of necessity is that the antecedent necessity causes things and events, and the subsequent necessity is caused by things or events This is why I find it quite problematic that S. Visser and T. Williams straightforwardly and without any qualification state right away: «Anselm's core notion of necessity is that of causal compulsion: “All necessity is either compulsion or constraint. These two necessities are related to each other as contraries, just like necessary and impossible. For whatever is compelled to be is constrained from not being, and what is compelled not to be is constrained from being, just as what is necessary to be is impossible not to be, and what is necessary not to be is impossible to be, and vice versa”. Since compulsion and constraint are interdefinable in this way, we can understand Anselm's notion of necessity entirely in terms of compulsion. What necessarily is, is what is compelled to be; what necessarily is not, is what is compelled not to be» [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 150ff].

This is a very one-sided statement that does not reflect the full picture of Anselm's modal theory. Although these authors later discuss the subsequent necessity as well (starting from p. 158), their initial position dominates their overall presentation of the issue.. It is exactly the latter «format» that corresponds to God's mode of foreknowing future events without necessitating them. But it also evident that there are two types of events - those happening by necessity and those happening by free choice. These two types of necessities and two types of events can form several combinations:

It is necessary for those events, which happen by necessity to happen.

It is necessary for those events, which happen by free choice to happen.

It is not necessary for those events, which happen by necessity to happen

It is not necessary for those events, which happen by free choice to happen.

Anselm does not discuss the thesis (iii) in DC, but, as was seen in the quotation from

CDH, he obviously dismisses this kind of statements, because the antecedent necessity entails the subsequent one and, thus, the proposition (iii) is a contradiction. Proposition (iv) could have served as the model for a «total contingency» - a reality where nothing is necessary and everything depends on free choice's decisions only - but Anselm does not discuss such a possibility. He prefers to concentrate his own and the reader's attention on theses (i) and (ii) instead. He comments on them, gives some examples and applies them to the issue discussed (DC I, 3-4).

Proposition (i) is logically correct and incorporates both types of necessity without any free choice included. It perfectly exemplifies a natural order with its chains of causes and effects as well as any other instances of compulsion or direct causality. The sunrise that has to necessarily occur (by the natural law efficiently causing it, according to God's decision) will necessarily occur (subsequent necessity). Hence, God necessarily knows the future events, which have to happen by necessity.

Proposition (ii) is also logically correct and includes a rationally acceptable combination of the free choice and the necessity of God's (fore)knowledge. The latter operates in the «subsequent necessity mode» whereby the knowledge logically follows and is necessarily entailed by the happening event. The former serves as a so-to-say «substitute» to efficient causality of the antecedent necessity, since the act is produced by a rational agent (not God) who possess the ability for free voluntary decisions. Yet, Anselm does not say that God's knowledge of a future event, which happens by the free choice is really - i.e. actually, realiter in the world of Actua - caused by, and thus is dependent on, a creature's free decision. Rather, he says, that (a) God's knowledge of the future is perfect and, in a sense, necessary (i.e. required by his divine ontology); but (b) this knowledge accords with the «mode» of event or object known - if the event itself is necessary (i.e. happening by necessity), then God knows it as necessary, and if the event itself occurs by free choice, God knows it as occurring by free choice. Thus, quoniam quamvis omnia futura praesciat, non tamen praescit cuncta futura necessitate, sed quaedam praescit futura ex libera rationalis creaturae voluntate (DC I, 3)21. Moreover, there is relation of mutual logical reciprocity, reflecting the laws of identity and non-contradiction, between the divine (fore)knowledge and the event's «mode» of occurrence - Haec omnia deus, qui scit omnem veritatem et non nisi veritatem : sicut sunt spontanea vel necessaria videt ; et sicut videt, ita sunt (Ibid)22. Therefore, the necessity of God's perfect foreknowledge neither transforms the ontic constitution of subjects possessing the free will - they remain free agents - nor alters the free nature of events occurring by the free choice.

Hence, in the last analysis, it is really possible to conclude (together with G.R. Evans) that, God's «necessary futurity may be seen as in some sense containing contingent futurity» [Evans, 2002: p. 90], since God's necessarily perfect necessary knowledge embraces both necessarily happening events and freely (or voluntarily) done actions23. But it is also possible (together with J. Hopkins) to rename the two types of necessity and conclude that Anselm actually distinguished - implicitly though - between the necessity per se, i.e. the necessity qua compulsive causality (necessitas praecedens), and the certainty as a statement of necessary logical truthfulness (necessitas sequens). Then, the logically correct rendering of the latter principle would perhaps look like this:

«The proposition “If X is foreknown to happen in way Y, then X happens in way Y” is necessarily true» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 160].

I will not discuss the validity of this formula, but I will agree with Hopkins that epistemological certainty is a good way of interpreting Anselm's subsequent necessity principle. Yet, I do not think that it is the only interpretation24. Nevertheless, the theological value of «For although God foreknows all future events, He does not foreknow that all of them are going to

occur by necessity. Rather, He foreknows that some of them will occur as the result of the free will of a rational creature». «Now, God (who knows all truth and only truth) sees all these things as they are - whether they be

free or necessary; and as He sees them, so they are». In Anselm's own words (DC I, 3): Quoniam enim quod deus vult non potest non esse : cum vult hominis voluntatem nulla cogi vel prohiberi necessitate ad volendum vel non volendum, et vult effectum sequi voluntatem : tunc necesse est voluntatem esse liberam et esse quod vult. In huiusmodi ergo verum est quia necessitate fit opus peccati quod vult homo facere, quamvis non necessitate velit. («For since what God wills is not able not to occur: when He wills for no necessity either to compel the human will to will or to prevent it from willing, and when He wills that the effect follow from the act of human willing, it is necessary that the human will be free and that there occur what it wills. In this respect, then, it is true that the sinful deed which a man wills to do occurs by necessity, even though the man does not will it by necessity».) E.g. for some alternative ways of looking at the issue see [Knuuttila, 2004: p. 111-131] and [Visser &

Williams, 2009: p. 149-169].

Hopkins' discovery helps better translate the Anselmian argumentation into contemporary ordinary speech:

Assume that a free choice is foreknown to occur. (Anselm has previously established to his own satisfaction that there are free choices.) Then Anselm's argument runs: if it is foreknown, then it is certain; if it is certain, then (in a sense) it is necessary; and if it is necessary, then it cannot fail to occur as it is foreknown, viz. freely. Hence, far from interfering with freedom, foreknowledge guarantees it [Hopkins, 1972: p. 159].

Anyway, by his argumentation Anselm formulates a very peculiar paradox: God ontologically necessarily and epistemologically necessarily knows all future events which are going to occur by free choice and ex libera rationalis creaturae voluntate. If follows, then, then some kinds of necessity (as understood by Anselm) really coexist with and even support the freedom of choice which can be found in the world of rational creatures endowed with the free will. Sed si aliquid est futurum sine necessitate, hoc ipsum praescit deus, qui praescit omnia futura. Quod autem praescit deus, necessitate futurum est, sicut praescitur. Necesse est igitur aliquid esse futurum sine necessitate. Nequaquam ergo recte intelligenti hic repugnare videntur praescientia quam sequitur necessitas, et libertas arbitrii a qua removetur necessitas, quoniam et necesse est quod deus praescit futurum esse, et deus praescit aliquid esse futurum sine omni necessitate (DC I, 1) «Now, if something is going to occur without necessity, God foreknows this, since he foreknows all future events. And that which is foreknown by God is, necessarily, going to occur, as is foreknown. Therefore, it is necessary that something be going to occur without necessity. Hence, the foreknowledge from which necessity follows and the freedom of choice from which necessity is absent are here seen (for one who rightly understands it) to be not at all incompatible. For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and, on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity»..

But in the argumentation of the thinker's from Aosta (then Bec, and afterwards Canterbury) there is another interesting twist, which has to deal with the nature of futurity, the nature of (God's) eternity, and a little word simul.

In second turn, Anselm approaches the same problem of the hypothetic (dis)harmony between there existing God's impeccable foreknowledge and the creaturely freedom of choice from different perspective. He notes that, diachronically thinking, for an agent with the free will there is always a possibility to take an unconstrained and non-necessitated decision. Only when the decision has been already made, then it becomes necessary (the necessitas sequens). Thus, he definitely believes in what can be called a «diachronic contingency» principle: «it is the concept of temporal or diachronic possibility [whose formula looks like this:] p is contingent = def p is true at the very present time tk and not-p will be true at a future time t» [Vos, 2006: p. 269]. But he puts it into a different formula:

P is not necessary or p is diachronically contingent = it is t1 now and it is not the case that p is at tj and it is possible that p is at t2 or that not-p is at t2.

But then, if it is t2 now and it is the case that p is at t2, then it is not possible that not-p is at t2.

Now, after the choice has been freely made and p happens, is happening or has happened, it is necessary for p to be at t2 because «when we say of what is going to happen that it is going to happen, this statement must be true, because it is never the case that what is going to happen is not going to happen» (DC I, 2) As rightly suggests S. Knuuttila, this whole idea can be read as a traditional doctrine of the necessity

of the present which is based on the famous Aristotle's dictum that whatever is, when it is, necessarily is. And it is indeed probable that Anselm fully embraced the idea, which he could find in his sources (directly Boethius, indirectly Aristotle, and additionally some contemporaneous logicians and theologians such as Peter Damian and the «dialecticians» of that time). Nevertheless, the same Knuuttila notes, that there are no clear definitions or distinctions in Anselm, as regards these temporal and modal aspects of the theo-logic. The theologian from Aosta «does not systematically discuss modal consequences or modal syllogisms» [Knuuttila, 2004: p. 124, cf. 111-115, 122-123]. «Similarly, it is not by necessity that a thing is temporally present. For before the thing was present, it

was able to happen that it would not be present; and after it has become present, it can happen that it not remain present. But it is necessary that a present thing always be present, because neither before it is present nor after it has become present is a present thing able to be not-present at the same time. In the same way, some event - e.g., an action - is going to occur without necessity, because before the action occurs, it can happen that it not be going to occur. On the other hand, it is necessary that a future event be future, because what is future is not able at the same time to be not-future».. The Anselmian expression of this principle of the diachronical non-necessity of events reads like this (Ibid):

Similiter res non necessitate est praesens, quoniam antequam esset praesens, potuit fieri ut praesens non esset ; et postquam est praesens, potest fieri non praesens. Rem autem praesentem necesse est esse praesentem semper, quia nec priusquam sit nec postquam est praesens, potest praesens simul esse non praesens. Eodem modo res aliqua - ut quaedam actio - non necessitate futura est, quia priusquam sit, fieri potest ut non sit futura ; rem vero futuram necesse est esse futuram, quoniam futurum nequit esse simul non futurum22.