An analysis of Anselm’s philosophical theology and the problem of man’s freedom in his De Concordia

However, this is only a part of his argument. If we think about the freedom of choice and its relation to the foreknowledge of God, we should take heed to their different ontological modes - or, better, different «time factors». The former is diachronically possible along the time-span and within the temporal framework of this created world. But the latter functions within - quite mysterious - parameters of the divine eternity. The last mentioned concept (along the Boethian lines) signifies for Anselm «an eternal present in which the whole of time is contained» (praesens... aeternum, in quo tempora cuncta continentur) which can also be called «the nature of eternity, which encompasses the whole of time and whatever occurs at any time» (vis aeternitatis, quae claudit omne tempus et quae sunt in quolibet tempore) (DC I, 5; cf. DCD 21). This eternal - and actually divine, since this is how he experiences reality - present has neither temporal succession, nor temporal categories of past, present and future. Hence, God does not really foreknow the future events - he knows them as «presently present», i.e. immediately present to him within his immutable eternal present. But he does not see those events as «future», «present» or «past» in temporal sense [Hopkins, 1972: p. 160-161].

This doctrine allows Anselm to (quite paradoxically) conclude the following (DC I, 45; Roman type is mine):

,..[C]um vult aut facit deus aliquid, sive secundum aeternitatis dicatur immutabilem praesentiam, in qua nihil est praeteritum aut futurum, sed omnia simul sunt sine omni motu... sive secundum tempus... negari nequit scire quae vult et facit, et praescire quae volet atque faciet. ...

Cum autem res tam aliter esse cognoscatur in tempore quam in aeternitate, ut aliquan- do verum sit quoniam aliquid non est in tempore quod est in aeternitate, et quia fuit in tempore quod ibi non fuit, et erit temporaliter quod non ibi erit : nulla ratione negari videtur posse similiter aliquid esse in tempore mutabile, quod ibi est immutabile. Quippe non magis opposita sunt mutabile in tempore et immutabile in aeternitate, quam non esse in aliquo tempore, et esse semper in aeternitate ; et fuisse vel futurum esse secundum tempus, atque non fuisse aut non futurum esse in aeternitate 28.

It means that every (freely taken) decision and every event (occurred by the free choice) exists in two modes of reality: in the created world of Actua - and we know it only as such - and in the uncreated reality of God's eternity - and God knows it only as such. But these two modes cannot be thought to oppose each other, since logically it does not follow from the definitions and characterizations of the temporal and eternal world-orders. Hence, Anselm contends, «free choice and God's foreknowledge are not at all inconsistent with each other» (praescientia dei et liberum arbitrium nequaquam invicem repugnant) (DC I, 5). Vice versa, it follows out of this understanding of the eternity and the temporality that God's foreknowledge and creatures' free choices can coexist. Yet, this idea is even deeper than that.

At the very beginning of his oeuvre St. Anselm has clearly set forth his goal: to prove that it is possible to simul esse etpraescientiam dei et libertatem arbitrii (DC I, 1). And he constantly repeats this formulation - «simul esse» (Idem, I, 2ff). Hopkins regularly translates it as a simple «co-exist». But in my estimation, this is a mistranslation on the side of this authoritative interpreter of the Anselmian texts, and, hence, another translation should be preferred here. Since (a) Anselm almost exclusively uses the simul to mean specifically «at the same time» or «simultaneously»29, and (b) his argument «from eternity» implies «.. .When God wills or causes something, He cannot be denied to know what He wills and causes and

to foreknow what He shall will and shall cause. ([It makes no difference here] whether we speak in accordance with eternity's immutable present, in which there is nothing past or future, but in which all things exist at once without any change (e.g., if we say only that He wills and causes something, and deny that He has willed or has caused and shall will or shall cause something), or whether we speak in accordance with temporality (as when we state that He shall will or shall cause that which we know has not yet occurred). .

A thing is known to exist in time so differently from the way it exists in eternity that at some point the following statements are true: (1) in time something is not present which is present in eternity; (2) in time something is past which is not past in eternity; (3) in time something is future which is not future in eternity. Similarly, then, it is seen to be impossible to be denied, in any respect, that in the temporal order something is mutable which is immutable in eternity. Indeed, being mutable in time and being immutable in eternity are no more opposed than are not existing at some time and always existing in eternity - or than are existing in the past or future according to the temporal order and not existing in the past or future in eternity». (Italics are mine.) See and compare the following formulations:

1) Non enim aliud significat haec necessitas, nisi quia quod erit non poterit simul non esse. - «For this necessity signifies nothing other than that what will occur will not be able not to occur at the same time». (DC I, 2)

2) . puto quia et praescientiam dei et libertatem arbitrii simul esse nulla prohibet inconvenientia. - «I think that no inconsistency prevents freedom of choice and God's foreknowledge from co- existing» (Idem).

3) Lignum vero album semper necesse est esse album, quia nec antequam sit, nec postquam est album, fieri potest, ut album simul sit non album. - «For neither before a white thing was white nor after it has become white can it happen that a white thing is not-white at the same time» (Ibid).

4) ... non potest aliquid simul esse et non esse. - «[S]omethi'ng cannot both be and not be the case at the same time» (Idem).

5) . nihil horum prius aut posterius apud deum est, sed omnia simul aeterno praesanti sunt intelligenda. Habet enim aeternitas suum simul, in quo sunt omnia quae simul sunt loco vel tempore, et quae sunt diversis in locis vel temporibus. - «.none of these actions is earlier or later for God; rather everything must be understood to exist at once in an eternal present. For eternity has its own «simultaneity» wherein exist all things that occur at the same time and place and that occur at different times and places» (DC I, 5). some kind of simultaneity, it is most logical to translate his key thesis of the first section of the De Concordia in the following manner: «We have shown that God's foreknowledge and the free choice exist and act simultaneously, that is, at the same time» (monstravimus quodpraescientiam dei et liberum arbitrium simul esse) (DC I, 7). This is how his presentation of the differences between the eternal and the temporal modes of reality and separate treatments of the two naturally receive a bridge, which joins the two different sides. The human reality operates in the temporal mode; the divine reality enjoys the eternal present. But how do they coexist? Anselm's answer is clear: they do so harmoniously - at the same time, all at once, in a flash, without «before» or «after». Hence, in my estimation, the simultaneity of God's foreknowledge and the rational creatures' free choices is the key to the metaphysical part of Anselm's argument pro horum concordia.

Lastly, in DC I, 6-7, the archbishop of Canterbury explains some crucial nuances of the rational beings' ability for willing which are expected to further elucidate on the subject discussed. Already earlier (DC I, 3) he established that by definition free will must act freely: Opus vero voluntatis... voluntarium sive spontaneum est, quoniam spontanea voluntate fit, et bifariam est necessarium, quia et voluntate cogitur fieri, et quod fit non potest simul non fieri. Sed has necessitates facit voluntatis libertas, quae priusquam sint eas cavere potest30. And the will itself, as was said above, is an ability to make decisions on the basis of preceding rational deliberation. But the key thing is that this deliberative power must be free and unconstrained.

Even if the will should follow some ratiocinatio of the mind or some «advice» of the soul's desires, it is the will itself that takes a decision. Neither fleshly desires, nor emotional inclinations, nor even rational knowledge determine what the will will finally choose. When there is any freedom of choice, sola voluntas determinat ibi quid teneat, nec aliquid facit vis necessitatis, ubi operatur electio sola voluntatis (DC I, 6) «Now... the will's deeds are voluntary and free because they are done by a free will. But these deeds

are necessary in two respects: (1) because the will compels them to be done, and (2) because what is being done cannot at the same time not be done. But these two necessities are produced by freedom- of-will; and the free will is able to avoid them before they occur». «[T]he will alone here determines what he keeps; and where only the will's choosing is operative, there the force of necessity accomplishes nothing».. When in DCD 27 Anselm has to discuss the reason of a good angel's fall, he unambiguously explicates this thesis [Pranger, 1975: p. 81-82] (Roman type is mine):

D. Cur ergo recessit ab angelo iusto iustitia?

M. Si proprie vis loqui, non recessit ab eo, sed ipse deseruit eam volendo quod non debuit.

D. Cur deseruit eam?

M. Cum dico quia volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit, aperte ostendo cur et quo- modo illam deseruit. Nam ideo illam deseruit, quia voluit quod velle non debuit; et hoc modo, id est volendo quod non debuit illam deseruit.

D. Cur voluit quod non debuit?

M. Nulla causa praecessit hanc voluntatem, nisi quia velle potuit.

D. An ideo voluit quia potuit?

M. Non, quia similiter potuit velle bonus angelus, nec tamen voluit. Nam nullus vult quod velle potest ideo quia potest, sine alia causa, quamvis numquam velit si non potest.

D. Cur ergo voluit?

M. Non nisi quia voluit. Nam haec voluntas nullam aliam habuit causam qua impellere- tur aliquatenus aut attraheretur, sed ipsa sibi efficiens causa fuit, si dici potest, et effec- tum «S. So why did justice depart from the just angel?

T. If you wish to speak properly, justice did not depart from him, but he deserted justice by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he desert it?

T. When I say that he deserted it by willing what he ought not to have [willed], I indicate clearly why and how he deserted it. For he deserted it because he willed what he ought not to have willed; and he deserted it in this manner, viz., by willing what he ought not to have [willed].

S. Why did he will what he ought not to have [willed]?

T. There was no cause which preceded this willing - except that he was able to will.

S. Did he will because he was able?

T. No, for the good angel was likewise able to will [what he ought not to have willed]; nevertheless he did not will [it]. For although no one would ever will if he were not able [to will], nonetheless it is not the case that what someone is able to will he wills because he is able, and for no other reason (causa).

S. Then, why did he will [what he ought not to have willed]?

T. Only because he willed [it]. For this willing had no other cause (causa) by which in any respect to be driven or drawn; rather, it was an efficient cause of itself - if this can be said - and its own effect»..

It is a very powerful statement - «willing has no other cause; rather, it is an efficient cause of itself - if this can be said - and its own effect». For Anselm ie entails several things:

There are things which the will should choose and which, if it has a chance, it wills - something beneficial (commodum), the good (bonum), justice (iustitia), and so on. The most noble orientation and, at the same time, prerogative or even freedom of the will is to will uprightness of the will for its own sake. Yet, the mankind as well as some portion of angels failed to keep this uprightness and therefore are no more able to always will good (DC I, 6).

There are things which the will should not choose - the evil (malum), what is detriment (incommmodum), injustice (iniustitia), and so on. However, because of the very nature of the will (to will freely) and a possibility to choose not-good (simply because even the good needed to be chosen freely and, consequently, there must have been a possibility of not-choosing it; but this possibility should not have been actualized), the first man made the fatal choice in favor of the evil. As a result, the original rightness and the healthy ability not to sin were lost [Evans, 2002: p. 87-89]. Now, the man still possesses some freedom of will and choice, but it is incomplete (Idem).

As the last example shows, although the will is an ability with strong rational element imbedded in it, it still can, and often does, will irrationally [Hopkins, 1972: p. 150]. This is not good, but required by the very constitution of will (libertas) and, additionally, its current state (culpa, rectitudo deserata) (DC I, 6-7). In fact, the ability to choose without possibility to choose freely would lead to pure necessity. M.B. Pranger, rightly encapsulates this Anselmian thought in a phrase: «Potestas without voluntas is necessi- tas» [Pranger, 1975: p. 85]. «Potestas zonder voluntas is necessitas»..

At the same time, due to the very same reason (the ontic constitution of the will), it should be held that the will cannot be compelled or caused to do anything, unless it wills so. The story of the fall and a creative example of a man who is «threatened with death unless he tells a lie» demonstrate that. If a man is threatened in this manner, it can be said that he is compelled to make a choice. But, in fact, such a conclusion is «misleading: against his will the man is confronted by an unfortunate option, but he does not actually opt against his will» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 151]. The range of possibilities is determined, but the choice itself is not. It is impossible to will unwillingly. Any decision of the will is an act of willing which is in itself by definition voluntary and not necessary (DC I, 6)34.

Finally, in the case of God's (fore)knowledge and will and its relation to the free choice and the creaturely free will, the following theses hold. (i) God's will must be absolutely free because (a) any will must by definition be free, but (b) he is the most perfect being and cannot have any necessity «hanging» over himself (although there is some necessity in God [Pranger, 1975: p. 143]). (ii) God's will cannot be determined by his perfect knowledge, since then, again, a sort of necessity is imposed on his will, which is impossible, for the divine voluntas must be divinely - i.e. absolutely - free. (iii) God's will cannot be really or temporally preceded by his perfect knowledge, because God lives in the permanent present of the eternity, where everything occurs simul. The objects of his knowledge as well as the objects of his will are present to him at one and the same moment. The conclusion (iii) is derived from DC I, 5 and 6, while (i) and (ii) are inferred directly from the following passage in DC I, 4: Quare si scire et praescire dei necessitatem ingerit omnibus quae scit aut praes- cit, nihil secundum aeternitatem aut secundum ullum tempus vult aut facit ipse ex libertate, sed omnia ex necessitate. Quod... absurdum est vel opinari.. ,35

Hence, in the last analysis, it becomes clear that Anselm has coined several very interesting arguments in support of his «concordatic» position. Some of these are definitely taken from Augustine, Boethius and Aristotle, but their creative reworking and some emendations - together with many original ideas - belong to St. Anselm of Canterbury. Yet, even though the harmony of God's foreknowledge and the free choice has been demonstrated and proved (in his opinion), the problem of predestination and «irresistible» grace remains. It will be treated in the next section.

2.2 God's predestination, grace and free choice

The problem here is well formulated by Anselm:

Praedestinatio videtur idem esse quod praeordinatio sive praestitutio ; et ideo quod deus praedestinare dicitur, intelligitur praeordinare, quod est statuere futurum esse. Quod autem deus statuit futurum esse, necessitate videtur esse futurum. Quare quidquid deus praedestinat, necesse est futurum esse. Si ergo deus praedestinat bona et mala quae fiunt, nihil fit per liberum arbitrium, sed omnia ex necessitate. ... Si ergo deus omnia praedestinat, et praedestinata sunt ex necessitate : cum nihil per liberum arbitrium necessitate fiat, Hopkins provides a very good analysis of Anselm's notions of the will's ability/inability and comments on its positive contributions as well as its flaws. See [Ibid, p. 145-151]. «Therefore, if God's knowledge or foreknowledge imposes necessity on everything He knows or foreknows, then He does not freely will or cause anything (either in accordance with eternity or in accordance with a temporal mode); rather, He wills and causes everything by necessity. Now. this conclusion is absurd even to suppose. » sequi videtur nihil esse liberum arbitrium manente praedestinatione ; aut si statuimus in aliquibus liberum arbitrium, perire in illispraedestinationem (DC II, 1)36.

The logical chain is simple: the divine predestination determines all future events before they occur (praeordinare, statuere futurum esse) ^ then all future events - whether those happening by necessity or by free choice - are determined by God's will, i.e. they must occur ^ then there is no room for the free decision of the will(s). Hence, even if God's (fore)knowledge does not necessitate the events of our world, God's omnipotent will does. Consequently, there should by only one explanation of how the so-called voluntary decisions are taken: they are either the outcomes of God's will (praedestinatio) or his free creatures' wills (liberum arbitrium). It seems an «either - or» situation or, speaking logically, a strict disjunction.

However, Anselm dismisses this option altogether. He restates and somewhat adjusts his arguments from DC I and offers a way of explaining the harmonious coexistence of the divine and the creaturely rational free wills.

In the first place (DC I, 7; II, 1), he notes that it is important to differentiate between two «types» of actions God commits: (i) he is said to foreordain (praedestinare) all evil deeds of the free agents and (ii) he is said to cause (facere) good deeds of the free agents. But concerning the former it should be said that God directly causes only the essential goodness of these agents and their deeds (for since God has created them, and everything God creates is good, they are good in this sense), but as for the free decisions of their wills - God only permits (permittit) and does not correct (non corrigit) them. As for the latter, it is indeed more appropriate (specialius) to say that God predestines the good decisions of the free agents, because «He causes both what they are [essentially] and the fact that they are good» (in illis facit quod sunt et quod bona sunt). Thus, along the Augustinian lines, the predestination is taken to mean either direct causation (in the case of good deeds), or indirect causation (in the case of evil deeds), i.e. «permission» [Evans, 2002: p. 91].

In the second place, he reiterates the argument de aeternitate: as there is no foreknowledge, i.e. the actual knowledge of the fact before it has taken place, in God, there is also no predestination or foreordination, i.e. God's willing of the fact before it has happened. God dwells in the eternal present, where all the objects of his knowledge and all the decisions of his will are present to him at one and the same «moment» of eternity. It means that for him to know a «future» (or «past») event and to will the same «future» (or «past») event is to commit a double action - since knowing and willing are different from each other - at the same time, simul. Anselm expresses this principle quite briefly: Sciendum quoque est quia sicut praescientia non in deo dicitur proprie, ita nec praedestinatio ; quia illi nec ante nec post aliquid est, sed omnia sunt illi simul praesentia37 (DC II, 2). Thus, he «Predestination is seen to be the same thing as foreordination or predetermination. And so, that which

God is said to predestine, He is recognized to foreordain - i.e., to determine to be going to occur. But what God determines to be going to occur must, it seems, be going to occur. Therefore, it is necessary that whatever-God-predestines be going to occur. Hence, if God predestines the good and the evil actions which are done, nothing is done by free choice but everything occurs of necessity. ... Hence, if God predestines all things, and if things predestined occur of necessity: since nothing done by free choice is done by necessity, it seems to follow that as long as there is predestination there is no free choice, or - if we establish that in some cases there is free choice - that in these cases there is no predestination». «We must also realize that just as foreknowledge is not properly said to be found in God, so predestination is not either. For nothing is present to God either earlier or later, but all things are present to Him at once». goes here along the Boethian lines of theological thinking [Hopkins, 1972: p. 29], but definitely broadens and deepens them.

In the third place (DC II, 3), he repeats his theory of the two necessitates and adjusts it to the new context of the nécessitas - voluntas span [Pranger, 1975: p. 85], instead of the nécessitas - scientia combination, which was analyzed in DC I. Now he states that as it was logically correct to say, that God foreknew both the necessarily-happening and the freely-done actions of his creatures, so it is impeccable to say that «without any inconsistency, some actions that are going to occur by means of free choice are... predestined» (praedestinari similiter per liberum arbitrium quaedam futura absque omni inconvenien- tia). This is necessarily true, because, given God's perfect knowledge and omnipotent will, it is indeed necessary for him to know and will all the events that are to occur in the world, including those being brought about by the creature's free will. But this is a sample of the subsequent necessity, claims Anselm, and not that of the antecedent (or real causal) one. Pariter igitur, quamvis necesse sit fieri quae praesciuntur et quae praedestinantur, quaedam tamen praescita et praedestinata non eveniunt ea necessitate quae praecedit rem et facit, sed ea quae rem sequitur, sicut supra diximus3S. Yet, after this unambiguous phrase he adds several comments which could either hide, or further elucidate his idea.

On the one hand, he says that «although God predestines these things, He causes them not by constraining or restraining the will but by leaving the will to its own power» (Non enim ea deus - quamvis praedestinet - facit voluntatem cogendo aut voluntati resistendo, sed in sua illam potestate dimittendo). Hence, it seems that God's will is thought to logically and metaphysically follow decisions of the free will. But then, is not it the case that the divine act of will is somehow dependent on the creature's act of will that has to happen first?

Yet, on the other hand, it is immediately clarified that «although the will uses its own power, it does nothing which God does not cause - in good works by His grace, in evil works not through any fault of His but through the will's fault» (Quamvis tamen sua voluntas utatur potestate, nihil tamen facit, quod deus non faciat in bonis sua gratia, in malis non sua sed eiusdem voluntatis culpa). Here it seems that the situation is the other way around: God's will somehow causes (faciat) absolutely everything, since it is said to equally efficiently act both by means of God's own grace (sua gratia) and by means of the creature's (evil) will (non sua sed eiusdem voluntatis culpa).

Moreover, after this Anselm adds another interesting phrase: «And just as foreknowledge, which is not mistaken, foreknows only the real thing as it will occur - either necessarily or freely - so predestination, which is not altered, predestines only as the thing exists in foreknowledge» (Et sicut praescientia, quae non fallitur, non praescit nisi verum sicut erit, aut necessarium aut spontaneum : ita praedestinatio, quae non mutatur, non praedes- tinat, nisi sicut est in praescientia). What does this praedestinatio praedestinat sicut est in praescientia mean? It can mean two things: either (a) the predestination follows the foreknowledge and acts in accordance with the information provided by it, or (b) the mode of predestination's «functioning» is similar to that of the divine foreknowledge. The first seems fallacious, because God's will must be absolutely free and cannot be constrained even by God's own knowledge. But then the second interpretation must be correct: God «Therefore, although things foreknown and predestined must occur, it is nonetheless equally true that some things foreknown and predestined occur not by the necessity which precedes a thing, and causes it, but by the necessity which succeeds a thing - as I have said above». predestines (even freely done) events in exactly the same manner in which he foreknows them. And if we collect the sayings I have just quoted - about the predestination's subsequent necessity, the power of the creature's will, the causing activity of God's will and its mode of functioning - and analyze them together, a clearer picture of Anselm's argumentation will arise.

I think that in DC II, 3 he wants to say that God's knowledge and God's will function in the similar way: they both are simultaneous with each other (since they «happen» in the eternal present) and with the creaturely free will (since, it is said, they «are simultaneous» (simul esse) with each other as well). Consequently, in every single act of the creature's free will there are two agents, who are both active at the same moment (simul) and whose actions can be said to be either «parallel» or even «glued together». From God's perspective the logical order of this simultaneity or synchronicity would be this: (i) I, God, will - either causally (facere) or permissively (permittit) - and (ii) the free will of the creature wills. From the creature's viewpoint the situation looks differently: (i) I, creature, will, and (ii) God wills. But the problem is that these two types of a logical order are somewhat fallacious, because Anselm's key point does not speak of the logical ordo, although every event can and should be ascribed to God's activity par excellence, since everything that happens, does so in accordance with God's will. Yet, the point is that, in the last analysis, the logical order (in any of the two versions) is not to be identified with the chronological or «real» order: in reality, the decision of God's will and the decision of human will are absolutely simultaneous. There is no even «and» between the two: God wills - rational creature wills; rational creature wills - God wills. The metaphysical or «realistic» synchronicity is the key to the understanding of Anselm's idea in DC. The divine foreknowledge and the divine preordination and the human free choice exist and act simultaneously, that is, at the same time.

Besides, it should be noted that in the last part of his opus St. Anselm of Canterbury comments on the nature of God's grace and its role in salvation, deepens his understanding of the will and explains in detail what it is and how it works. This explanation is very important, because it elucidates on his thesis that the will is by definition free and cannot be constrained. He unfolds his overall analysis in the following way. divine knowledge will freedom

Since the Holy Scripture speaks of both God's gracious gift of mercy (gratia) and human active participation (per liberum arbitrium) in the drama of salvation, it is important to keep balance between the two sides (DC III, 1). Anselm even directly states that nec sola gratia nec solum liberum arbitrium salutem hominis operetur39 and then adds: gratia et liberum arbitrium non discordant, sed conveniunt ad iustificandum et salvandum hominem40 (DC III, 5). Specifically, it is said that the grace is nothing else than God's saving power, i.e. «that without which no one (after he has reached the age of understanding) merits salvation» (de illo, sine quo nemo salutem meretur, postquam intelligibilem habet aetatem); and the free choice here is nothing else than human responsible actions which are meritorious for salvation, i.e. «that without which no man is saved» (de illa, sine qua nullus salvator homo). Grace should touch the man's heart first, enabling him to believe, but it is (also) true that ever after the man's responsibility is to rightly believe (recte credit), rightly understand (recte intelligit) and rightly will (recte vult). These three constitute a sine qua non of human salvation, because only a combination of these three «... [N]either grace alone nor free choice alone accomplishes man's salvation». «... [G]race and free choice are not incompatible but cooperate in order to justify and to save a man»actions counts as the uprightness of heart required for being justified by God, as written in Ps. 94:14-1541. But for Anselm the rectitude voluntatis is the most crucial element of the uprightness, because it is to this end - ad recte volendum - that the Christian faith (fides) and the right understanding (intellectus) are given to men (DC III, 2).

Thus, it is needed that the will act rightly. Yet, «the will wills rightly only because it is upright. For just as sight is not acute because it sees acutely but sees acutely because it is acute, so the will is not upright because it wills rightly but wills rightly because it is upright» (voluntas non vult recte, nisi quia recta est. Sicut namque visus non est acutus, quia videt acute, sed idcirco videt acute, quia est acutus : ita voluntas non est recta, quia vult recte, sed recte vult, quoniam recta est). Thus, possession of the uprightness logically precedes volition of the uprightness. Idem autem est voluntati rectam esse et rectitudinem habere42 But now, after the Fall43, man cannot have (habere) this uprightness, unless God's grace (nisi per Dei gratiam) gives it to him and he accepts (accepit) it. Only after this the man can have the uprightness of the will and is able to keep it by his free will (hanc autem rectitudinem per liberum arbitrium servari posse). Anyway, the process of «uprightnessification» of the will is initiated by grace alone, after the original Adam's innocence has been lost, but still, the will should actively participate in the process (DC III, 3). The archbishop of Canterbury summarizes it in the following paragraph (DC III, 4):

Quibus autem modis post rectitudinem eandem acceptam gratia liberum arbitrium adi- uvet ut servet quod accepit... Nemo certe servat rectitudinem hanc acceptam, nisi volendo. Velle autem illam aliquis nequit, nisi habendo. Habere vero illam nullatenus valet, nisi per gratiam. Sicut ergo illam nullus accipit nisi gratia praeveniente, ita nullus eam servat nisi eadem gratia subsequente. Nempe quamvis illa servetur per librum arbitrium, non tamen est tantum imputandum libero arbitrio quantum gratiae, cum haec rectitudo servatur ; quoniam illam liberum arbitrium non nisi per gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem habet et servat44.

Thus, it seems that everything is done by, or with assistance of, the grace. Although the uprightness is kept by the free will, everything is to be imputed to God's mercy [Evans, 2002: p. 92]. But why, then, and how this will is said to be permanently free and extremely important for human life and salvation?

In DC III, 11-12 Anselm explains what some scholars labeled a «revolution in the theory of will» [Vos, 2006: p. 423]. He refuses to hold exclusively to the classical Latin meanings of the term velle, which then meant «to be inclined», «to want», or «to wish», and offers a much deeper reading of the word. He puts an emphasis on the will as «active and resolute Latin text (Psalmus 93) reads: ...Non enim derelinquet Dominuspopulum suum et hereditatem suam non

deseret, quoniam ad iustitiam revertetur iudicium et sequentur illud omnes recti corde. Modern English (NIV, Psalm 94) sounds: «For the LORD will not reject his people; he will never forsake his inheritance. Judgment will again be founded on righteousness, and all the upright in heart will follow it». «But for the will to be upright is the same as for it to have uprightness». See DC III, 7-9 for a more detailed treatment of the Fall, which Anselm offers. «Since grace assists in many ways, I cannot list all the ways in which grace aids free choice (after free choice has received this uprightness) to keep what it has received. . Assuredly, no one keeps this received uprightness except by willing it. But no one can will it unless he possesses it. And he cannot at all possess it except by means of grace. Therefore, just as no one receives uprightness except by means of grace preceding, so no one keeps uprightness except by means of this same grace following. Assuredly, even though uprightness is kept by free choice, still its being kept must be imputed not so much to free choice as to grace; for free choice possesses and keeps uprightness only by means of prevenient and of subsequent grace» willing» or decision-making activity [Ibid, p. 423-424; cf. Glare, 2005: s.v. uolo]. But he does conjoin this idea with the older meanings, skillfully combining and distinguishing between the various aspects of both the word and the phenomenon it stands for.

As I have said in Section 1 («Terminological and conceptual introduction to St. Anselm's thinking on the «knowledge-and-will» issues»), the will has a threefold structure: the faculty of willing (voluntas instrumentum), some dispositions or inclinations of the will (voluntas affectio), and actual thoughtful use of the will (voluntas usus). The nature of the will is analyzed in DC III, 11, where Anselm first states that it is important to «distinguish in the will - in regard to which we are discussing these matters - the instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses» (discernamus in voluntate propter quam ista dicimus instrumentum, et aptitudines eius, et usus eius) and then concludes: «Assuredly, the will is seen to be spoken of equivocally - in three senses. For (a) the instrument-for-willing, (b) the inclination of this instrument, and (c) the use of this instrument, are distinguishable» (Voluntas utique dici videtur aequivoce tripliciter. Aliud est enim instrumentum volendi, aliud affectio instrumenti, aliud usus eiusdem instrumenti).

Having said that, he continues by (i) clarifying the meaning of each of the structural elements of the will and (ii) explaining how the three work together and have their share in the «vocation» of the will. Let us consider both steps of Anselmian thinking each in its turn.

He defines the «will-as-instrument» (or «instrument-for-willing» in Hopkins' translation) as a «power-of-the-soul, which we use for willing (vis illa animae qua utimur ad volendum) - just as the reason is the instrument-for-reasoning, which we use when we reason, and just as the sight is the instrument-for-seeing, which we use when we see». The inclination(s) of the will is (are) «that by which the instrument is so inclined to will some given thing (even when a man is not thinking of that which he wills) that if this thing comes to mind, then the will wills [to have] it either immediately or at the appropriate» (qua sic afficitur ipsum instrumentum ad volendum aliquid... ut si venit in memoriam, aut statim aut suo tempore illud velit). Thus, it refers to an internal reason of our choices and illuminates the fact that our «choices are motivated» [Hopkins, 2003: p. 149]. Actually, the will-as-affection could be connected to the concept of «motivation» in contemporary psychological terms, but I will not defend, reject or investigate deeper this thesis, since it falls out of the scope of my research. Finally, the «use» of the will is «something which we have only when we are thinking of the thing which we will» (quem non habemus, nisi cum cogitamus rem quam volumus). It means that using implies a double action: willing itself (volumus) and reflective thinking (cogitamus). Hence, the usus voluntatis is a rational, i.e. conscious and thoughtful, act of willing.

Being able to exercise the freedom of choice means having the instrument for willing; being inclined, i.e. wanting, feeling desire for or having need in something is the same as the affectio; and rationally deciding to choose something - e.g. «I will to read now» - is actually the same as using the will. A man who is able to see could serve as a parallel example of this tripartite scheme, given that his ability to see, i.e. the faculty of seeing, would be considered similar to the faculty of will which we discuss now. In this case, his ability to see is an instrument he has; his (natural) inclination or desire to look around, see the world and «visually contemplate» something or someone is the disposition or affection; and his actual sight, i.e. act of seeing, is the use of the faculty.

The will-as-instrument is single and monolith: there cannot be less or more of it. Moreover, everybody - at least, every human being, every rational creature - has this ability. Hoc instrumentum semper habet homo, quamvis illo non semper utatur ; sicut habet visum qui est instrumentum videndi, etiam quando illo non utitur, ut cum dormit45. And the act of willing (voluntas usus) is but a regular or periodic exercise of this ability, that is a number of instances when «we direct the will toward various things» (conver- tere voluntatem ad diversa). However, the situation is more complex with the voluntas affectio. The inclinations are of two kinds: «the affection for what is to our advantage (affectio commodi) [and] a second and more noble tendency, an inclination or affection for justice (affectio iustitiae). ... To will, in the sense of to wish or to want, is much more akin to velle in classical Latin which is connected with what suits and is convenient for me and is convenient to me (bonum commodi), while the new Christian sense of willing is especially a matter of what we ought to do» [Vos, 2006: p. 423-424]; cf. [Hopkins, 1972: p. 142-143]. The wish for what is good to me is good, but the wish for the good itself is better. The beneficial, which attracts a man, can be relatively good or can seem good, but it is not necessarily good in itself. Vice versa, what seems to humans pleasant and beneficial after some time frequently appears to be not good at all. However, God qua the good, the justice and the uprightness is necessarily, unchangingly and unquestionably good. Therefore any commodum cannot be compared to the bonum itself or, in DC's wording, rectitudo itself and iustitia itself. Justice and rightness are the best things for the will to will. Thus, in Anselm's own words, una est ad volendum commoditatem [affectio vel aptitudo], altera ad volendum rectitudinem46 - the two are really different. Therefore, now, that this distinction has been drawn, there is no surprise that for Anselm the true - and the very best conceivable - freedom of the will is «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake» (potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem). It is so because he really «places “justice” at the heart of things» [Evans, 2002: p. 92].

In general, on the basis of what has just been said, the threefold understanding of the will according to St. Anselm must be clear now. But it is also important to see how these parts work together. And here the scheme is easily reconstructed (DC III, 11-12):

the will-as-instrument is a fundamental faculty of rational creature which «contains» two aptitudes and «implies» a possibility of its own active usage. But both the former and the latter are essential elements of the will's nature, its ontic constitution, and, thus, the will is indeed «an instrument that moves itself» (instrumentum se ipsum movens)47 without any external compulsion; «A man always possesses this instrument even though he does not always use it. The case is similar to

his having sight, in the sense of the instrument-for-seeing, even when he does not use it (e.g., when he is asleep)». «One of these is the inclination to will what is beneficial; the other is the inclination to will what is

right». The full quotation and translation of this passage:

Voluntas quidem instrumentum movet omnia alia instrumenta quibus sponte utimur, et quae sunt in nobis - ut manus, lingua, visus -, et quae sunt extra nos - ut stilus et securis -, et facit omnes voluntarios motus ; ipsa vero se suis affectionibus movet.

Unde dicipotest instrumentum se ipsum movens.

«Indeed, the will-as-instrument moves all the other instruments which we freely use - both those instruments which are a part of us (such as our hands, our tongue, our sight) and those that are independent of us (such as a pen and an ax). Furthermore, it causes all of our voluntary movements; but it moves itself by means of its inclinations. Hence, it can be called an instrument that moves itself».

now, the two aptitudes or inclinations «effect» the will-as-instrument (afficitur instrumentum) by «pushing» it to a decision which favors one of them - either a decision for the sake of justice and uprightness, or a decision for the sake of wellbeing;

then, the instrument - rationally or irrationally - decides what to choose and «switches on» the use-function whereby it commits the act of willing itself and, at the same time, thinks about this act, being aware of what it does.

The first step is an ontological statement and a possibility-statement: there is ability with certain «sub-abilities», and there is no other forces or factors, which determine its actions; consequently, this ability can do something or function in some way quite independently. The second step is a motivation statement: the inclinations motivate the agent to make a specific choice which, in general, corresponds to one of the two purposes - happiness and well-being or justice and uprightness. The third step is the very act of willing: the instrument of will deliberately acts by making a certain choice. But since (a) no external forces participate in the process and (b) only internal inclinations See DC III, 12-13 for a more detailed treatment of the issues - e.g. human inclinations before and after the Fall, the nature of the commodum and the rectitudo, etc - involved. and own power of the will are involved, whenever and however the free will makes its choice, it wills freely. S. Visser and T. Williams summarize this Anselmian point well:

[T]he person... is free because he knows what goal he ought to aim at and has the power to choose accordingly, and no external force is operating so as to necessitate his choice. ... What is central to Anselm's definition is that the action be self-initiated and consciously chosen, not that it be one of at least two possibilities. This aspect of Anselm's theory partially satisfies the intuition that as long as a person knows what he is doing and why he is doing it, his action is free, regardless of whether the agent had some other option available to him. .

What is relevant to freedom is not the source of the motivations, but whether, when there is a decision to be made among competing goals, it is the agent himself who is doing the deciding. If the agent initiates the choice and is not determined by circumstances outside his control, then his choice is free and it is permissible to hold him responsible for his action. In the unfortunate, and indeed unlikely, instance in which a person has absolutely no good motives from which to choose, he is still responsible for the action that results from the motive he chose to follow [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 187, 188-189].

This is a good capture of some of Anselm's key points of the De Concordia. If the will is an ability to make deliberative decisions and if it functions exactly as he described it, then it is indeed possible to speak of the ever-present and never-absent freedom of the will. Hence, Anselm of Canterbury understanding of the will is a real achievement of the medieval theological thought. At that moment it was a very powerful theory, which perhaps deserved to be called a «revolution». But it both employed some already-existing and well-known ideas and, on the other hand, created a fresh and original synthesis of those old and some newer conceptions. We have discussed that already and now I would like to summarize my points and formulate some conclusive remarks concerning Anselm, his theological thought, and the De Concordia.

Analytical summary and integrative conclusion to the study of the De Concordia's key ideas and arguments

In brief, the De Concordia, written by Anselm, then already the archbishop of Canterbury, in 1107-1108 AD [Hopkins, 2003: p. 11-12; Aird, 2014: p. 90], is a treatise on the relation of God's (fore)knowledge and gracious (pre)destination with his creatures' free will operating in the «free choice» mode which shows some distinctive features of the western medieval thinking in general and the Anselmian way of theologizing in particular. It collects some ideas of St. Augustine and Boethius, integrates, updates and synthesizes them (together with some original Anselm's theories) in creative manner and, as a result, becomes a work containing some peculiar ideas and challenging hypotheses.

In my estimation, the key ideas and arguments of the DC are those concerning (a) the two types of necessity, (b) a definition of the freedom of choice and of will, (c) the nature of the will and, finally, (d) the relation of simultaneity that exists between God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's will. Summing them up and critically assessing them, I would like to share the following theses.

St. Anselm's treatment of the necessity with its two types follows in the footsteps of Boethius who distinguished between natural and propositional kinds of necessity [Hopkins, 1972: p. 79, n 20] (which can be also called simple and conditional kinds [Marenbon, 2007: p. 45]). But the archbishop of Canterbury somewhat modifies and deepens this distinction. In particular, he «rebrands», renames the both necessities, thus highlighting (i) their fundamental difference and (ii) their connection to the physical and metaphysical realities, including God's relation to the world. In his view there is the antecedent necessity (nécessitas praecedens), which both really - i.e. physically, metaphysically, naturally, etc. - and logically precedes and causes things or events, and the subsequent necessity (necessitas sequens), which both really and logically follows from things or events, being in a sense caused by them [cf. McCall, 2011: p. 502, 503]. Hence, the former is to be identified with the necessity as necessitating power of coercion and compulsion, and the latter - with the necessity as non-necessitating relation of identification - i.e. semantic, logical or metaphysical identity or correspondence between the terms or particular individual objects. This important philosophical distinction helps clarify the relation between God's foreknowledge and the free choice available to his creatures: God necessarily knows all objects and events in the world in the «subsequent necessity mode», which means that, then, the divine foreknowledge by no means causes or necessitates anything. Rather, it is necessarily bound or immediately connected to the object or event known logically and metaphysically. As several centuries before him Boethius, Anselm thought that «since God knows all things as if they were present, future events are necessary, in relation to their being known by God, in just the way that anything which is presently the case is necessary. And this necessity of the present is an unconstraining necessity - ...in themselves the future events remain completely free» [Marenbon, 2007: p.46; McCall, 2011: p. 504]. In this aspect, the thinker from Aosta offers an adequate interpretation and a slight modification of an old theory.

With respect to the definition of the freedom of choice and of will, his contribution is also significant not as much as its original but as much as it remains faithful to and continues the tradition of the earlier centuries and restates it afresh for a new century. Here he, basically, repeats the ideas of the doctor gratiae - St. Augustine - and argues for them. For this great thinker the true freedom of choice (once-really and now only hypothetically available to men) is the freedom to choose, will and do what is good and upright. In Enchiridion 30 (9) he states [Augustine, 2014; Augustinus, 2014a]:

For he is freely in bondage (liberaliter enim servit) who does with pleasure the will of his master. Accordingly, he who is the servant of sin is free to sin. And hence he will not be free to do right (ad iuste faciendum liber), until, being freed from sin, he shall begin to be the servant of righteousness. And this is true liberty (vera libertas), for he has pleasure in the righteous deed (propter recte facti laetitiam); and it is at the same time a holy bondage (pia servitus), for he is obedient to the will of God.