An analysis of Anselm’s philosophical theology and the problem of man’s freedom in his De Concordia

At the same time, the human freedom of choice can be also identified with a «neutral power (media vis) for performing good or for performing evil» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157]. This second definition appears in De Spiritu et littera (The Spirit and the Letter) 33 (58) [Augustinus, 2014b]. Thus, Augustine offers two possible definitions of the freedom of the (human) will but definitely favors the first one.

His 11th-century follower slightly modifies this definition by adding «references to the object of choice, viz., uprightness, within the definition of “free choice”» [Hopkins, 1972: p. 157]. For Anselm, the libertas voluntatis is «the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake». Perhaps, we could even say that the freedom of choice is but an ability to choose good, but the freedom of the will is an ability to choose what is right because it is right. This slight modification of Augustine's definition does not change its core or ethos, but does highlight some of its aspects. Specifically, St. Anselm emphasizes the (more-or- less) rational nature of the will - it chooses something because it has reasons for that - and maximizes the importance of its (natural) orientation to the good itself. To be able to will some upright deeds does not mean to be free; to will those deeds because (a) you rationally deliberated on their nature and came to the conclusion that they are good and (b) you want to choose the best option available, i.e. only what is really and mostly right - this is what makes one really free. This definition and its explanation show Anselm's great dependence on and clear faithfulness to St. Augustine's legacy. But, again, they reveal his desire to deepen and expand those ancient doctrines.

However, when it comes to the theorizing about the nature of the will, an innovative character of Anselm's contribution becomes more obvious. He suggests a very interesting differentiation between (i) the will as the instrument for deliberative decisions, (ii) the will as disposition(s) or inclination(s) of the will, and (iii) the will as the «use» of the will, i.e. act of willing per se. It helps him explain the mechanism of willing and its tiny nuances. The notion of a disposition shows the importance of motivation and leads to another distinction - that between the desires for what is advantageous or beneficial and what is upright and just. But the notions of the will-as-instrument and the will-as-act-of- willing and the fact that there are at least two types of inclinations clearly show that neither rational deliberation, nor internal disposition can «automatize» and determine what the will finally chooses. Vice versa, these conceptual «manipulations» demonstrate the logical and psychological reality of the freedom Here freedom means «independence», «self-determination» or «unrestrained ability to choose its course», rather than «the ability to choose good». But the reason for such ambiguity or equivocation is that Anselm himself allows for it, ambiguously speaking of freedom in both senses. See, for example, DC I, 2-3, 5 and 6, etc. of the will. The faculty makes decisions on the basis of some rational thinking, but still, it is the will alone that takes the decision. It has two inclinations, which push it in one or another direction, but again, it is the will alone that defines the course of actions. Hence, for Anselm, neither knowledge, nor emotional affection, nor anything else - whether we speak of God or men - can determine the will's decisions. The will must be free to be a will. And if its decisions are (a) not constrained or determined by any external power а la the (antecedent) necessity, (b) not determined but only informed or influenced by some internal forces а la the intellect and the will's affections, and (c) self-initiated and determined by the «undeterminable» will alone, then the will must be free by definition and because of its constitution. This line of Anselm's thinking is indeed peculiar, since here he goes beyond Augustine or Boethius. Even more, such a theory of will opened door to some more revolutionizing «theologies of will» in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries and, thus, solidified Anselm's crucial role of the «pиre de la scolastique» [Gilson, 1925, p. 55]. But his most important idea, expressed in the De Concordia, is that of the simultaneity of God's knowledge, God's will and the creature's free choices. The simple phrase simul esse et praescientiam dei [et ejus praedestinationem] et libertatem arbitrii, when analyzed within the scope of Anselmian and Boethian doctrine of the nature of the divine eternity See for a deeper treatment of these ideas in Boethius' opera in [Marenbon, 2007: p. 42-46, 53-55]. and exclusively Anselmian theory of the will, reveals a really great idea. The human reality operates in the temporal mode where there is the past, the present and the future. The divine reality enjoys the eternal present, the permanent now. The point of their connection is the double action of God himself, who decides what should happen and knows what actually happens in the world. But - and this is the key statement - the decision of God's will or God's knowing of his own and his creatures' voluntary activity are absolutely temporally Here «temporally» does not mean «happening along the time span» or «bearing a temporal nature».

Rather, it means «happening in reality (which from human point of view necessarily has a temporal aspect» or «standing in a relation to the space-time continuum». synchronic with the human free will's decisions. In my view, this notion of the real synchronicity of God's and human actions is crucial to the understanding of Anselm's theses in the DC. And this discovery - perhaps, not fully realized even by Anselm himself, let alone his interpreters - can still be used, and definitely should be discussed, in the realms of Christian systematic/dogmatic theology and philosophical theology, since it is neither outdated, nor shallow. Its insights were, and still are, intellectually promising [cf. Wawer, 2014: p. 367ff, 399].

But, of course, some aspects of Anselmian inquiry into the nature of willing seem to be not well-grounded or controversial. Visser and Williams speak of some ambiguities in Anselm's account of freedom of the will [Visser & Williams, 2009: p. 171-172ff, 185186, 188-190], and Hopkins notes several very peculiar paradoxes about «Anselm's conception of human free will» [Hopkins, 2003: p. 149]. But I omit the discussion of these issues due to the lack of space and the different angle I take. Both Hopkins and the duet of Visser and Williams concentrate on Anselm's understanding of the will qua human will while I am more interested in a study of the will qua will per se, including both the divine and the human will. Of course, the theory, which Anselm offers, should be applied to the notion of human will par excellence, since it corresponds to his intentions. But still, his account of the nature of the will is - at least, to certain extent - applicable to theology proper (the doctrine of God) or «theology of the will» proper. For example, his belief in the centrality of the will in one's actions as well as the emphasis on maximally possible freedom of the will is applicable to both God-talk and «man-talk». In similar way, the mechanism of the will's «work» - i.e. a combination of ability, inclination(s) and use of the faculty - can prove almost equally helpful for theology proper as for theological or philosophical anthropology. In any case, St. Anselm's De Concordia and its crucial ideas have played their role in the medieval theology, being influential in 11-13th centuries, and can be interesting and challenging nowadays. At least, these ideas can - and no doubt should - become or issues in or topics for contemporary debates and research [Bйly, 2013: p. 408, 409; Sumner, 2013: p. 25-35; Wawer, 2014: p. 366]. As for the development of the medieval theology after Anselm, it will not be an extravagant exaggeration to state together with early E. Gilson.

The philosophy of St. Anselm does not compose a complete system, but it is possible to say that the spirit of St. Anselm contained in a nutshell almost all the philosophical speculation which had to find its full blooming in the thomism. ... If we consider a definition of scholasticism, that identifies it with certain bodies of common doctrines, sufficient, we will also agree with the title of «the father of scholasticism» (which is quite honorary) reserved for St. Anselm. In any case, he remains the father of the line of philosophers, the greatest of who are St. Thomas [Aquinas] and St. Bonaventure, but the most vigorous is indisputably St. Anselm «La philosophie de saint Anselme ne constitue donc pas un systиme complet, mais on peut dire que l'esprit de saint Anselme contenait virtuellement toute la spйculation philosophique dont le thomisme devait marquer l'йpanouissement complet. . Si nous estimions satisfaisante la dйfinition de la scolastique par un certain corps de doctrines communes, nous accepterions aussi pour saint Anselme le titre de “pиre de la scolastique” dont on l'a souvent honorй. Il demeure, en tout cas, le pиre de cette lignйe de philosophes dont saint Thomas et saint Bonaventure sont les plus grands, mais dont saint Anselme est incontestablement le plus vigoureux». [Gilson, 1925, p. 54-55] (translation mine)..

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