Afghanistan in Transnational Infrastructural Projects of Central and South Asia

Though the estimated total of investments varies greatly, the most defended sum is around $1 trillion. Regardless the risky side of such an exceedingly big amount of investment, there is much to gain on an economic and political level for China. To China, the BRI initiative has become an opportunity to ship its domestic production abroad and create consumers. The European and North-American demand most definitely opened new markets for Chinese products but also protect the Chinese economy from an eventual slowdown or stagnation. However, now that the U.S. under president D. Trump and China have a serious conflict over the access of Chinese products on new markets, it is quite uncertain how this will apply to Afghanistan's case. BRI, in a certain sense, is about creating permanent consumers of Chinese production, whether this be in the form of material products or services. China is also on a quest of resources, searching to maintain its economic growth and encourage it further as well as to improve the country's overall quality of life.

Afghanistan is a country very rich in resources such as copper, gold, silver, petroleum, zinc, gas, iron, cobalt, talc and uranium but also in precious stones. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India [TAPI] Pipeline. [Electronic resource]. URL: http://mom.gov.af/en/page/1378/shiberghan-gas-project . (Date of access: 28.12.2018) China has been very active in resource-rich countries in Africa and South-America and, therefore, supporting Afghanistan is not only a matter of resources but also a question of security. By providing support to Afghanistan facing security issues, Beijing hopes to simultaneously secure its province Xinjiang, bordering to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kirghizstan and Kazakhstan. Xinjiang is inhabited mostly by Uighurs that have been a source of concern to Beijing. This is a subject that will be developed later, as it is worth being discussed in the framework of this subject. For now, it is important to retain that it isn't entirely clear whether the BRI initiative remains purely development-focused as an operation or whether China has shifted its security priorities. As China is working on deepening its relations with other Central Asian countries, the desire to cooperate and pacify Afghanistan is increasing as it is understood that it is at the benefit of all. Beijing rarely speaks of expanding its security with other states, but these trends show that China's BRI has not only made it an influential actor in the economic sphere, but also in politics, two spheres who are increasingly intertwined, as discussed earlier.

The Uighurs, inhabiting Xinjiang, have caused concern a fair amount of concern to Beijing. Part of the population has radicalize and sought social acceptance on Taliban territory, acceptance and security which they claim not to find China. This is an important aspect of the subject that is worth getting back to in detail later. For now, we shall remember that Afghanistan figured high on China's foreign policy priority list even before 9/11, as Beijing was attempting to keep a strong hold on Xinjiang, inevitably making it a part of the Central Asian political environment. This is a fact that has been entirely overlooked. The importance of Xinjiang to China must not be underestimated, as Xinjiang increasingly became China's gateway to Central Asia and perhaps even the Middle East.

Joining BRI could have many outcomes for Afghanistan. The first and most obvious benefit that Afghanistan could get from being part of the BRI initiative is that it would be a central hub for the New Silk Road due to its geographical location, linking South and Central Asia as a start. The obvious reason Beijing has avoided large-scale infrastructure projects so far is the fear of constant growing security issues combined with the government's financial weakness that causes a poor return on investment. Though BRI has often been accused of being a modern-day Marshall plan, Beijing has made clear it does not intend to use its growing economic power to become yet another provider of public goods. This will be made clear if Beijing remains consistent to its BRI policy, a policy of non-interference and win-win cooperation, in its interaction with Kabul. Consequently, western powers, who have often accused BRI of being a modern-day Marshall plan, are rethinking China's true motives and approach to BRI, remembering how their own previous attempts to stabilize Afghanistan have failed. Though Afghanistan has become one of China's strategic priorities, it is important to remember that it is not in Afghanistan's interest to let foreign “hard power” nor “soft power” determine its future.

In 2015, China began facilitating and encouraging a dialogue between the Ghani government and the Taliban. The Taliban seemed more open to Beijing taking the part of a mediator than any Western representative, mainly because Beijing refers to the Taliban as a Rebel group rather than a Terrorist organization and is prepared to interact on this basis. Despite the amount of efforts put into the dialogue, there came little progress. This was mainly due to the deteriorating relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan as a result of the continuous Taliban attacks in the Afghan capital, Kabul. Beijing understood that, as long as Pakistan and Afghanistan remained in discordance, the Taliban could not be brought to the negotiating table and thus, China set out to bring Pakistan into its peace efforts by engaging in several rounds of “shuttle diplomacy” between Islamabad and Kabul to put in place a trilateral crisis management mechanism. Ramachandran, S. Is China Bringing Peace to Afghanistan? // The Diplomat. 20 June 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/is-china-bringing-peace-to-afghanistan/ (Date of access: 15.02.2019) December 2017, Beijing hosted trilateral talks where the three states called on the Taliban to join the process. Ibid

China's role in Afghanistan has grown quickly into a very decisive role on important matters. This is remarkable as only a few years ago, Beijing's presence in Afghanistan was merely noticeable. In fact, China kept a very low-profile and remained a spectator of event after the fall of the Taliban regime in December 2001, unlike other states who engaged into military counterinsurgencies and financial contributions or support for reconstruction. Beijing's lack of action can be explained by its prudence and avoidance of presenting itself as a U.S.-ally because for China, there were no real goals or at least a limited amount of goals that could have justified its interference in Afghanistan. There was no desire to democratize, “liberate”, rebuild Afghanistan nor “fix” its ideological orientations and politic system. Thus, between 2001 and 2012 China was rather low profile yet maintaining close ties with the Afghan government by signing treaties such as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations with Kabul Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. Treaty of China-Afghanistan Friendship, Cooperation and Good-neighborly Relations Takes Effects. 14 August 2008. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/t484518.shtml. (Date of access: 07.01.2019) in 2006 or by sealing a $3 billion contract with the Mes Aynak copper mines in the Afghan Logar province. Ramachandran, S. Is China Bringing Peace to Afghanistan? // The Diplomat. 20 June 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/is-china-bringing-peace-to-afghanistan/ (Date of access: 15.02.2019)

Between 2002 and 2013, Beijing has invested a total of $240 million in aid to Afghanistan of which $80 million was given in 2014 alone and an additional $240 million was promised over the next three years. By 2017, Beijing added an additional $90 million in development projects (mainly infrastructure) in Badakhstan province. Ibid. This has made China Afghanistan's largest foreign investor, mainly in resource extraction and infrastructure building, which consequently has led to investments in telecommunication such as the fiber-optic constructions in 2017. Ibid.

Though, as mentioned earlier, Beijing has not made any official statement expressing its wish to add Afghanistan to its BRI network, it has become clear there is a desire to do so. Before China can even dream of such ambitions, it has to worry about Afghanistan's security issues, as these could derail Beijing's projects. The success of BRI as well as its flagship, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, majorly depends on whether Afghanistan is stable or not. Beijing has therefor decided to step up its engagements to Afghanistan to a no longer only coming in the form of financial aid but in the sphere of security, as it is a matter that equally concerns the security of China. Though a close cooperation in security between Afghanistan and China seems at both country's advantage, it is a rather ambitious project to undertake. Indeed, many projects are being delayed or have failed in Afghanistan because of serious security issues, therefore the need and urgency to secure the country is undeniable.

The railway line linking China's Jiangsu province to the Afghan rail port of Hairatan runs empty from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan on its return route. This railway has the capability of reducing the travel time and cost of production of goods, but the export remains too low. Afghan security issues and Uzbek border restrictions have made it impossible for China to have a direct rail link in the north of Afghanistan. Therefore, BRI may promise Afghanistan to increase road and rail infrastructure to link the landlocked country to more markets, but this becomes complicated when Afghanistan's export capacity remains so low and creates such situations as with the Jiangsu-Hairatan railway.

Therefore, Beijing feels the need to tackle the Afghan security issue. Even though China's military role in Afghanistan is visibly increasing, there is not much clarity on the subject. The Afghan Ministry of Defense, however, confirmed the set-up of a military base in the northern Afghan province of Badakhstan, a region rich in Lazurite deposits, with the Chinese extending financial support to cover all technical and material expenses for the military base - whether that be weaponry or military equipment such as uniforms. Badakhstan is a remote province situated in a mountainous area, which is mostly inhabited by Sunni Tajiks. In the north beyond the Panj lies Tajikistan and in the southeast lies Pakistan's Chitral, arguably the most ethnically diverse region in the entire world. Куприянов А.В. Китаестан: Зачем КНР военная база в афганском Бадахшане. // Известия. 21 января 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://iz.ru/697205/aleksei-kupriianov/kitaestan . (Date of access: 24. 03.2019) On the eastern side lies the Wakhan corridor, cutting between mountain ranges and stretching all the way to the Chinese border. Historically, the corridor was a part of the Ancient Silk Road and an important corridor for trade caravans coming from China.

One of the biggest questions remains whether or not, and when, it will house Chinese military personnel. Though Beijing finances an Afghan mountain brigade supposed to operate in Badakhstan province near the border areas, China has made a point in demonstratively showing its distance from any forceful action on Afghan territory. By restricting geographically speaking its military role in Afghanistan to Badakhstan, China shows it is very unlikely to expand its role geographically as it does not want to be caught in the Afghan «quagmire» as the US did. Beijing would rather downplay its military role in Afghanistan, which is the reason why Chinese diplomats in Kabul maintain that China is exclusively engaged in “capacity building”. Additionally, the Chinese ministry of Defense dismisses any reports that claim the military is carrying out patrols in Afghanistan and states the two states are engaged in joint law enforcement operations in the border area with the purpose of fighting terrorism. In fact, China's involvement in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan is not as much aimed as the Taliban as it has been for most other foreign powers militarily active in the area. In fact, it is much more about the elimination of training bases the ETIM [Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement] is believed to be running training camps in the Wakhan corridor. Beijing wishes to prevent jihadists from entering Xinjiang, the Chinese province bordering Afghanistan. The Sino-Afghan border measures approximately 76 kilometers and lies at the eastern end of the Wakhan corridor, stretching from the border of the two countries with Pakistan's Gilgit-Balistan at one end to the trijuction with Tajikistan at the other end. World Atlas. Countries that border China. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-countries-border-china.html (Date of access: 27.03.2019) It is near this border that the mentioned joint counterterrorism operations are taking place.

During March 2019, a trilateral meeting between Afghanistan, China and Pakistan was held in Kabul. The purpose was to discuss the results of discussions that were held in the previous year, meant to expand cooperation between the countries. China had previously made its desire to become a peace mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan in case of need. Trust-building measures between Kabul and Islamabad were taken in different spheres in the hope to fight terrorism and encourage economic cooperation. Thus, senior officials from the three parties gather in the Afghan capital after which Afghan Deputy Foreign Minister Edris Zaman warned that even if a potential peace agreement is possible in the near future, threats which are emerging from insurgency in Afghanistan will not be entirely eliminated and there will still be an urgent need for collective efforts to fight terrorism. E. Zaman mentioned thereafter that in this fight against terrorism, there should be no distinction nor exception made between any terror group. Popalzai, M. A. Afghan, Chinese and Pakistani Officials Hold Meeting in Kabul. // Tolo News, 11 March 2019. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghan-chinese-and-pakistani-hold-trilateral-meeting-kabul . (Date of access: 13.04.2019) Chinese officials made their good will clear once more:

“All these kinds of jobs, all these processes [should be] based on the principles of Afghan-led and Afghan-owned and Afghan government should play a leading role in this process. As a country [China] just wants to support you and we don't like any kind of approach led to make any so-called power game in this country,” said Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan Liu Jinsong.

China urges Afghans and Pakistanis to forget old conflicts and promises the inclusion of Afghanistan in CPEC, which is still considered one of the most promising regional projects.Куприянов А.В. Китаестан: Зачем КНР военная база в афганском Бадахшане. // Известия. 21 января 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://iz.ru/697205/aleksei-kupriianov/kitaestan . (Date of access: 24. 03.2019) Regional interconnectivity is once more highlighted and China expresses the desire to bring peace to Afghanistan and stability between Kabul and Islamabad. The real question is how successful China is likely to be in stabilizing Afghanistan. China has advantages that strengthen its hand in mediating talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. One of these advantages is that China is not burdened by a negative historical legacy, which has made its “interference” far more acceptable to both the Afghan government and the Taliban. Beijing never referred to the Taliban as a terrorist group, but rather as a group of opposition. In addition, Beijing is Pakistan's closest ally, which means it has a remarkable influence over Islamabad and important leverage when there is need for support in the peace process and including the Taliban in that process. China is an important participant in the QCG [Quadrilateral Cooperation Group] Putz, С. Can China Help Mediate Between Afghanistan and Pakistan? // The Diplomat, 13 June 2017. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/can-china-help-mediate-between-afghanistan-and-pakistan/ . (Date of access: 20.02.2019), which is composed of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the U.S. The aim of QCG is to achieve the reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban all while maintain peace. This group has a few weaknesses, as it does not include Russia, which could contribute a lot with its knowledge of Afghanistan. It equally excludes important regional actors such as Iran and India. Furthermore, there have been doubts on Pakistan's true motives and effort in the framework of this organization. Nevertheless, China can bring ideas and expertise from these dialogues to the negotiation table. China can offer powerful inducements, benefits of regional trade and economic development to convince Afghanistan and Pakistan to negotiate and cooperate until a settlement is reached. Ibid. Though China is cautious about the Taliban, it is not opposed to cutting deals with them.

Despite China's favorable position, there are some constraints of which many are self-imposed. Beijing has not used its considerable influence over Islamabad to end its policy of using terrorist groups as an instrument of its foreign policy. Indeed, Pakistan has been providing sanctuary to the Taliban while simultaneously trying to bring them to the negotiation table. China seems however to have focused on getting Pakistan to crackdown on ETIM sanctuaries in Pakistan and its allied Islamic Movement of UzbekistanRehman, Z. U. ETIM's presence in Pakistan and China's growing pressure // Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. August 2014. [Electronic resource]. URL:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183175/381280b226170116bb6f07dc969cb17d.pdf . (Date of access: 03.04.2019) , as they are of more concern to China than the Taliban. Therefore, Beijing has not pushed Islamabad to end all support to Taliban terrorist attacks. This is contradicting as such as approach to counter-terrorism issues cannot build peace or stabilize a region, but at best weaken certain branches.

Therefore, China is unlikely to quell long-lasting conflicts in a very near future, as economic development of conflict areas requires peace. As China's involvement has been criticized and scrutinized it has remained cautious and superficial in its approach, not too keen to address the underlying causes of the Afghan security crisis. Beijing is disinterested in shaping the political outcome of negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. China's role in Afghanistan is undoubtedly growing and evolving; its influence remains limited but it has allowed a dialogue with the Taliban from evolving as well as negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which can be considered an achievement as well. Whilst the U.S. considers a peace process in Afghanistan cannot move forward without Washington and that China and the U.S. therefore need to cooperate, China will have to coordinate its efforts with other powers; whether it be with the U.S. or other regional actors if it wishes the peace process to be more effective. Other regional actors such as India, Iran, Uzbekistan and others will be of as much importance in the process of regional interconnectivity, economic interdependence and regional peace.

2.3 Afghanistan as a crossing knot of interests of regional and extra-regional actors

Afghanistan's security and economic wellbeing is in the interest of many regional and extra-regional actors who, through infrastructure projects, hope to improve the country's interconnectivity and connect the country to new markets. Due to Afghanistan's geographical location, the country takes mostly the role of a transfer hub, a status of which it could enjoy of many benefits.

The New Silk Road initiative was first envisioned in 2011, and announced by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the same year. Shepard, W. Afghanistan: China's “New Silk Road” Picks up where Hillary Clinton's Flopped // Forbes. 9 September 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2016/09/09/chinas-new-silk-road-picks-up-where-hillary-clintons-flopped-in-afghanistan/#52f38b8b63f9 . (Date of access: 01.05.2019) The primary purpose of the U.S.'s New Silk Road was to continue integrating Afghanistan into its regional economy by recuperating old and traditional trading routes and to reconstruct important connecting infrastructure that has been destroyed throughout the decades of conflict. The U.S., being very aware of the strategic capacity Afghanistan has due to its location, sees the territory as an open door to key areas, a North-South transit point as well as an East-West connection across Eurasia. The U.S. made its plan to promote the New Silk Road Initiative public, by stating its desire to link Central Asia to South Asia in order to promote regional connectivity and economic integration in Afghanistan. This act of connecting Central to South Asia would be performed in four key areas. Firstly, it would take pace in the regional energy markets; South Asia's economy has been remarkably thriving over the past decades and continues to show indications of growth. Consequently, South Asia's demand for efficient, reliable yet inexpensive energy has grown tremendously too. The U.S. sees an opportunity to redirect resources such as oil, gas and hydropower from resource-rich Central Asia to South Asia, through Afghanistan. To do so, the US provided support for the CASA-1000 [Central Asia South Asia power project] regional electricity grid as well as a $15 million contribution, the March 2014 World Bank commitment of $526.50 million and support for the CASA Secretariat. The World Bank. Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000). 2014. [Electronic resource]. URL: http://projects.worldbank.org/P145054?lang=en . (Date of access: 14.12.2018)

More than $1 billion USD in support of energy transmission lines, hydropower plants and associated reforms has been invested into CASA-1000 providing South Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan who have to endure persistent electricity deficiency with electricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Ibid. Both countries possess some of the world's most abundant clean hydropower resources with water gushing from the mountains filling the rivers every summer and providing the countries with a surplus of electricity. This helps avoid citizens of Pakistan and Afghanistan lacking electricity needs especially during the hot summers and the power cut in industrial production causing the loss of small businesses and jobs. Hence, CASA-1000 as an electricity transmission system connects all four countries -Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan- and enables Central Asian countries to transfer and sell their electricity surplus mostly during the summer to deficient countries in South Asia. The project is additionally supposed to integrate and expand markets to increase trade and find long-term solutions to water resources management.

Regarding infrastructure, the U.S. has provided more than 3000 kilometers of roads either built or rehabilitated in Afghanistan and supported Kazakhstan and Afghanistan's' accession to the WTO [World Trade Organization]. Furthermore, the U.S. provided technical assistance of the 2010 APTTA [Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit-Trade Agreement] World Trade Organization. Afghanistan and Regional Trade Arrangements. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/3_afganrta_e.pdf . (Date of access: 09.03.2019) and for the CBTA [Cross-Border Transport Agreement] Ibid. between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The U.S. equally works with regional partners to reduce border time wait, increase cooperation at key checkpoint and crossing to prevent transit of illegal and dangerous materials as well as human trafficking. U.S. Department of State. U.S. Support for the New Silk Road (Information realized 20 January 2009 - 20 January 2017). [Electronic resource]. URL: https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/af/newsilkroad/index.htm . (Date of access: 28.04.2019)

The U.S.'s New Silk Road Initiative, never put into action, cannot be considered a success but it did show the belated American reaction on China's increasing regional influence and the vast and growing BRI. CASA-1000 and other projects such as CBTA, APTTA are an attempt to set an economic foothold in the region. However, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is about to diminish even more so. President D. Trump concluded that after $1 trillion USD spent and 2400 American lives lost, Afghanistan is not more stable than it was eighteen years ago when the U.S. troop arrived. Luce, E. Donald Trump is pulling a Vietnam in Afghanistan. // The Financial Times. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ft.com/content/621fe9a6-5643-11e9-91f9-b6515a54c5b1 . (Date of access: 09.05.2019) Since the Taliban and Al-Qaida operate in many countries where there are no U.S. troops present, this decision is very unlikely to cause any dramatic changes in history other than the fact that it affects what could be called the U.S.'s “global standing”, as it has once more failed to successfully complete its role of bringer of peace and democracy.

European countries have not forgotten the 1000 non-American NATO troupes that have died in Afghanistan during NATO's mutual defense clause to come to the U.S.'s aid. Nonetheless, Z. M. Khalilzad, U.S. diplomat and Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation at the Department of State, has consistently excluded Europeans from talks with the Taliban; such an affront to allies has its consequences and the U.S. reputation in the Middle East is not ideal. Its standing vis-а-vis India suffers from it too, as India views the Taliban as a Pakistani tool. As for China, it is taking note too. In other words, the U.S. has tremendously failed in stabilizing Afghanistan and the region.

Therefore, as the U.S.'s military presence in Afghanistan is to become inexistent, one is also to expect little advancement and investments from the American side in the field of infrastructure projects and facilitation in the coming years.

Also known as the “trans-Afghanistan pipeline” or the “peace pipeline”, its acronym stands short for its member countries that include Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. With a diameter of 56in, it will transport 33bcm of natural gas a year. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline Project. // Hydrocarbons Technology.2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/turkmenistan-afghanistan-pakistan-india-tapi-gas-pipeline-project/ . (Date of access: 19.02.2019) In length, it is 1,814km and running between the four countries. The plan for the TAPI project was originally conceived in the 1990s and a stone-laying ceremony was held to commemorate the start of construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan section of the pipeline in December 2015, near the Galkynysh gas field. However, the actual beginning of construction of the Afghanistan-Pakistan section of the pipeline was held much later, in February 2018. ADB: Asian Development Bank. Completion Report: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Phase 3. March 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/44463/44463-013-tcr-en.pdf . (Date of access: 10.02.2019) The initial motive in 1990's was to generate revenue from Turkmenistan's gas reserves by exporting natural gas via Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. In 2002, the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkmenistan requested the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to become the Secretariat for a proposed TAP [Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan] Natural Gas Pipeline Project and in March 2013, India was invited to join the project.  Ministry of Mines and Petroleum: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India [TAPI] Pipeline. [Electronic resource]. URL: http://mom.gov.af/en/page/1378/shiberghan-gas-project . (Date of access: 28.12.2018) ADB had a primarily secretarial role by assisting the government parties in the preparation of relevant studies supposed to guide each government's process of decision-making and the further development of the project as well as the establishment of the TAPI's legal framework.

In 2010, IGA [Inter-Governmental Agreement] Intergovernmental Agreement between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Government of the Republic of India, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of Turkmenistan (TAPI IGA), signed 11 December 2010 / Intergovernmental Agreements and Host Government Agreements on Oil and Gas Pipelines -A Comparison- / Energy Charter Secretariat 2015, Annex XVI, pp. 539-54 was signed between the heads of the four member countries which established the legal corner stone of the project and a series of agreements were signed such as a bilateral gas sale purchase agreement in May, 2012. By 2013, gas enterprises such as GAIL [Gas Authority India Ltd.], Interstate Gas Service, Afghan Gas Enterprise and Turkmengaz became the shareholders of their respective countries by promoting and investing in the TAPI project. As for ADB, it was appointed by the client -TAPI- as the Transaction Advisor to market the project and attract a suitable clientele to participate in TAPI. In accordance to the Transaction Advisor's studies, the total cost of the project was estimated to be a 10 billion USD with a transmission capacity of 32.8 billion cubic gas per year holding in account the duration of the project is to be for 30 years and extendable. Ministry of Mines and Petroleum: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India [TAPI] Pipeline. [Electronic resource]. URL: http://mom.gov.af/en/page/1378/shiberghan-gas-project . (Date of access: 28.12.2018) Delivering annually an approximate amount of 33 billion cubic meters in gas from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, India and Pakistan is a hardy project. The TAPI natural Gas Pipeline will have a length of 1814 km, and the total construction costs of the project is estimated to be 9.9 billion USD. ADB: Asian Development Bank. Completion Report: Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline Project, Phase 3. March 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/44463/44463-013-tcr-en.pdf . (Date of access: 10.02.2019) This inevitably brings the creation of thousands of new jobs and career opportunities with it.

The TAPI project could be very promising for its members. For instance, Pakistani and Indian state-owned companies are each expected to purchase 42% of the total volume of the produced gas, which is an approximate amount of 14bcm. As for Afghanistan, it is expected to purchase 5.11bcm of gas, which amounts to approximately 16% of the total volume. Ibid. In addition, Afghanistan is esteemed to receive $400m a year as transit fee for the pipeline. Afghanistan's section of the pipeline will be built alongside the highway crossing the cities of Herat and Kandahar, making its way southeast to Pakistan to eventually reach its final destination in India, Fazilka. Ibid. It can expect numerous benefits from TAPI. Such a project can facilitate cooperation across the region and encourage complex interdependent between its members. It is estimated that more than 1.5 billion people in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India can enjoy the benefits of a long-term energy security solution that the project provides. Ibid. Though the project mostly boost Turkmen revenues via the sale of gas, Afghanistan and Pakistan will equally enjoy great benefits through transit fees.

The pricing of gas, needless to say, is the key to the TAPI pipeline project, as it has to be competitive with alternative sources of energy. Member countries have held systematical multilateral and bilateral meetings to address various commercial, technical and operational issues though there is hope to reach a final agreement in the near future. The four member countries of TAPI are optimistic for an energy rich future and all the benefits that regional cooperation can bring to them. Afghanistan as a major energy trade and transit hub has the opportunity to use this project to transform its stagnating economy and war ravaged country into a thriving economic bridge between Central and South Asia. In other words, it is a viable project that has received international support from the European Union and U.S. The goal was for the pipeline to be operational by 2016, however the deadline had been delayed to 2020. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan had to agree upon an acceleration plan in order to make the pipeline ready, disclosed and official by the end of 2019, which now has been extended to 2020. The acceleration plan, proposed by Pakistan, was approved by all members in the hope that the project will ease tension between members. The Economic Times. TAPI pipeline worth $10 billion unlikely before 2020. 10 July 2015. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/tapi-pipeline-worth-10-billion-unlikely-before-2020/articleshow/48018617.cms?from=mdr . (Date of access: 15.02.2019)

Establishing as based medium capacity power plants and gas-consuming industries will encourage industrial productivity and solid investment opportunities for both domestic and international manufacturers. It will also provide smaller industries the opportunity to grow and offer much needed jobs and economic interdependence should encourage friendly relations between states. However, not everyone is optimistic about the realization of this project. According to A. Kazantsev, the deteriorating political situation and security of Afghanistan, the terrorism issue and spread of international terrorist organizations show the likelihood of these projects decrease. Казанцев А.А. CASA-1000, ТАПИ -- сами собой исчезают: что ждет Трампа в «Южной Азии» // EurAsia Daily, 16 ноября 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/11/16/casa-1000-tapi-sami-soboy-ischezayut-chto-zhdet-trampa-v-yuzhnoy-azii . (Date of access: 27.01.2019) They will not remain relevant to for instance, the U.S. who has for decades heavily invested in Afghan aid, not only because this is no longer relevant under Trump, but because of regional issues. The lack of security and progress in the pacification of the region dissuades investors who will not be able to see the fruit of their investments. A. Kazantsev further argues, that political lobbying in Afghanistan were associated to very high hopes for the country but the situation has changed in such a way, that TAPI has practically come off the agenda. Казанцев А.А. CASA-1000, ТАПИ -- сами собой исчезают: что ждет Трампа в «Южной Азии» // EurAsia Daily, 16 ноября 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2016/11/16/casa-1000-tapi-sami-soboy-ischezayut-chto-zhdet-trampa-v-yuzhnoy-azii . (Date of access: 27.01.2019)

The Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project is the first substantial common carrier rail road project in Afghanistan. Equal to the TAPI project, the Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project was approved by ADB in July 2009 and fact-finding missions were carried out in August 2009. In September 2009, the bank announced its decision to finance the project. UTY was awarded the $129m construction contract in November 2009. Hairatan-Uzbekistan Rail Project // Railway Technology. 2013. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/hairatanuzbekistanra/ . (Date of access: 08.01.2019) As an exception to the usual procurement rules, tenders w ere not invited because it was unlikely that any other company would bid for the project due to security reasons. Design review and construction supervision contracts were awarded to engineering and consulting “SMEC International” and an Uzbek “Islohotkonstaltservis” firms in November 2009.

Uzbekistan will provide commercial services to the 75km railway line in addition to operating the line, under a three-year contract signed with Afghanistan in August 2011. The construction of the project was started in January 2010 and completed in November 2010. Ibid. The line was first opened to the public in August 2011, after successful completion of test runs. Built on a flat plain of barren land without vegetation, the Hairatan-Uzbekistan railway line has an elevation of 350-550m. The 75km rail link connects Hairatan on the Uzbekistan-Afghan border to the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. The project was built by the state-owned Uzbekistan Railways (UTY). The estimated cost of the project was $170 million USD, of which $165 million USD was provided by ADB [the Asian Development Bank] and runs in the cooperation of CAREC [the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation] Program. Hairatan-Uzbekistan Rail Project // Railway Technology. 2013. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/hairatanuzbekistanra/ . (Date of access: 08.01.2019) The remaining $5 million USD was provided by the Afghan Government.

The aim behind the Hairatan-Uzbekistan project, part of the transport strategy and action plan of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program, is to boost freight volumes and to improve the image of Afghanistan as a transit hub and focal point for the transportation of goods from Central Asia, South East Asia, Europe and Pakistan. At the Hairatan border, freight trains from Uzbekistan stop to offload and reload their trucks, which causes cost overruns and frequent delays. The Afghan government has entered into direct ECP [Engineering Change Proposal], operation and maintenance contracts with the Uzbekistan Railway Company with the aim to overcome these delays. To Afghanistan, it seemed quite natural to cooperate with Uzbekistan Railway as there are no other companies comparable in regional capability and in undertaking such a project. Ibid.

Plans to extend the route into the west to Herat and east to Shirkhan Bandar are being discussed as the line could be connect at Herat to Iran and at Shirkhan Bandar to Tajikistan. In other words, it would create a corridor extending from northern Afghanistan, enabling freight coming from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, eventually reaching the ports of the Persian Gulf by rail. All whilst avoiding passing through Turkmenistan. The Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project requires heavy investments; however, rolling stock will not be part of it as Uzbekistan vehicles are being used. In fact, the Uzbek railway fleet was acquired from the Soviet Union during the separation from the USSR in 1991. Ibid.

It is worth pointing out Uzbekistan's recent and growing desire to open up and develop in to become an important regional actor and mediator in regional issues. It seems that after the death of President Islam Karimov in 2016, the country has shown a desire to open up. At the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan in March 2018 BBC: Asia. Spring in Tashkent: Is Uzbekistan really opening up? 31 March 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43582371 . (Date of access: 16.04.2019), with delegates and journalists flying in from all over the world, Uzbekistan showed the highest-profile indication of yet a new willingness to re-engage with the world. Indeed, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has shown he wants things to be done differently. A peace summit seemed more than appropriate to outsiders, as Afghanistan is no longer perceived as merely a nearby security threat but rather as a potentially enormous market for Uzbek products and goods. With many products coming from China, these have become more expensive as Mirziyoyev put tariffs on many of these products. Ibid. However, the majority of people understand the economy has been stagnating for decennials and the tariffs imposed by Mirziyoyev are merely perceived as the President encouraging national production, a form of protectionism. Sodyk Safoyev, a former foreign minister and now deputy head of the Uzbek Senate, considers the conference was taking place because of what he called Uzbekistan's "renewed foreign policy" over the past year and a half.

"A completely new political atmosphere has been created in Central Asia," he said. "There's mutual trust, and mutual readiness to resolve the most sensitive issues in the region." Ibid.

Just like that, quite unexpectedly, the peace conference turned out to be rather a breakthrough. Uzbekistan showed a strong desire to reclaim its place on the international stage as well as solidarity for a peace process not only with Afghanistan, but also within all of Central Asia. A regional mediator and vector of regional peace is what Uzbekistan wishes to grow into. This meant it showed support on efforts to bring the Taliban to negotiate.

The Chabahar Port is a port located in southeastern Iran, on the Gulf of Oman. It is Iran's only port and can be divided into two separate ports, namely Shahid Kalantari and Shahid Beheshti of which each has five berths. "Ports Information - Chabahar". Seas Ark S.A. Retrieved 30 June 2016. In 1973, the shah of Iran made his first proposal of the project; however the Iranian Revolution of 1979 delayed the plans. During the Iraq-Iran war in 1983, Iran shifted its maritime trade sector east towards the Pakistani border in order to decrease its dependence on the Persian Golf, which was very vulnerable to Iraqi attacks at that moment. Vatanaka, Alex (2015). Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence. Google Books: I.B. Taurus & Co. Limited. This explains why the first phase of the port was opened in the same year. The Chabahar port essentially will result in 60% reduction in shipment costs and 50% reduction in shipment time from India to Central Asia. Connectivity projects should be consonant with sovereignty principles: Vijay Gokhale, Economic Times, 18 January 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/connectivity-projects-should-be-consequent-with-sovereignty-principles-vijay-gokhale/articleshow/62554336.cms . (Date of acces: 22.02.2019) The three main components are Iran, India and Afghanistan and the core aim of the project is to encourage regional trade between these countries, Afghanistan once more playing the role of a transit country. Central and South Asia could possibly become the new global center of economic growth and activity in the coming next decades but this, of course, depends on a plethora of factors. For Afghanistan, as mentioned fewer times earlier, it is given its location a chance to play a substantial role in the rising regional prospects. Afghanistan, looking to make major advances on its economic front is indeed very motivated to invest in major transport infrastructure projects like the development of the Chabahar port.

In 2001, India started taking on a number of big infrastructure projects in its development assistance program in Afghanistan. One of these infrastructure projects is the Zaranj-Delaram Highway. This highway is approximately 217 kilometers long and connects Zaranj (Nimruz province) near the Iranian border to Delaram (neighboring Farah province). It equally connects the Afghan-Iranian border to the Kandahar-Herat highway, one of Afghanistan's most important infrastructures, in Delaram. Osmani, R. The South Asia Channel. Chabahar Port, A Win for South Asia. // Foreign Policy, 5 February 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/05/chabahar-port-a-win-for-south-asia/ . (Date of access: 22.02.2019) The Zaranj-Delaram highway connects the Chabahar port on the Gulf of Oman to the approximately 2092 kilometers long Afghanistan Ring Road. Connecting 16 countries, 34 provinces, stretching from Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar and to Tajikistan's Gorno-Badakhstan province, this infrastructure creates a North-South transport corridor that links the Indian sub-continent to otherwise land-locked Central Asia. Ibid. The Zaranj-Delaram highway gives Afghanistan access to the Arabian Sea by passing through Iran which will inevitably stimulate foreign investment from trade starting with India who encouraged the development of the project. It was on the 24^th of February, 2019, that Afghanistan launched this new route allowing to export good to reach India through the Chabahar port. Ibid. However, trade between Afghanistan and India had not been lying still; in the previous year, the country exported over $740 million USD worth of goods to India, which is considered its largest overseas export destination. Panda, A. A First: Afghan Shipment Heads to India via Iran's Chabahar Port // The Diplomat. 25 February 2019. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/a-first-afghan-shipment-heads-to-india-via-irans-chabahar-port/ . (Date of access: 05.04.2019) India, even before the Zaranj-Delaram highway was officially launched and operational, expressed great satisfaction over the increase in bilateral trade that has crossed the $1 billion USD mark, following a meeting between A. Ghani and N. Modi in September 2018. A. Ghani confirmed this at the inauguration of the trade route on the 24th of February 2019 in Afghanistan's western province, Nimroz by making the following statement:

“Chabahar port is the result of healthy cooperation between India, Iran and Afghanistan this will ensure economic growth,” Tehran Times: Hellenistic Shipping News. `Chabahar Port result of healthy cooperation between India, Iran, Afghanistan'. 27 February 2019. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/chabahar-port-result-of-healthy-cooperation-between-india-iran-afghanistan/ . (Date of access: 09.05.2019)

Back in 2016, when Afghan Chief Executive Officer A. Abdullah visited Iran on January the 4th, the finalization of the Chabahar Transit and Transport Agreement was on top of his priority list. Abdullah put a lot of hope on the momentum of December 2015 when Indian Prime Minister Modi reiterated his commitment to improve connectivity between India and Afghanistan through the Chabahar port. A. Abdullah could have no doubts about India wanting the project as it represents a huge strategic significance for India given its direct access to Central Asian countries and Afghanistan all while avoiding Pakistan. On May 6, 2015, New Delhi and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding worth $195 million USD to secure India's participation in the development of Chabahar port. Thus, in May 2016, Indian Prime Minister N. Modi concluded a trilateral agreement to develop the port in cooperation with Afghanistan and Iran by investing another $500 million USD. BBC: India and Iran sign `Historic' Chabahar Port Deal. 23 May 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36356163 . (Date of access: 01.05.2019)

However, discussion between Afghanistan, India and Iran over the exact use of the Chabahar port had been going on for a long time. The Port should provide India access to Central Asia and for the country to become the world's fourth largest energy consumer, as it will access to Iran's crude oil reserves of more than 150 billion barrels and 33612 billion cubic meter of gas reserves. As mentioned earlier, it allows India access to Central Asian resources, which include Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan who possess over 30 billion barrels of oil and 7503 billion cubic meter of gas reserves. Kazakshtan respectively has 679,300 tons of uranium in possession and more than 37,000 million short tons of recoverable coal reserves. Osmani, R. The South Asia Channel. Chabahar Port, A Win for South Asia. // Foreign Policy, 5 February 2016. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/05/chabahar-port-a-win-for-south-asia/ . (Date of access: 22.02.2019) In addition to that, India will maximize its trade potential with the Central Asian countries as currently India is far behind on regional players such as China, Russia and Turkey when it comes to trading volumes with Central Asian countries. It is not because of complicated relations. In fact, India has enjoyed quite good relations with Afghanistan and most Central Asian countries throughout history. It is merely the lack of physical bordering that caused logistical problems and lack of access. For example, India's trade with Kazakhstan, its largest Central Asian bilateral trading partner, was worth $952 million in 2014 and 2015, versus $315 million with Uzbekistan in 2014. Osmani, R. The South Asia Channel. Chabahar Port, A Win for South Asia. // Foreign Policy, 5 February 2016 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/05/chabahar-port-a-win-for-south-asia/ . (Date of access: 22.02.2019) Conversely, China-Kazakhstan bilateral trade reached $22.53 billion in 2013 and China-Uzbekistan trade turnover accounted for $4.75 billion in 2014. In fact, according to some estimates, India has the potential to reap up to $450-500 billion in trade through Central Asia and Afghanistan. Ibid.