Afghanistan in Transnational Infrastructural Projects of Central and South Asia

As for Afghanistan, its lack of infrastructure and necessity for connectivity have prevented it from extracting its prodigious deposits of oil, gas and minerals to its fullest potential. Though approximately 9173km of road have been built since 2001 with the aid of the Afghan government, donors and USAID, more than 85 percent of Afghanistan's roads are in bad condition. Ibid President A. Ghani has however shown his will to make the procurement and management of development projects faster, more efficient and more transparent. Nevertheless, to ensure more long-term benefits and less dependence from foreign powers in the future, there should be a stronger institutional environment for the infrastructure sector as Afghanistan has little labor force and poor infrastructure maintenance knowledge. Being sorely behind in developing and issuing road use rules and weight limits, it is questionable whether the country is ready to handle large amounts of trade. Until this matter is taken into hands, the roads will always be in a bad state, which could have a negative impact even on the short term with the use of Afghani trade routes by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

Other than maintenance issues, the Chabahar port project has also a certain amount of geopolitical implications. The project is very displeasing to Beijing and Islamabad; Pakistan is worried about India's influence in Afghanistan for historical and political reasons and Beijing and New Delhi are regional rivals. In fact, the Chabahar port will be the direct competitor of the Chinese Gwadar port situated in Pakistan. China is building up Gwadar to open up trade routes through Pakistan and northward back to China as India built Chabahar to open up trade routes through Iran and Afghanistan. In other words, there is a risk that the Chabahar port could become the source of rivalry and tensions between China and India. If the the Chabahar port will be as beneficial as it is estimated to be, the region will benefit from the new trade routes stretching from the north to Central Asia all the way down to Chabahar in South Iran. Chabahar will represent a station for global imports coming from the Gulf region as well as a gateway to the Middle East and the eventual access to Europe for export of goods coming from Central Asia and Afghanistan. It will not only benefit India's trade volume especially with Central Asia, but also be a boost for Afghanistan who will access Indian, European and Middle East markets. However, China has already an important presence on Pakistani territory with Gwadar, which ensures its proximity to the Gulf and Indian regions. In a close future, it will be possible to see if the current regional institutions will be at the base of the creation of a trustworthy and cooperative political environment or if regional players will allow these ports to become source of rivalry.

Regretfully, security issues have already arisen in the framework of the Chabahar port. At the end of February 2019, Afghanistan was consigned to dispatch at least twenty-three trucks carrying fifty-seven tons of carpets, dried fruits, textiles and other products from Zaranj to Chabahar, to be sent to Mumbai. It was the first time Afghanistan was exporting a large amount of products through the Chabahar port, and happened only a few days after a deadly attack near the port that killed 27 members of IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]. Tehran Times: Hellenistic Shipping News. `Chabahar Port result of healthy cooperation between India, Iran, Afghanistan'. 27 February 2019. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/chabahar-port-result-of-healthy-cooperation-between-india-iran-afghanistan/ . (Date of access: 09.05.2019) A Pakistani terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack.

The state and lack of maintenance of infrastructure in Afghanistan is not the only obstacle the country is facing. Many of Afghanistan as well as Central Asia's resources cannot be cost effectively shipped by truck. Such resources include iron ore and grain. For these type of resources, rail transport would be the only option. Despite an Iranian railway that connects Iran to Afghanistan's northern neighbors, Afghanistan itself is not connected. Indeed, the country has no rail capacity and the absence of low-skilled labor, the inability to produce at scale and the poor infrastructure has made Afghanistan unable to compete on the regional and global market. In other word, Afghanistan needs to find a solution to cost effectively exporting resources.

A narrow strip of territory, stretching from northeastern Afghanistan to China and separating Tajikistan from Pakistan, the Wakhan corridor is about 350km long and 13-65km wide. Between Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan and Pakistan, inside the Pamir KnotHassnain, J. Wakhan Corridor and CPEC. // The Nation. 26 February 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://nation.com.pk/26-Feb-2018/wakhan-corridor-and-cpec . (Date of access: 02.04.2019) , it finds itself to be in a strategic emplacement. A product of history, serving as a buffer zone between British India and Tsarist Russia in the 19^th century - then formally demarcated between the Kingdom of Afghanistan and the Chinese People's Republic in November 1963- the Wakhan corridor had historically been an important transit path of the ancient Silk Road route. Parsa, M. The Bridge to Connect Asia. // Fair Observer, 20 November 2017. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/wakhan-corridor-china-pakistan-afghanistan-tajikistan-world-trade-news-81661/ . (Date of access: 01.05.2019) Though not impossible, the geography of the Pamir Mountains does make building infrastructure challenging and costly, there is no doubt it would bring immense benefits to the regional economy. Security concerns and regional politics however have once more been the cause that prevented initiatives and projects from being undertaken. This has had a bad influence on, for example, bilateral trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the total volume of trade overall decreased from a peak of $2.5 billion in 2010 to $1.482 billion in 2017.Hassnain, J. Wakhan Corridor and CPEC. // The Nation. 26 February 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://nation.com.pk/26-Feb-2018/wakhan-corridor-and-cpec . (Date of access: 02.04.2019) A journey to the Little Pamir, the mountainous section of the Wakhan corridor, is a journey that takes over six days on a horseback and is quite hard to reach by car. Levi-Sanchez, S. // Lowy Institute: The Interpreter. The Corridor of Power. 16 October 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/corridor-power . (Date of access: 06.05.2019)

In January 2018, there had been rumor that the Chinese military had set up a military base in the Little Pamir, a rumor Beijing was quick to deny. Though these rumors have indeed not been confirmed by any facts, Chinese security involvement is not new in the region. In 2014, during a little-know conflict near the Wakhan Corridor in Khorog (Tajikistan) along the Afghan border, Chinese weapons, which had been sold to the Tajik security forces were used in the neutralization of two local leaders. Ibid. China's interest in the Wakhan Corridor is not about weapons sale; it is in China's very own interest that the region be secure. Having a very important role as a regional actor and the power of persuading other regional actors to engage more effectively, China wishes to secure the area as it could jeopardize the large amount it invested in CPEC as well as the eventual perspective of adding Afghanistan to its BRI network.

There are many advantages to developing infrastructure through the Wakhan corridor. The infrastructure would be nothing less than life changing to the local population who is living in absolute isolation and would provide them access to other markets and cities to sell their products and eventually have a larger variety of production. In addition to short-term economic benefits, the access to education and alternative sources of income would create long-term economic benefits for the communities in the area. Locals could enjoy reliable sources of employment and rejuvenate their historical ties to the Ancient Silk Road. The people would no longer be geographically isolated as they have been from other civilizations for centuries, which has resulted in underdevelopment and chronic economic insecurity. In fact, the literacy rate in Wakhan district hardly reaches 5 percent and the population mostly lives of livestock husbandry and agriculture. Hassnain, J. Wakhan Corridor and CPEC. // The Nation. 26 February 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://nation.com.pk/26-Feb-2018/wakhan-corridor-and-cpec . (Date of access: 02.04.2019)

On the larger economic scale, the linking of the Wakhan corridor to the Karakorum Highway would provide the shortest route for China to reach BRI in Afghanistan and give Afghans access to the Chinese market. The north-south expansion of the corridor would equally provide landlocked Tajikistan access to Pakistan's ports and in return provide Pakistan access to resource-rich Central Asian republics by shortcutting through Afghanistan. In other words, it might be very pricy for infrastructure to be built in the Wakhan corridor- simply due to its geographical complexity- but on the long run, it would be the least costly trade route between China, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan compared to all other alternatives. Thus, for China and Pakistan who enjoy the benefits of CPEC, it is an interesting perspective to extend and include Afghanistan and Tajikistan. If the Wakhan route in the Little Pamir were connected to CPEC, trade would undeniably boost the regional economy and change the entire region.

3. Security issues; the main challenge for the socio-economic development of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is struggling with a number of serious security issues that prevent the country from developing economically. Construction has been put on a hold in many areas as construction sites have been victim of terrorist attacks. Infrastructure is not rentable if projects are interrupted, not safe enough to be used at their fullest capacity for trade or are used for illicit economic activities by terrorist groups.

3.1 General characteristics of the situation in Afghanistan

Political parties have not especially developed in post-Taliban Afghanistan. During the Soviet presence an the civil war of 1992-1996, many Mujahideen parties were based on ethnicity and loyalty to major ethnic commanders, supported by outside powers. This is a factor that has contributed to the popular aversion to formal political parties. Katzman, K. // Congressional Research Service. Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance. 12 January 2015. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf . (Date of access: 09.05.2019) Since 2009, the formation of parties has somehow strengthened but it is to early to say that these are the main organization of the institute for political activity. Ibid.

When it comes to Afghanistan's modernization, the year 2014 occupies a special place in it, because of two major reasons. Firstly, the external factor which was Obama's decision to withdraw the main contingent of American troops. Secondly, the internal factor, which was the holding of the new presidential election without causing any internal instability or armed opposition. Additional uncertainty was caused by an economic crisis making the country dependent on foreign aid and foreign donor assistance, but also causing the Afghan drug production to increase to a point where it went beyond the control of authorities and became a core part of Afghan economy. Конаровский М.А. Афганистан после 2014 года. // International Organizations Research Journal, vol. 12 pp. 242-253 [Electronic resource] URL: https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2017/11/01/1158673052/М.А.%20Конаровский.pdf . (Date of access: 12.02.2019)

The 2014 presidential elections were extensive and painful. After a delay from spring to autumn, the elections continued to split the ruling elite, which, even in the eve of a sharp decline in foreign military presence was unable to take steps towards a real, and not merely formal, unification. Personal ambitions of the main contenders for the future leadership implicated in inter-ethnic and inter-regional contradictions. It essentially created a dead end in the identification of the election winner. After none of the candidates managed to win more than 50% of the vote in the first round of election, A. Ghani and A. Abdullah became the two front runners of the first round. They contested each other in a run-off election, held on the 14th of June 2014. Dudgeon, I. Afghanistan's Presidential Elections: Ghani or Abdullah? // Australian Institute of International Affairs. 11 August 2014. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/afghanistans-presidential-elections-ghani-or-abdullah/ . (Date of access: 27.12.2018) After a lot of “backstage politics” and Washington's unavoidable involvement, A. Ghani became the new head of the country as an overwhelming favorite in the elections. Allegations of electoral fraud resulted in a dead end, threats of violence and the formation of a parallel government by the opponent camp, A. Abdullah.

During his inaugural speech, A. Ghani's pronounced the benchmarks for his domestic and foreign policy. The priorities are to solve security problems and ensure effectiveness of defense and security structures as well. The fight against terrorism and drug production figure high above the list as well as the wish to see an increase in human rights. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) // NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative, 26 October 2011. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/south-asian-association-regional-cooperation-saarc/ . (Date of access: 02.02.2019) There is a will to establish negotiations with the Taliban and the goal to reset economy by creating a gradual transition from foreign financial aid and economic assistance to self-reliance. As long as there is no security, the economy cannot prosper to its fullest potential, as foreign investors will remain hesitant. Central and South Asian countries have shown to be prepared to cooperate with Afghanistan on security issues and economic growth as the pacification of the country is not only a guarantee for their investments, but of common interest. Surrounding Central-Asian countries such as Tajikistan and South-Asian Pakistan wish to pacify the region, overcome their isolation and serve as transitioning countries and enjoy all the benefits that this status carries with it.

A. Ghani correctly set counterterrorism and counternarcotic high on the priority list of internal affairs. Terrorism is part of the daily life in Afghanistan as multiple threats are issued daily. There are frequent and widespread lethal attacks against ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] Government of the United Kingdom// Foreign Travel Advice: Afghanistan. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/afghanistan/terrorism (Date of access: 01.01.2019) by terrorists and insurgents. Domestic and international political and civilian targets include those working in the humanitarian and construction fields. Eastern Afghanistan has been especially tense for some time; shootings, suicide bombings, roadside bomb attacks as well as rocket attacks have almost been reported daily. The region bordering Pakistan is considered extremely dangerous. As hiking and trekking in the Wakhan Corridor has become a popular destination for the most adventurous travelers, it is strongly advised to travel within the Wakhan Corridor or Badakhstan, and to avoid travelling in Afghanistan altogether unless necessary. Any airport or infrastructure leading to the airport, every consulate or hotel is considered a zone of risk. Attacks such as shootings, bombings and suicide attacks have been led against foreign diplomats and kidnappings of tourists and journalists have been frequent. The Afghan people themselves are suffering the most; random suicide attacks such as on a wedding hall on the 20^th of November 2018 in Kabul and frequent random detonation of cars in the street caused many victims. Islamist militants do not shy from attacking places of worship as could be seen on the 20^th of October 2017 in Kabul's Imam Zamum mosque, where approximately fifty Shia worshippers were killed. Freedom of speech was shown not to be taken for granted when, on the 28^th of December 2017 two explosion targeting the Afghan Voice News agency took place in the Tabyan Social Center. Ibid.

Terrorism and drug trafficking are a closely related problem. In fact, for the Taliban the drug trade makes up to 60 percent of their income, according to Afghan and Western officials. Mashal, M. Afghan Taliban Awash in Heroin Cash, a Troubling Turn for War //The New York Times. 29 October 2017.[Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/asia/opium-heroin-afghanistan-taliban.html . (Date of access: 24.03.2019) The Taliban aggressively seized territory from the Afghan government, especially in opium-producing regions. By taxing and providing security for producers and smugglers, the Taliban have been profiting for a long time from the opium trade. In fact, the Taliban are involved so deeply in every level and stage of the drug business that they have become rivals to Afghan cartels and practically undistinguishable. Mashal, M. Afghan Taliban Awash in Heroin Cash, a Troubling Turn for War //The New York Times. 29 October 2017. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/asia/opium-heroin-afghanistan-taliban.html . (Date of access: 24.03.2019) The drug war is the burden of many police forces but it must not be overlooked that these are often complicit in the opium trade themselves trade themselves, feeding corrupt networks within the Afghan government, both locally and nationally. Ibid.

Afghanistan's struggle with counterterrorism and counternarcotic have not only had an important negative impact on the country, but on the entire region. In fact, Afghan cross-border drug trafficking is another threat that concerns especially China, considering its accountability of roughly 80 percent of the global opium production. Consequently, the Central Asian states contain major transit routes for narcotics. Afghanistan continues to be the world's largest cultivator of opium poppy and the world's largest producer of opium. In 2017, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 ha, an increase of 63 percent (127,000 ha) compared with the previous year. Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017 (Vienna, 2017), p. 5.

Afghan opium production appears to have surged since 2016, partly due to the use of a new genetically modified poppy seed originating in China, where some opium is farmed legally for pharmaceutical purposes (China is one of the world's largest opiate consumers). Opium poppy cultivation has a long history in Afghanistan of being used as a coping strategy in response to the extremely low wages, unemployment and absence of agricultural assistance and basic services such as health care. Indeed, as medical services are scarce, many use opium as a pain killer and pain relief. The level of financial insecurity Afghan people face reflect the Afghan Government's challenges in exercising its authority across the country. Hence, the cultivation of opium has become for many Afghans the only option to support their livelihood. That or sending a family member abroad have become the main solutions people have found to survive. Although there is a variety of reasons why one would choose to cultivate poppies, economic security is definitely the main one. The dependence of Afghan farming households on poppy cultivation for economic benefits is not enormous; the cultivation of the poppy is quite costly which reduces the cultivators profit but it only goes to show how little access these cultivators have to other markets or off-farm employment.

Opium trafficking goes mainly through Afghanistan's northern routes (such as Mazar-e-Sharif) and south at the border to Iran and Northwestern border to Pakistan. Ministry of Counter Narcotics (MCN) and UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017 (Vienna, 2017) Practically all of it is trafficked on mainland by truck, vehicle or train. Naturally, opium trafficking does not mean the trafficking is restricted to only opium, in fact, heroin, cannabis, synthetic drugs and weapons are often to be found with it. The lack of security and control in northern Afghanistan has most definitely facilitated the trafficking of such commodities but the concealment and trafficking of illicit commodities has become increasingly professional. The biggest reported amounts of heroin found in vehicles or on human couriers has been reported to be the northern route of Afghanistan, bordering to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In 2014-2015, the Russian Federation reported an increase in opiate trafficking and expressed its concern that due to the online market it might continue expanding. Ibid.

The movement of funds within the opiate trafficking industry is an interesting occurrence. It can be done in three different ways combined: through bank or money transfers by using opiates to barter for goods (for example cars) and through informal money transfer systems such as hawala Ibid.. Within the countries that are situated along the northern route of Afghanistan, profits through such illicit trade is often laundered through real estate investments, front companies and licit businesses and illicit profits from drug trafficking enter the international banking system via countries well outside of the northern route.

The increasing development of infrastructure and transport facilitations, not only along the northern route but throughout Afghanistan connecting West and Central Asian countries on land, air and water demand our attention on the drug trafficking issue as this might hinder the further development of infrastructure or could cause misuse of the transport corridors. The level of opium cultivation is at record level and it calls for action and renewed commitment on a regional level and in an inclusive manner with Afghanistan in the center. There is furthermore a need for baseline data to identify to which extend the opiate use has grown and its patterns across Central Asia but also the Russian Federation. So far, its size has only been estimated roughly, which makes it very hard to seize its actual size and impact and the actual needed solutions. The current data gap also prevents from having a clear overview of the social, economic and health impact the opiate industry has on the region it affects.

According to the UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime], regional efforts should be coordinated and in this effort, the key role of the CARICC [Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center] needs to be further strengthened so that its technical capacity leads to operational results. UNODC believes CARICC has the capacity of assisting Member States in addressing the various issues related to transnational crime such as drug trafficking itself, money laundering and other illicit activities. Considering the opiate trafficking originates from Afghanistan, UNODC advices CARICC to further develop cooperation with Afghanistan connecting it with the Joint Planning Cell of the Triangular Initiative between Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. Similarly, considering the importance of Afghanistan's northeastern infrastructure and the important amount of opiate trafficking that goes through this region, it is imperative to Afghanistan to boost cooperation with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan far beyond the exchange of intelligence, joint operations and drug liaisons officers. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Afghan Opiate Trafficking along the Northern Route. 21 June 2018. [Electronic source]. URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/NR_Report_21.06.18_low.pdf . (Date of access: 19.02.2019)

Afghanistan's neighboring countries are suffering of it. Kazakhstan, over the period of 2011-2015 accounted for 26 percent of all the opiate seizures in Central Asia and the quantity of opiates seized was equivalent in heroin, which were largely reported in areas close to Kyrgyzstan as well as areas in the bordering area to the Russian Federation. Kyrgyzstan itself accounted for 17 percent of all the opiate seizures in Central Asia over the same period and had the fourth largest proportion of all opiate seizures in the Central Asian region. As for Tajikistan, statistics were very worrying as the country accounted for 34 percent off the totality of opiate seizures in the region over the same period. Tajikistan saw an immense increase in opiate seizures (particularly of heroin) up to 2003, which decreased following the withdrawal of Russian border control troops in 2005. The decreasing trend continued until 2011 and went back to increasing. Ibid

For Turkmenistan however, there is a different story. The trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan via Turkmenistan to other Central Asian countries and to the Russian Federation is currently very limited. In 2015, Turkmenistan was the only country in Central Asia who wasn't reported by the Russian Federation amongst the key transit countries for opiate trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia. Ibid. However, only a decade earlier, it had been mentioned as one of the key countries. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan is very likely to become vulnerable to attempts by drug traffickers to smuggle Afghan opiates across its border for onward trafficking to other countries such as Uzbekistan where heroin is already seized close to the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border as well as via the Caspian Sea to the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan for onward trafficking to Georgia and across the Black Sea to Europe. Heroin seizures in the Afghan provinces bordering Turkmenistan suggest that cross-border trafficking between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan may go undetected.

In order to avoid the drug trafficking to jeopardize infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, regional cooperation will be of great importance as this issue originating from Afghanistan goes transnationally and must be tackled at the core through cooperation. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia will have to cooperate on high levels so that the infrastructure they invested in does not become the means of illicit activities.

3.2 China's interest in Afghanistan

After ISIS [Islamic State] ISIS - Islamic State (ИГИЛ - Запрещенная в Российской Федерации организая). established its Khorasan Province offshoot in Afghanistan, Beijing's position towards Afghanistan's security issues significantly changed. The presence of ISIS in Afghanistan has initiated important changes in the Chinese policy. Though terrorist groups have long indirectly threatened Chinese nationals living in Pakistan and other countries, Chinese leaders were shocked when ISIS issued its first direct threat against China in February 2018. Stanzel, A. Fear and Loathing on the New Silk Road: Chinese security in Afghanistan and beyond // European Council on Foreign Relations. 12 July 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/new_silk_road_chinese_security_in_afghanistan_beyond . (Date of access: 13.03.2019) This announcement went through a video in which Chinese Uighurs pledged to return home to carry out attacks. To Beijing, ISIS is much more of a threat than the Taliban to whom they have more frequently referred to as a rebel group rather than a terrorist group. China fears that ISIS has gained territory in Badakhstan province. It is believed the group recruits new ETIM supporters to assemble there. To China, these developments are directly linked with the late 90's events when the Uighur separatist movement in Xinjiang was supported by the then Islamist Afghan government.

The Uighurs, referred to as Weiwu'er in China are one of the oldest Turkic speaking ethnicity in interior Asia. The majority live in the Uygur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang but they can equally be found in small number in Central Asia in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan since the early 21st century. Augustyn, A.// Uighur. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Edited in 2019. [Electronic source]. URL: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Uighur .(Date of access: 09.03.2019) The Uighurs are one of the older are mentioned in Chinese records from the 3rd century CE. In the 1950s, large numbers of Han (ethnic Chinese) move into Xinjiang after the autonomous region's establishment. By the early 20^th century, the Han constituted 40 percent of Xinjiang's population. Ibid. Economic disparities and ethnic tensions accentuated between the Uighur and Han population and inevitably led to protests and violence such as suicide bombings and knife attacks.

China took no interest in what was happening in the western mountainous regions for quite a while, in fact, until the formation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. With it appeared the fight for regional leadership. China started investing in Afghanistan by supporting the Mujahedeen who were battling the communist Afghan government and Soviet presence (1979) by supplying weapons through the Wakhan Corridor.Malik, Y. Geo-political Significance of the Wakhan Corridor for China. //Research Gate. June 2014. [Electronic source]. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/271911374_Geopolitical_Significance_of_the_Wakhan_Corridor_for_China . (Date of access: 10.03.2019) By 1990, Beijing had established contact with the Taliban commander and leader, Mullah Omar, in the hope to persuade him of banning Uighur militants from crossing the Chinese border. Though Mullah Omar was willing to cooperate, those old guarantees were no longer valid after his death in 2013. Ibid. Omar's successor, Akhtar Mansur, could not keep the Uighurs under control. Haybatullah Akhundzada, who took his position after his death in 2016, once again managed to establish control over most of the Taliban detachments. The Chinese are at the ready: Beijing needs good relations with the Taliban, primarily to ensure the security of commercial projects. Куприянов А.В. Китаестан: Зачем КНР военная база в афганском Бадахшане. // Известия. 21 января 2018. [Electronic source]. URL: https://iz.ru/697205/aleksei-kupriianov/kitaestan . (Date of access: 24. 03.2019)

By early January 2019 it was clear what had been agreed upon as General Davlat Vaziri, the representative of the Ministry of Defense of Afghanistan, declared the appearance of a new military base in Badakshtan for which China provides just about anything, which left many question marks. Куприянов А. Китаестан. Зачем КНР военная база в афганском Бадахшане / Известия, 21.08. 2018. [Electronic Resource] URL: https://iz.ru/697205/aleksei-kupriianov/kitaestan (Date of access: 15.02.2019) Whilst Kabul is mostly concerned about the Taliban, China considers it a question of border security as Badakhshan is known to have ISIS militants. Some of them are Pashtuns and another part is Uighurs, including those who fight for ISIS in Syria and Iraq. If ISIS settles in Badakhshan near China's Xinjiang province where a powerful separatist movement of Islamic character is happening, it will be able to transfer trained militants along the Wakhan corridor to Xinjiang. Though Beijing has good reasons behind its concern, it is not all about border security.

Beijing is not exclusively preoccupied by terrorist violence directly entering Xinjiang. In fact, it is just as concerned about terrorism gaining foothold in Pakistan as this could consequently endanger CPEC [China-Pakistan Economic Corridor], the flagship of Beijing's BRI project in Pakistan and Central Asia. This concern has been fed by the numerous and increasing terrorist attacks in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India of which ISIS claimed responsibility for. In addition, an estimated 2,000-4,000 people from Central Asian countries have joined ISIS, aiding the network's efforts to commit terrorist attacks across the globe. Stanzel, A. Fear and Loathing on the New Silk Road: Chinese security in Afghanistan and beyond // European Council on Foreign Relations. 12 July 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/new_silk_road_chinese_security_in_afghanistan_beyond . (Date of access: 13.03.2019) For instance, an ethnic Uzbek carried out a truck attack in New York in the group's name in October 2017. An assault on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan's capital, in August 2016 reminded China of militants' reach in Central Asia. The attackers were allegedly Uighurs with ties to fighters in Syria. Stanzel, A. Fear and Loathing on the New Silk Road: Chinese security in Afghanistan and beyond // European Council on Foreign Relations. 12 July 2018. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/new_silk_road_chinese_security_in_afghanistan_beyond . (Date of access: 13.03.2019)

Therefore, China's interest in Afghanistan's security issues are related to the fear of growing terrorism both inland as on a regional level, as China is trying to assure its position as a regional economic leader by engaging into transnational infrastructural projects. Terrorism and the security issues deriving from it could jeopardize Beijing's large investments and the future of CPEC and BRI. Though the Uighurs have been a reason of concern to Beijing, it is less likely of being the main concern as China has its national security very much at hand. By negotiating with the Taliban, Beijing is still hoping to contain Uighur insurgents, but most of all finding a common ground of understanding with the Taliban to ensure the safety of its economic projects.

3.3 Russia, the U.S. and the Afghan agenda

While over the past decades Afghanistan received a lot of aid from the United States, one is to expect a decrease in U.S. aid not only in Afghanistan but also on a regional level. With D. Trump's arrival in office, Washington has taken a more isolating position, a position of economic nationalism wishing to prioritize national economy over foreign investments and aid abroad. The American operations in Afghanistan are bound to be associated to Barack Obama and his first secretary of state Hillary Clinton's project Af-Pak (Afghanistan-Pakistan). She was Obama's first secretary of state when he said that Republicans (George W. Bush) shifted their attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, and called it a big mistake, because “terrorism must be defeated in Afghanistan.” All efforts were then redirected to this issue. If reducing aid to Afghanistan or Central Asia leads to some type of crisis, the origin of this issue is more likely to come from Obama and Clinton. Though Trump has not made any clear statement of reducing aid in Afghanistan or Central Asia, he has made clear he is reducing aid abroad overall and this will undoubtedly include Afghanistan and its region. According to A. Kazantsev, the reducing of American aid in Afghanistan could lead to small invasions in Central Asia. He does not mean the Taliban, who he considers will most likely continue to have their policy over Afghanistan, but rather of various international groups of terrorists who is estimated 5000 are already established in the country. A. Kazantsev mentions many of these groups originate from post-soviet countries in Central Asia, and also Russia and China and are often associated to Al-Qaeda or ISIS.Казанцев А.А., Гусев Л.Ю. Продвижение «мягкой силы» России в Центральной Азии как инструмент развития евразийской экономической интеграции. // Управленческое консультирование. № 11. 2015. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://www.acjournal.ru/jour/article/view/219 . (Date of access: 11.03.2019) For Russia, with the immigration labor crisis and massive immigration from Central Asia, namely Tajikistan, this causes extra worries.

Russia is traditionally responsible for the security in Central Asia within the framework of CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization]. Even though this does nog guarantee full cooperation, as we can notice by the diplomatic difficulties Russia has with a rather isolated Turkmenistan. As for a cooperation with the United States, especially abroad and in Central Asia, it is not to be expected. Though Russia enjoys a certain jubilation in its relation with the U.S. following Trump's election, relations are not without any confrontation and Trump, being especially economy oriented is not interested in rewriting relations with Russia.

According to A. Kazantsev, Saudi Arabia and Qatar play a tremendous role in the threats in Central Asia connected to the Taliban victory. Indeed, he claims Saudi Arabia and Qatar have a desire to extend Middle East conflicts to Central Asia and Afghanistan in order to hinder both Iran and Russia, which is confirmed by the huge inflow of funds to ISIS and Al-Qaeda from certain directions. Ibid.

Though Trump's election was rejoiced in both China and Russia, it is not clear what the terms of the principal agreements with the U.S. will be in the post-soviet space. Therefore, it remains quite hard to predict what role the U.S. will have in Central Asia.

In 2012, I. Safranchuk suggested in number of his allegations that Russian-Afghan politics have not lost their relevance or actuality. He made a number of recommendations relating to the Afghan vector of Russian politics, which remain relevant and have adjusted themselves to the recent growth of Beijing's interest in this region. The expert for example mentions that friendly relations and contacts should be kept not only with the central government in Kabul, but also with the local Afghan authorities. This is advisable to maximize access to different segments of Afghan society.

I. Safranchuk emphasizes Russia will need cooperation programs, especially in the sphere of socio-economics as Russia will not be able to come close to the sums of money that the US, the EU and Japan provide to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, these large funds often seem to go in projects with minimal practical impact, according to the expert. Russia, on the contrary, is capable of achieving a positive attitude and response on the part of the Afghan government and society if it successfully implements practical, useful projects in the socio-economic and humanitarian spheres, and this even at the cost of considerably smaller resources.

As stated earlier, it is rather unlikely to see any cooperation between the U.S. and Russia in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, on the 14^th of May 2019, a meeting between President Vladimir Putin and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took place. РИА Новости. Путин на встрече с Помпео отметил, что афганское урегулирование идет сложно. 14 мая 2019. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://ria.ru/20190514/1553492829.html . (Date of access: 14.05.2019) V. Putin stated that the issue of resolving the situation in Afghanistan is challenging and that there is a need for progress and a need to interact more actively. Yuri Ushakov, V. Putin's presidential aide, assured the President is very well aware of the Taliban's strengthening position and the difficulties around the process of stabilization. Regardless of this statement, it is impossible to make any predictions. Though this statement does not confirm anything, it does show that an eventual cooperation between the U.S. and Russia could be possible, the only question remains when as Afghanistan's situation requires immediate interference.

Therefore, there is a flagrant necessity to develop a regional dialogue on the Afghan issue with Central Asian countries, Pakistan, China, India and Iran. I. Safranchuk stresses that all these powers have their own interests in Afghanistan and that they pursue an independent policy on their implementation there with their own set of tools. Сафранчук И.А. Россия в глобальной политике. Афганистан в поисках баланса // Россия в глобальной политике. 05 сентября 2012. [Electronic resource]. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/number/Afganistan-v-poiskakh-balansa-15648 . (Date of access: 27.04.2019).

A special conference on Afghanistan was held in Moscow in 2009 under the auspices of the SCO [Shanghai Cooperation Organization]. It seemed that this platform could become the basis for a regional dialogue on Afghanistan, but since 2010, the format “Istanbul Process - Heart of Asia”, the “Heart of Asia” conference has become the main platform for regional dialogue on Afghanistan.

The conference is held annually and gathers Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates. It is supported by Egypt, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the US and the United Nations, NATO, the SCO and CAARS. Президент Афганистана провёл переговоры с главой китайского МИД // Afganistan.ru 10.12.2015/ [Electric resource]. URL: http://afghanistan.ru/doc/92573.html (Date of acces: 13.05.2019)

Such a meeting was held in Islamabad, 2015. President of Afghanistan, A. Ghani and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Wan I (said: Wang Yi) were present. Wang Yi offered on behalf of China assistance in the development of infrastructure and communication services as well as in the training of professional personnel. The minister also welcomed the desire of Afghanistan to join the BRI initiative and to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In 2016, the “Heart of Asia” conference was held in Amritsar in India, at which the Indian Prime Minister N. Modi announced joint plans with Afghanistan to create a direct transit aviation corridor. He furthermore states Afghanistan should be at the center of regional relations, not on the periphery and that Afghanistan has potential for becoming the largest trade and transit center between South Asian and Central Asian countries. I. Safranchuk refers to this figure of speech as “bride enticement”. A year later, in 2017, the conference was held in Baku within the framework of “Istanbul Process- Heart of Asia”.

M. Omelicheva expresses some critics regarding the effectiveness of the SCO and CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] in general, and on the Afghan case in particular. As an expert, she pays attention to events such as the following: In 2016, high officials of the CSTO countries held a gathering in Yerevan to discuss regional cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism. Омеличева М. Провалы в политике ШОС и ОДКБ // Россия в глобальной политике. 28.11.2017 https://globalaffairs.ru/PONARS-Eurasia/Provaly-v-politike-ODKB-i-ShOS-19167 (Date of access: 03.04.2019) Simultaneously, an anniversary SCO summit took place in Tashkent, at which the leaders of the participating states reiterated their commitment to closer cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The CSTO joint statement also mentioned its concerns on the growing influence of the Taliban and ISIS in Afghanistan. However, M. Omelicheva points out that the close intertwining of the problems of terrorism, armed anti-government activity and organized crime in the CSTO and SCO areas of responsibility was completely overlooked. The reasons for this extremely important link to be ignored are the very same reasons that have undermined the effectiveness of collective response measures to security problems in the concerned region and this, for too long. First, each CSTO and SCO member state has its own interest, which do not always coincide or complement the interest of partners. At the same time, both organizations lack serious potential to respond to the new security challenges that have arisen. The leadership of the participating countries often treats security cooperation only as a tool of national and international self-affirmation and are therefore primarily interested in projects that promote their own specific interests. Consequently, they are distracting attention from internal sources of problem that regard regional security and it is such an approach that hinders the development of effective measures and undertakings against terrorism and crime. It equally exacerbates the deformations in the political and security sphere.

The fact that terrorism and crime are so closely intertwined is no secret to CSTO and SCO. Both organizations have over the past few years adopted a number of declarations that recognize the futility of attempts to defeat terrorism without eliminating its sources of funding which goes through illicit activities. Indeed, the leadership of CSTO and SCO understands very well that the drug trade is one of the major sponsors for militants and terrorists but directs all of its attention only at the operational aspect of this bundle whilst ignoring many other aspects. Some efforts looked promising but resulted to be based on false premises in reality. In 2016, for example, the CSTO troops worked out a scenario for the invasion of militants from Afghanistan to Tajikistan as it was assumed that hundreds or even thousands of ISIL and Taliban militants as well as other Islamist groups trained in the northern provinces of Afghanistan were preparing for terrorist attacks and sabotage. In reality, these militants have no particular motive for such an invasion and in particular, the Taliban who have no tactical, ideological or strategic interest in invading the post-Soviet region. Taking control of the northern routes of drug trafficking is a profitable a nd feasible projects for militants of any group. Simultaneously, the Afghan province of Badakhstan is one of the strongholds of the anti-government forces. The shortest route for drug trafficking in the direction of Russian and Europe through Central Asia runs through this area which has over time turned into a kind of financial center for militants, where in recent years heroin production has dramatically increased as well as revenues from drug trafficking. This would be the more reasonable explanation for militants increasing their activities in the northern area of Afghanistan. Омеличева М. Провалы в политике ШОС и ОДКБ // Россия в глобальной политике. 28.11.2017 https://globalaffairs.ru/PONARS-Eurasia/Provaly-v-politike-ODKB-i-ShOS-19167 (Date of access: 03.04.2019) .

Conclusion

South-Asian and Central-Asian infrastructural projects in Afghanistan are about much more than improving Afghan infrastructure. Afghanistan has its fair share of benefits and gains from these projects. Nonetheless, this mostly depends of internal factors and Afghanistan's efforts on coping with its own security issues such as corruption, terrorism, narco-trafficking and other issues that have been discussed in this research. The way Afghanistan will develop, will unavoidably have a large impact on the regional political climate and eventually exercise an important influence on matters such as the Pakistan-India conflict, Uzbekistan's ambitions on becoming a regional leader, Turkmenistan's political and economic isolation, the Middle East's access to the European market, China's BRI, CPEC and altogether relations with Pakistan as well as Russia and the U.S.s role in Afghanistan and Central Asia. If Afghanistan does not wish to leave its future in the hand of foreign powers such as has been the case in the past, but neither wishes to close its doors to opportunities that could help the war-thorn country back on its feet, then it should be prepared to tackle its security issues effectively.

The current Afghan government should make security its priority so that ongoing investments are not lost. With such an exceptional richness in resources, the only thing holding foreign investors from investing in the region is the flagrant lack of security. Once Afghanistan becomes a safe territory for investments, there is no doubt the opportunities and economic growth will be abundant. To make the gains as beneficial as possible for Afghanistan itself, the economy should remain diversified. That is, not strictly related to, for instance, Beijing's BRI or any other project or source of investment. It is very important that Afghanistan further stimulate trading with Central Asian countries and other South Asian countries to avoid unilaterality with China or India and encourage further regional economic development, interdependence and regional peace.

Neoliberalism in international relations has been an adequate guideline and effective foundation for this research. As this research has proven, the security issues and current economic state of Afghanistan do not only concern the Afghan government; its consequences are of regional scale. Therefore, regional actors and even extra-regional actors have openly demonstrated their wish to improve infrastructure in Afghanistan in the hope to encourage transnational and regional trade and interconnectivity. Nonetheless, it is understood that each state has its own interest and works towards its own needs. Therefore, Afghanistan's future still very much depends on its own actions, how and until what measure it will accept foreign aid.